Affirming Naturalism Presupposes God

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]And I understand now why Plantinga insists that E is the only option for the materialist

You may understand, but I do not understand; and Plantinga fails to adequately support the idea that semantic epiphenomenalism is hard to avoid under materialism. As I have tried to hint, the idea that your average materialist would be, in virtue of his mat ...[text shortened]... on in tow. This is all regardless if semantic epiphenomenalism is true or not.[/b]

I do not know how many different ways I can put this point: the materialist, one would have thought, has available options outside of epiphenomenalism because the materialist is generally not even committed to the mental/physical distinction at play within epiphenomenalist discourse.

It is my understanding that E is not an exclusive threat to dualism.

The materialist presupposition that all mental properties are identical to or supervene upon the physical properties of the brain (viz., the mind is 'just the brain'😉 carries with it the implication that a belief—purely by virtue of its content—has no causal efficacy, since it is the physical property of the brain (the gray, squishy conglomeration of neurons) doing all the work. In which case, mental properties are nothing more than epiphenomena.

If there are aspects of Robinson's argument that Plantinga is in position to justifiably rebut here, it is most definitely *not* concerning the exact details of how 'C' acquires content within Robinson's model.

If the exact details of how 'C' acquires content is irrelevant, why go through all the trouble of delineating the process? Why not just declare that the implication of model 'A' is that cognitive faculties are reliable as a consequence of N&E—If A, therefore B; A, therefore B. But how does an indefensible model make the defensibility of a more sophisticated model plausible? I really don't understand.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Ironically, in order to affirm that naturalism is warranted, we must presuppose God's existence. If naturalism is true, our cognitive faculties will be aimed at survival, not at producing true beliefs (see Alvin Plantinga's, Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism). Therefore, according to its own commitments, naturalism cannot have warrant. In order ...[text shortened]... our belief that our cognitive faculties are aimed at producing true beliefs.

Any takers?

"EAAN argues that the combination of evolutionary theory and naturalism is self-defeating on the basis of the claim that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then—according to Plantinga's calculations— the probability of having reliable cognitive facilities is low." -- Wikipedia

I suggest that he is right, but right in the sense that our cognitive facilities are not, in the main, reliable. We rely on the unreliability of others' cognitive ability, be it a wildebeest on the savanna, or our opponent across the chess board, in order to win against them. While the probability of having reliable cognitive facilities may be low, those that do have a bit more reliability in their cognitive processes will end up having the others over for lunch -- literally.

So, affirming naturalism may require admitting the unreliability of our cognitive facilities, but it does not require positing Plantinga's version of God.

Originally posted by JS357
"EAAN argues that the combination of evolutionary theory and naturalism is self-defeating on the basis of the claim that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then—according to Plantinga's calculations— the probability of having reliable cognitive facilities is low." -- Wikipedia

I suggest that he is right, but right in the sense that our cognitive fac ...[text shortened]... y of our cognitive facilities, but it does not require positing Plantinga's version of God.

Do you have your own version of God? If so, can you briefly
explain it.

Originally posted by RJHinds
Do you have your own version of God? If so, can you briefly
explain it.

A great question, perhaps the best to be asked here. At this moment I find no reply that does not limit God.

Originally posted by JS357
A great question, perhaps the best to be asked here. At this moment I find no reply that does not limit God.

And a great answer. None of us have the ability to explain God without limits.
Our languages even puts limits on us to explain God accurately. Our mind
is not capable of conceiving the entirety of God.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]I do not know how many different ways I can put this point: the materialist, one would have thought, has available options outside of epiphenomenalism because the materialist is generally not even committed to the mental/physical distinction at play within epiphenomenalist discourse.

It is my understanding that E is not an exclusive threat to d he defensibility of a more sophisticated model plausible? I really don't understand.[/b]

The materialist presupposition that all mental properties are identical to or supervene upon the physical properties of the brain (viz., the mind is 'just the brain'😉 carries with it the implication that a belief—purely by virtue of its content—has no causal efficacy, since it is the physical property of the brain (the gray, squishy conglomeration of neurons) doing all the work. In which case, mental properties are nothing more than epiphenomena.

🙄 I honestly do not know where to begin here. Your analysis makes absolutely no sense. Let's think about this for a second. If S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities; then, even if S is committed to the idea that physical entities "do all the work", S is not committed to the idea that mental entities are nothing more than epiphenomena. Why? Well, once again: S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities. I hate to keep breaking this to you, but here goes again: that mental entities do work is quite consistent within some view wherein (1) physical entities do all the work and (2) mental entities are identical with physical entities.

If the exact details of how 'C' acquires content is irrelevant, why go through all the trouble of delineating the process? Why not just declare that the implication of model 'A' is that cognitive faculties are reliable as a consequence of N&E—If A, therefore B; A, therefore B. But how does an indefensible model make the defensibility of a more sophisticated model plausible? I really don't understand.

