01 Jan 08
Originally posted by KellyJayIn the light of evolution I'm not sure what we use to judge moral
I do not think "moral facts" have anything to do with being either
an Atheist or a Theist, it is either true without human agreement or
it is a human opinion, not a moral fact. If you think I’m pushing
being a Theist is better than being an Atheist in this discussion I
suggest you read what I have written again. My contention is with
the words facts an ...[text shortened]... y too?
With respect to other life forms I more than likely misread you,
I’m sorry.
Kelly
facts as being good or bad
That's probably because evolutionary theory doesn't equip us with the means to make such judgments because it doesn't have normative or prescriptive entailments. Where the theory implies that certain things are good or of advantage to a species, those are still just in reference to descriptive concepts, such as Darwinian fitness and fecundity. Evolutionary theory could shed light on matters of descriptive ethics that concern, for example, why people may be disposed toward certain moral beliefs and values (again, it would probably provide Darwinian explanations concerning what sort of things are naturally selected and/or what sort of byproducts might accompany things that are naturally selected). But evolutionary theory would be silent on the matter of what moral beliefs are actually correct and on what sorts of things are actually valuable. Anyone who mistakenly tells you otherwise is probably invoking some form of the naturalistic fallacy.
is there an authority or does
there have to even being one?
Why should we think there has to be some higher authority who tells us what is right and wrong; or who simply determines what is right or wrong?
01 Jan 08
Originally posted by KellyJayPeople who restrict the scope of their compassion to those in some preferred "in-group" make a moral error. They are racist, sexist, elitist, or whatever. We can discuss just what these sorts of errors consist in, but my hope is that it is fairly clear to you why these discriminatory attitudes are wrong. Roughly, the bigot takes as a criterion for full moral considerability some property or trait that is actually irrelevant to moral considerability (e.g., race, sex, class). It is quite right that we may not be able to convince the bigot of his error. He may not be persuaded by our arguments, even if those arguments are very good ones. We may press him on why he takes race, sex, class, etc. to be morally important. He will probably respond that these properties track wickedness, weakness, irrationality, stupidity, etc. That is, he will probably assume that these non-moral properties actually correlate (perhaps cause) properties that can serve as the basis of normative assessment. When we point out to the bigot that he is simply factually in error, and that no such correlation or causal relation exists, he may stubbornly remain committed to his bigotry. What can we do then? Well, we can try to make sure that the bigot is prevented from exercising his bigotry publically. We can keep presenting him with evidence. We can look seriously at the psychological explanations for why the bigot has the beliefs in question. We can use this knowledge to inform our practices of educating children.
I am in agreement with you, but what about those that have a
different core set of beliefs/values, where their compassion is
saved for those of like mind or color? If we were to suggest a moral
fact those others may not agree with you and I on what and where
we 'should' place our honest responces, compassion, and so
on. That does not even address the g ...[text shortened]... re anyone of us that has the moral authority to say this
is the way walk ye in it?
Kelly
01 Jan 08
Originally posted by AThousandYoungI have no idea what you mean by "implicit". Have I used that term in relation to value? I thought I used the term "intrinsic", but I could have just as well used the term "non-instrumental". Evaluative properties, of which moral properties are a subset, are not analogous to the primary qualities of the physical like shape, mass, etc. A better analogy is between evaluative properties and secondary properties of the physical (color, heat, etc.), particularly in relation to how those properties are manifest to conscious agents like us. In one sense, it is an objective fact that my cat is black, since my cat has this property independently of any human beliefs or desires. In another sense, it is a partly subjective fact that my cat is black, since it is only in virtue of humans have a certain form of visual processing system that cats with a particular type of fur appear as black. There are, in effect, two separate "objective/subjective" distinctions that often get run together in informal discussions about ethics.
Bbarr, I don't want to harass you, but I want to a) understand where you're coming from and b) help you understand any mistakes you made, or to understand my own.
I have not yet succeeded.
Would you address my proton example? Is "implicit" used differently in philosophy and science? I don't understand...
