Originally posted by SwissGambitIs quantum mechanics a perfect science? I dont think that branch of science is even 100 yrs old as yet. Im pretty sure there is a lot more to learn.
This idea is in serious trouble thanks to quantum mechanics. At the atomic level, we find that we cannot predict the outcomes of certain events with certainty. The best we can do is calculate the probability that a particular outcome will occur.
Originally posted by JS357I agree. You are saying the same thing Im saying, although more clearly.
I think you are describing the "hidden cause" notion of randomness, which explains some seemingly random events as not really random, but as due to determinate causes we do not understand fully in terms of the variables and their values. For example, we do not understand the variables in weather, and we may understand the variables in a roulette wheel, but do ...[text shortened]... se would be, perhaps, events where the hidden variable is "God wills it." 😉
Originally posted by Rajk999There is no 'perfect science.' There is always more to learn.
Is quantum mechanics a perfect science? I dont think that branch of science is even 100 yrs old as yet. Im pretty sure there is a lot more to learn.
However, that does not mean that we cannot use the QM knowledge we have established. As far as I can tell, there is no serious dispute that outcomes at that level are probabilistic. There is mainly disagreement on how to interpret the results.
Originally posted by RJHindsRandom is a very simple word in common usage. It means an event without a specific cause or pattern.
I guess you do not think the result of flipping a coin is random, huh? Can you give your definition of random.
So my question remains. How is saying yes or no to God a random choice. There must be a specific cause or reason why someone makes that choice to say yes or no to God. It cannot be random.
Originally posted by SwissGambitIn the last 100 years explanations and causes for many events were discovered. Think of what will happen in 1000 years or 100,000 years. Randomness might be eliminated.
There is no 'perfect science.' There is always more to learn.
However, that does not mean that we cannot use the QM knowledge we have established. As far as I can tell, there is no serious dispute that outcomes at that level are probabilistic. There is mainly disagreement on how to interpret the results.
Originally posted by Rajk999If god knows the initial conditions of the universe perfectly, and the universe's state is perfectly
I disagree that an all-knowing God means that there is no free will.
knowable by god at any point given perfect knowledge of the initial conditions...
Then the universe is by definition deterministic.
EVERYTHING that happens in it was determined and immutable from the moment it was created.
Thus in such a universe 'free will' is absolutely impossible.
If god really is 'all-Knowing' and that god knows in advance the outcome of every event then there
is and can be no free will for any being in the universe.
As god is also posited to be the creator of the universe and is posited to have the ability to decide
how to make the universe god in this scenario has absolute and total responsibility for absolutely
everything that happens in such a universe. The strongest possible problem of evil argument applies
here.
If you posit that god can and does know the outcome of every event before it happens then you
by definition believe in a deterministic universe.
And free will is impossible in a deterministic universe.
So you either believe that god does not know the outcome of every event before it happens and allow
for free will...
Or
You believe that god does know the outcome of every event before hand in which case free will is impossible.
pick one.
Originally posted by SwissGambitOh hell I am not reading all that.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
If you want to take issue with my statement/argument that it's impossible to have free will
in a deterministic universe then do it yourself in your own words.
In the hypothetical scenario where the universe was created by a god.
That universe is deterministic so that everything that will ever happen in it is predetermined by
it's initial starting conditions.
That god is all knowing and thus knows the outcome of every event before hand.
And That god can choose how to start the universe thus has a choice as to what happens in it.
Then that god has ultimate and complete responsibility for everything that happens in it.
In such a universe if I were to (for example) pick up an axe and go on a killing spree, I would have
been compelled to do so by a chain of immutable events started off by god at the beginning of time
and god would have known what my actions would be and would have indeed caused my actions
when god set the universe in motion.
In such a universe it would be predetermined precisely who would and would not qualify for heaven
as everyone's actions would have been fixed in advance by god.
There is no possible definition of free will that I will accept that allows you to say that a person in such a
universe has free will.
Free will MUST include the ability to choose ones thoughts and actions and in a deterministic universe where
all your thoughts and actions were pre-determined by events before your birth there is and can be no choice.
Originally posted by googlefudgeOK.. I understand the theory and as JS 357 suggested I read some articles on the topic.
