Spirituality
01 Jun 10
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04 Jun 10
I agree that God's omniscience does not threaten compatibilist free will.
I wonder whether believers in omniscience and libertarian free will think a bit like this: when we make a choice, imagine a solid line from the past to the present which splits into several possible futures, represented by dotted lines fanning out from the decision point. It is only when we make our choice that one of the branches becomes the path we traverse through time and becomes solid as we move along it.
Now the reason god knows our future choices is because god has a view from nowhen. God can see the branch points and the dotted futures and also the paths taken. I can see why this might seem to reconcile omniscience with libertarian free will.
I am a compatibilist and regard the notion of libertarian free will as incoherent.
04 Jun 10
Yeah, just to clarify for palynka's benefit...I talk about the libertarian notion of free-will in that a choice is truly free independent of coercion or other inputs. Compatibilism seems to relax the definition of "free" such that an act is free if it is not forced by some agent. Whether that action was governed in any deterministic sense (for example the configuration of my brain at any time, and the interaction between myself and local environment) has no bearing on "free-ness".
I don't champion this definition of free.
04 Jun 10
4 edits
Originally posted by Lord SharkThe model of omniscience+ libertarian free will you put there fails, in my opinion, to capture the notion that some particular branch was known in advance. That is, I wouldn't argue against the idea that God having knowledge of all possible states of my existence impacts upon my libertarian free will until state_N is said to be known in advance.
I agree that God's omniscience does not threaten compatibilist free will.
I wonder whether believers in omniscience and libertarian free will think a bit like this: when we make a choice, imagine a solid line from the past to the present which splits into several possible futures, represented by dotted lines fanning out from the decision point. It is o ...[text shortened]... ree will.
I am a compatibilist and regard the notion of libertarian free will as incoherent.
Furthermore, as a determinist in the incompatibilist sense I also find the notion of libertarian freewill incoherent.
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04 Jun 10
Originally posted by AgergOriginally posted by Agerg
The model of omniscience+ libertarian free will you put there fails, in my opinion, to capture the notion that some particular branch was known in advance. That is, I wouldn't argue against the idea that God having knowledge of all possible states of my existence impacts upon my libertarian free will until state_N is said to be known in advance.
Furthermore ...[text shortened]... rminist in the incompatibilist sense I also find the notion of libertarian freewill incoherent.
I agree that there is some justification for regarding the 'free' as a bit of a misnomer in the compatibilist version of free will. But as with music, I think constraints on freedom are good. Structure constrains but also facilitates.
The model of omniscience+ libertarian free will you put there fails, in my opinion, to capture the notion that some particular branch was known in advance.
It does, but for a particular reason: for this god there is no 'in advance'. That's the point. God sees your choice results. The theist can be forgiven for thinking this does not entail that there was no choice in the first place.
That is, I wouldn't argue against the idea that God having knowledge of all possible states of my existence impacts upon my libertarian free will until state_N is said to be known in advance.
Recall the logical argument quoted from the other thread:
1. G knows in advance that S will do A.
2. It is not possible both that G believes S will do A and that S refrain from doing A (infallibility).
3. G believes S will do A (entailed by 1). So from 1 and 2, it is not possible that S refrain from doing A.
4. If it is not possible that S refrain from doing A, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A.
5. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A, then S is not free with respect to A.
6. Hence, If God knows (infallibly) in advance that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to A.
G 'knows in advance' you see. Presumably if G had known in retrospect instead, the argument would lose force. But for god, there is no 'advance' or 'retrospect'.
Furthermore, as a determinist in the incompatibilist sense I also find the notion of libertarian freewill incoherent.
So we agree and disagree. Splendid!
05 Jun 10
Originally posted by Lord SharkI know of the argument (and use it myself, albeit not usually so formally as I should). You say that there is no "advance", to a point I agree with you since supposing some god is unbound to our timeline, in "nowhen" (with whatever temporal properties allow for it to 'get things done' in nowhen) then from *it's* perspective the word is meaningless.
