28 Oct 05
1 edit
I would be interested to know how many posters on this thread are parents. In addition has anyone else has experience life as part of an infertile couple, still birth or miscarriage.
If your answer is no to all four then I'd suggest you have nothing to contribute to this debate. (That includes you Johnny Pope). If you answer yes to any then your personal experience will have told you the answer to the question 'when does life start'. Your experience is your own and your answer is your own and cannot be imposed on anyone else.
If you haven't had any of these experiences, well, I can recommend parenthood. If you have experience of infertility, still birth or miscarriage you have my heart fet symapathy.
28 Oct 05
1 edit
Originally posted by HalitoseYou asked why was 3rd trimester abortion was an option - in reality it is not. I don't understand the relevance of the rest of your post; I was just responding to your statement, quite frankly I don't know what the other poster's argument was as I didn't read his post.
Fair enough, but aren't you detracting from the argument, I wasn't saying that everybody is doing it.
28 Oct 05
1 edit
Originally posted by HalitoseActually it's in the Liberal Ideology thread:
Thanks
Me (sitting on Bbarr's lap): Yes, so what? Your point is irrelevant to my view. The coma patient (depending on the extent of the damage) still has the capacity to suffer, reason, and reflect. The coma may prevent temporarily the exercise of these capacities, but the capacities are possessed nonetheless. The fetus does not have these capacities, because the fetus lack the cognitive architecture that undergirds these capacities. So, that is the essential difference between these cases, as far as I'm concerned. The coma patient is still a person, the fetus was never a person. The fetus may become a person in time, if it is not aborted. But if a fetus is aborted, then no rights have been violated, because fetuses aren't persons.
(APPLAUSE and a kiss from Candice)
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by aardvarkhomeCome now aardvark, by the same reasoning, many here have nothing to contribute to a spirituality forum.
I would be interested to know how many posters on this thread are parents. In addition has anyone else has experience life as part of an infertile couple, still birth or miscarriage.
If your answer is no to all four then I'd suggest you have nothing to contribute to this debate. (That includes you Johnny Pope). If you answer yes to any then your pe ...[text shortened]... you have experience of infertility, still birth or miscarriage you have my heart fet symapathy.
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by no1marauderI'll concede as much... 😉
You asked why was 3rd trimester abortion was an option - in reality it is not. I don't understand the relevance of the rest of your post; I was just responding to your statement, quite frankly I don't know what the other poster's argument was as I didn't read his post.
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by no1marauderOkay...
Actually it's in the Liberal Ideology thread:
Me (sitting on Bbarr's lap): Yes, so what? Your point is irrelevant to my view. The coma patient (depending on the extent of the damage) still has the capacity to suffer, reason, and reflect. The coma may prevent temporarily the exercise of these capacities, but the capacities are possessed nonethel ...[text shortened]... ights have been violated, because fetuses aren't persons.
(APPLAUSE and a kiss from Candice)
The coma patient (depending on the extent of the damage) still has the capacity to suffer, reason, and reflect.
Does it? I've been in one, didn't reason, suffer or feflect. The fetus does have the capacity to suffer and reflect; it reacts to pain, enjoys sweeter amniotic fluid, swallows less fluid if it is made bitter. It swipes at an object when it is tickled.
The coma may prevent temporarily the exercise of these capacities, but the capacities are possessed nonetheless.
With a fetus, its age prevents the exercise of these capacities. Same difference.
The fetus does not have these capacities, because the fetus lack the cognitive architecture that undergirds these capacities.
Are you saying it only becomes human when it can feel pain?
The coma patient is still a person, the fetus was never a person.
Who are you to define what a person is? Didn't Hitler try the same trick? Didn't previous generations consider their slaves "not persons"?
The fetus may become a person in time, if it is not aborted.
I contend that it is already a person. As I've asked before, please draw the line where somebody becomes a person. Why is it a double homicide if a pregnant woman is murdered? The fetus is given "person" status, just not when its unwanted.
But if a fetus is aborted, then no rights have been violated, because fetuses aren't persons.
So you are taking current legislation as your barometer of ethics?
(APPLAUSE and a kiss from Candice)
lol. No offence, just interested in your views...
28 Oct 05
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Originally posted by HalitoseME: I'll leave it to Bbarr to discuss his definition of personhood the philosophical basis of which differs from mine, though the result is the same in this case. I will say as a legal matter, it was never a double homicide until fairly recently when a pregnant woman was murdered; those laws are of recent vintage. I would also state that in traditional civil law, fetuses were never given legal rights of any kind (this topic is covered in the decision in Roe v. Wade). The Hitler thing is a little played out and slaves were considered persons, although it is commonly and erroneously asserted by antiabortionists they were not. The rights of slaves were severely restricted but so were the rights of women and other minorities; but obviously you can't "free" a non-person and have it become a "person" all of a sudden.
Okay...
[b]The coma patient (depending on the extent of the damage) still has the capacity to suffer, reason, and reflect.
Does it? I've been in one, didn't reason, suffer or feflect. The fetus does have the capacity to suffer and reflect; it reacts to pain, enjoys sweeter amniotic fluid, swallows less fluid if it is made bitter. It swipes at a ...[text shortened]...
