Theologian John Haught on evolution, etc...

Originally posted by vistesd
This goes back to bbarr’s point about “If P, then Q” and “S believes ‘If P then Q’” being two distinct propositions. Whether or not S must believe Q if she believes P is not analytic. S may simply be suffering from cognitive dissonance (e.g., by (4) above), or may just be irrational.

Does this get it, O Leonine Doctor?

Yes. See the Two-Part Invention dialogue in GEB for a related illustration, or the original here if you don't have the book handy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

Originally posted by vistesd
(1) If P, then Q.

(2) P. [though this seems to be unnecessary here, I include it only to sharpen the point]

(3) S believes P.

(4) S understands (1).

(5) S has been given a post-hypnotic suggestion that prevents her from believing Q.

(6) S does not believe Q.

—This goes back to bbarr’s point about “If P, then Q” and “S believes ‘If P t ...[text shortened]... ssonance (e.g., by (4) above), or may just be irrational.

Does this get it, O Leonine Doctor?

Again, by postulating fictitious pseudo-empirical *explanations* for the rejection of Q, you are obscuring the underlying, ineluctable logical facts of the matter.

For "post hypnotic suggestion" or "a chip in the head" you could just as easily substitute a fairy with a magic wand. How does the magic wand cause someone who simultaneously believes both P and the argument "if P then Q" to reject Q? If the "post hypnotic suggestion" was given *before* the acceptance of one or both of these premises, then logically it can only work by interfering with their acceptance. If it was given after the acceptance of one or both of these premises, then logically it can only work by eliminating the conviction(s) or the understanding. The question arises, WHY does someone accept NOT-Q if they also accept P and "if P then Q"? Answer: they don't. *IF* they persist in rejecting Q then it MUST be that at the time of rejection they fail to fully accept P and/or "if P then Q".

The problem with "empirical" examples of this sort is that they completely misunderstand the way that logic (and reason in general) works. It's the sort of argument that one might expect from an "artificial intelligence" which has no consciousness and does not understand the purpose and role of consciousness in the reasoning process. It therefore simultaneously attempts to assert that logical reasoning is the result of a belief set while also attempting to argue that it is the result of arbitrary "empirical' features independent of the belief set which forms the premises.

Bbarr, for instance, calls reasoning "a cognitive act" but the "empirical" events which he postulates as being responsible for the rejection of Q are not cognitive acts: they are deterministic causal phenomena which are completely independent of cognitive acts. Essentially, Bbarr postulates a kind of human robot who believes one thing and SAYS he believes something else, with the former due to cognitive acts and the latter due to causal defect. But an inconsistency between what is said and what is believed is not what he is claiming.

Edit: Note also that there is no way to empirically determine what someone else believes. One can only empirically measure what they say they believe. There can, therefore, be no empirical proof of the sort claimed.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Yes. See the Two-Part Invention dialogue in GEB for a related illustration, or the original here if you don't have the book handy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

"A Kill-Ease!" (Yeah, I had the book handy.)

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]if P is accepted, AND "if P then Q" is accepted, then it is logically impossible for Q to be rejected, because the conjunction of these two acceptances is analytically equivalent to accepting Q.

That's just obviously false. That the conjunction of P and P => Q logically entails Q does not mean that it is logically impossible for one to believe P, believe P => Q, and yet fail to believe Q.[/b]

It's just obviously true. Your claim to the contrary does not demonstrate otherwise. Go back to what I said about logical arguments depending on self-evident truths. The fact that you make a contrary statement to a self-evident truth does not indicate that the truth is other than a truth, or even that you believe what you say. In fact, I know you do not. (And my knowledge of this also constitutes a self-evident truth.)

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
Again, by postulating fictitious pseudo-empirical *explanations* for the rejection of Q, you are obscuring the underlying, ineluctable logical facts of the matter.

For "post hypnotic suggestion" or "a chip in the head" you could just as easily substitute a fairy with a magic wand. How does the magic wand cause someone who simultaneously believes both lieve. There can, therefore, be no empirical proof of the sort claimed.

No. The empirical question is whether or not people are always rational. The particular cause of irrationality (post-hypnotic suggestion or a chip in the head or clinging to an irrational belief for other reasons) is not crucial.