Originally posted by Agerg
I agree that there is some justification for regarding the 'free' as a bit of a misnomer in the compatibilist version of free will. But as with music, I think constraints on freedom are good. Structure constrains but also facilitates.
[b]The model of omniscience+ libertarian free will you put there fails, in my opin ...[text shortened]... notion of libertarian freewill incoherent.
So we agree and disagree. Splendid![/b]
However, from our perspective I don't see why it is wrong to talk about advance or prior knowledge when it is claimed that for all points on our timeline (as we play out our transient 'mortal' lives on it) there exists an entity, possibly independent of it who is omniscient and can see our future(s) as effortlessly as it sees our past(s). I don't see how it is profitable to try and talk from the perspective of an entity who's very nature of existence (supernatural) renders it impossible to say anything with justified conviction.
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05 Jun 10
Originally posted by AgergYes I think there is an all-bets-are-off aspect to such a god. This is partly what gives god-talk its enduring appeal I think.
I know of the argument (and use it myself, albeit not usually so formally as I should). You say that there is no "advance", to a point I agree with you since supposing some god is unbound to our timeline, in "nowhen" (with whatever temporal properties allow for it to 'get things done' in nowhen) then from *it's* perspective the word is meaningless.
Ho ...[text shortened]... ence (supernatural) renders it impossible to say anything with justified conviction.
I wonder whether it does make sense to talk of god's knowledge as prior, even from our perspective. Surely from our perspective the best we can do is to say god's knowledge is eternal?
The point is, if a temporally bound agent G knows infallibly at time t that you will do A at time t + 1, then by the quoted argument, you were not free at time t with respect to A. But why not? Perhaps there is a tacit assumption that the only way G could know infallibly that you would do A at t +1, is if it is true at time t that at t + 1, you will do A.
But of course, this is not the case for god.
Do you see what I mean?
06 Jun 10
3 edits
I had an epiphany of sorts today on the subject of an all poweful and all knowing God and the ability to inact free will. If God so CHOOSES, could he create without wanting to know the end result? In short, could an all powerful God CHOOSE not to be all knowing at the initial time of the creative act?
There is no getting around the notion that in order for us to have free will, an all powerful God would have to CHOOSE to relinquish his "powers" in some form or fashion at some point and on some level. He would then have to relinquish his power of being all knowing as well as over direct control over our free will. Of course, after the fact he could then look at what the future held. This would explain his ability to prophesize.
06 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by whodeyThere is no getting around the notion that in order for us to have free will, an all powerful God would have to CHOOSE to relinquish his "powers" in some form or fashion at some point and on some level.
I had an epiphany of sorts today on the subject of an all poweful and all knowing God and the ability to inact free will. If God so CHOOSES, could he create without wanting to know the end result? In short, could an all powerful God CHOOSE not to be all knowing at the initial time of the creative act?
There is no getting around the notion that in order act he could then look at what the future held. This would explain his ability to prophesize.
I think that is false. Adopt some form of compatibilism, for example. Then there will be no tension between free will and an omnipotent, omniscient God. What I have come to understand from my studies on the issue of free will is that (1) libertarian versions of free will are nearly always the ones that appeal most readily to first-order "common sense" takes on free will and (2) despite (1), all libertarian versions of free will are hopelessly incoherent upon deeper scrutiny.
If, however, you retain a libertarian or incompatibilist version of free will, then, yes, you may need to make sacrifices in the way you outline. Alternatively, you may be able to get around the fatalist problem by working with the notion God as "eternal", as Lord Shark has been outlining. However, I think this also ends up being hopelessly incoherent when conjoined with some of the other commitments you have for God. (I think I will start a separate thread for discussion about that.)
06 Jun 10
Originally posted by LemonJelloOr he could always give up the claim that propositions about future events have truth-values. This courts its own risks, however. By the way, LJ, I read through that nice little argument of yours on the previous page. Do you have any concerns about the way the possibility operators function in the move from premise 2 to premise 3?