Again, Robinson is directing his argumentative attention there toward a specific section of Plantinga's argument wherein it is simply blanketly granted that such entites as 'C' can satisfactorily acquire such content. Robinson is simply respecting the fact that, according to this section of Plantinga's own argument, the "exact details" you reference are quite irrelevant. Given that Robinson is specifically targeting a section of Plantinga's argument wherein Plantinga himself takes the exact details as irrelevant to the discussion, why exactly would you expect Robinson to feel compelled to delineate the exact details? I am afraid you are getting quite bogged down in non-issues with respect to the Robinson paper.

Originally posted by LemonJello
The materialist presupposition that all mental properties are identical to or supervene upon the physical properties of the brain (viz., the mind is 'just the brain'😉 carries with it the implication that a belief—purely by virtue of its content—has no causal efficacy, since it is the physical property of the brain (the gray, squishy conglomeration of n are getting quite bogged down in non-issues with respect to the Robinson paper.

If S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities; then, even if S is committed to the idea that physical entities "do all the work", S is not committed to the idea that mental entities are nothing more than epiphenomena. Why? Well, once again: S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities.

It is one thing to believe that mental properties are identical to physical properties—but, if such a proposition is incoherent, why should it matter if S believes it or not?

The problem is, on this view, the fact that mental states have logical relations (e.g., between "it is raining outside" and "it is wet outside" ), while brain states have causal relations (e.g., the firing of neurons, hormone secretions, etc.)—there is no way to match up causally interrelated brain states with logically interrelated mental states. Even materialists understand these kinds of implications, which is why they have abandoned, for the most part, identity theory in favor of functionalism (monism being essentially idealistic rather than materialistic, in that it reduces the brain to the mind rather than the mind to the brain—not to mention it being prone to insurmountable difficulties as well).

That mental entities do work is quite consistent within some view wherein (1) physical entities do all the work and (2) mental entities are identical with physical entities.

But, you are forgetting that identity theory is a reductionist theory (viz., mental properties are nothing but physical properties). If we reduce mental properties to physical properties, then the only causal efficacy mental states have they have because they are identical to or supervene upon physical states—i.e., the "work" mental states seem to do are really only the result of physical processes. In which case, mental properties, such as intentionality, qualia, etc., can only be epiphenomena. Again, you could do the opposite and reduce physical properties to mental properties, but then it wouldn't be a materialistic theory anymore, and so tangential to our discussion.

I am afraid you are getting quite bogged down in non-issues with respect to the Robinson paper.

OK, let me start over then.

It seems to me that Plantinga actually has addressed Robinson's toy model (itself based on Jerry Fodor's formulations of the causal theory of intentionality), by way of a rebuttal of a critique leveled by William Ramsey.

Ramsey (who, for the sake of argument—like Robinsion—presupposes epiphenomenalism) likens beliefs to "maps by which we steer," having a non-causal effect on behavior. The more accurate O's map (i.e., beliefs), the better equipped O will be for survival—by implication, true beliefs can be selected for, i.e., they are not "invisible to natural selection," as Plantinga claims (this seems to me to be eerily similar to Robinson's claim).

Plantinga counters that Ramsey, by positing that beliefs have an effect on behavior similar to a map, is, in fact, presupposing that "the content of belief is causally efficacious with respect to behavior" contrary to epiphenomenalism. Ramsey, like Robinson's toy model, paints a picture of a physical brain "consulting" the content of epiphenomenal belief like a hiker consults a map—e.g., "...a certain complex, C, of which N is a proper part, is to be assigned the belief content that an F is present..."

Further, if the presence of an object (F) causes the belief that F is present, based on the typical objection to externalist theories, this commits Ramsey (and Robinson) to the claim that none of our beliefs could ever be false (i.e., the misrepresentation problem). But, since the beliefs alluded to by Ramsey (and Robinson), as Plantinga points out, are indicator representations (like thermometers) without propositional content, and are treated in an externalist fashion (above), they are simply not applicable to beliefs bearing definite descriptions, such as "gravity makes things that go up or down" or "the entire universe is naturalistic", &c., which, on N&E simpliciter, are highly likely to be false.

https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/handle/10355/4184 (see pp. 121-136 in the public.pdf)

In so far as Robinson's critique resembles Ramsey's, it fails as a defeater for EAAN, since it is merely possible that our cognitive faculties are reliable on Ramsey's model—but a mere possibility is not enough to establish sufficient reliability.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]If S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities; then, even if S is committed to the idea that physical entities "do all the work", S is not committed to the idea that mental entities are nothing more than epiphenomena. Why? Well, once again: S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities.

