Originally posted by LemonJello[/b][/b]I would grant you that the zygote is a latent person.
[b]I'm not sure which one you mean
I meant I would grant you that the zygote is a latent person. This doesn't help your case at all because it follows tautologically that a latent person is not a person (at least, not yet). That is, the young fetus is not a person but merely a potential person. Potential persons don't have rights; and there is n ...[text shortened]... siderable and cannot be harmed in any way and the woman has a basic claim to self-autonomy.[/b]
That is not what I'm arguing for; I'm not saying that the zygote is a latent person. To the contrary, I content that the zygote is a person – but with latent sentience.
I think you fail to make proper distinction between "being a person" and "functioning as a person".
Functioning as a person refers to all the activities proper to persons; I would imagine that it includes reasoning, deciding, imagining, talking, experiencing love and beauty, remembering, intending (willing) and much more.
The term "function" does not refer here to the functioning of the physical body, but rather to those of the mind, though I'm sure certain functions of the body, especially those of the brain, are necessary conditions for functioning as a person.
Let’s take a person in a deep dreamless sleep. He is not conscious; he does not fulfill any of the above mentioned personhood criteria -- in fact, he is not functioning as a person; that is part of what being asleep means. But of course he is a person; he retains fully the status of being a person, and killing him while asleep is just as morally wrong as killing him while he is awake and functioning as a person.
When you claim that the 1st trimester fetus satisfies none of the criteria for personhood (whichever these may be), you are only showing that a fetus does not function as a person, not that it lacks the being of a person, which is the crucial thing.
At this point you may raise some objections: First the sleeping person will soon wake up and function as a person, while the being in the womb will not (at least for a little while longer).
In reply, neither the sleeping person nor the being in the womb now display the qualities of a functioning person. Both will display them. It is only a matter of time. Why should the one count as a real person because the time is short, while the other does not, simply because in their case the time is longer?
You may then argue that the sleeping person was already self-conscious, etc, etc, i.e. he had already qualified for personhood; he has a history of functioning as a person. The child in the womb has no such history. Thus you could argue that an organism cannot have a serious right to life (be a person) unless it either now possesses, or did possess as some time in the past, the necessary qualities required for functioning as a person. The human being sound asleep counts as a person, because he once functioned as a person, the child never did, so he/she does not count as a person.
True, there is a difference with respect to past functioning, but the difference is not morally relevant. The reason the fetus never functioned as a person is because their capacity to do so is not yet sufficiently developed. It simply cannot be, for he/she is near the beginning of their existence, in the first phase of their life.
Let’s consider the case of two children. One has a brain condition which prevents sufficient brain development. He will be born in a comatose condition (i.e. it has never functioned as a person) and he will remain so until the age of nine. The other is healthy at birth, but as soon as she functions as a person, she, too lapses into a coma, from which she will not emerge until she is nine. Can you seriously hold that the second child is a person with a right to life, while the first child is not? In one case, personhood will only be achieved in nine years, while in the other, it will return. In both cases the necessary requirements of personhood will grow and develop. Picture the two children lying side by side 8 years later. Would it not be absurd to say that only one of them is a person, that there is some essential morally relevant difference between them? If someone were about to kill them, consistent with the theory, one would have to say: "You may kill the first, for he is not a person. He is human only in the genetic sense, since he has no history of functioning as a person. You may not kill the second, since she does have such a history." If this distinction is absurd when applied to two born human beings, is it any less absurd when applied to two human beings, one born (asleep in bed), the other preborn (sleeping in the womb)?
In short, when it comes to functioning as a person, I content that there is no significant moral difference between "did, but does not" (the sleeping adult) and "does not, but will" (the fetus).
Keeping the distinction of “being a person” and "functioning as a person” in mind, let’s compare the following beings:
A) A normal adult, sound asleep, not conscious.
B) An adult in a coma from which he will emerge in, say, six months and function normally as a person.
C) A normal newborn baby.
