29 Jul 06
Originally posted by NordlysSelfish doesn't mean "having a positive effect on ourselves" but being concerned with one's advantage or welfare in disregard of others. The way you are using the word makes it meaningless; there is no contradiction between an emphatic, social animal believing its moral acts are beneficial both to it and to others.
Ultimately, I think morality probably arises from selfish behaviour, yes. Because of our ability to empathize, it makes us feel bad if someone else feels bad, and it makes us feel good if we can make xym feel better. So to care for others has a positive effect on ourselves. If it didn't have this effect on ourselves, I think we would probably come approximat ...[text shortened]... abilities would guarantee moral behaviour, conscience might become redundant and disappear.
Since other less intelligent social animals act in an emphatic manner, it seems that empathy evolved first and Man simply rationalizes it more than say a dog does.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by no1marauderThat reminds me of the "helper syndrome", where people have a need to help because it makes them feel good, and they will do so even if the help is unwanted and actually having a negative effect on the person they help. I would certainly call that selfish, although they may not be able to see (and they certainly won't admit) the negative effect their behaviour has on others. If the positive effect on yourself is only a side effect, and you would act the same way regardless the effect on yourself, it wouldn't be selfish. But I believe that the positive effect on ourselves is a big motivational factor, and thus I would say that selfishness is at least part of the explanation for moral behaviour, unless a negative effect on others is a defining characteristic of selfishness. The way Palynka used the word, this was obviously not the intended meaning, as appeasing one's own consciousness doesn't have a negative effect on others most of the time.
Selfish doesn't mean "having a positive effect on ourselves" but being concerned with one's advantage or welfare in disregard of others. The way you are using the word makes it meaningless; there is no contradiction between an emphatic, social animal believing its moral acts are beneficial both to it and to others.
Since other less intelligen ...[text shortened]... it seems that empathy evolved first and Man simply rationalizes it more than say a dog does.
I agree that empathy (and I guess if you say "emphatic", you actually mean "empathic" ) is not an exclusively human characteristic.
29 Jul 06
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Originally posted by NordlysI hate spelling corrections when the meaning is obvious from the context; this is an internet forum, not a college writing course.
That reminds me of the "helper syndrome", where people have a need to help because it makes them feel good, and they will do so even if the help is unwanted and actually having a negative effect on the person they help. I would certainly call that selfish, although they may not be able to see (and they certainly won't admit) the negative effect their behavio "emphatic", you actually mean "empathic" ) is not an exclusively human characteristic.
29 Jul 06
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Originally posted by no1marauderSorry, but as the word "emphatic" exists as well, I was not entirely sure whether it was a mistake or not (especially as it was misspelt consistently), so I thought I'd better make sure that I don't misunderstand you. Otherwise I wouldn't have mentioned it.
I hate spelling corrections when the meaning is obvious from the context; this is an internet forum, not a college writing course.
29 Jul 06
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Originally posted by Halitose"If our actions are ultimately unrelated to our destiny, I submit that
[b]To say that the absurd is incompatible with all meaning is patently false.
Righto. So essentially you are arguing that “meaning” and “the absurd” are not mutually exclusive since neither of them is used as an absolute. Is that correct?
I was under the impression that you were a supporter of deontological maxims: I find it surprising that you g without committing the fallacy, since your origins are inherently naturalistic.[/b]
everything is permissible."
Yes, I do subscribe to deontological maxims, and no, I despise the view
where the "end justifying the means"
Your stance on this matter is contradictory. In particular, your first claim above contradicts the very core of deontology; so if you actually hold belief in that claim while simultaneously subscribing to deontological principles, then there is something very wrong and inconsistent with your belief system. Deontology holds that any action that possesses moral worth is necessarily an action that is carried out in accordance with duty; further, this moral worth derives not from any inclinations with respect to intended effects; and not from any consequences that are actually realized; but merely from the "principle of volition", or the maxim that determines the undertaking of the action. When you say that you subscribe to deontological maxims, you are claiming that there exist duties that bear no relation whatsoever to consequences or futures states or proposed ends or any considerations thereof. On the other hand, your first (Dostoevskian) claim above contradicts this entirely because it entails that no such duties exist. Your first claim above entails that the existence of moral worth necessarily implies some relation to effecting future states -- and that's about as un-deontological as you can get. I would argue deontology holds that accordance with the principles of volition renders some actions meaningful in and of themselves, with no regard to effects and relations with "destiny". Your Dostoevskian claim precludes such meaning. It's ironic how you say that you despise the view in which the "ends justify the means" because that's exactly what your first claim above entails: under such a view, everything is merely a means to an eschatological end. Nothing can be viewed as an end in and of itself.
how does confrontation cause contentment, unless confrontation is the end goal?
