06 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by AThousandYoungWell, it's unfortunate that rabid creationists have co-opted the term, but I think it's clear enough how KJ and I employed the term in context.
Any time I hear the word "evolutionist" or "evolutionism" that's what I think. I'm not an evolutionist any more than I'm a gravitist.
Edit: However, I understand that the term has a long history of being eschewed based on its connotations (in addition to the more recent hijacking of the term by creationist groups). I probably should have refrained from following KJ's use of it for all these reasons.
06 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by AThousandYoung
Based on my unbiased analysis of the language used, snow is claiming that
the usage of the word 'evolutionist' shows "that the theory of evolution has prescriptive entailments"
I don't know what that means, but that seems to be a paraphrase of what he wrote.
07 Jan 08
Originally posted by Bosse de NageYou accept evolution as true do you not, though that can mean a lot
'Evolutionist' makes me think 'fundie'. Don't y'all be calling yourselves evolutionists now, y'hear...
of different things to different people. I do not call myself a theist
yet I can be desribed as one.
Kelly
07 Jan 08
Hi,
Bbarr and others, just a note to let you know that I am not ignoring your messages nor am I quietly bowing out of the discussion. On recent weekends I have had computer access limitations, and today the network I usually use during the week was down. I did read the replies today and plan to respond as soon as reasonably possible.
07 Jan 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIt can't be empirically false because it is not an empirical proposition: it's analytic. I'll respond in more detail in my reply to Bbarr's response.
I don't believe your claim. In fact, I believe it is empirically false.
Could you humor us with a deduction demonstrating the entailment?
08 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by Bbarr
If one understands the deduction, then one understands that if P is true, Q must also be true. When one antecedently believes P, thiis generally results in the immediate inference that Q is true, but this is not necessarily so.
We can (and should) dispense with empirical conditionals (e.g., a "chip" in the head) because they require their own proofs (not forthcoming) and are both unnecessary and obscuring.
You postulate a circumstance in which a subject "believes that if P is true then Q must also be true" -- and believes P, but refuses to believe Q. That postulation, or stipulation, embodies a set of mutually exclusive premises, however, and can therefore be dismissed as logically impossible. If the subject genuinely believes that "if P, therefore Q", and believes P, that is analytically equivalent to believing Q.
There might be any number of reasons WHY a subject rejects Q, but he CANNOT logically be postulated as rejecting it IF he believes P AND believes that P entails Q.
If, confronted with a deductive argument that P entails Q, and he believes P, but he nevertheless rejects Q, then logically he MUST believe that it is possible that the deduction, for one reason or another, or even for no reason at all, IS or MAY BE inadequate to entail Q. But if he believes that the deductive argument does not conclusively prove that P entails Q, then he cannot be said to believe that "if P, then Q".
The problem here is that you a postulating the logically impossible. You say that you can give concrete examples, but clearly you cannot since there are no concrete examples of the logically impossible. Therefore, your examples must suffer the same logical flaws as the faulty interpretation you have given them.
08 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsYou claim: "the act of accepting [the argument's] validity, if genuine, entails the acceptance of Q if P"
It can't be empirically false because it is not an empirical proposition: it's analytic. I'll respond in more detail in my reply to Bbarr's response.
That is, you claim that it is logically impossible to do all of:
1) accept the argument's validity
2) accept P as true
3) not accept Q as true
It is my contention that your claim is empirically false. That is, I could observe or construct counterexamples in the real world in which all of (1), (2) and (3) hold. I could cite users and discussions in this very forum that serve as such counterexamples.
To reiterate my request, especially in light of your insistence that your claim is purely analytical, please provide a deduction to demonstrate the truth of your claim. Bbarr has already suggested a deductive framework for you to use, namely deriving a contradiction from (1) & (2) & (3).
08 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesEvidently you don't understand the distinction between an empirical proposition (which depends upon concrete examples for its validity) and an analytical proposition (which is strictly a matter of definitional consistency and logic).
You claim: "the act of accepting [the argument's] validity, if genuine, entails the acceptance of Q if P"
That is, you claim that it is logically impossible to do all of:
1) accept the argument's validity
2) accept P as true
3) not accept Q as true
It is my contention that your claim is empirically false. That is, I could observe or constr ...[text shortened]... a deductive framework for you to use, namely deriving a contradiction from (1) & (2) & (3).
I have already pointed out that, if P is accepted, AND "if P then Q" is accepted, then it is logically impossible for Q to be rejected, because the conjunction of these two acceptances is analytically equivalent to accepting Q.
If, given an argument (deductive or otherwise) that P entails Q, and someone rejects Q, then they must, as a matter of deductive logic, reject P, or the argument that P entails Q, or both; but there is no logically consistent postulation in which both P and the argument "if P then Q" are accepted while rejecting Q. That is the proof, and you cannot observe or construct counterexamples, either in the real world or otherwise. If you cannot see this then the problem represents, for you, a pons asinorum.
08 Jan 08
4 edits
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsCompared to me, you understand less about this material than the the tsetse fly understands about nuclear fission.
Evidently you don't understand the distinction between an empirical proposition and an analytical proposition. If you cannot see this then the problem represents, for you, a pons asinorum.
I am an intellectual giant and you are but an ant roaming aimlessly in my shadow.
My critical thinking skills surpass in grandeur any accomplishment you shall ever achieve in your lifetime.