D) A normal baby soon to be born.
E) A normal "well proportioned small scale baby" in the womb at seven weeks.
Case A, the normal adult sound asleep, is someone who has the being of a person, who is not functioning as a person, and who clearly has the capacity to function as a person. I will attempt to prove that all the other cases are essentially similar to this one. That is, if case A is a person -- a full-fledged member of the moral community, a being with a right to life, whose value lies in his own being and dignity, and not merely in his significance for others (like natural resources and works of art), a being whose willful destruction is murder -- each of the other cases is a person as well.
Your objection is that the being in the womb lacks the capacity to function as a person. True, it lacks what I'll define as the present immediate capacity to function, where responses may be immediately elicited. Capacity defined as the capability to function; where such capabilities vary enormously among people, and normally develop and grow as a result of learning and experience.
The capability of functioning as a person is grounded in the basic inherent capacity to function. This has a physical basic, typically in the form of the brain and the central nervous system. It is a capacity that grows and develops as the child grows and develops.
This basic inherent capacity may be fully accessible, as in a normal sleeping adult -- it then exists in its present immediate form. It may also exist in other forms where it is latent, as in a reversible coma. This form of latency defined as latency-1 capacity, where the basic inherent capacity is present, but temporarily damaged or blocked. In a small child, the basic inherent capacity is there, but insufficiently developed for the child to function in the manner of a normal adult – latency-2 capacity.
The beings in the list, differ only with respect to their present immediate capacity to function. They are all essentially similar with respect to their basic inherent capacity, and through this, their personhood.
In this, the adult in reversible a coma, B, is not essentially different from the sleeping person in case A. Person B) is in a deep, deep sleep, while person A is in a comparatively superficial sleep. B cannot be woken easily, while A can. B is in a long sleep, A is in a short sleep. Both have the basic inherent capacity: in A it is present immediately; in B it is latent-1. This is not a morally relevant difference. If the status of A and B is to be viewed in terms of capacity to function as a person, then surely a latent-1 capacity (the one that's temporarily blocked) qualifies as much as a non-latent capacity – A.
Lets take C, the newborn baby. He too has the physical properties to function as a person -- a brain, CNS, etc). The overall development, however, is insufficient for him to function as a normal adult. This is latency-2 capacity. There is an essential similarity between B and C. Neither of them has the present immediate capacity to function as a person. Both take longer than A to awake from their "non-functioning" sleep. Both however, have a latent capacity to function, because both have the basic inherent capacity to function. In B, the impossibility of eliciting a response (personhood functionality) is due to an abnormality, brought on by the coma. In C, this is due to the fact that the being is not yet far enough along in his process of development. In both cases the basic inherent capacity is there, it is merely latent.
C and D, babies just after and before birth, are clearly the same in terms of their capacity to function as persons. Birth is only the beginning of new opportunities to develop the basic inherent capacity to function by seeing, hearing, touching etc., a capacity that is equally present just before birth.
E, a baby at seven weeks, already has all the internal organs of the adult; and after the eighth week no further primordia will form; everything is already present that will be found in the full term baby. These organs and primordia constitute the physical base for the basic inherent capacity to function as a person. They are substantially present in E and D. Thus D and E are essentially similar with respect to their basic inherent capacity, and because of this, entitlement to personhood.
Essentially cases B through E are similar. If a person whose lack of present immediate capacity to function is due to a disorder (B) should be respected as a person, then surely a being whose lack of this capacity to function is due to insufficient development (C through E) should be respected as a person. Both are beings with the potential to function as a person; and this they can only have if they have the basis for it, that is, the being of a person. B represents a latent-1 capacity, C through E represent a latent-2 capacity; both are forms of the basic inherent capacity to function, proper to the nature of a person. If latent-1 capacity is a mark of a person, then surely latent-2 capacity is also a mark of a person. B through E represent beings who will have the capability to function as persons, who lack this capability at present due to the condition of the working basis of this capability (brain, CNS, etc.). In one, the condition is one of disorder or blockage, in the other, the lack of developmental proper to the age of the being in question.
