Questions for the moral atheist

Originally posted by bbarr
How, exactly, does this avoid the Euthyphro dilemma? Is God perfectly good because he perfectly adheres to independent standards of goodness, or is he perfectly good because he is definitive of standards of goodness? If the first, then goodness is not dependent on God. If the second, then goodness is essentially an arbitrary affair. It's the same problem. u read any serious moral philosophy, or do you just throw out these allegations willy-nilly?

Is God perfectly good because he perfectly adheres to independent standards of goodness, or is he perfectly good because he is definitive of standards of goodness? If the first, then goodness is not dependent on God. If the second, then goodness is essentially an arbitrary affair.

All this shows is that there is an infinite regress of moral standards, and if there are any moral standards at all, there must be a supreme moral standard. But God, in Alston's reformulation of the DCT, is that least arbitrary stopping point.

It's fine, I guess, for you to claim that atheists are stuck grounding morality in convention, but I see no reason to take that seriously in the absence of an argument... I mean, have you read any serious moral philosophy, or do you just throw out these allegations willy-nilly?

Point taken. I guess I'm just skeptical of the possibility of establishing moral obligation based on the 'is' statements of science. I'm sure professional philosophers have concocted elaborate and subtle theories showing how that is accomplished, I just don't see how any of them could ultimately succeed. But, yes, there are of course certain atheist materialists who do not ground morality in convention.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Is God perfectly good because he perfectly adheres to independent standards of goodness, or is he perfectly good because he is definitive of standards of goodness? If the first, then goodness is not dependent on God. If the second, then goodness is essentially an arbitrary affair.

All this shows is that there is an infinite regress of moral sta ...[text shortened]... here are of course certain atheist materialists who do not ground morality in convention.[/b]

I don't understand this reluctance to acknowledge the very real reasons, when we are discussing it rationally, to conclude that morality is grounded in convention. Humans are intelligent, language-using social animals. The conventions in which morality are grounded are conventions upon which societies depend, to enable the expression of two essential human needs: freedom and security. It is clear that being a member of society enhances our ability to be free and secure. These needs are universally expressed, to the extent that they are given the status of universal rights. People can come into conflict over their preferred way of expressing these rights. Morality involves many things, but makes use of powerful emotions in the handling of these conflicts. There is much more that can be said about this, but I only want to express the fact that the utility and power of morality as a system of regulating human behavior is not diminished by acknowledging its grounding in convention.

After all, the phrase "We hold these truths to be self evident..." begins with "We hold." That makes everything that follows, a convention, an intersubjective agreement.

Yes, societies universally enshrine their morality in whatever institutions can help ensure that the moral code is a central part of the society, including the family, religion, community groups, government, you name it. And perhaps it is essential that some members of the society have genuine belief in a divine source of a society's morality. But this belief does not make it so. Even if there were such a source, all we can do is approximate what it would want of us, and test the truth of our approximations in our daily lives.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Is God perfectly good because he perfectly adheres to independent standards of goodness, or is he perfectly good because he is definitive of standards of goodness? If the first, then goodness is not dependent on God. If the second, then goodness is essentially an arbitrary affair.

All this shows is that there is an infinite regress of moral sta ...[text shortened]... here are of course certain atheist materialists who do not ground morality in convention.[/b]

I guess I'm just skeptical of the possibility of establishing moral obligation based on the 'is' statements of science. I'm sure professional philosophers have concocted elaborate and subtle theories showing how that is accomplished, I just don't see how any of them could ultimately succeed.

There must be some confusion here. To say that an atheist does not ground his morality in convention is not to say that he grounds his morality in purely descriptive 'is' claims. As I have already tried to say to Freaky, atheists are in no way committed to grounding their morality in purely descriptive claims. Further, it is not at all clear that one could do so, even in principle, since conclusions inferred from wholly descriptive 'is' claims would still have to rely on norms regarding justification and inference -- norms which themselves could not be justified in any non-circular fashion. It's quite unreasonable for you or Freaky or anyone else to suggest that the atheist is committed to grounding his morality in purely descriptive claims. Presumably you think that, otherwise, the atheist suffers from some circularity problem with respect to the normative. But, in fact, that is a "problem" that exists quite generally. Are you under the impression that you do not suffer from exactly the same "problem"? Ha!

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Is God perfectly good because he perfectly adheres to independent standards of goodness, or is he perfectly good because he is definitive of standards of goodness? If the first, then goodness is not dependent on God. If the second, then goodness is essentially an arbitrary affair.