If god knows the initial conditions of the universe perfectly, and the universe's state is perfectly
knowable by god at any point given perfect knowledge of the initial conditions...
Then the universe is by definition deterministic.
EVERYTHING that happens in it was determined and immutable from the moment it was created.
Thus in such a univer ...[text shortened]... he outcome of every event before hand in which case free will is impossible.
pick one.
So in the anthill example. After the ants got flooded out they can choose to go east, west, north or south to set up their new home. Only I know what is going on in those directions and I know that they will die if they dont go North, lets say.
How does my knowledge stop the ants from exercising their free will to choose a direction.
How does Gods perfect knowledge stop us from using our limited knowledge to make decisions.
Or is it that you are defining free will differently from me?
Originally posted by googlefudgeAlthough there is no causal link between knowing that X (even infallibly* knowing that X) and X actually happening, I think the logic works something like this:
Oh hell I am not reading all that.
If you want to take issue with my statement/argument that it's impossible to have free will
in a deterministic universe then do it yourself in your own words.
In the hypothetical scenario where the universe was created by a god.
That universe is deterministic so that everything that will ever happen in it i ts and actions were pre-determined by events before your birth there is and can be no choice.
1. G knows that X;
2. G’s knowledge is infallible;
3. it is possible that ~X.
But 3. contradicts 1. and 2., and results in a reductio ad absurdum. Thus, it is illogical to suggest a state of affairs in which an infallibly knowing being can be wrong. Even infallible knowing does not cause the known effect, but if there is not some (known or unknown) deterministic mechanism that ensures that X, then you can have an absurd result.
If by “free will” (whether of the libertarian or compatibilist varieties) one means that one can exercise effective choice of outcomes (e.g., ~X), then G’s infallible knowing is logically inconsistent with that “free will”. The “free will” version of the above reductio might look like this:
1. G knows that P does X;
2. G’s knowledge is infallible;
3. it is possible that P does ~X.
Again, this proposes nothing more than that positing the conjunction of (a) infallible knowledge of an event, and (b) the possibility that an agent can effectively choose otherwise leads to logical contradiction. (I want to thank FreakyKBH and ConrauK for arguing with me about previous incarnations of this argument, which at least resulted in this reduced form that does not employ any temporal language, and my specifying “effective choice” being entailed by “free will”. They may or may not agree with the result, and logical corrections are certainly welcome.)
At bottom, while it is strictly incorrect to say that the universe is deterministic because of G's infallible knowing, it is correct to say that G's infallible knowing is not logically consistent with alternate possible outcomes, whether effected by free human agency or not.
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* Although fallibilism is the more accepted epistemic view, it is not compatible with the omniscience normally predicated of god.
Originally posted by SwissGambitWell, at least I am concluding from the discussion that from the POV of an omni-god (God) there would no random events in the universe created by that god. All events would be either directly willed without any dependence on causes, or would be in keeping with God-established cause and effect "laws"; these laws being put in place without dependence on causes.
However, until it is....
It is a strange concept.
The rest of this discussion seems to concern whether the power to cause things can be delegated by God to the natural creatures, and what responsibility goes along with this delegation.
But that doesn't seem any more strange.
Originally posted by googlefudgeCompatibilism is the position that free will is compatible with determinism.
Free will MUST include the ability to choose ones thoughts and actions and in a deterministic universe where
all your thoughts and actions were pre-determined by events before your birth there is and can be no choice.
Once we throw out the idea that choices are only free if there was a possibility of choosing otherwise, there is no problem with this view. In fact, it makes more sense than the idea that there is some random element affecting my choices.
Originally posted by vistesdHmm, I thought from previous discussions here that a compatibilist would reject 3) in the 2nd argument. If so, a theist who is a compatibilist is not troubled by the argument.
Although there is no causal link between knowing that X (even infallibly* knowing that X) and X actually happening, I think the logic works something like this:
1. G knows that X;
2. G’s knowledge is infallible;
3. it is possible that ~X.
But 3. contradicts 1. and 2., and results in a reductio ad absurdum. Thus, it is illogical to suggest accepted epistemic view, it is not compatible with the omniscience normally predicated of god.