We could also look at it this way: A through E is the same being: a being in the womb developed from 7 weeks to birth, then lapsing into a coma and then recovering. If there is a person at the end (A), there is also that same person at the beginning (E). It is the same person going through various stages, representing first latency-2 capacity, then latency-1 capacity, and then finally a present immediate capacity.
The person is now a being capable of functioning as a person (present immediate capacity). These capabilities have changed, they have increased as his basic inherent capacity to function as a person has developed; but he always remains the same person, the same initial being, the being with these growing capabilities. The fact that these capabilities to function as a person have changed and grown, does not alter the absolute continuity of his essential being, that of a person. In fact, this variation in capabilities presupposes the continuity of his being as a person. It is as a person that he develops his capabilities to function as a person.
Originally posted by twhiteheadClaims that a single celled fetus is as human as an adult fall prey to the same issues that plague lucifershamers concept of the soul.
Claims that a single celled fetus is as human as an adult fall prey to the same issues that plague lucifershamers concept of the soul.
Any attempt to claim that a definition such as "Human being" is absolute will ultimately fail. There will always be gray areas. For example what happens with clones? What about a half fused egg cell and sperm. What about ...[text shortened]... omething will always suffer from the fact that potential can always be regressed further back.
You seem to be confused about terminology here... let me help:
Like toddler and adolescent, the terms embryo and fetus do not refer to nonhumans, but to humans at a particular stage of their development.
The word "embryo" is used of any living creature at an early stage of development. "Fetus" is a Latin word variously translated as "offspring", "young one", or "little child". It is scientifically inaccurate to say an embryo or a fetus is not a human being simply because he is at an earlier stage of development than a born infant. This is like saying that a toddler is not a human being -- or is less of a human being -- because he is not yet an adolescent. Stage of development has nothing to do with human worth. Is a two-year-old child more precious now than they were a year ago?
Btw, it would be more succinct to call your "single celled fetus" a zygote.
Originally posted by HalitoseThroughout your posts you seem to imply that being awake is a fundamental part of being a person. I disagree. I don't see how I can possibly be becoming less person for some hours every night.
A) A normal adult, sound asleep, not conscious.
Sleep is an essential part of the brains processing technique. There is a significant difference between an
1. organism with a brain that is asleep and
2. one with no brain at all.
In 1. you could possibly say it is 'unconscious'.
In 2 it is not even unconscious any more than a rock is unconscious.
Originally posted by twhiteheadSigh. Please read my posts again. You're confusing "being a person" with "functioning as a person". Much of what you have said above is exactly my point.
Throughout your posts you seem to imply that being awake is a fundamental part of being a person. I disagree. I don't see how I can possibly be becoming less person for some hours every night.
Sleep is an essential part of the brains processing technique. There is a significant difference between an
1. organism with a brain that is asleep and
2. one ...[text shortened]... ay it is 'unconscious'.
In 2 it is not even unconscious any more than a rock is unconscious.
You seem just a tad out of your depth with all the peripheral embryological and philosophical paraphernalia required to participate comprehensively; so rather than having me go through the tedious process, perhaps you could peruse the following links (just to sharpen up), after which I’ll gladly address any concerns you may still have:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person
http://www.answers.com/fetal%20development
http://www.all.org/abac/dni003.htm
http://www.all.org/abac/cwk004.htm
http://www.all.org/abac/jch008.htm
Originally posted by KellyJayYour stance on this issue is completely arbitrary. Why should I bother debating someone who can't give a good reason for what they believe?
It is amazing too call it a fetus it can be killed just because it is a fetus, call it a infant you cannot kill it just because it is a infant, call it a toddler you cannot kill it just because it is a toddler, call it a teenager you cannot kill it just because it is a teenager, call it an adult you cannot kill it just because it is an adult, call it elderl ...[text shortened]... elopment, nothing more, nothing less, yet open season on the human life that has started.