All this shows is that there is an infinite regress of moral sta ...[text shortened]... here are of course certain atheist materialists who do not ground morality in convention.[/b]

Euthyphro-type dilemmas concern explanatory priority; by themselves they do not generate any regresses (infinite or otherwise). For a regress, you'd need some ancillary assumptions. Consider a Euthyphro-type dilemma applied to the view that it is general social agreement that determines the content of morality. The question would be "Is X good because we all agree to it, or do we agree to X because it's good?" If the former, there is no regress. The claim is that the explanation for morality simply bottoms-out in the general agreement. If the later, then there may be a further question about the goodness of X, our knowledge of it, what explains it, etc. Suppose the theorist claims that, actually, we agree to X because it yields pleasure, and that pleasure is a fundamental good. Here is a different explanation of the goodness of X, identifying goodness with the presence of a natural property. So, no regress. The question is where the explanation bottoms out, on whichever account. You claim that there must be some supreme moral standard, but I don't see why. There could be a plurality of distinct goods, or a bevy of principles. Ross, for instance, thought there were both fundamental goods and prima facie principles, justified on the basis of intuition, and balanced via cultivated moral judgment (similar to Aristotle's notion of phronesis).

Honestly, I'm not sure why you think that, as stopping points go, God is the least arbitrary. God has His character essentially, so He couldn't have been otherwise. His character is not contingent, it is true. But suppose I am wondering why I should be a good person. DCT would have me believe that, ultimately, I should be a good person because the term 'good' is simply defined as that which coheres with the character of some entity. But why should I care about that? The DCT account of morality is arbitrary from the point of view of a moral inquirer who is looking for practical reasons. And to the extent that you start giving me reasons to be good that have nothing to do with the mere fact that 'good' is defined by God's character, you are engaged in a different sort of explanatory enterprise. I guess I prefer my moral theories to have stopping points that relate to areas of natural human concern (e.g., love, fellowship, compassion, trust, respect, etc.) But that's why I'm a virtue-ethicist, I guess; I think morality is essentially for us, and must ultimately end up being explained and justified on the basis of that about which, by nature, we are disposed to deeply care.

Actually, moral philosophers don't typically try to ground morality in descriptive scientific claims. Why would they? Ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, political philosophy, etc. are normative enterprises. We want our theories to be consistent with the best established results of inquiry in other domains, of course, but we don't think that claims about what should be the case, or what is good, reasonable, beautiful, etc. can be settled on scientific grounds.

Originally posted by JS357
I don't understand this reluctance to acknowledge the very real reasons, when we are discussing it rationally, to conclude that morality is grounded in convention. Humans are intelligent, language-using social animals. The conventions in which morality are grounded are conventions upon which societies depend, to enable the expression of two essential human nee ...[text shortened]... ate what it would want of us, and test the truth of our approximations in our daily lives.

What a strange post. You claim that morality is grounded in social convention, but then go on to explain that these conventions are themselves explained and justified by reference to their contribution to freedom and security. Surely, then, on your view, morality is grounded in certain fundamental human concerns; namely, the very ones you mention. And although I think your conception is anemic (since there are other fundamental human concerns), and narrow (since morality, broadly speaking, involves much more than the regulation of behavior), you are right that many particular moral judgments both 1) are expressed idiosyncratically cross-culturally, which indicates some conventional dependence, and 2) aim at addressing issues of fundamental human concern; that is, are deeply grounded in facts about the type of creature we are, the ills to which we're susceptible and the concerns that naturally motivate us.

Originally posted by bbarr
What a strange post. You claim that morality is grounded in social convention, but then go on to explain that these conventions are themselves explained and justified by reference to their contribution to freedom and security. Surely, then, on your view, morality is grounded in certain fundamental human concerns; namely, the very ones you mention. And altho ...[text shortened]... eature we are, the ills to which we're susceptible and the concerns that naturally motivate us.

That's good enough for me. Add other fundamental human concerns, involve more than the regulation of behavior, as appropriate.

Originally posted by avalanchethecat
It is not a side-step. I have stated that it is my belief that it is in the nature of man to discern and develop ethically and morally correct behaviour, given sufficient wisdom and consideration. Is it not clear then that I believe that morals pre-date any religion? In fact, I think it likely that it is from the realisation of the value of ethically and morally correct behaviour that most religions spring.

So your view is that morals pre-date any religion.
Now if religion started "thousands" of years ago and morals pre-dated that, so we assume that "early/ancient" man came up with these morals.

So now, the modern man with his much more developed intellect should be able to come up with at least one, if not ten, NEW morals which are not to be found in any of the major religions?

In other words can you find/list at least one new moral /ethic that was "invented" by an atheist philosopher / thinker?

Originally posted by shahenshah
So your view is that morals pre-date any religion.
Now if religion started "thousands" of years ago and morals pre-dated that, so we assume that "early/ancient" man came up with these morals.

I believe even my cat has morals at some level. I don't think that morals in general are invented or thought up but rather put into more concrete form by rules etc.
For example, I believe Jesus essentially stated that empathy was the basis for all Biblical law. My cat shows empathy, but may not understand the ten commandments.

