08 Mar 17
Originally posted by twhiteheadMy apologies, I misread it (and added an edit later admitting that).
Fair enough. No problem.
My personal opinions:
Person A: Plans to kill his wife with cyanide. He is about to put a cyanide pill in her tea, but she walks in on him and he doesn't so so.
Morally unsound. He planned the murder. He prepared the poison. He was in the act of carrying it out only for circumstances to make it not happen. I'd say it's morally unsound behaviour with some 'credit' [for want of a better word] for not going through with it.
Person B: Plans to kill his wife with cyanide. He is about to put a cyanide pill in her tea, and she doesn't walk in on him and he proceeds to do so and kills her.
Morally unsound.
Originally posted by Great King RatWell yes, I know what you mean. And I think you may be right. I remember Rank outsider once dismantling RJHinds completely over his belief in eternal torture and demonstrating that he did not actually believe it at all, or - at the very least - behaved as if he didn't believe it.
I get the feeling you're not actually trying to describe a person who believes these things, you're describing a person who merely gets a sense of self-satisfaction from having these thoughts and possibly tries to strenghten their own belief by making others have that same belief. Which, incidentally, is what I think might be true for a significant number of theists.
08 Mar 17
1 edit
Originally posted by FMFNo, not all. Forget about sonship if it makes it easier.
I don't have any objection to sonship peddling his torturer god creed to me. In fact, I cannot think of anything morally unsound that he has ever done or said to me. Does that answer your question in part?
Would this be a good summary of your OP?
FMF:
It's morally unsound for person A to use words to try and change person B's beliefs, even if A honestly believes B will burn in hell for all eternity if A doesn't try to change B
If so, how is it different from this situation: I see you approaching the train tracks and realise you will get hit by a passing train, because you're looking at your phone instead of where you're walking. I scream at the top of my lungs to try and change your impending doom. Is that morally unsound? What if it's not you I'm screaming at, but a mentally challenged child?
Edit: wrote this post before reading your follow-up. Ignore this if no longer relevant.
08 Mar 17
Not read the whole thread.
I think it's important to be able to distinguish between the actual, or at least what is meant by: sin, morality and criminality.
It is a sin to disobey a simple innocuous command from god, but that might not be immoral and certainly not a criminal act.
To look at a woman lustfully is described as sin in Bible and would generally be considered an immoral thought, but it's not a crime. It might not be immoral in some cultures.
To plan to kill someone is certainly a sin, certainly immoral but is that crime? At what point does it become a crime?
Originally posted by Great King RatWell sonship is going to do what he's going to do and all I can do is offer my evaluation of the moral dimension. In so far as I had the ability to control the situation and protect people who needed protection, I certainly wouldn't let him near anywhere near any child or vulnerable adult I had guardianship over or direct responsibility for unless he undertook to keep his noxious superstitions about revenge and violence to himself.
But what if sonship truly believes that you - or a vulnerable child - will go to hell unless you start believing the things he believes and act accordingly? Would it still be morally unsound to try and make you see "the truth" simply by talking to you? I'd say no. Wouldn't it be morally unsound in fact to do nothing?
If he were preaching his torturer god ideology to other children or to people with mental health problems or people who were educationally subnormal etc. it would be a fail, morally speaking, as far as I am concerned, on all three counts (them being, for me, no damage, no deception, no coercion) - obviously I think superstitious declarations about the moral perfection of torture are a deception, but let's put that aside for now as it is a moot point; but that still leaves damage and coercion.
Originally posted by Great King RatI am talking about the (psychological) damage you can do to an emotionally vulnerable person - who is unable perhaps to give informed consent about what superstitious notions he or she is exposed to and who, at the same time, might not be able to measure the authority and credibility of the person making the superstitiousclaims - by creating threats about invisible supernatural beings meting out torture as a punishment or attempting to coerce vulnerable people with such threats.
Would this be a good summary of your OP?
It's morally unsound for person A to use words to try and change person B's beliefs, even if A honestly believes B will burn in hell for all eternity if A doesn't try to change B
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08 Mar 17
Originally posted by twhiteheadYou stated 'all bad intentions are as bad as the actions they intend.'