To say that [ (1) P => Q; (2) P; (3) therefore Q ], thus S must believe Q if S believes P, requires an additional premise: that S is rational in this case.* That would be an empirical claim.

Are you claiming that, when confronted with such a deductive inference, people are always rational? Or that people never (for whatever reason) suffer from cognitive dissonance?

* Note: Dr. Scribble’s reading suggestion, here, is a good one.

As for empirically measuring what someone else believes: well, you will either choose to believe their statements or you will not.

EDIT: Or are you claiming that in such cases of cognitive dissonance, a person unconsciously disbelieves P, or unconsciously believes Q? If so, do you have any empirical psychological data to back such a claim?

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
It's just obviously true. Your claim to the contrary does not demonstrate otherwise. Go back to what I said about logical arguments depending on self-evident truths. The fact that you make a contrary statement to a self-evident truth does not indicate that the truth is other than a truth, or even that you believe what you say. In fact, I know you do not. (And my knowledge of this also constitutes a self-evident truth.)

The fact that you make a contrary statement to a self-evident truth does not indicate that the truth is other than a truth, or even that you believe what you say. In fact, I know you do not. (And my knowledge of this also constitutes a self-evident truth.)

Are you accusing LJ of simply being irrational, or having some cognitive impairment that confuses him about what he believes, or of deliberately lying? (There’s a point to that question: see below.)

___________________________________________

You state that we cannot empirically measure what someone believes, and yet you are making positive claims about what someone must believe in the face of certain logical statements. Something like the following seems to be what happens then, if you do not at least include rationality as a premise—

(1) What S believes cannot be empirically determined.

(2) Under conditions X*, S must believe Y.

(3) S concedes (2) and the existence of conditions X, but claims to not believe Y.

(4) Therefore S does not believe what S claims to believe. [by (2)]

(5) S is (a) not rational,** or (b) deliberately lying. [by (4)]

(6) Neither (5)(a) nor (5)(b) can be empirically determined. [by (1)]

—If one cannot determine whether S is irrational or simply lying, one cannot determine what S actually believes. This contradicts (2), even if (2) is asserted as an a priori.

—Now, how are you going to go about demonstrating to S that she does not believe what she claims? Simply by repeating (2) ad nauseum?

______________________________________________

* In the present discussion, being presented with a logical inference for which S believes (or claims to believe) that the premises are true. Basically X = [P => Q; P], which S believes (or claims to believe).

** I include simple confusion here, as well as any mental impairment that might cause such irrationality.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
Your "empirical examples" are neither empirical nor examples of your claim. You cannot cite examples of "a chip in the head", e.g., doing what you claim, because no such examples exist -- they don't even ostensibly exist; and even if they did *ostensibly* exist they would, of logical necessity, be either fictitious (misrepresented) or misinterpreted. Y ...[text shortened]... ction of P or the conviction of "if P then Q" or the simultaneous occurrence of both.

The fact that the examples are hypothetical is irrelevant to establishing the logical possibility of the failure to believe that Q. That's what thought experiments do.

The chip works by preventing the formation of the belief that Q, as specified in the example. Your claim that it must of necessity do this by either forcing revision in the antecedent belief that P or the antecedent belief that P->Q is simply question-begging.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
It's just obviously true. Your claim to the contrary does not demonstrate otherwise. Go back to what I said about logical arguments depending on self-evident truths. The fact that you make a contrary statement to a self-evident truth does not indicate that the truth is other than a truth, or even that you believe what you say. In fact, I know you do not. (And my knowledge of this also constitutes a self-evident truth.)

Oh, yeah, you mean your post where you fail to grasp the concept of analyticity? Here is a question for you:

Suppose S believe that P. Does it then follow as matter of logical necessity that S believes that Ex (P(x) -> (y)P(y))?

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
It's just obviously true. Your claim to the contrary does not demonstrate otherwise. Go back to what I said about logical arguments depending on self-evident truths. The fact that you make a contrary statement to a self-evident truth does not indicate that the truth is other than a truth, or even that you believe what you say. In fact, I know you do not. (And my knowledge of this also constitutes a self-evident truth.)

The hell it's true.

Anyway, you claim the aforementioned state of affairs is logically impossible. Well, then show us the demonstration: use deduction to derive a contradiction from the following premises.

