Theological Fatalism

Originally posted by knightmeister
God does not "believe" P , he watches P. He knows P in the same way you know the outcome of world war 2 , because it's already happened to him. Of course knowing the outcome of world war 2 does not prove that only one outcome was ever possible.

If God knows P, then He believes P. Belief is necessary for knowledge. If God knows P, it's not merely because He "watched" it (whatever that means). It's because God believes P; and God has sufficient justification for believing P; and P is true.

So, I don't think this is any sort of coherent objection to Premise 1 (especially given that you yourself claim that God knows P).

Originally posted by LemonJello
You probably just summed up the whole problem with organized God talk in total. Something like mistaking the finger for the moon, or...

In relation to Premise 1, if this is a problem, it's really the theist's problem. They're always claiming with nonchalance that God knows propositions. Surely, no theist is going to claim that it makes sense ...[text shortened]... proposition but that it doesn't make sense to talk about God's believing a proposition...

The problem is then I lose interest in the rest of the argument.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Consider the following argument for theological fatalism (see [1]). P is some proposition about the future concerning some agent and action (e.g., P is that Lemon will tie his right shoe at 3 P.M. tomorrow.) We also assume that God's beliefs are infallible: it is not possible that both God believes P and P is not true.

1. Yesterday, God believed P du/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
[2] Alvin Plantinga, On Ockham’s Way Out, 1986.

I reject premise (2).

As I pointed out in another thread to bbarr, the fact that a premise is true (e.g. "LJ tied his shoe at 3pm yesterday" ) does not make it necessary (the terminology is usually 'logically necessary', but I can see how that can be confusing in this context).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I reject premise (2).

As I pointed out in another thread to bbarr, the fact that a premise is true (e.g. "LJ tied his shoe at 3pm yesterday" ) does not make it necessary (the terminology is usually 'logically necessary', but I can see how that can be confusing in this context).

Btw, I didn't see your post in the other thread. I'll take a look at it again; but once again I think the lack of distinction between a proposition/fact that is necessarily true and one that is just true (which might be necessary or contingent) is at the heart of the apparent contradiction.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
The problem is then I lose interest in the rest of the argument.

That's probably not such a bad thing!

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I reject premise (2).

As I pointed out in another thread to bbarr, the fact that a premise is true (e.g. "LJ tied his shoe at 3pm yesterday" ) does not make it necessary (the terminology is usually 'logically necessary', but I can see how that can be confusing in this context).

I would reject Premise 2 as well. The example you cite (LJ tied his shoe at 3 pm yesterday), if true, I would argue is necessary – not logically necessary but necessary in the sense that it is not causable, it is not within influence or control. I would argue that such a proposition becomes accidentally necessary once it becomes true.

The problem though, I think, is that this sort of necessity is not enjoyed by just any past event as Premise 2 claims. It would only hold for things that are strictly about the past. For example, the claim that God believed P yesterday (where P is temporally indexed to the future as in this argument) is not strictly about the past. It says something about the past, but it is not strictly about the past because, given that God’s beliefs are infallible, it also implies something about the future (namely that P is true). If ultimately based on this, we say that P is necessary, then I think we are just performing the same sleight of hand discussed in the other thread.

This very roughly outlines Ockham’s rejection of Premise 2. The article by Plantinga that I cited discusses this in much more depth, and I think it’s a good essay.

Originally posted by LemonJello
If God knows P, then He believes P. Belief is necessary for knowledge. If God knows P, it's not merely because He "watched" it (whatever that means). It's because God believes P; and God has sufficient justification for believing P; and P is true.

So, I don't think this is any sort of coherent objection to Premise 1 (especially given that you yourself claim that God knows P).

God's justification for believing P is that he knows P has already happened. P does not have to be predicted in any way because God can be present when P happens whilst also being present a day before and after P. There's no leap of faith needed. God's eternal omnipresence ensures knowledge of P. The word "believe" is misleading here , it suggests somehow that God has faith that P will happen whereas the truth is that P happened a long time ago for him.

Originally posted by knightmeister
God's justification for believing P is that he knows P has already happened.

Yikes. You're very confused on the relationship between belief and knowledge. Justified belief is necessary for knowledge. So this statement of yours in incoherent.

Originally posted by knightmeister
God's justification for believing P is that he knows P has already happened. P does not have to be predicted in any way because God can be present when P happens whilst also being present a day before and after P. There's no leap of faith needed. God's eternal omnipresence ensures knowledge of P. The word "believe" is misleading here , it suggests som ...[text shortened]... has faith that P will happen whereas the truth is that P happened a long time ago for him.