(APPLAUSE and a kiss from Candice)
lol. No offence, just interested in your views...[/b]
As I said, Bbarr adopts his definition of personhood based on considerations such as he outlined above. Personally, as a Lockean fundamental rights theorist I believe that the mother has a right to self-autonomy over her body, that she has never agreed to relinquish that right to the State, that a fetus is wholly contained in her body and therefore she can do with it what she pleases in the same manner she can use mouthwash to kill germs (life) or have a tapeworm (life) removed. Once a fetus obtains viability and can exist as a seperate entity (i.e. outside of another person's body), it has gained the right of self-autonomy as well so it cannot be aborted in the 3rd trimester (in actual practice this is such a rare occurence it hardly matters). Attempts to declare that a fetus has rights before viability diminish a woman's right to self-autonomy in a manner she would not have agreed to and violate the Social Contract.
But that's me.
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by no1marauderO.K. Look, Halitose, nobody thinks that it is criterial for moral considerability that one actually be currently exercising one's capacity for consciousness. When LemmonJello and I (and others) claim that consciousness is criterial for moral considerability, this is shorthand for the claim that the capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for having moral considerability. Fetuses do not have this capacity, but merely the potential to develop such a capacity. Nobody I'm aware of has presented a coherent notion of potentiality that could undergird an argument for the claim that being a potential X is sufficient for having the rights of an actual X.
Here we go again .............. over to you, Bbarr!
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by HalitoseFirst, just so we're clear, I'm talking about fetuses in the first two trimesters. I think it is permissible to abort in the third trimester only if the mother's health is at stake.
Okay...
[b]The coma patient (depending on the extent of the damage) still has the capacity to suffer, reason, and reflect.
Does it? I've been in one, didn't reason, suffer or feflect. The fetus does have the capacity to suffer and reflect; it reacts to pain, enjoys sweeter amniotic fluid, swallows less fluid if it is made bitter. It swipes at a ...[text shortened]...
(APPLAUSE and a kiss from Candice)
lol. No offence, just interested in your views...[/b]
Now, you claim to have been in a coma, and not to have suffered, reflected, etc. This is irrelevant to my view. During your coma, you still had the capacities to do these things, but were temporarily prevented from exercising these capacities. Early fetuses do not have these capacities, because they (unlike you in a coma) don't possess the necessary cognitive architecture. The causal infrastructure simply isn't in place when it comes to these fetuses. The causal infrastructure may develop in fetuses, if they are allowed to gestate in favorable conditions for the requisite period of time. At such a point, the fetus will be a person with rights. Prior to this point, however, the fetus is just a potential person, and potential persons don't have rights.
You ask who I am to define what constitutes personhood. Well, I'm somebody who has arguments in defense of his view. Suppose I asked you "who are you to define what a chair is?" You would respond by giving reasons for thinking that your favored definition (if you, in fact have one) is correct. This is no different.
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by bbarrI'll need to look into the potentiality debate then... I, however contend that consciousness is not the prerequisite for personhood.
O.K. Look, Halitose, nobody thinks that it is criterial for moral considerability that one actually be currently exercising one's capacity for consciousness. When LemmonJello and I (and others) claim that consciousness is criterial for moral considerability, this is shorthand for the claim that the capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for hav ...[text shortened]... ument for the claim that being a potential X is sufficient for having the rights of an actual X.
28 Oct 05
Originally posted by HalitoseSo, you think that an object that completely lacks even the capacity for consciousness, and hence cannot, even in principle, suffer, nevertheless can have rights?
I'll need to look into the potentiality debate then... I, however contend that consciousness is not the prerequisite for personhood.
28 Oct 05
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrIf causal infrastructure is necessary for recognition of personhood where does one draw the line with the development of a fetus? The first brain-wave (if I remember correctly... I'll need to patch up my embryology for this debate) is at 8-10 weeks. This is long before the 3rd trimester. Couldn't genetic-individuality with the potential of maturation into a fully functioning and self-aware human be equally considerable for personhood. It may not look like a mature human; it may not exhibit the immediate capacity for cognizance like a mature human; but does its right to life hinge on the causal infrastructure of consciousness? How can consciousness really be defined? Or the infrastructure thereof? When it comes to defining personhood, it is very important that it should be well grounded and defined as the definition of a chair doesn't mean much, personhood however has very far reaching ethical and moral implications.
First, just so we're clear, I'm talking about fetuses in the first two trimesters. I think it is permissible to abort in the third trimester only if the mother's health is at stake.
Now, you claim to have been in a coma, and not to have suffered, reflected, etc. This is irrelevant to my view. During your coma, you still had the capacities to do these ...[text shortened]... nking that your favored definition (if you, in fact have one) is correct. This is no different.
You ask who I am to define what constitutes personhood. Well, I'm somebody who has arguments in defense of his view. Suppose I asked you "who are you to define what a chair is?" You would respond by giving reasons for thinking that your favored definition (if you, in fact have one) is correct. This is no different.
It was just a request for these arguments in defence of the statement given.