01 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrSorry, I made a mistake - not implicit, instrinsic. I used the wrong word, sorry. In the original example I used the correct word.
I have no idea what you mean by "implicit". Have I used that term in relation to value? I thought I used the term "intrinsic", but I could have just as well used the term "non-instrumental". Evaluative properties, of which moral properties are a subset, are not analogous to the primary qualities of the physical like shape, mass, etc. A better analogy is be bjective" distinctions that often get run together in informal discussions about ethics.
01 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrEvaluative properties are not instrinsic. Instrinsicness is something that does not need an evaluator.
I have no idea what you mean by "implicit". Have I used that term in relation to value? I thought I used the term "intrinsic", but I could have just as well used the term "non-instrumental". Evaluative properties, of which moral properties are a subset, are not analogous to the primary qualities of the physical like shape, mass, etc. A better analogy is be bjective" distinctions that often get run together in informal discussions about ethics.
You are giving a good example of why one must define terms like "black" clearly. Is it the wavelength of reflected light under white light or is it the light that meets a particular individual's eyes at a particular moment? If the latter, the cat changes color, if the former, it does not.
Well, maybe not so much for a black cat, but an orange one definitely. You shine anything on black and you see nothing but black.
02 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThe term "intrinsic value" is used in the manner indicated when I defined it a couple pages back. This is why I could have just as well called it "non-instrumental value". It really isn't the intrinsic part that you are concerned with, it is the claim that something could be valuable without there being somebody that values that thing. But I've never made this claim. All value presupposes something that is minimally capable of valuing, this is why value is not like shape and mass. In this respect, value is like color. Color is an objective secondary or relational property. It is a relation between objects and creatures with visual processing systems like ours.
Evaluative properties are not instrinsic. Instrinsicness is something that does not need an evaluator.
You are giving a good example of why one must define terms like "black" clearly. Is it the wavelength of reflected light under white light or is it the light that meets a particular individual's eyes at a particular moment? If the latter, the cat ...[text shortened]... at, but an orange one definitely. You shine anything on black and you see nothing but black.
02 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrThree pages, not a couple. However a couple pages ago there happened to be a copy and reply that included it so I was able to find it.
The term "intrinsic value" is used in the manner indicated when I defined it a couple pages back. This is why I could have just as well called it "non-instrumental value".
X is intrinsically valuable if and only if it X valuable in and of itself, not merely in its instrumental connection or relation to something else of value.
Oops, my mistake. You defined intrinsically valuable but not intrinsic.
Here's a reposting of an earlier post of mine:
A proton has intrinsic charge and mass. It does not have intrinsic beauty. It does not have intrinsic mass for the protonist but lack intrinsic mass for the aprotonist. Goodness and value are equivalent to beauty, not charge, mass or even pleasure.
The proton does not have intrinsic weight. One might say that "For Earthly conditions, the proton has a weight of X, while under Martian conditions, it has a weight of Y." This is why weight is not intrinsic to the proton but rather depends on something else. The structure of your sentences about intrinsic value are set up like my sentence about weight, exactly because of the lack of intrinsicness of value.
Now, stated correctly - why does the use of "intrinsic" seem to be different in your philosophical arguments compared to how the word is used in physical science?
02 Jan 08
Originally posted by AThousandYoungProbably because evaluative properties are more like secondary or relational physical properties than they are like primary physical properties, as I pointed out above.
Three pages, not a couple. However a couple pages ago there happened to be a copy and reply that included it so I was able to find it.
X is intrinsically valuable if and only if it X valuable in and of itself, not merely in its instrumental connection or relation to something else of value.
Oops, my mistake. You defined intrinsically val ...[text shortened]... erent in your philosophical arguments compared to how the word is used in physical science?
02 Jan 08
5 edits
Originally posted by bbarrWhat's a "secondary" or "relational" physical property? I was never exposed to these terms in my physics and chemistry classes at Berkeley, and they're not in Wikipedia either. I was however exposed to intrinsic physical properties. They are not dependent on any relationships, but rather intrinsic to the object in question.
