29 Jul 06
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloI strongly disagree with the last sentence. In my view, the moral law is based on what we are and is a component of our being i.e. it is in some sense "hotwired". Your last sentence dosn't make any sense; you seem to be simply denying the existence of the moral law by setting conditions which make its existence impossible.
[b]Ultimately, I think morality probably arises from selfish behaviour, yes.
If we are talking about 'morality' as the practical rules related to anthropology, then I would agree with you that self-interest could constitute at least part of a groundwork for 'morals'. In that sense, morality is a means to facilitate cooperation, coexistence, perpet ...[text shortened]... sibly be grounded on anything circumstantial, evidential, or otherwise [i/]a posteriori[/b].[/b]
30 Jul 06
Originally posted by kirksey957Could you say a little about how you learned this and how "continual vigilence" works for you?
Could you say a little about how you learned this and how "continual vigilence" works for you?
Have thought about this honest question a bit. How I “learned” it may not be relevant, since we are all different, our journeys and predilections and compulsions different. Meditation helps: there are lots of techniques out there; I like the simpler ones. My first experience of clear-mind (which is not blank mind!) was on an 8-day “intensive” centering prayer retreat, done mostly in silence. Although having a Christian (specifically Catholic/Trappist) framework, centering prayer is really very like Soto Zen sitting meditation, and can be done, as I did it, in a very nonreligious way. You might start by reading Centering Prayer by Basil Pennington.
Because I tend to have a compulsively busy (wordy) mind, koan work has been and is helpful for me. My struggle is always between clarity and compulsive “thoughty-ness.” Using a koan, or a phrase from one, helps to re-mind me toward clarity. The more one practices (or attends), the less one strays, the easier to remind oneself.
Clear-mind (clarity) is just being-aware without preconceptions, and focusing awareness as you choose (attending). If you want to think, you think and are aware of your thinking, and what you are thinking about.
I’m not trying to make any of this sound too easy. It isn’t. It takes (a) willingness to do it, (b) technique(s) that work for you, and (c) practice and continual attending. But that is all it takes. And maybe some fortuitous “accidents” along the way...
_________________________________
BETWEEN
My story’s telling does not matter—
it is only mine and the only
time will not tick for it again—
better that I remain between,
in between the hands the words,
and only wave, inarticulate:
“That way, that way too will take you
here,” to where I live, between—
Once I thought I was quickly dying
(“these hands will in a moment
never tick for it again—I feel the crash
and then the pendulum, unmoving...” )
—and so I caught to mind and held,
in between the pain and fear,
a simple, sole imagining
of something beautiful
and rare.
—vistesd
30 Jul 06
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloThanks, my friend. Here’s another “koan” (to the same point):
Hello there, old man. With your koan in hand, I'm still searching.
Good to see you around again.
On the deep green lily-pad
the dew-drop
has no color of its own—
(Ikkyu)
What color is your original mind?
[If your being-aware has colors of its own, then how else could you see the world? How would you know? And if not...?]
_______________________________
Re searching: What you’re searching with is the “answer”... But don’t think of it as a “thing” just because we speak with nouns, and then begin to conceptualize about it. Just abide in the heart of the matter, aware... Real-ization is not understanding “it,” but being “it”—which you are!
So—what color is your original mind...?
30 Jul 06
1 edit
Originally posted by no1marauderThat statement of mine does not set conditions that preclude existence of the moral law. Saying that the moral law cannot rest on a posteriori principles just means that if the moral law exists it rests only on a priori principles. This statement -- that if the moral law exists it rests only on pure reason -- I strongly agree with. This is a point on which I think Kant was dead on target:
I strongly disagree with the last sentence. In my view, the moral law is based on what we are and is a component of our being i.e. it is in some sense "hotwired". Your last sentence dosn't make any sense; you seem to be simply denying the existence of the moral law by setting conditions which make its existence impossible.
"As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Every one must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, 'Thou shalt not lie,' is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, yet, in as far as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to motive, such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral law.
"Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being."
--Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
Kant would go on to say that experience is needed to "sharpen" judgement for observance of the law; but the law itself can only rest on pure reason and cannot have any empirical division.
30 Jul 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloI'm unimpressed by people who give a lengthy quote of some "eminent" person to support their philosophical positions.
That statement of mine does not set conditions that preclude existence of the moral law. Saying that the moral law cannot rest on a posteriori principles just means that if the moral law exists it rests only on a priori principles. This statement -- that if the moral law exists it rests only on pure reason -- I strongly agree with. This i ...[text shortened]... ; but the law itself can only rest on pure reason and cannot have any empirical division.
Your statement was: On the other hand, I think moral law – if such a thing exists – cannot be grounded (even in part) on self-interest. I don't think it could possibly be grounded on anything circumstantial, evidential, or otherwise a posteriori.
