28 May 11
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloYou simply cherry-picked throughout that section without any reference to Robinson's actual point.
[b]It doesn't really matter what a monist thinks, because, as Robinson points out, the claim that qualitative events are identical with neural events is unintelligible
You have really failed to understand what exactly Robinson was saying here. I think we need to back the truck up. Why does Robinson put forth the statements you quoted? He makes n address in this paper (because they are not relevant to the purpose of this paper).[/b]
I think cherry-picked is a little off the mark since that implies I understood Robinson's point to begin with. 🙂 BTW, thank you for taking the time to clarify.
I think that epiphenomenalism is almost certainly false; but I think the strongest arguments against it are ones that Robinson does not even address in this paper (because they are not relevant to the purpose of this paper).
Well, we should discuss those, then, since E or not-E seems to be the crux of the issue. For Plantinga's part, as far as I can tell Robert Cummin's Meaning and Mental Representation is the basis for his belief that semantic epiphenomenalism is unavoidable for the materialist. Which, admittedly, I think is pretty cool since Robert Cummin is a professor of philosophy here in Champaign-Urbana where I live and plan to graduate. I'm going to have to get my hands on that book ASAP. In the meantime, perhaps you can give me some references for the arguments you consider the strongest against E.
28 May 11
1 edit
I've made a cursory review of arguments for and against both epiphenomenalism and functionalism, and it seems to me that E, even though it is counter-intuitive (counter to the inner experience of consciously affecting outcomes), nevertheless has more explanatory power. There's nothing F can show to be beyond explanation in the context of E. The various studies showing how decision making precedes conscious awareness of choice also seem to corroborate E.
28 May 11
3 edits
Originally posted by epiphinehaswe should discuss those, then, since E or not-E seems to be the crux of the issue
You simply cherry-picked throughout that section without any reference to Robinson's actual point.
I think cherry-picked is a little off the mark since that implies I understood Robinson's point to begin with. 🙂 BTW, thank you for taking the time to clarify.
I think that epiphenomenalism is almost certainly false; but I think the strong aps you can give me some references for the arguments you consider the strongest against E.
We have already been using 'E' to refer to evolutionary considerations in the context of Plantinga's argument, so let us start to use something else to denote semantic epiphenomenalism (say, C).
So let us use:
R = our cognitive faculties are reliable
N = Naturalism
E = contemporary evolutionary explanatory account
C = semantic epiphenomenalism
Whether or not C is true is not the crux of the issue. At issue is whether or not Plantinga is correct that P(C|N&E) is high, such that it would be hard for the naturalist to avoid C; and also at issue is whether or not Plantinga is right that P(R|N&E&C) is low (which is basically the subject of Robinson's objection directed at Plantinga). That is not the whole issue with respect to Plantinga's claim that P(R|N&E) is low/inscrutable though, since what he thinks about P(R|N&E&~C) and whether or not he is right about it also factor, especially if it turns out that Plantinga is wrong when he says P(C|N&E) is high.
In the meantime, perhaps you can give me some references for the arguments you consider the strongest against E.
There are actually multiple arguments I consider quite strong against C. One could be called the argument from knowledge of other minds; another can be referred to as the reporting problem (related to a paradox of phenomenal judgment); another the semantic problem. I will give you a reference that gives some body to the reporting problem and the semantic problem (it also talks about an emergence problem, which is related to the arguments from evolution that Robinson presents in his paper):
A Bailey, "Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36: 481–510 (2006).
You can find a copy of the paper here:
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~abailey/Research/publications.html
Please refer to the section that discusses the falsity of epiphenomenalism (starting around page 17).
28 May 11
Originally posted by epiphinehasYou think epiphenomenalism has more explanatory power than functionalism on what issues? At any rate, I would not consider epiphenomenalism vs functionalism any sort of "true" dichotomy.
I've made a cursory review of arguments for and against both epiphenomenalism and functionalism, and it seems to me that E, even though it is counter-intuitive (counter to the inner experience of consciously affecting outcomes), nevertheless has more explanatory power. There's nothing F can show to be beyond explanation in the context of E. The various ...[text shortened]... showing how decision making precedes conscious awareness of choice also seem to corroborate E.
28 May 11
1 edit
Originally posted by epiphinehasI think is pretty cool since Robert Cummin is a professor of philosophy here in Champaign-Urbana where I live and plan to graduate.
You simply cherry-picked throughout that section without any reference to Robinson's actual point.
I think cherry-picked is a little off the mark since that implies I understood Robinson's point to begin with. 🙂 BTW, thank you for taking the time to clarify.
I think that epiphenomenalism is almost certainly false; but I think the strong aps you can give me some references for the arguments you consider the strongest against E.
By the way, good school!