It is one thin re possibility is not enough to establish sufficient reliability.[/b]

It is one thing to believe that mental properties are identical to physical properties—but, if such a proposition is incoherent, why should it matter if S believes it or not?

Sorry, but it is NOT incoherent. And, certainly, no considerations you have supplied in this thread would demonstrate otherwise. You submitted one line of thought for the idea that the psycho-physical identity thesis is incoherent (or unintelligible), which amounted to your referencing a particular section of Robinson's paper. And the only things you managed to show was that your reading of that particular Robinson section was shamefully selective and that your interpretation of Robinson's actual point there was tragically flawed.

The problem is, on this view, the fact that mental states have logical relations (e.g., between "it is raining outside" and "it is wet outside" ), while brain states have causal relations (e.g., the firing of neurons, hormone secretions, etc.)—there is no way to match up causally interrelated brain states with logically interrelated mental states.

I think there is notional confusion here. Mental states themselves do not stand in logical relations. Propositions are what stand in logical relations, but prositions are not mental states. Propositions form the content of some mental states.

Even materialists understand these kinds of implications, which is why they have abandoned, for the most part, identity theory in favor of functionalism

The only reason I brought up the psycho-phsyical identity theorist in the first place was to provide an example of a materialist or physicalist who is in general not committed to epiphenomenalism. Now, take a good look at what you are trying to argue here. You're telling me that functionalism is so much more plausible than identity thesis. Okay, if that is what you think (regardless if it is true or not), then I will give you yet another example of a materialist who is not committed to epiphenomenalism: a materialist functionalist. Functionalists are not committed to epiphenomenalism any more than identity theorists are. In fact, far from being committed to the idea that mental states are inefficacious, functionalists think the efficacy of mental states is basically their defining feature.

If we reduce mental properties to physical properties, then the only causal efficacy mental states have they have because they are identical to or supervene upon physical states

Even if that is true, then so what? Remember, you were trying to tell me that my example identity theorist is committed to epiphenomenalism, which holds that mental states are inefficacious. But, you are simply contradicting that here, since if the identity theorist thinks mental states are efficacious (even if only because they are identical with physical states that are efficacious), then obviously he is not committed to epiphenomenalism. Again, not sure how many ways I can point this out to you. Good grief!

Ramsey (who, for the sake of argument—like Robinsion—presupposes epiphenomenalism)

Hang on, where exactly in his model does Robinson presuppose epiphenomenalism? I see nothing about his model that presupposes ephiphenomenalism. I think his arguments regarding the model specifically should be taken as irrespective of whether epiphenomenalism is true or not. Of course his model must be consistent with semantic epiphenomenalism (otherwise this section would make no sense relative to his primary aim), but I would not say it presupposes semantic epiphenomenalism. I could be wrong about this; do you have any argument for the claim that Robinson's model presupposes epiphenomenalism?

Plantinga counters that Ramsey, by positing that beliefs have an effect on behavior similar to a map, is, in fact, presupposing that "the content of belief is causally efficacious with respect to behavior" contrary to epiphenomenalism.

If that is true, then I do not think you can be right when you say that in countering Ramsey Plantinga also counters Robinson. Again, I think Robinson's model is irrespective of the truth of epiphenomenalism.

Further, if the presence of an object (F) causes the belief that F is present, based on the typical objection to externalist theories, this commits Ramsey (and Robinson) to the claim that none of our beliefs could ever be false (i.e., the misrepresentation problem).

Robinson does not claim that the presence of F causes O to have the belief that F is present. He claims that stimulation of O's sensory organs by the presence of F causes N. And then he claims merely that O is disposed toward the belief that F is present only when N occurs. This is all quite different from the claim that F causes O to have the belief that F (which I would agree is quite problematic).

In so far as Robinson's critique resembles Ramsey's

Honestly, that seems not so far, just based on what you have said.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]If S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities; then, even if S is committed to the idea that physical entities "do all the work", S is not committed to the idea that mental entities are nothing more than epiphenomena. Why? Well, once again: S thinks mental entities are identical with physical entities.

It is one thin re possibility is not enough to establish sufficient reliability.[/b]

Plantinga counters that Ramsey, by positing that beliefs have an effect on behavior similar to a map, is, in fact, presupposing that "the content of belief is causally efficacious with respect to behavior" contrary to epiphenomenalism.

Sorry, I forgot to add something here. Even if I am not quite sure whether one should think that Robinson's model presupposes epiphenomenalism, it is quite clear that one should think that Robinson's model is consistent with semantic epiphenomenalism (again, otherwise this section of his would be pointless). There surely is nothing about Robinson's model that presupposes anything that contradicts semantic epiphenomenalism. So, I really don't see why any of this is relevant to Robinson's paper.