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30 Jul 11
Originally posted by bbarrHe may want that explanation, and may posit that the atheist is committed to the idea that the moral domain can be reduced to the material domain, but this is not a necessary commitment of atheism. Theists can also hold that moral values are not truth statements but are instead principles of behavior that are best explored, at least at present, at the anthropological, psychological and sociological level, although there is current research at the neurobiological level of internal reward and punishment systems.
OK, but I am unsure that your paraphrase is a fair characterization. Is Freaky committed to the claim that it is an entailment of atheism that the moral domain can be reduced to the material domain in a way that would qualify as algorithmic? In any case, I doubt Freaky simply wants an explanation of how moral beliefs could arise in creatures like us. He wan ...[text shortened]... ms. At least, I think that's what he wants. He'll have to correct me here if I'm wrong.
30 Jul 11
Originally posted by JS357Of course the atheist isn't committed to the reduction of the moral to the material, or even the supervenience of the moral on the material. An atheist could be an error theorist, for instance. But Freaky's OP is addressed to the moral atheist. By which I take him to mean atheists who think both that there are objective moral facts, and that those facts give us reasons (or, stronger, obligations) to act certain ways, cultivate certain traits, be particular sorts of people, etc. In other words, he would be unsatisfied (as would I) by a deflationary account of morality that eschews talk of truth and contents itself to explain why we have moral beliefs but not whether those beliefs are justified.
He may want that explanation, and may posit that the atheist is committed to the idea that the moral domain can be reduced to the material domain, but this is not a necessary commitment of atheism. Theists can also hold that moral values are not truth statements but are instead principles of behavior that are best explored, at least at present, at the anthropo ...[text shortened]... here is current research at the neurobiological level of internal reward and punishment systems.
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31 Jul 11
Originally posted by bbarrI didn't take it that way (moral atheist = those who think all that) but won't argue for how to take it. Cheers.
Of course the atheist isn't committed to the reduction of the moral to the material, or even the supervenience of the moral on the material. An atheist could be an error theorist, for instance. But Freaky's OP is addressed to the moral atheist. By which I take him to mean atheists who think both that there are objective moral facts, and that those facts giv ...[text shortened]... tents itself to explain why we have moral beliefs but not whether those beliefs are justified.
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31 Jul 11
Originally posted by bbarrIn other words, he would be unsatisfied (as would I) by a deflationary account of morality that eschews talk of truth and contents itself to explain why we have moral beliefs but not whether those beliefs are justified
Of course the atheist isn't committed to the reduction of the moral to the material, or even the supervenience of the moral on the material. An atheist could be an error theorist, for instance. But Freaky's OP is addressed to the moral atheist. By which I take him to mean atheists who think both that there are objective moral facts, and that those facts giv ...[text shortened]... tents itself to explain why we have moral beliefs but not whether those beliefs are justified.
I don't think settling whether moral beliefs are justified can be done without explaining how those believes are justified (explaining the process) and it might also not be satisfied without actually justifying specific moral beliefs using that process. For example, WRT process, one process would be consequentialism, another would be reliance on a purported source of divine revelation, etc., and then the soundness of these AS PROCESSES can be discussed. In terms of actual justification, specific examples, such as the morality of extortion, could be looked at. I choose extortion because it is not a "hot topic."
Originally posted by JS357Consequentialism is not a process, it is a general category under which particular accounts of the good (and, hence, the right or obligatory) are subsumed. There are utilitarian and egoist versions, direct and indirect versions, act and rule and character and global versions, etc. You don't get a full-fledged moral theory, or an account of proper moral deliberation, or an account of the justification of moral beliefs until you specify some particulars.
[b] In other words, he would be unsatisfied (as would I) by a deflationary account of morality that eschews talk of truth and contents itself to explain why we have moral beliefs but not whether those beliefs are justified
I don't think settling whether moral beliefs are justified can be done without explaining how those believes are justified (explaini ...[text shortened]... orality of extortion, could be looked at. I choose extortion because it is not a "hot topic."[/b]
But, in any case, I wonder whether you'd also claim, about non-moral knowledge claims, that you can't settle justificatory questions without having a well-worked out general theory of epistemic justification. You probably shouldn't claim this, since we assess accounts of epistemic justification at least partly on the basis of their implications regarding claims we take ourselves to clearly know. Particular knowledge claims are, in other words, epistemically prior to accounts of justification.
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01 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrMaybe to advance this, you could provide an example of a non-moral and a moral claim and how each is to be handled.
Consequentialism is not a process, it is a general category under which particular accounts of the good (and, hence, the right or obligatory) are subsumed. There are utilitarian and egoist versions, direct and indirect versions, act and rule and character and global versions, etc. You don't get a full-fledged moral theory, or an account of proper moral delib ...[text shortened]... ular knowledge claims are, in other words, epistemically prior to accounts of justification.
01 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrHey, bbarr. Nice to see you in the ring again. Always a treat to watch an expert in the field.
So, Freaky, you seem to be claiming that atheists are committed, by virtue of their atheism, to a certain explanatory program with regard to morality. Moreover, this explanatory program must end with facts that are physical or material; facts like those we find in physics, chemistry, etc. If so, you are essentially challenging the atheist to present an argum ...[text shortened]... nothing more than personal preference or subjective opinion. Is this a fair characterization?
