Theologian John Haught on evolution, etc...

Originally posted by bbarr
Right, you believe as you should in this case. If you had failed to form the belief Q, despite recognizing the validity of the deduction, you would have failed to believe as you should. What does this mean? It means that you are failing to believe in accord with the evidence at your disposal. If it is a habit of yours that you fail to believe in accord with the evidence at your disposal, then you are epistemically irresponsible or defective.

If I had failed to form the belief Q then, considering what you said was true about P and the logic from P to Q and my understanding of same, then we have a paradox. This situation cannot exist any more than 2+2 can = 5.

Irrational people are those who do not understand that P implies Q despite knowing P and being otherwise educated and familiar with the logic involved. Given that I do understand that P logically implies Q, I believe Q.

I don't understand why the word "should" has anything to do with any of this.

Originally posted by KellyJay
A fact does not depend on my views it is what it is, a moral fact
implies to me that opinions do not matter which I have yet to see
from you any reason to believe that is true.
Kelly

Well, that is because you have never read any secular ethical theory. This is why it is bizarre that you are so cavalier about declaiming on the possibility of objectivity in secular ethics. If you are really interested in how different secular ethical theorists account for moral facts, then pick up a book on the subject. Consequentialists claim that moral facts are ultimately facts about intrinsically valuable states of affairs, and they present arguments aimed at characterizing the intrinsically valuable. Kantians claim that moral facts are facts are ultimately facts about what we can rationally will, and they present arguments aimed at showing that when we act immorally we are actually being irrationally inconsistent. Virtue Ethicists claim that moral facts are ultimately facts about intrinsically good states of character (or, alternatively, facts about the character traits that are constitutive of an objectively flourishing human life). Social Contract theorists claim that moral facts are ultimately facts about the norms or principles we would consent to if we were fully informed and perfectly rational. None of these views claim that moral facts are ultimately matters of mere opinion. If you want to research the arguments given by proponents of these secular ethical theories, then I can give you excellent references.

Originally posted by KellyJay
Unless you can show
me from your perspective why your fact should matter to me I'd
say all you really have is an opinion based upon personal taste.
Kelly

Then you simply have very confused notions of "fact" and "opinion."

You are claiming that facthood manifests from persuasively arguing in favor of a particular opinion. I deny this, for it entails that in world of indifferent people or no people at all, there are no facts.

Originally posted by bbarr
Kelly, I've read your post over at least ten times, yet I am having a hell of time trying to figure out just what it is you are worried about. Suppose that two theists, A and B, disagree about the nature of God, the content of revelation, and the manner in which the content of revelation should inform their moral deliberations. This not only frequently occur hat there are good standards of argument or reason that should inform moral inquiry.

In my opinion, there's a vast difference between theistic and secular ideas of "moral facts". To the theist, "moral fact" is defined as God's opinion. To the secularist, "moral fact" is defined as...what?

There's no reference to the phrase "moral fact" for the secularist. The phrase means nothing as far as I can tell.

EDIT - Unless one clearly defines the term. For example, one could say that the state of affairs which results in the greatest pleasure, least pain or with careful definition of the relative values of the two, the greatest pleasure AND least pain is by definition the most good state of affairs. Then it's a moral fact I suppose that this state of affairs is perfectly good, because "moral fact" and "goodness" have been given references in the real world. Those terms now mean something. But without such a utilitarian argument, or the theistic one...what do these words and phrases MEAN? Nothing.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, that is because you have never read any secular ethical theory. This is why it is bizarre that you are so cavalier about declaiming on the possibility of objectivity in secular ethics. If you are really interested in how different secular ethical theorists account for moral facts, then pick up a book on the subject. Consequentialists claim that moral ...[text shortened]... given by proponents of these secular ethical theories, then I can give you excellent references.