(1) S believes P.
(2) S believes P => Q.
(3) S does not believe Q.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
It's just obviously true. Your claim to the contrary does not demonstrate otherwise. Go back to what I said about logical arguments depending on self-evident truths. The fact that you make a contrary statement to a self-evident truth does not indicate that the truth is other than a truth, or even that you believe what you say. In fact, I know you do not. (And my knowledge of this also constitutes a self-evident truth.)

The trouble is that words like "reject" (which you used) and "believe" (which bbarr used) bring a humanoid into the room.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]That said you cannot really defend that view
within an evolutionary universe and force another to agree with our
stances on treating everyone equally.

Of course you can (defend the view, that is; on the other hand, no you probably generally cannot reasonably force another to agree with you). What one can do, in short, is offer reasons that su ...[text shortened]... you familiarize yourself with some of them such that you can evaluate their actual merits?[/b]

Again, secular folks have recourse to many accounts that entail that it doesn't just boil down to a matter of opinion. Why don't you familiarize yourself with some of them such that you can evaluate their actual merits?

Give me an example instead of just saying they are there if I look
for them.
Kelly

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
Again, by postulating fictitious pseudo-empirical *explanations* for the rejection of Q, you are obscuring the underlying, ineluctable logical facts of the matter.

For "post hypnotic suggestion" or "a chip in the head" you could just as easily substitute a fairy with a magic wand. How does the magic wand cause someone who simultaneously believes both ...[text shortened]... lieve. There can, therefore, be no empirical proof of the sort claimed.

You claim this of me:

Bbarr, for instance, calls reasoning "a cognitive act" but the "empirical" events which he postulates as being responsible for the rejection of Q are not cognitive acts: they are deterministic causal phenomena which are completely independent of cognitive acts. Essentially, Bbarr postulates a kind of human robot who believes one thing and SAYS he believes something else, with the former due to cognitive acts and the latter due to causal defect. But an inconsistency between what is said and what is believed is not what he is claiming.

This is mistaken. Reasoning is a cognitive act, and the hypothetical events I'm talking about are causal interferences in normal processes of reasoning. Some of these are empirically instantiated (failure to believe due to brain lesion, for instance), others are purely hypothetical. I am not postulating any sort of robot, I am claiming that it is logically possible for one to suffer from the failure to believe in accord with what one takes to be sufficient evidence. Of course this will be weird from the perspective of the agent, and of course they will probably revise their antecedent beliefs to reduce dissonance. So what? What you are doing, with your really embarrassing confusion, is taking general psychological laws of inference and belief revision and elevating them to a form of logical necessity. That is why we are all asking you for the actual deduction of a logical contradiction. We know you can't provide one. We know that all you'll be able to do is reiterate that you believe this sort of irrationality is logically impossible. Unfortunately, these reiterations of yours simply point out your fundamental ignorance of how thought experiments can be used to show logical possibility.

Originally posted by KellyJay

Give me an example instead of just saying they are there if I look
for them.
Kelly

I wrote the following, which you may have overlooked, at the end of the last post I directed toward you:

"Why don't you take a look at the quick examples bbarr gave on page 7 of this thread, and maybe that will allow you to focus the discussion."

Originally posted by LemonJello
I wrote the following, which you may have overlooked, at the end of the last post I directed toward you:

"Why don't you take a look at the quick examples bbarr gave on page 7 of this thread, and maybe that will allow you to focus the discussion."

I did over look it, but bbarr did write a lot of things on 7 there
something you'd like to quote?
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
I did over look it, but bbarr did write a lot of things on 7 there
something you'd like to quote?
Kelly

I had in mind this section:

Posted by bbarr (page 7):

"Consequentialists claim that moral facts are ultimately facts about intrinsically valuable states of affairs, and they present arguments aimed at characterizing the intrinsically valuable. Kantians claim that moral facts are facts are ultimately facts about what we can rationally will, and they present arguments aimed at showing that when we act immorally we are actually being irrationally inconsistent. Virtue Ethicists claim that moral facts are ultimately facts about intrinsically good states of character (or, alternatively, facts about the character traits that are constitutive of an objectively flourishing human life). Social Contract theorists claim that moral facts are ultimately facts about the norms or principles we would consent to if we were fully informed and perfectly rational. None of these views claim that moral facts are ultimately matters of mere opinion."