12 Aug 10
2 edits
Originally posted by Lord SharkThat's a good question. I think that my version of a Frankfurt-type examples sidesteps this particular criticism. I don't think, however, that FEs, in general, can avoid all variations of this criticism; since the criticism can go just as 'deep' as the example. As is often the case in philosophy, the trick is figuring out just where you want to beg the question.
Yes this seems better than my attempt because it gives some detail of the deliberation process and hence how the chip might work in principle without assuming that the deliberation process is deterministic.
I had argued as follows, suppose the chip is activated when the brain state of S is sufficiently close to a correlate of the decision not to shoot, riticism more neatly as I do, or do you think the criticism is flawed on other grounds anyway?
FEs show that PAP is false; or at least they pump our intuitions to that effect. So, the incompatibilist opts for PAPD. Here I provide an FE at the level of weighing reasons, and it seems one is still responsible, despite the presence of the chip that would ensure reasons get weighed in some particular way. The incompatibilist could argue that either the weighing of reasons is reason-responsive or it is not. If it is, then a deeper incompatibilist principle is suggested (The Principle of Alternative Possible Assessments of the Weight of Reasons?). If not; if the weighing of reasons is just automatic, caused by nature, deep-self, or something similarly outside our direct control, then agent-causation will find no purchase there by definition and the question is begged.
But I don't think begging the question at the level of character, or deep-self, or whatever plausibly person-constituting constellation of states and dispositions is problematic. What is the indeterminist to say? We're not free unless we can exercise agent-causation at the level of what makes us who we are? As though we either can or need the ability to self-create in order to assessed or held responsible for our judgments and actions?
What do you think?
12 Aug 10
2 edits
Originally posted by Andrew HamiltonGod NEVER relinquishes his power, he shares it. Having said that, at no point will the power he "shares" threaten him. At least, it will not threaten his soveriegnty and ultimate power over his creation even though it threatens those that he loves including his own Son.
I find that an interesting question.
Perhaps another interesting question is WHY a “God” that was an all knowing all powerful “God” would then want to choose to diminish his own power by making himself no longer be all knowing?
It does strike me as an odd thing to want to do, like you choosing to deliberately give yourself brain damage in order that you are no longer so clever.
As for why God did it that way, I would think that free will affords God the ability to take interest in his creation. Otherwise it would be like playing tic tac toe with yourself. Just imagine how boring and unfulfilling your life would be if you had absolute power over the will of those that you create. They would end up being nothing more than another apendage.
12 Aug 10
Originally posted by LemonJelloFrom our own vantage point these seem to be the only options. However, that is not to say that there are not others we have not yet contemplated or are able to comprehend. Make no mistake, free will is a mystery of sorts and probably always will be.
If God were to not know a knowable outcome, you could not say that God is all-knowing in the sense of knowing all there is to know. But presumably you could still say He is "all-knowing" in the sense that He has the capacity for knowing all there is to know, even if this capacity is for whatever reason not being fully exercised (in this case, I guess, by ...[text shortened]... So, if you're okay with this concession, then yes I think this another way you could respond.
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12 Aug 10
Originally posted by bbarrThanks for helping me think through this, I agree with what you have said here.
That's a good question. I think that my version of a Frankfurt-type examples sidesteps this particular criticism. I don't think, however, that FEs, in general, can avoid all variations of this criticism; since the criticism can go just as 'deep' as the example. As is often the case in philosophy, the trick is figuring out just where you want to beg the ques ...[text shortened]... order to assessed or held responsible for our judgments and actions?
What do you think?
I think even if compatibilists can't defeat an nth level PAPD, the incompatibilist is left with the problem of how the indeterminacy they want to introduce, at whatever level, enhances our freedom. All this indeterminacy does is prevent certain determinist consequences going through, but I have yet to see a plausible positive account of how it would give us something worth wanting as opposed to noise in the system.
I hold that something like moderately reason-responsive agents, with suitable conditions for ownership of their evaluation mechanisms, are enough for moral discourse even if we have rejected incompatibilist concepts of moral responsibility or desert. I also think Strawson had a point about reactive attitudes, but that's another story.
12 Aug 10
Originally posted by whodey“…God NEVER relinquishes his power…”
God NEVER relinquishes his power, he shares it. Having said that, at no point will the power he "shares" threaten him. At least, it will not threaten his soveriegnty and ultimate power over his creation even though it threatens those that he loves including his own Son.
As for why God did it that way, I would think that free will affords God the ability ...[text shortened]... he will of those that you create. They would end up being nothing more than another apendage.
But by giving us “free-will” “he” would be reducing his power –specifically, the power to know what you are about to choose to do next –right? I mean, it would mean that “God” has made himself NOT all-knowing.
12 Aug 10
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkThe indeterminacy they want to introduce, at whatever level, has to do two things that are in tension. On the one hand, such indeterminacy must avoid characterization as metaphysically random (i.e., not having causally sufficient antecedents), lest the resultant 'action' be merely movement. Or, if the indeterminacy is deeper, not properly attributable to us (just "noise in the system" ). On the other hand, such indeterminacy has to be somehow related to whatever it is that makes us who we are in order to fulfill the ownership condition and undergird normative evaluation. But plausible accounts of personal constitution/identity invoke states, capacities and dispositions that are part of the causal order. To the extent that the will is removed from the causal order, it becomes unhinged from who we are.
Thanks for helping me think through this, I agree with what you have said here.
I think even if compatibilists can't defeat an nth level PAPD, the incompatibilist is left with the problem of how the indeterminacy they want to introduce, at whatever level, enhances our freedom. All this indeterminacy does is prevent certain determinist consequences going ...[text shortened]... desert. I also think Strawson had a point about reactive attitudes, but that's another story.
12 Aug 10
Originally posted by whodeyWhat constitutes what we call ”free will” ( assuming it is really meaningful to vaguely talk about “free will” -I am not sure if it is ) could be a mystery but, if so, it is one that can be solved by science. It is the brain’s ability to consciously decide to do/think one thing rather than another thing. We still don’t yet fully understand how the brain “consciously decides” anything but that is just one more thing for science to discover.
From our own vantage point these seem to be the only options. However, that is not to say that there are not others we have not yet contemplated or are able to comprehend. Make no mistake, free will is a mystery of sorts and probably always will be.
21 Aug 10
Originally posted by Andrew HamiltonWe have free will because we have a human soul
What constitutes what we call ”free will” ( assuming it is really meaningful to vaguely talk about “free will” -I am not sure if it is ) could be a mystery but, if so, it is one that can be solved by science. It is the brain’s ability to consciously decide to do/think one thing rather than another thing. We still don’t yet fully understand how the brain “consciously decides” anything but that is just one more thing for science to discover.