[b]There is no getting around the notion that in order for us to have free will, an all powerful God would have to CHOOSE to relinquish his "powers" in some form or fashion at some point and on some level.
I think that is false. Adopt some form of compatibilism, for example. Then there will be no tension between free will and an omnipotent, omnis ...[text shortened]... nts you have for God. (I think I will start a separate thread for discussion about that.)[/b]
06 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrOr he could always give up the claim that propositions about future events have truth-values.
Or he could always give up the claim that propositions about future events have truth-values. This courts its own risks, however. By the way, LJ, I read through that nice little argument of yours on the previous page. Do you have any concerns about the way the possibility operators function in the move from premise 2 to premise 3?
Yes, I agree.
By the way, LJ, I read through that nice little argument of yours on the previous page. Do you have any concerns about the way the possibility operators function in the move from premise 2 to premise 3?
I'm not aware of a problem with the move from 2 to 3 (or with the reasoning: A; it is not possible that both A and B; therefore, not B), but if you see a problem here I would be interested to know what you think.
Also, generally, I have major problems understanding the modal construal when it concerns infallibilism (or if there is any default understanding to be had). For example, if we look at a somewhat general infallibilist thesis like "S knows P on basis b only if it is not possible that S has b and P is false"; what is the understanding of "not possible"? This is something I struggled with when I formulated the fatalist argument. I think at the end of the day, I concluded that the success of such an argument (whether or not the considerations of possibility we are talking about actually end up precluding something like libertarian free will) may need to be modified ad hoc, depending on what the theist may actually mean concerning the non-possibility of God's being mistaken, or something like that. I would be interested in your ideas on that as well.
06 Jun 10
2 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloO.K., but this is preliminary and I need to keep thinking about it.
[b]Or he could always give up the claim that propositions about future events have truth-values.
Yes, I agree.
By the way, LJ, I read through that nice little argument of yours on the previous page. Do you have any concerns about the way the possibility operators function in the move from premise 2 to premise 3?
I'm not aware of a pro ng mistaken, or something like that. I would be interested in your ideas on that as well.[/b]
Your argument makes a move from premise 2 to 3 that goes, in outline, as follows:
1) It is not possible that (P & Q)
2) P
3) Therefore, it is not possible that Q
Now suppose that Q is just the negation of P. If we substitute accordingly we get the following argument:
1) It is not possible that (P & ~P)
2) P
3) Therefore, it is not possible that ~P
But, in modal logic, the possibility and necessity operators are interdefinable.
The locution ‘it is not possible that…’ means the very same thing as ‘necessarily, it is not the case that…’. So, the conclusion ‘It is not possible that ~P’ means the very same thing as ‘Necessarily, it is not the case that ~P’. But since double negations cancel out, this entails ‘Necessarily P’.
This should be worrisome. After all, we can substitute any proposition for P. It apparently follows from repeated application of your argument that every true proposition is necessarily true (e.g., It is not possible that it is both raining and not raining. It is raining. Therefore, it is not possible that it is not raining. Therefore, necessarily it is not the case that it is not raining. Therefore, necessarily it is raining.) But I bet you think that some truths are only contingent. If the rain here in Seattle was logically necessary, I'd probably hang myself.
What do you think?
With regard to the infallibilist thesis, I think the claim is that it is not possible that the conjunction of those two propositions is true. But I do not think that from this you can legitimately infer anything about the modal status of of either of the conjuncts. Or, anyway, this is how it initially seems to me. I am going to have to go back to by notes on modal logic proofs.
06 Jun 10
Originally posted by bbarrOh, snap. I see the problem you are alluding to now. Actually, in my previous post I made the mistake of saying that my reasoning was A; it is not possible that both A and B; therefore, not B. Actually, as you point out, the reasoning in my argument is actually A; it is not possible that both A and B; therefore, it is not possible that B. Yes, I see now that this looks problematic.