So:
Person A: Plans to kill his wife with cyanide. He is about to put a cyanide pill in her tea, but she walks in on him and he doesn't so so.
Person B: Plans to kill his wife with cyanide. He is about to put a cyanide pill in her tea, and she doesn't walk in on him and he proceeds to do so and kills her.
In your opinion, Person A is morally blameless but person B deserves a life sentence or some equivalent punishment and is morally terrible?[/b]
However, to make the scenario of your Person A work you had to tender the extreme example of the action being halted by the wife walking in. - What if the action had been stopped instead by the husband having second thoughts or a twang of conscience? What if the intention turned out to be a dark fantasy that he couldn't go through with? - Would the intention still be 'as bad' as the action itself?
08 Mar 17
Originally posted by FMFNow suppose the poison was something that was always available, so he didn't 'prepare' it.
Morally unsound. He planned the murder. He prepared the poison. He was in the act of carrying it out only for circumstances to make it not happen. I'd say it's morally unsound behaviour with some 'credit' [for want of a better word] for not going through with it.
Now suppose that he wasn't quite yet 'in the act of carrying it out'.
Surely you can imagine a scenario in which no actions, but only thoughts took place and in which the lack of actions were in no way attributable to him but to some extraneous circumstances?
08 Mar 17
Originally posted by Ghost of a DukeAn intention that is just a 'dark fantasy you cannot go through with' is not equivalent to an intention that you will go through with.
You stated 'all bad intentions are as bad as the actions they intend.'
However, to make the scenario of your Person A work you had to tender the extreme example of the action being halted by the wife walking in. - What if the action had been stopped instead by the husband having second thoughts or a twang of conscience? What if the intention turne ...[text shortened]... that he couldn't go through with? - Would the intention still be 'as bad' as the action itself?
I am saying that it remains the intention not the action that renders one morally guilty - although I do recognize the concept of compensation.
I also recognize that intuitively we think there is reduced guilt if an action does not have as severe consequences as intended - eg if you shoot someone with intent to kill and miss, it is not as bad as if the bullet killed them. But I find it hard to actually justify such a stance in terms of moral accountability.
I must point out that it is usual when discussing the 'thought crime' concept for people to immediately confuse fantasy with real intent (not saying you are doing this). Thinking your neighbors wife is sexy and fantasizing about having an affair with her, is not the same as intending to have an affair with her.
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Originally posted by twhiteheadOkay, forget dark fantasy. What if an intended action is halted by self control?
An intention that is just a 'dark fantasy you cannot go through with' is not equivalent to an intention that you will go through with.
I am saying that it remains the intention not the action that renders one morally guilty - although I do recognize the concept of compensation.
I also recognize that intuitively we think there is reduced guilt if an acti ...[text shortened]... sizing about having an affair with her, is not the same as intending to have an affair with her.
What if Person A is intent on punching his manager on the nose, but when it comes to the point of action, musters the self control to walk away and calm down? Was his intention to punch his manager as bad as if he had actually carried out the action of punching him?
(Please answer quickly. Am seeing my manager at 4pm).
08 Mar 17
Originally posted by Ghost of a DukeIts hard to say. I think someone capable of calming down and walking away deserves more credit than some who isn't so capable. But I fail to see how the intention of one was any less blameworthy than the other.
Okay, forget dark fantasy. What if an intended action is halted by self control?
What if Person A is intent on punching his manager on the nose, but when it comes to the point of action, musters the self control to walk away and calm down? Was his intention to punch his manager as bad as if he had actually carried out the action of punching him?
Now suppose person C gets to the managers office and he isn't in. Is he less blameworthy than person B who actually punched his manager? If not, then we can say a persons blameworthyness is a sum of their mental activities including self control. If yes, then actions do matter.
(Please answer quickly. Am seeing my manager at 4pm).
And your decision on whether to punch him will be based on whether you think not doing so is blameworthy? ie since you've already committed the thought crime of planning to punch him, you might as well go ahead? I think there are flaws in that argument.