29 May 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloI once had an opportunity (or at least an invitation, pending interviews and all that) to teach there; labor studies. Land too flat though; I got vertigo with all that sky... 🙂
[b]I think is pretty cool since Robert Cummin is a professor of philosophy here in Champaign-Urbana where I live and plan to graduate.
By the way, good school![/b]
01 Jun 11
3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloWhether or not C is true is not the crux of the issue.
[b]we should discuss those, then, since E or not-E seems to be the crux of the issue
We have already been using 'E' to refer to evolutionary considerations in the context of Plantinga's argument, so let us start to use something else to denote semantic epiphenomenalism (say, C).
So let us use:
R = our cognitive faculties are reliable
N = Nat to the section that discusses the falsity of epiphenomenalism (starting around page 17).[/b]
I see that now. I've completely misconstrued the debate. And I understand now why Plantinga insists that E is the only option for the materialist: materialism cannot account for the intentionality of consciousness—and it is doubtful that it ever can. The materialist (or naturalist) insists that mental properties are either identical to or supervene upon the neuronal structures in the brain. The problem being, once you identify the intentionality of consciousness with the physical properties of the brain, there seems to be no room for mental properties to have any causal efficacy—the physical properties end up doing all the causal work. The crux of the issue, then, as you point out, is whether or not materialistic theories regarding intentionality succeed in avoiding E. If not, there's no good reason to think the truth-value of beliefs have any effect on behavior.
...and also at issue is whether or not Plantinga is right that P(R|N&E&C) is low (which is basically the subject of Robinson's objection directed at Plantinga).
I can't see the relevance of Robinson's toy model. All he seems to be showing is how a maladaptive behavior can affect the neural structure of some belief, but as far as I can tell that says nothing about how the neural structure itself, thereby, gains truth-value. N, in this case, is still selected for based on its survival value—but I think Plantinga has shown how the survival value of a belief and the truth-value of a belief need not coincide. It could just as easily be, after all, that in the case of N, the truth-value of F might negatively affect the survival of the organism.
02 Jun 11
Originally posted by vistesdI've come to appreciate the flatness. When you're away from the city it's like being stranded on an ocean. If you're open to its influence, it can be as awe-inspiring as the grand canyon in its ability to give you a direct perception of the true girth of our planet. BTW, what a trip it would be to take a class from you. 🙂
I once had an opportunity (or at least an invitation, pending interviews and all that) to teach there; labor studies. Land too flat though; I got vertigo with all that sky... 🙂
03 Jun 11
1 edit
Originally posted by epiphinehasYes, I’m sure that’s true—perhaps, as a desert-wanderer spiritually, I need the enclosure of ridges and hills! (Though, at the time, I ended up not so far away, at U. of IA in Iowa City.)
I've come to appreciate the flatness. When you're away from the city it's like being stranded on an ocean. If you're open to its influence, it can be as awe-inspiring as the grand canyon in its ability to give you a direct perception of the true girth of our planet. BTW, what a trip it would be to take a class from you. 🙂
You offer me very kind words! But I do not feel worthy of them. But, my dear friend, the fact that I believe that we would stand shoulder to shoulder on the issues that affect human beings qua human beings, regardless of their religious affiliation or understanding, is more than enough.
03 Jun 11
Originally posted by vistesd...I believe that we would stand shoulder to shoulder on the issues that affect human beings qua human beings, regardless of their religious affiliation or understanding...
Yes, I’m sure that’s true—perhaps, as a desert-wanderer spiritually, I need the enclosure of ridges and hills! (Though, at the time, I ended up not so far away, at U. of IA in Iowa City.)
You offer me very kind words! But I do not feel worthy of them. But, my dear friend, the fact that I believe that we would stand shoulder to shoulder on the issues th ...[text shortened]... a human beings, regardless of their religious affiliation or understanding, is more than enough.
Undoubtedly!
08 Jun 11
Originally posted by epiphinehasAnd I understand now why Plantinga insists that E is the only option for the materialist
[b]Whether or not C is true is not the crux of the issue.
I see that now. I've completely misconstrued the debate. And I understand now why Plantinga insists that E is the only option for the materialist: materialism cannot account for the intentionality of consciousness—and it is doubtful that it ever can. The materialist (or naturalist) insis ...[text shortened]... ase of N, the truth-value of F might negatively affect the survival of the organism.[/b]
You may understand, but I do not understand; and Plantinga fails to adequately support the idea that semantic epiphenomenalism is hard to avoid under materialism. As I have tried to hint, the idea that your average materialist would be, in virtue of his materialism, committed to epiphenomenalism is, frankly, just bizarre. I do not know how many different ways I can put this point: the materialist, one would have thought, has available options outside of epiphenomenalism because the materialist is generally not even committed to the mental/physical distinction at play within epiphenomenalist discourse. And even supposing a material monist does make the distinction on some level (with, say, property dualism or something), he still is generally not committed to epiphenomenalism.