Originally posted by shahenshah
So your view is that morals pre-date any religion.
Now if religion started "thousands" of years ago and morals pre-dated that, so we assume that "early/ancient" man came up with these morals.

So now, the modern man with his much more developed intellect should be able to come up with at least one, if not ten, NEW morals which are not to be found in an ...[text shortened]... ist at least one new moral /ethic that was "invented" by an atheist philosopher / thinker?

...modern man with his much more developed intellect...

What makes you think modern man has a more developed intellect?

I would say that the atheist thinker 'invents' his or her morals all the time, since in a given situation he or she is free to weigh up all contributory factors in order to make a judgement as to the most morally correct course of action. Sometimes of course the conclusion will be wrong because some factor or other has been overlooked or incorrectly weighted. The religious thinker I understand will try to divine his or her morality from scripture however, and may thus lack the necessary flexibility to make the correct decision. For example, I'm sure we can all come up with an example of a situation where some form of theft can be considered morally correct, although this would of course be in direct contravention of the eighth commandment.

Originally posted by bbarr
In other words, he would be unsatisfied (as would I) by a deflationary account of morality that eschews talk of truth and contents itself to explain why we have moral beliefs but not whether those beliefs are justified.

Again, justified in what sense?

Originally posted by bbarr
Euthyphro-type dilemmas concern explanatory priority; by themselves they do not generate any regresses (infinite or otherwise). For a regress, you'd need some ancillary assumptions. Consider a Euthyphro-type dilemma applied to the view that it is general social agreement that determines the content of morality. The question would be "Is X good because we al ...[text shortened]... what is good, reasonable, beautiful, etc. can be settled on scientific grounds.

What do you mean by 'not generating regresses'? Also, is morality a distinct separate study in philosophy or is it part and parcel?

Originally posted by avalanchethecat

...modern man with his much more developed intellect...

What makes you think modern man has a more developed intellect?

I would say that the atheist thinker 'invents' his or her morals all the time, since in a given situation he or she is free to weigh up all contributory factors in order to make a judgement as to the most morall ...[text shortened]... correct, although this would of course be in direct contravention of the eighth commandment.

What makes you think modern man has a more developed intellect?
Good point... but after a few thousands of years shouldn't there be some improvement?

I would say that the atheist thinker 'invents' his or her morals all the time..shortened... For example, I'm sure we can all come up with an example of a situation where some form of theft can be considered morally correct, although this would of course be in direct contravention of the eighth commandment.[/

You missed my point.. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough. But what I mean to say is that APART from the 10 commandments or any other moral/ethic/law which can be found in any of the major religions; is there any other moral / ethic, newly invented, especially by an atheist philosopher.

Originally posted by shahenshah
What makes you think modern man has a more developed intellect?
Good point... but after a few thousands of years shouldn't there be some improvement?

I would say that the atheist thinker 'invents' his or her morals all the time..shortened... For example, I'm sure we can all come up with an example of a situation where some form of theft can be cons ...[text shortened]... s; is there any other moral / ethic, newly invented, especially by an atheist philosopher.

What makes you think modern man has a more developed intellect?
Good point... but after a few thousands of years shouldn't there be some improvement?

Why would there be an improvement? Personally I see no evidence nor reason for improved intellect in our species in the last forty thousand years or so. One could make a better case for reduction, in my opinion.

I didn't miss your point, I just chose to answer it in a way which doesn't 'work' for you according to the framework in which you posed it. You appear to be challenging me to come up with a never-before-considered moral concept which has been recently codified by an atheist philosopher rather than one of a theistic bent. As I tried to explain, I view morality and ethics as dependent upon context and not a series of fixed laws, so the question as posed is unanswerable according to my framework.

Originally posted by bbarr
Euthyphro-type dilemmas concern explanatory priority; by themselves they do not generate any regresses (infinite or otherwise). For a regress, you'd need some ancillary assumptions. Consider a Euthyphro-type dilemma applied to the view that it is general social agreement that determines the content of morality. The question would be "Is X good because we al ...[text shortened]... what is good, reasonable, beautiful, etc. can be settled on scientific grounds.

Wouldn't (in the case of X being good) either scenario be dependent upon a further definition of 'good,' and thus an infinite regress?

Originally posted by avalanchethecat
The religious thinker I understand will try to divine his or her morality from scripture however, and may thus lack the necessary flexibility to make the correct decision.

Although in practice the vast majority of theists seem to make their own decisions about morality then try to justify them through selective choice and interpretation of religious texts. I think you would be hard pressed to find a theist that actually changed their views about a given moral rule as a result of a religious text.
In fact doing so (changing their views) would shoot in the foot some of their basic arguments (that God is good, or that their religion encourages good morals). It would destroy this thread as it would highlight the fact that Gods morals could be arbitrary.