Probably because evaluative properties are more like secondary or relational physical properties than they are like primary physical properties, as I pointed out above.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_properties
EDIT - Keep using the wrong word for "intrinsic"
02 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by AThousandYoungPrimary physical properties are properties like shape, mass, charge, etc. These are properties that objects have essentially, or independently of other objects. Secondary physical properties are properties like color, heat, taste, etc. These are properties that objects have in relation to certain types of entities, or (depending on your metaphysics) properties of relations between objects and entities. Primary physical properties are objective in two sense of that term. First, they are as they are regardless of what people believe or desire about them. Second, their existence is independent of the existence of minds. Secondary physical properties are objective in only one sense. They are as they are regardless of what people believe of desire about them. Their existence, however, is dependent on the existence of minds. Note that when I refer to secondary properties I am referring to the properties that concepts like "color" refer to. In the case of color concepts this will have an inelimable phenomenological element. I am not referring to the primary physical properties that ultimately give rise to secondary properties. So, I take "black" to be a secondary property of certain objects, where what ultimately explains why these objects have this secondary property may be facts about their primary properties like surface reflectancy, texture, etc. Now, as I mentioned above, evaluative properties are not analogous to primary physical properties. If one is committed to any sort of evaluative/physical analogy, one is better served by construing evaluative properties as analogous to secondary physical properties.
What's a "secondary" or "relational" physical property? I was never exposed to these terms in my physics and chemistry classes at Berkeley, and they're not in Wikipedia either. I was however exposed to intrinsic physical properties. They are not dependent on any relationships, but rather intrinsic to the object in question.
http://en. ...[text shortened]... kipedia.org/wiki/Physical_properties
EDIT - Keep using the wrong word for "intrinsic"
These are philosophical distinctions, common in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, etc. It is unfortunate, though understandable, you were not exposed to them in your science classes.
02 Jan 08
3 edits
Originally posted by bbarrHere is a Google search for "secondary physical property".
Primary physical properties are properties like shape, mass, charge, etc. These are properties that objects have essentially, or independently of other objects. Secondary physical properties are properties like color, heat, taste, etc. These are properties that objects have in relation to certain types of entities, or (depending on your metaphysics) propert is unfortunate, though understandable, you were not exposed to them in your science classes.
http://tinyurl.com/yq65wn
There is exactly one hit.
Measuring individual natural gas constituents is commonly in the natural gas industry, using analytical instruments such as a gas chromatograph. Gas composition can be segmented between major constituents – typically methane, ethane, propane, butanes plus heavier hydrocarbons, and inert gases. Even with this simplification, the industry primarily uses physical property measurements or indices to quantify and characterize natural gas rather than gas composition.
The most popular of these include: heating value (also called calorific value), specific gravity, and Wobbe Number (also known as Wobbe Index). These are the primary natural gas “figures of merit.” In addition, there are many secondary physical property measurements or indices. Insome cases, these factors are derived from empirical tests, often related to fuel combustion characteristics. Example secondary factors include: Yellow Tipping, Flashback, Lifting, Weaver Index, Motor Octane Number, Research Octane Number, Methane Number, hydrocarbon dewpoint, water dewpoint, etc.
It's doesn't seem to be talking about secondary physical properties, it's talking about secondary physical propery indices and measurements. Thats is, the property doesn't seem to be secondary, but rather the measurement is secondary.
How come this search didn't work?
I have never heard something described as "intrinsically black" or even worse "To Larry, it's intrinsically black." These are not ways I've ever seen that word used. What sort of source gave you this information about the word "intrinsic"? Usually Google will find it, but not this time.
02 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThat's because I was trying to use a term more familiar than "quality". The traditional distinction, originating with Locke, is between primary and secondary qualities.
Here is a Google search for "secondary physical property".
http://tinyurl.com/yq65wn
There is exactly one hit.