Realize that Camus employs 'confrontation' in a context that is different than normal usage. Camus claims that sustained confrontation is a necessary entity for living "without appeal". If you read Camus, don't expect him to furnish you with sufficient conditions for happiness. But I would say he does discuss what he considers to be necessary conditions. I would also say that many of his ideas are confused. But what really resounds with me is his portrayal of Sisyphean adventure; living "without appeal"; and conscious revolt. None of that is causally sufficient for happiness; but it is certainly compatible with the cultivation of happiness. "Confrontation causes happiness" is not at all the point Camus is trying to make.
You're not getting away this easily...
Where did you get the idea that my version of absurdism represents a worldview? It doesn't. It is simply a claim against immortality and eternal significance. My worldview is a complicated patchwork of different textures, absurdism constituting only a stitch or three.
The problem lies in that your worldview does not allow for objective moral/ethical judgments, only subjective preference claims.
Wrong. By my "worldview" you are referring (incorrectly, as discussed above) to my absurdism, and by "does not allow" you can only be referring to logical contradiction; so this claim of yours is just plain false. If it were the case, for example, that the act of one's using his armpits to produce fart noises is objectively wrong, then demonstrate exactly how that would lead to a logical contradiction within my version of absurdism.
BTW, that a worldview "addresses" a certain question does not imply that it yields any sort of substantive answer. Some of the questions you mention don't have any justified answers.
At least my normative beliefs are ontologically undergirded by our "endowment"
No they aren't. I ain't no paper cutter, and neither are you. As I have stated before, your "solution" offers no more substance than that of the atheist who states that some things are objectively right/wrong "just because". The problem of God's existence is immaterial here. The problem, as I see it, is one that every person faces (God included, if He were to exist): basic normative beliefs must exist if we are to 1. hold any normative beliefs at all AND 2. not commit any is-ought fallacies. So how are we to say that these basic normative beliefs are properly basic and therefore compatible with our noetic structures' being rational? What criteria are there for the identification of a properly basic normative belief? I don't see any simple answers there. Worse still, it seems to me that the foundationalism I am espousing also implicitly assumes normative beliefs about how noetic structures should be organized. Metaphysics of morals is not easy, and that you think you have a suitable solution in Divine Command is laughable.
With respect to metaphysics of morals, one thing I am quite certain of is that empiricism will get us nowhere. Empirical observations and motives can tell us something about anthropology and what are taken to be social norms – but that's a different topic. I like the work of Kant in this area where he searches for a priori grounding, but I'm not convinced.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by HalitoseAll actions are ultimately permissible.
IIRC it was Tolstoy; but that aside:
1) Our actions do influence our immediate destiny (just threw this one in for what it's worth).
2) Our actions don't influence our ultimate destiny.
3) Our actions are ultimately meaningless in defining our ultimate destiny.
4) No action is ultimately preferable to another.
5) All actions are ultimately permissible.
This is NOT the conclusion you advanced previously. The conclusion you advanced previously was " ... everything is permissible". If all you're trying to show here is that barring immortality, nothing we do has eternal significance; then I agree. But what you asserted before was essentially that barring immorality, nothing we do has any significance. This I disagree with, and this is what I am challenging. There is an important distinction to be made: that X has no eternal significance does not imply that X has no significance; that X is permissible with respect to consequentialist criteria that consider only eternal ramifications does not imply that X is permissible. A good example of this fallacy is the following claim of WL Craig: “Because man ends in nothing, he is nothing.”
Going back to a previous analogy: that a chess game ends with no eternal ramifications is sufficient to say that no move during the game has any eternal ramifications. But the Dostoevskian claim you made is trying to advance something far stronger -- that if the game ends with no enduring ramifications, then no move during the game was preferable to any other move. Even if your argument above is sound, it does not even address your earlier conclusion (the Dostoevskian claim).
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by vistesdHello there, old man. With your koan in hand, I'm still searching.
Being aware;
being aware of being aware,
and always aware from “some-here”—
______________________________
How does any of this require the inference of a substantive “self,” like a homunculus in the head, so to speak? A hobgoblin in the body? A “ghost in the machine?”
When there is seeing, there is seeing. When there is feeling, there is feeli ...[text shortened]... llo. Hope you are all well. Thank you all for the many kind comments I find on my “last post.”
Good to see you around again.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by NordlysNice avatar.