Beyond that, I think you are failing to understand Robinson's argument:
I can't see the relevance of Robinson's toy model. All he seems to be showing is how a maladaptive behavior can affect the neural structure of some belief, but as far as I can tell that says nothing about how the neural structure itself, thereby, gains truth-value.
I agree that it makes no sense to say that maladaptive behavior is what explains content assignment or truth-aptness. But that is not at all what Robinson is trying to show with his model. Robinson presents the model to show a simplified example of a naturalistic account that generally indicates reliable cognition. The bit that follows (about maladaptive behavior) is a secondary consideration where he is simply trying to show that the underlying complexes (to which belief content is assigned) can be selected for. This is put forth as a counter to Plantinga's argument, since if there are simple naturalistic assignment accounts that generally imply reliable cognition and associated underlying complexes that can be selected for; then that is certainly a strike against Plantinga's claim that the probability of reliable cognition is low conditioned on N&E *even when* Plantinga is granted the otherwise dubious claim that semantic epiphenomenalism goes hand in hand with N&E.
Yes, Robinson is quite vague on the exact details of the content assignment. He says "a certain complex C, of which N is a proper part, is to be assigned the belief content that an F is present because the parts of C other than N are related to N in a certain way". Hard to get any more vague than that! But remember the context of this discussion: Robinson is countering a section of Plantinga's argument in which Plantinga has just blanketly assumed for argument's sake (despite his personal doubts otherwise to the contrary) that a successful naturalistic account of content assignment can be given and that such a thing as a Robinson's 'C' can indeed acquire content. If there are aspects of Robinson's argument that Plantinga is in position to justifiably rebut here, it is most definitely *not* concerning the exact details of how 'C' acquires content within Robinson's model.
could just as easily be, after all, that in the case of N, the truth-value of F might negatively affect the survival of the organism.
Fs do not have truth-values, and nothing in Robinson's paper suggests that they do. F is a real-world property that is not truth-apt. In the model, N occurs when O gets stimulated in the presence of F. An obvious consequence within this model is that the content (that F is present) that supposedly gets assigned to C (of which N is some part) will generally have the property of being true. Robinson then argues that occurrences of C can be selected for. But, if so, then true beliefs can follow natural selection in tow. This is all regardless if semantic epiphenomenalism is true or not.
08 Jun 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloI think it is bizarre to look to evolution in nature for the truth.
You think it is bizarre that epiphinehas and vistesd would stress common bonds of humanity, irrespective of religious views or lack thereof?
The truth comes from God. The book of truth, the Holy Bible,
in a psalm in praise of God's Word says, "Thy sum of Thy word
is truth, and every one of Thy righteous ordinances is everlasting."
(Psalm 119:160) Jesus said, "I am the way, the truth, and the
life; no one comes to the Father, but through Me." (John 14:6)
Jesus said to Pilate, "You say correctly that I am a king. For this
I have been born, and for this I have come into the world, to
bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears My
voice." Pilate said to Him, "What is truth?" (John 18;37-38 NASB)
Pilate could find no guilt in Him. Jesus told His disciples, "These
things I have spoken to you, while abiding with you. But the
Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name,
He will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all
that I said to you." (John 14:25-26 NASB) And again He said to
them, "I have many more things to say to you, but you cannot
bear them now. But when He, the Spirit of truth comes, He will
guide you into all truth..." (John 16:12-13 NASB) And Paul
speaking of the coming of the man of sin, the antichrist, says,
"And then that lawless one will be revealed whom the Lord will
slay with the breath of His mouth and bring an end by the
appearance of His coming; that is, the one whose coming is in
accord with the activity of Satan, with all power and signs and
false wonders, and with all the deception of wickedness for those
who perish, because they did not receive the love of the truth so
as to be saved. And for this reason God will send upon them
a deluding influence so that they might believe what is false, in
order that they all may be judged who did not believe the truth,
but took pleasure in wickedness." (2 Thessalonians 2:8-12 NASB)
08 Jun 11
Originally posted by RJHindsSorry I asked....
I think it is bizarre to look to evolution in nature for the truth.
The truth comes from God. The book of truth, the Holy Bible,
in a psalm in praise of God's Word says, "Thy sum of Thy word
is truth, and every one of Thy righteous ordinances is everlasting."
(Psalm 119:160) Jesus said, "I am the way, the truth, and the
life; no one comes to the Fathe ...[text shortened]... lieve the truth,
but took pleasure in wickedness." (2 Thessalonians 2:8-12 NASB)