Saying that the moral law cannot be grounded in self-interest shows a fundamental defect in your understanding of what the moral law is, at least in reference to Natural Law theory.
30 Jul 06
1 edit
Originally posted by no1marauderI don't care about Natural Law Theory. I am talking about metaphysics of morals.
Saying that the moral law cannot be grounded in self-interest shows a fundamental defect in your understanding of what the moral law is, at least in reference to Natural Law theory.
Also, I was not trying to "impress" you. I was trying to clarify my position.
EDIT: If you are looking for metaphysics of morals in Natural Law theory, you ain't gonna find it -- you'll find practical anthropology.
30 Jul 06
2 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloDiscussions concerning "Metaphysics about X" are invariably pointless naval gazing. No evidence can ever be brought to bear which makes Position 1 more plausible than Position 2. Therefore, I wouldn't look for "metaphysics of morals" in Natural Law theory and consider their non-existence in NLT as one of its many strengths.
I don't care about Natural Law Theory. I am talking about metaphysics of morals.
Also, I was not trying to "impress" you. I was trying to clarify my position.
EDIT: If you are looking for metaphysics of morals in Natural Law theory, you ain't gonna find it -- you'll find practical anthropology.
30 Jul 06
3 edits
Originally posted by no1marauderWell, rationalism vs. empiricism has been a hot debate for a long time, and I guess you have your stance and I have mine.
Discussions concerning "Metaphysics about X" are invariably pointless naval gazing. No evidence can ever be brought to bear which makes Position 1 more plausible than Position 2. Therefore, I wouldn't look for "metaphysics of morals" in Natural Law theory and consider their non-existence in NLT as one of its many strengths.
Nordlys said something like 'ultimately, morality comes from...', and I took that to mean she was talking about metaphysics of morals. If she was merely talking about practical anthropology, then -- as I said in my post to her, btw -- I agree with her (and with you, to an extent, since some forms of NLT do a pretty good job explaining that side of things).
30 Jul 06
5 edits
Originally posted by LemonJello“When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being."
That statement of mine does not set conditions that preclude existence of the moral law. Saying that the moral law cannot rest on a posteriori principles just means that if the moral law exists it rests only on a priori principles. This statement -- that if the moral law exists it rests only on pure reason -- I strongly agree with. This i ; but the law itself can only rest on pure reason and cannot have any empirical division.
How is Kant’s position different from something like this?
A. If moral law is not given a priori, then it has no metaphysical foundation.*
B. Morals should have a metaphysical foundation (otherwise they “degenerate” to anthropology).
C. Therefore, moral law is given a priori.
In other words, is Kant here not (1) begging the question, or (2) simply exploring what happens if one assumes moral law (like time and space dimensionality) is given a priori?
In the second case, is he not in the position that the only argument for such an a priori is that it yields more congenial results (e.g., the possibility of a categorical imperative)?
No1’s “hotwired” idea does seem to allow some a posteriori study of morality based, say, on cultural anthropology, sociology, the cognitive sciences... The general moral principles of such a “natural morality” would seem to be distributed, within and across cultures, statistically. And there do seem to be some people who have not been "given" Kant's this a priori (e.g., psychopaths, sociopaths)...
* Aside from DCT.
EDIT: I might be wrong, but I thought that Kant's moral a priori was also a synthetic a priori, and not simply an analytical one--nor simply the ability to reason about morals(i.e., to moral conclusions), but that pure reason (not practical reason) reveals the a priori categorical imperative?
30 Jul 06
Originally posted by vistesdOk. Well, for it's worth, I would say that your A -> C is not at all what Kant argued, although the text I referenced might sorta give that impression. Particularly, I would say Kant is not guilty of B, since I don't see how any "should" factors into his argument: Kant tried to argue descriptively that moral law does exist based on the necessary form of rational will and that any rational being does have some ends that are necessitated solely by reason.
Please ignore my last post (too late to edit it away!).
Seems as if this forum nearly always becomes a discussion of morality—as if, at bottom, that is the main thing all religion, philosophy, living, is about.
I just don’t want to add my push to spin that wheel anymore...
Regarding synthetic a priori: ultimately, Kant needs that notion because there clearly is no analytic connection between rationality and conformity with moral requirement. So, iirc, that a rational will conforms to the categorical imperative is taken to be synthetic.
Yeah, I guess I am guilty of spinning the wheel -- another form of moon-gazing, I gather. Maybe it's time I take another long break from the forum....
30 Jul 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloThanks for the clarification, though... 🙂
Ok. Well, for it's worth, I would say that your A -> C is not at all what Kant argued, although the text I referenced might sorta give that impression. Particularly, I would say Kant is not guilty of B, since I don't see how any "should" factors into his argument: Kant tried to argue descriptively that moral law does exist based on the necessary form of ...[text shortened]... orm of moon-gazing, I gather. Maybe it's time I take another long break from the forum....