No, it was Dostoevsky. It's an essential question, maybe the essential question, in "The Brothers Karamasov". What's interesting is that the person who discusses and advocates this idea most, Ivan, doesn't live by it. He has evil wishes (wishing the death of his father) and believes there's nothing wrong with having those thoughts, but he would never ...[text shortened]... truct which has little bearing on real life. I think it is incompatible with human nature.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by HalitoseI'm afraid that your true pragmatic colors are really showing in this thread. In the future, let's just skip the discussions where someone pretends like Christianity possesses even a shred of rational warrant, mmm-kay? Let's stick to debating the virtues, if any, of the real content here: that some think endorsement of Christianity is the best (only?) method to achieve whichever personal and social transformations they consider imperative.
This is not about scientific fact; worldviews are about convictions. At this rate you might as well answer "don't know" to all and then drown yourself -- be it in water or alcohol.
29 Jul 06
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Originally posted by HalitoseHow about shooting for an accurate worldview? Besides, as I understand the term, 'convictional' means adept at convincing; therefore, a worldview that accords with available evidence is the only sort that should be viewed as convictional. And again, keep in mind that the available evidence sometimes does not warrant positive belief. Your worldview, for example, I do not consider convictional.
Back to my point -- you can't have transformation without the direction of a convictional worldview. Revolution cannot be an end unto itself.
On the other hand, you may be using "convictional worldview" to denote simply a belief system in which the adherent possesses passionate, strong beliefs. In reference to Christianity: yes, many hold strong unjustified beliefs in Christ. So, again, we could focus on pragmatic virtues, if any, of such a 'convictional worldview'.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by HalitoseIs that supposed to be pejorative? It sounds concise and accurate to me. Keep in mind that any future destination necessarily lacks actuality – in contrast to each and every present moment of this richly textured journey.
The old "journey without a destination" argument.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by vistesdNow, suppose I agree with A (I don’t, but that has been argued to death on here, and by more capable folks than I). How does that in any way justify my accepting C?
[b]Weltanschauung: a comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world especially from a specific standpoint (http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/weltanschauung).
It seems to me that a worldview can have three components:
(1) Examined—that is, those perceptions, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, etc. that we have consciously considered, and ab ...[text shortened]... h. There, that’s better.”
The students look at him disconcertedly. The roshi just smiles...[/b]
In sum, if we start our examination of our own worldview with preconceived (unexamined or too-little-examined) notions of what we will consider to satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and what we will admit to our worldview on that basis, we may well come up with a worldview that is quite satisfactory to us—but that is nonetheless inaccurate.
Good post. I think this is along the same lines of my earlier ranting against pragmatic efforts at formulating a worldview. Worldviews that are aimed at comforting answers typically involve some appeals process. Simple unjustified belief can, I think, in certain cases be enabling; but I consider the appeals processes in which one stands in awareness of his own "burdens" being lifted to be more closely related to a sort of self-delusion, rather than just unjustified belief. I find it preferable to live without such appeal (a la Camus); but, moreover, living without such appeal promotes accuracy. If we take it to be the case that a 'worldview' must address the aforementioned questions, then the accurate and warranted worldview will remain silent on at least some of them -- making an appeal instead does not lead to "conviction", IMO.
29 Jul 06
Originally posted by NordlysUltimately, I think morality probably arises from selfish behaviour, yes.
Ultimately, I think morality probably arises from selfish behaviour, yes. Because of our ability to empathize, it makes us feel bad if someone else feels bad, and it makes us feel good if we can make xym feel better. So to care for others has a positive effect on ourselves. If it didn't have this effect on ourselves, I think we would probably come approximat ...[text shortened]... abilities would guarantee moral behaviour, conscience might become redundant and disappear.
If we are talking about 'morality' as the practical rules related to anthropology, then I would agree with you that self-interest could constitute at least part of a groundwork for 'morals'. In that sense, morality is a means to facilitate cooperation, coexistence, perpetuation. On the other hand, I think moral law – if such a thing exists – cannot be grounded (even in part) on self-interest. I don't think it could possibly be grounded on anything circumstantial, evidential, or otherwise [i]a posteriori[/b].
29 Jul 06
OK, I am done spamming for a good while, but this thread is an interesting one.
I think the analogy to music is a rich one.
----------------------------------------------
"There is a song, bird song or wind song,
or the song old rooms sing when no one
is awake to hear. For a moment I almost
catch the melody we make with bare walls,
old iron sagging beds, and scarred floors.
There is one deep full note for each of us.
This is the first night of my life
I know we are music."
Philip Levine
29 Jul 06
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Originally posted by LemonJello[/i]Excellent point.
[b]Ultimately, I think morality probably arises from selfish behaviour, yes.
If we are talking about 'morality' as the practical rules related to anthropology, then I would agree with you that self-interest could constitute at least part of a groundwork for 'morals'. In that sense, morality is a means to facilitate cooperation, coexistence, perpet sibly be grounded on anything circumstantial, evidential, or otherwise [i]a posteriori[/b].[/b]