O.K., but this is preliminary and I need to keep thinking about it.
Your argument makes a move from premise 2 to 3 that goes, in outline, as follows:
1) It is not possible that (P & Q)
2) P
3) Therefore, it is not possible that Q
Now suppose that Q is just the negation of P. If we substitute accordingly we get the following argument:
1) It is no ...[text shortened]... rain here in Seattle was logically necessary, I'd probably hang myself.
What do you think?
I think I can probably amend the argument. Let me give this a think and return to it....
I do not want to give the impression that we are concluding to the idea that B is a non-possibility, per se, but rather that the non-possibility of B is here contingent on A obtaining.
06 Jun 10
Originally posted by PBE6to PBE6
I have yet to hear a satisfactory response to the question of why an omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent God would allow a child to be sexually molested.
God is removed from the mundane goings on of the world, and the child who is molested has their own karma to deal with, we do not know the karma of another but karma is the same as cause and affect.
which means that for a child to be molested, they would have set that up, on some level unbeknown to us, any how the body is temporary, and the spiritual beng within is unaffected by the materiel condition.
god is not like a human person, like the christians would have you beleive, but god is the energy and substance of the universe and beyond, and their is no such thing as good and bad in gods mind
cheers vishvahetu
06 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloHow about this:
Oh, snap. I see the problem you are alluding to now. Actually, in my previous post I made the mistake of saying that my reasoning was A; it is not possible that both A and B; therefore, not B. Actually, as you point out, the reasoning in my argument is actually A; it is not possible that both A and B; therefore, it is not possible that B. Yes, I see n ...[text shortened]... possibility, per se, but rather that the non-possibility of B is here contingent on A obtaining.
P: God knows that you will A.
Q: You do not A.
L: Libertarianism is true.
1) Necessarily ~(P & Q)
Since it is logically impossible to know something that is false, the use of the modal operator in this premise is justified by the definition of 'know'.
2) So, necessarily (P > ~Q)
This simply follows from the derivation rules of first-order logic.
3) So, (necessarily P > necessarily ~Q).
This is a rule of modal logic, and should seem intuitive. If it is necessary that if P, then ~Q, then if P is necessary, ~Q is necessary too. Or, to put the point in terms of possible-worlds semantics, (3) claims that every possible world is such that if P, then ~Q. So, if every possible world is such that P, then ~Q will be the case in each of those worlds as well.
4) Necessarily P.
This is justified on the basis of the theist's own commitment to a definition of God that entails that He is infallible, and on the definition of infallibility. After all, it's not possible that God is wrong, is it?
5) Therefore, necessarily ~Q
Modus ponens.
6) Suppose L.
For the purposes of a reductio ad absurdum.
7) Then, possibly Q
This follows from the traditional libertarian account of free will.
8) But, ~ possibly Q
This is just a translation of line (5) above, in accord with the translation rules for modal operators. If something is necessarily not the case, then it is not possible that it is the case.
9) So, (possibly Q & ~ possibly Q)
Just the conjunction of (7) and (8).
10) Therefore, ~ L
Here just discharging the earlier supposition by showing it leads to a contradiction. Of course, since the argument till now is also assuming that God exists and is infallible, somebody committed to libertarianism could just as well reject one of those claims to dissolve the contradiction.
What do you think? You can still derive the result that there are no contingent truths, but in this argument that follows from the notion of infallibility, and how it allows us to infer (4). Rather than this unpalatable result following from our modal inferences, it follows from the theist's own commitment to infallibility. And this seems accurate. If God knows every true proposition of necessity, then it is impossible that he could be wrong. But since he could only be wrong by merely believing a proposition that turned out to be false, it must be impossible for any proposition He believes to be false. But since He believes all true propositions, it is impossible for any true proposition to be false. Hence, every true proposition is true necessarily, and there are no contingent truths. Independently of concerns about free will, this should be sufficient to get rid of these theistic commitments.