Kelly
Originally posted by no1marauderThe fact that you've heard it doesn't mean others on the site, newcomers for instance, have.
What a lot of hysterical blather that all adds up to "I SAY IT'S A BABY!!!". We've heard it before, KellyJay - get a new shtick.
.... and who is this "we", maurauder ?
Originally posted by twhiteheadI asked the real question, the concern was over pain not the life.
The real question to be asked when it comes to abortion is why you think killing is 'wrong' and where do people get their 'rights' from. I think the second one is more important as the first question is really answered by saying that killing violates a persons 'right to life'.
I see three possible solutions to "where do people get their rights from".
...[text shortened]... framework.
Democracy generally means that 2. is the answer to 'effective rights'.
1. You want to bring in God to the point of view I can agrue that point too, but so far I have not.
2. If we all agree on making someone of a different skin color slaves than consensus makes it okay? Been there done that, consensus is not a good judge over time.
3. Yes, my point, personal taste nothing more, and for some, it is just I want what I want.
Kelly
Originally posted by BigDoggProblemYou decide what can be aborted and the justification for this is done by nothing but arbitrary means, I'm pointing out to you that it completely arbitrary the ways abortions are justified and you say my stance is arbitrary, how pathetic. The very post you respond to shows you that human life at its various stages, and I laid out for you the open season on human life, there was nothing arbitrary about my stance, only yours.
Your stance on this issue is completely arbitrary. Why should I bother debating someone who can't give a good reason for what they believe?
Kelly
Originally posted by twhiteheadhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_rights
The real question to be asked when it comes to abortion is why you think killing is 'wrong' and where do people get their 'rights' from. I think the second one is more important as the first question is really answered by saying that killing violates a persons 'right to life'.
I see three possible solutions to "where do people get their rights from".
...[text shortened]... framework.
Democracy generally means that 2. is the answer to 'effective rights'.
Originally posted by HalitoseI'm not saying that the zygote is a latent person. To the contrary, I content that the zygote is a person
I would grant you that the zygote is a latent person.
That is not what I'm arguing for; I'm not saying that the zygote is a latent person. To the contrary, I content that the zygote is a person – but with latent sentience.
I think you fail to make proper distinction between "being a person" and "functioning as a perso en "did, but does not" (the sleeping adult) and "does not, but will" (the fetus).[/b]
So, you think the zygote at conception -- a single diploid cell -- is a person?
I think you fail to make proper distinction between "being a person" and "functioning as a person".
No, because my claims about personhood have to do with certain capacities, where a capacity is such that it could be exercised. A fully developed human has the capacity for consciousness, despite his or her not exercising it at certain times, such as during a deep sleep. The zygote, on the other hand, does not have the capacity for consciousness because it lacks even the necessary causal structure underlying consciousness.
When you claim that the 1st trimester fetus satisfies none of the criteria for personhood (whichever these may be), you are only showing that a fetus does not function as a person
No. A 1st trimester fetus does not merely "not function as a person". It's not a case in which the thing has capacities sufficient for personhood but is not currently exercising them, either. It doesn't have such capacities, and it's not a person at all.
I wouldn't raise the two objections you cite (related to future function and past function) because they both miss the primary point here. The obvious objection is that the difference between a sleeping person and a 1st trimester fetus is that the person actually holds capacities that are necessary and sufficient for personhood, whereas the 1st trimester fetus doesn't (but might someday).
Originally posted by LemonJelloSee the second post where I address your "capacity" objections.
[b]I'm not saying that the zygote is a latent person. To the contrary, I content that the zygote is a person
So, you think the zygote at conception -- a single diploid cell -- is a person?
I think you fail to make proper distinction between "being a person" and "functioning as a person".
No, because my claims about ...[text shortened]... ficient for personhood, whereas the 1st trimester fetus doesn't (but might someday).[/b]