"Intrinsically good"? Good's another opinion dependent word.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, that is because you have never read any secular ethical theory. This is why it is bizarre that you are so cavalier about declaiming on the possibility of objectivity in secular ethics. If you are really interested in how different secular ethical theorists account for moral facts, then pick up a book on the subject. Consequentialists claim that moral ...[text shortened]... given by proponents of these secular ethical theories, then I can give you excellent references.

So instead of a Bible I need to read a secular ethical book to gleen
the facts about morals. The text you approve of that is the plum line
of what makes something a facts or opinion? I hope you do not mind
if I disagree with you, all you have done is just say instead of the
Bible you need to read this book to find real factual statements about
morals. All you have done is enforce the need to have a single source
for saying what is or isn't a fact.
Kelly

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
If I had failed to form the belief Q then, considering what you said was true about P and the logic from P to Q and my understanding of same, then we have a paradox. This situation cannot exist any more than 2+2 can = 5.

Irrational people are those who do not understand that P implies Q despite knowing P and being otherwise educated and familiar w ...[text shortened]... I believe Q.

I don't understand why the word "should" has anything to do with any of this.

No, we do not have a paradox. Paradoxes result when we have at least two propositions, both of which are justified, but the conjunction of which entails a contradiction. The propositions "ATY does not believe that Q" and "ATY has sufficient reason to believe that Q" are consistent, hence no paradox.

What we do have in this hypothetical case is an instance of irrationality, and instances of irrationality are certainly possible (unlike 2+2=5, which entails a contradiction). Instances of irrationality are instances of people not believing in accord with the reasons they have. In other words, instances of irrationality are instances of people not believing as they should.

That you would actually believe Q is irrelevant. The example was hypothetical. If somebody failed to believe Q in the example as described, they would thereby be failing to believe in accord with the evidence at their disposal; they would thereby fail to believe as they should.

That you are so reticent to agree with these fairly banal comments about the use of the term "should" indicates to me that you use the term "should" idiosyncratically.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Then you simply have very confused notions of "fact" and "opinion."

You are claiming that facthood manifests from persuasively arguing in favor of a particular opinion. I deny this, for it entails that in world of indifferent people or no people at all, there are no facts.

What is a moral fact? That is the real quesiton! I agree opinions and
facts are not the same thing and if we cannot tell the difference
between an opinion and a fact what do we have when it comes to
morals? I agreed if we have a moral fact we should live by it, but
the question then becomes who gets to say what is or isn't a moral
fact? If it is just one person putting their opinions above others all we
have then are just matters of opinion not a moral fact.
Kelly

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
In my opinion, there's a vast difference between theistic and secular ideas of "moral facts". To the theist, "moral fact" is defined as God's opinion. To the secularist, "moral fact" is defined as...what?

There's no reference to the phrase "moral fact" for the secularist. The phrase means nothing as far as I can tell.

EDIT - Unless one clearl ...[text shortened]... n argument, or the theistic one...what do these words and phrases MEAN? Nothing.

Every secular ethical theory clearly defines the term You understand the definition given by the Hedonistic Utilitarian because that is the only secular ethical theory you are familiar with. As I briefly indicated to Kelly above, other secular ethical theories conceive of moral facts differently. There is no difference between the theist and the secularist on this point. Each will construe the moral facts according to their ethical theory, and each will provide a conceptual analysis of the term "moral fact". Every ethical theory, theistic and secular alike, will take some normative claim as basic or primary or axiomatic.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
"Intrinsically good"? Good's another opinion dependent word.

No, it is not. I can't believe that you can't grasp this very simple point. It is dependent on my opinions what I take to be intrinsically valuable. It is not dependent on my opinions what is, in fact, intrinsically valuable. For the theist, living in accord with God is intrinsically valuable. Is this just a matter of opinion? No. It is the theist's opinion that living in accord with God is intrinsically valuable. It is not a matter of opinion whether, in fact, living in accord with God is intrinsically valuable. Please wrap your head around this distinction.