Measuring individual natural gas constituents is commonly in the natural gas industry, using analytical instruments such as a gas chromatograph. Gas composition can be segmented between major constituents – typically methane, e ation about the word "intrinsic"? Usually Google will find it, but not this time.
What is it with your obsession with the term "intrinsic"? Look, I already defined the term as it is generally used in regards to value. If you remember correctly, this was what this whole discussion was about. Now, it seems you are more interested in finding something to object to than actually reading the content of these posts. The whole reason I brought up color was because you bizarrely think that intrinsic value must be analogous to something like an intrinsic physical property. My response was that if you really need to draw some sort of analogy between the evaluative and the physical, then it's better to do it with secondary than with primary qualities.
02 Jan 08
3 edits
Originally posted by bbarrThere is a fundamental disconnection between what you're saying and what I am understanding here, and this confusion about the word "intrinsic" is one way it shows itself.
That's because I was trying to use a term more familiar than "quality". The traditional distinction, originating with Locke, is between primary and secondary qualities.
What is it with your obsession with the term "intrinsic"? Look, I already defined the term as it is generally used in regards to value. If you remember correctly, this was what thi ...[text shortened]... ve and the physical, then it's better to do it with secondary than with primary qualities.
It seems to me that you insist on referring to subjective things, like value, as objective. It's like saying a particular skateboard brand is "intrinsically (or "objectively" ) cool". What the hell does that mean?
You use profound sounding terms that as far as I can tell are without meaning. You're very convincing and confident, but I bet there are really smart philosophers who disagree with you on any number of issues that you are convincing and confident about and can be just as profound sounding as you while disagreeing with you. I also know that sometimes people hide behind authority and jargon, often unconciously. Thus when I start hearing phrases that sound impressive but as far as I can tell are meaningless, I start suspecting that maybe I'm on to something, and when I dig for more information and can't seem to find it anywhere...
02 Jan 08
6 edits
Intrinsic describes a characteristic or property of some thing or action which is essential and specific to that thing or action, and which is wholly independent of any other object, action or consequence.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsic
Secondary qualities do not exist in things themselves. They depend on a perceiver's senses...Secondary qualities are subjective.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary_quality
Are these reasonable definitions? How are they compatible? I don't see how it's possible. Subjective qualities can never be wholly independent of things other than whatever it is they are qualities of. For example, if a painting is pretty according to John, that prettyness is dependent on John despite being a property of the painting. Thus it's not intrinsic to the painting.
The one definitions says "this quality is always dependent on some third party" and the other says "this quality is always independent of any third party". Paradox!
02 Jan 08
Originally posted by AThousandYoungFor the last time, I'm using the term "intrinsic value" in the way I described previously. Intrinsically valuable goods, or traits, or states of affairs, or whatever, are those things that are not valuable merely as a means to something else. This usage of the term is as close to universal in philosophy as any notion ever is. You are the one who is focusing on the term "intrinsic" and taking it to indicate some analogy with physical properties. I tried to be deferential to your wish for a physical analogy, and so brought up secondary properties. Secondary properties are about as close a physical analogy to evaluative properties as you are likely to find. Your allegation that I call subjective properties objective is either an indication that you have failed to read my posts or that you are simply too dim to understand the content of those posts. As I've mentioned above, there are two different notions of objectivity in play in this discussion that are being run together. I have already explicitly claimed above that evaluative properties are mind-dependent in that there can be no value without something that does the valuing. This is the crucial disanalogy between primary physical properties and evaluative properties. What I am not claiming, what I deny, is that the truth of claims like "X is intrinsically valuable" depends upon our beliefs and desires. Just as the color of something does not depend upon what we believe or desire about its color, so the intrinsic value of something does not depend upon our what we believe or desire about that something.
There is a fundamental disconnection between what you're saying and what I am understanding here, and this confusion about the word "intrinsic" is one way it shows itself.
It seems to me that you insist on referring to subjective things, like value, as objective. It's like saying a particular skateboard brand is "intrinsically (or "objectively" ...[text shortened]... something, and when I dig for more information and can't seem to find it anywhere...