If, by saying "explanatory program" you refer to my presumption of a natural cause to existence as the precursor to the eventual state of morality, then the answer is yes. I think the question boils down to (again) the presumption of existence's cause (naturalism) and the rise of morality. LJ has gone to great lengths to avoid the question of origin (those pesky brute facts), but I contend that--- whether articulated or not--- an idea of origin exists.
If nature has always been (in whatever form), then morality is the equivalent of earrings, or perhaps a brooch on an otherwise resplendent ensemble. And, speaking of 'resplendent,' even that cannot really matter, since the universe will be burping forth another iteration of itself within short order.
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01 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHPerhaps in your view of the naturalist interpretation, you are lowering the status of morality to your view of the status of earrings, whereas elevation of the status of earrings to the status of morality is more in order, or is at least, an alternative, one you seem to reject as possible under the naturalist interpretation. The same would go for this iteration of the universe as against any other, or against their totality. Perhaps all is resplendent, and you don't see that.
Hey, bbarr. Nice to see you in the ring again. Always a treat to watch an expert in the field.
If, by saying "explanatory program" you refer to my presumption of a natural cause to existence as the precursor to the eventual state of morality, then the answer is yes. I think the question boils down to (again) the presumption of existence's cause (natur ...[text shortened]... r, since the universe will be burping forth another iteration of itself within short order.
01 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357LOL.... good one!
order: morality -- religion -- leisure --beer -- philosophy.
perhaps it may have come about like this...
God, man, woman, marriage, nag,nag,nag,nag,nag, nag,nag,nag,nag,nag, nag,nag,nag,nag,nag,nag,nag,nag,nag,nag, left-over food & ferment grape juice = philosophy 🙂
01 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHHey Freaky, nice to see you, too! I hope everything is going well on your end.
Hey, bbarr. Nice to see you in the ring again. Always a treat to watch an expert in the field.
If, by saying "explanatory program" you refer to my presumption of a natural cause to existence as the precursor to the eventual state of morality, then the answer is yes. I think the question boils down to (again) the presumption of existence's cause (natur ...[text shortened]... r, since the universe will be burping forth another iteration of itself within short order.
I admit to being confused about the relevance of questions of ultimate origins to accounts of why morality is authoritative or binding, or, less strongly, why it gives us practical reasons (reasons to act, live, or be a certain way). Suppose that the theist is correct, and that God is author of creation, writes morality into the fabric of the world, or on the hearts of men, or whatever. It is still a sensible question "But why do I have reason to abide by the dictates of morality?" The theist will have an answer. In fact, they have several (e.g., Because you will be rewarded or punished accordingly [the egoistic answer], or because it is your function as the type of creature you are to act in accord with morality [the Thomist/Aristotelian answer], or because it is the best bet for living a flourishing life [the Eudaimonist answer], or...). The atheist can, and has, used similar strategies (and others besides) to answer the same basic question. Now, if you think that the theist's strategy here is on better footing, because grounded in a conception of God, then I guess I'd like to know why.
01 Aug 11
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Originally posted by FreakyKBHLJ has gone to great lengths to avoid the question of origin (those pesky brute facts), but I contend that--- whether articulated or not--- an idea of origin exists.
Hey, bbarr. Nice to see you in the ring again. Always a treat to watch an expert in the field.
If, by saying "explanatory program" you refer to my presumption of a natural cause to existence as the precursor to the eventual state of morality, then the answer is yes. I think the question boils down to (again) the presumption of existence's cause (natur r, since the universe will be burping forth another iteration of itself within short order.
You contend that "an idea of origin exists"? Not to be a broken record, but I confess I do not know what that means. Anyway, you still have not explained why an atheist would need to have some account of cosmological origins in order to, say, explain what he thinks a moral value is.
As it regards "those pesky brute facts", I remind you that when I brought up the subject of brute facts, it had nothing specifically to do with the subject of origins. That was imported in by your poor reading of my earlier comments. I simply brought up the subject of brute facts as one counterexample (out of a whole list of them) against your absurd implication that atheists are committed to the idea that the laws of physics/chemistry explain simply everything.
At any rate, if you think brute facts are really all that "pesky", then it's quite incredible to think that you would be much satisifed with your own view as you have expressed it. You already said that, for you, the fact of God's existence is simply brute. Your position, it would seem, is particularly awkward in this respect. For example, on one hand, you seem to think (for some nonobvious and heretofore unexplained reason) that in order for one to explain what she thinks a moral value is, she needs to be able to give some ultimate account of origins and do so in such a way as to avoid those "pesky" brute facts; on the other hand, your own account of [enter just about anything at all here] ultimately terminates with...a brute fact -- some nebulous creature whose existence is inexplicable. If ultimate explanatory power is what you are looking for, it is a delusion to think your God-creature fits the bill. Is this "pesky brute fact" talk just a case where thou presumest to take out a speck from the atheist's eye whilst having a log in thine own?
01 Aug 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloIf you want to talk about termites, take it to the science forum.
[b]LJ has gone to great lengths to avoid the question of origin (those pesky brute facts), but I contend that--- whether articulated or not--- an idea of origin exists.
You contend that "an idea of origin exists"? Not to be a broken record, but I confess I do not know what that means. Anyway, you still have not explained why an atheist would need ...[text shortened]... sumest to take out a speck from the atheist's eye whilst having a log in thine own?[/b]