Originally posted by KellyJay
So instead of a Bible I need to read a secular ethical book to gleen
the facts about morals. The text you approve of that is the plum line
of what makes something a facts or opinion? I hope you do not mind
if I disagree with you, all you have done is just say instead of the
Bible you need to read this book to find real factual statements about
morals. ...[text shortened]... ve done is enforce the need to have a single source
for saying what is or isn't a fact.
Kelly

No, you need to read some secular ethics to understand the structure of secular ethical theory. In the absence of you educating yourself about secular ethical theory, there is no reason for anybody to take your declarations about secular ethical theory seriously. It is not my opinion that determines whether some book is an instance of good secular ethical theory, but I am a reliable judge of good secular ethical theory.

Originally posted by KellyJay
Are there facts when it comes to morals, following your example
of ice cream that is all personal tastes nothing more. Bringing it
back to purgatory if there is no God does it matter what anyone
believes about purgatory if it isn't real. Morals independent of God
basically boils down to everyone doing what is right in their own
eyes to coin how the Old ...[text shortened]... ould matter to me I'd
say all you really have is an opinion based upon personal taste.
Kelly

Morals independent of God
basically boils down to everyone doing what is right in their own
eyes to coin how the Old Testament stated it.

And this is a concern for you, that the considered actions of atheists will reflect their own evaluative commitments when they deliberate on what course of action they think is right? Gee, I thought that's basically how it works for anyone who is acting autonomously, whether they be theist or atheist. Of course, the theist's evaluative commitments concerning morality may involve reference to God in material ways, whereas the atheist's won't.

The above I think deals with descriptive ethics, and it just doesn't have anything to do with the discussion at hand, which concerns the existence of moral facts. Bbarr already put together a very nice post where he explained to you in a clear manner that whatever claim the theist advances for an objective, factual basis for morals, the atheist can give a corresponding dialectically symmetric claim. I don't really understand why you think there's a problem here.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, it is not. I can't believe that you can't grasp this very simple point. It is dependent on my opinions what I take to be intrinsically valuable. It is not dependent on my opinions what is, in fact, intrinsically valuable. For the theist, living in accord with God is intrinsically valuable. Is this just a matter of opinion? No. It is the theist's opi ...[text shortened]... in accord with God is intrinsically valuable. Please wrap your head around this distinction.

How is it different for something to be valuable to a theist and for something to be intrinsically valuable to a theist?

Can the same thing be intrinsically valuable to John and not intrinsically valuable to Bob? What does the term intrinsic mean here? I thought it meant that the quality existed independent of which individual is examining it, or even if no one is examining it.

Let us say that P is intrinsically valuable to John, but not to Bob. Then what if neither John nor Bob existed? Is P still valuable? It should be since the value is intrinsic, right? And it should not be, because it's lack of value is intrinsic. I see a paradox here.

I also see a problem with calling something valuable when there's no valuer.

Originally posted by bbarr
Every secular ethical theory clearly defines the term You understand the definition given by the Hedonistic Utilitarian because that is the only secular ethical theory you are familiar with. As I briefly indicated to Kelly above, other secular ethical theories conceive of moral facts differently. There is no difference between the theist and the secularist o ...[text shortened]... , theistic and secular alike, will take some normative claim as basic or primary or axiomatic.

It sounds to me as though there is no "intrinsic good" simply because every one of those ethical theories has it's own definition of the term. You can say intrinsically good as defined by a particular theory, but I don't see how something can be simply intrinsically good, period.

If Hitler were murdered, would it be an intrinsically good act? Depends on which ethical theory you want to look at it from, and therefore, it's not intrinsic to the act; it's dependent on the ethical theory.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
How is it different for something to be valuable to a theist and for something to be intrinsically valuable to a theist?

X is intrinsically valuable if and only if it X valuable in and of itself, not merely in its instrumental connection or relation to something else of value. This construal of intrinsic value is common across theistic and secular ethical theories.