The word "believe" is misleading here , it suggests somehow that God has faith that P

No, it doesn't. It just suggests that God endorses some mental representation about P. As I've already stated, God cannot know P unless He believes P. So if you think God knows P (which you do), then coherency dictates that you also think God believes P.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I reject premise (2).

As I pointed out in another thread to bbarr, the fact that a premise is true (e.g. "LJ tied his shoe at 3pm yesterday" ) does not make it necessary (the terminology is usually 'logically necessary', but I can see how that can be confusing in this context).

And I've never disagreed with that. Of course there is a distinction between being true and being logically necessary; a distinction I exploit in my general argument from evil. Of course, I never claimed that true propositions about the past are logically necessary (or even nomologically necessary). My claims about theological fatalism are based on it being logically impossible that God is mistaken about future events, combined with the assumption that the sort of freedom at issue is libertarian.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]The word "believe" is misleading here , it suggests somehow that God has faith that P

No, it doesn't. It just suggests that God endorses some mental representation about P. As I've already stated, God cannot know P unless He believes P. So if you think God knows P (which you do), then coherency dictates that you also think God believes P.[/b]

You're not understanding the difference between God's knowledge and man's. God doesn't need to believe anything to establish His knowledge as all knowledge belongs to Him without assent. Man must assent, must have confidence because he is essentially without knowledge.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
You're not understanding the difference between God's knowledge and man's. God doesn't need to believe anything to establish His knowledge as all knowledge belongs to Him without assent. Man must assent, must have confidence because he is essentially without knowledge.

Maybe I don't understand the distinction as dictated by FreakyKBH's Magical Book of Secret Divine Knowledge. But, sorry Freak, I don't care about your fantasy world. Somehow you and KM think that God can know something without holding, or maybe just without endorsing, any associated mental representations. Whatever...I mean, Jesus Christ, this is hardly relevant, anyway. You and KM can just insert knowledge into the argument instead of belief (just replace 'believes' by 'knows' and 'believed' by 'knew' as appropriate). That will clear up all your imaginary worries and won't affect the argument one bit.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]The word "believe" is misleading here , it suggests somehow that God has faith that P

No, it doesn't. It just suggests that God endorses some mental representation about P. As I've already stated, God cannot know P unless He believes P. So if you think God knows P (which you do), then coherency dictates that you also think God believes P.[/b]

You believe that you are looking at a computer screen now because you are present in the same time and space as said screen. There is some "belief" on your part because you need to trust your senses (eg the computer screen may be a figment of your imagination or you may be hallucinating) .
You may also feel that you have a mental construct of yourself as existing because you know that philosophically you cannot prove that the universe itself isn't part of some gigantic computer simulation.For you , some belief is always neccessary because you can never be 100% sure of anything.
God however has no such insecurities, being infallible. If he is present with you in time/space when you tie your shoe then he knows what you are doing. Because he knows that life is not a figment of his imagination and he also knows the ultimate nature of all reality , belief is not necessary. Only omnipresence.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
I have a problem with this premise. Seems to be covert anthropomorphism or conceptual idolatry.

It depends on what type of God LJ is targeting. Wouldn't a God that 'created man in His own image' be anthropomorphic?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Maybe I don't understand the distinction as dictated by FreakyKBH's Magical Book of Secret Divine Knowledge. But, sorry Freak, I don't care about your fantasy world. Somehow you and KM think that God can know something without holding, or maybe just without endorsing, any associated mental representations. Whatever...I mean, Jesus Christ, this is hardl ...[text shortened]... That will clear up all your imaginary worries and won't affect the argument one bit.

That's cute but not applicable. If I were ascribing to God some arcane or unique characteristic not immediately available through a superficial reading of Scripture, your charge of 'secret magic' might apply. I am not the one originally claiming omniscience on God's behalf: He is. I am not the one who said that He knows the end from before the beginning: He is.

Although the finer details and parameters of God's various qualities and characteristics are only available via proper exegetical study, the basics of God's omniscience are clearly evident for even the casual reader.

That being said, the distinction between how man comes to know things and God's knowledge must be made if any sense of these attendent issues is to be had. Quite frankly, once that distinction is made, the formulas pretty much solve themselves.

The action of the fans at a football game can sometimes influence the action on the field. However, when we watch a replay of a football game, does the experience of our knowledge have any impact on the outcome of the game?