I am so far to the right of you on the IQ curve, I have to raise my arm at a mere 2 degree angle from horizontal to point and laugh at you, though you be but a speck on the horizon when I do.
I am the reigning RHP Champion of Debates and the founder of the Ivory Tower of yore. I don't need a lesson about propositions from you. Your claim is empirically false.
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsOf course you would want to dispense with the empirical conditionals, since their very possibility entails that it is not analytic that the proposition 'S believes (P & (P -> Q))' entails the proposition 'S believes Q'. Of course it is a logical entailment of 'P & (P ->Q)' that 'Q', but this is irrelevant. My claim is not that it is possible for Q to be false despite both P and P->Q being true. My claim is the the belief that P and that P->Q does not logically entail the belief that Q. The examples I gave illustrated this. Of course, it is a general psychological truth that the former beliefs will tend to generate the latter, but this is not a necessarily exceptionless psychological law. The fact that it is logically possible that an implanted chip, or deep-seated psychosis, or lesion in the brain could causally bring about the failure to believe Q shows that it is not analytic that one will form the belief that Q. What your claim about analyticity shows is that you do not understand what 'analytic' means. Analytic truths are those secured purely by the meaning and relation of the concepts employed in the putatively analytic proposition. "Bachelors are unmarried" is analytic because the very meaning of 'Bachelor' includes the concept 'unmarried'. It is not part of the very meaning of the concept 'belief' that one will as a matter of contingent fact come to believe that which is entailed by the rest of one's beliefs. Neither it is part of the meaning of 'inference' that one will as a matter of contingent fact infer in accord with what one takes one's evidence to be.
Originally posted by Bbarr
[b]If one understands the deduction, then one understands that if P is true, Q must also be true. When one antecedently believes P, thiis generally results in the immediate inference that Q is true, but this is not necessarily so.
We can (and should) dispense with empirical conditionals (e.g., a "chip" in the hea ...[text shortened]... les must suffer the same logical flaws as the faulty interpretation you have given them.[/b]
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf bombast and intellectual superiority were identical, you would indeed be a giant among men, but it isn't. If false pride were the hallmark of wisdom, you would indeed be a sage, but it isn't. You need the lesson -- you really do -- but you won't accept it. Very well. I can't say I am surprised, given your BWA icon. I prefer Nat King Cole myself.
Compared to me, you understand less about this material than the the tsetse fly understands about nuclear fission.
I am an intellectual giant and you are but an ant roaming aimlessly in my shadow.
My critical thinking skills surpass in grandeur any accomplishment you shall ever achieve in your lifetime.
I am so far to the right of you on t ...[text shortened]... of yore. I don't need a lesson about propositions from you. Your claim is empirically false.
08 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrYour "empirical examples" are neither empirical nor examples of your claim. You cannot cite examples of "a chip in the head", e.g., doing what you claim, because no such examples exist -- they don't even ostensibly exist; and even if they did *ostensibly* exist they would, of logical necessity, be either fictitious (misrepresented) or misinterpreted. You cannot point to any concrete occurrence as an example of the embodiment of logical impossibility, because there is no such thing.
Of course you would want to dispense with the empirical conditionals, since their very possibility entails that it is not analytic that the proposition 'S believes (P & (P -> Q))' entails the proposition 'S believes Q'. Of course it is a logical entailment of 'P & (P ->Q)' that 'Q', but this is irrelevant. My claim is not that it is possible for Q to be fals contingent fact infer in accord with what one takes one's evidence to be.
Again: if someone accepts P, and accepts an argument that "if P then Q", but rejects Q -- whether ostensibly because of a chip in the head or otherwise -- then they CANNOT be said to accept both P and the argument "if P then Q" simultaneous with their rejection of Q. How could such a chip work? Logically, only by eliminating either the conviction of P or the conviction of "if P then Q" or the simultaneous occurrence of both.
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribbles(1) If P, then Q.
Compared to me, you understand less about this material than the the tsetse fly understands about nuclear fission.
I am an intellectual giant and you are but an ant roaming aimlessly in my shadow.
My critical thinking skills surpass in grandeur any accomplishment you shall ever achieve in your lifetime.
I am so far to the right of you on t ...[text shortened]... of yore. I don't need a lesson about propositions from you. Your claim is empirically false.
(2) P. [though this seems to be unnecessary here, I include it only to sharpen the point]
(3) S believes P.
(4) S understands (1).
(5) S has been given a post-hypnotic suggestion that prevents her from believing Q.
(6) S does not believe Q.
—This goes back to bbarr’s point about “If P, then Q” and “S believes ‘If P then Q’” being two distinct propositions. Whether or not S must believe Q if she believes P is not analytic. S may simply be suffering from cognitive dissonance (e.g., by (4) above), or may just be irrational.
Does this get it, O Leonine Doctor?
08 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by Mark Adkinsif P is accepted, AND "if P then Q" is accepted, then it is logically impossible for Q to be rejected, because the conjunction of these two acceptances is analytically equivalent to accepting Q.
Evidently you don't understand the distinction between an empirical proposition (which depends upon concrete examples for its validity) and an analytical proposition (which is strictly a matter of definitional consistency and logic).
I have already pointed out that, if P is accepted, AND "if P then Q" is accepted, then it is logically impossible for r otherwise. If you cannot see this then the problem represents, for you, a pons asinorum.
That's just obviously false. That the conjunction of P and P => Q logically entails Q does not mean that it is logically impossible for one to believe P, believe P => Q, and yet fail to believe Q.