Whats the Harm...

Originally posted by sumydid
Here is my charge, and it's not really a charge, it's just a stated fact.

Interestingly your position seems to have shifted over time - yet you act like it hasn't.

Originally posted by sumydid
[b]But, yes I can entirely dismiss Sumydid's charge.

Of course you can. But that doesn't mean you are correct in doing so.

His charge, basically, is that one cannot claim to know that God does not exist if one cannot completely rule out all possibilities that God does exist.

Ignorance--or strawman--pick one. I never laid out that charge fix the issue. 2 wrongs don't make a right, as they say.

Good day.[/b]

So, similarly, you don't know there does not exist a poltergeist in your freezer. After all, it's logically possible there is a poltergeist in your freezer and your only evidence that there is not a poltergeist in your freezer comes from your personal experience.

I just want to pause for second, because I need to you to be straight with me. Are you being serious?

Do you really believe that knowledge of any proposition requires absolute and utter logical certainty? This is a 'yes' or 'no' question. If 'yes', then will you admit, here and now, that you don't know your date of birth, home address, and the name of the current President of the U.S.? If 'no', then will you promise, here and now, not to require absolute and utter logical certainty of others when they provide the evidence for the propositions they claim to know?

I need these questions answered, or else there is no point in trying to explain to you why I believe the things I do, and why I believe that my evidence is strong enough to justify the claim that I know God does not exist.

Originally posted by Soothfast
I agree that (1) must be part of any general definition of what it means to "know" something, but if P stood for "God does not exist" then my position was and is that we have not satisfied (1) sufficiently, by which I mean that we have not satisfied (1) with mathematical certainty or even with the certainty of a theory in the sciences. However, if P stand lf with item (4) in the definition of "know" that you (and presumably Bbar) are using.

Consider some subject S and proposition P.

'S knows P' will be true iff:

1) P is true
2) S believes P
3) S is warranted in believing P
4) S's warrant for believing P non-accidentally satisfies Gettier counterfactuals.

(1) is an external condition. 'External' in the sense that whether (1) is satisfied is wholly a function of whether the world in fact is the way P claims it is. We do not satisfy (1), the world does. When we amass evidence, present arguments, give proofs, etc. for P, we are attempting to satisfy (3). Worries about degrees of epistemic justification, certainty, etc., are worries about the extent to which (3) is satisfied. But nothing about our reasons, our evidence, our warrant, makes it the case that (1) is satisfied. That would mean that our reasons, our evidence, our warrant, literally brings about the truth of P. That's crazy. If anything brings about the truth of P, it's the world; the actual facts, states of affairs, or whatever.

Originally posted by kevcvs57
I think proof and proven are simple enough, for me, I accept empirical evidence, it is perhaps the concept of knowledge and what constitutes it is where the subjective fuzziness comes in.

As I tried to say in my earlier post I have been exposed to enough
Empirical evidence to the contrary of Sunnydids god construct that I 'know' that construct is false ...[text shortened]... I would not claim any knowledge about either way.

We may well be talking at cross purposes.

Sounds to me like we pretty much agree, so yeah we were probably talking past each other before.

Originally posted by Soothfast
I agree that (1) must be part of any general definition of what it means to "know" something, but if P stood for "God does not exist" then my position was and is that we have not satisfied (1) sufficiently, by which I mean that we have not satisfied (1) with mathematical certainty or even with the certainty of a theory in the sciences. However, if P stand ...[text shortened]... lf with item (4) in the definition of "know" that you (and presumably Bbar) are using.

Okay, then you do agree that (1) should be included in the analysis of knowledge.

Regarding the rest, I think there is some notional confusion here. As bbarr has already pointed out, (1) is not something we satisfy. As you can see from its statement, (1) makes no demand on S. It makes a demand on P, in how the proposition needs to relate to the world. The condition (1) basically states that the proposition S believes, P, needs to pick out an actual fact about the world.

So when you talk about failure on the part of S to satisfy, you should be referring not to (1) but to (3), since (3) is what regards the justification condition. For instance, if you think we have not amassed enough or good enough evidence, say, to be able to claim we know P, then that would tie into a failure to satisfy (3), not (1). Does this make sense?

Originally posted by sumydid
[b]But, yes I can entirely dismiss Sumydid's charge.

Of course you can. But that doesn't mean you are correct in doing so.

His charge, basically, is that one cannot claim to know that God does not exist if one cannot completely rule out all possibilities that God does exist.

Ignorance--or strawman--pick one. I never laid out that charge ...[text shortened]... fix the issue. 2 wrongs don't make a right, as they say.

Good day.[/b]

Here is my charge, and it's not really a charge, it's just a stated fact. You don't "know" God doesn't exist, because your only empirical evidence of His non-existence is your own personal experience.

Huh? Can you restate your charge. I'm not understanding what you're saying.

By the way, does this mean that you cannot "know" Santa and the Tooth Fairy, etc, do not exist? Are you consistent on this issue? You don't claim to know such things do not exist?

Also, by the way, how is this explanation supposed to justify your stance that one cannot verifiably prove a negative or a non-existence claim? Not all evidence is empirical or based on experience. For example, if the definition of 'God' at issue were "a square circle", how is this explanation of yours supposed to show that we cannot prove that such a 'God' does not exist?

Logic agrees with me here: You can't say you have evidence that something doesn't exist, just because you personally haven't witnessed it.

Again, I don't have any idea what you're talking about. The evidence we would have against the existence of your God is in the form of arguments. These arguments don't simply state "I personally haven't witnessed God; therefore God doesn't exist." So, if this is the charge you are making, it does not even bear any relevance to our claim, let alone show that our claim in knowledge must be mistaken.

The best thing to lay claim to, which I've already offered up to you and bbarr is: You are utterly convinced that God does not exist and you have gathered a lot of data to support your conclusion.

No, I never said (and I am not in fact) "utterly convinced" that God does not exist. I said that I know God does not exist.

In fact, the best argument against your claim to "know" God doesn't exist is for me to simply say, "Ok. Well you're wrong, because I likewise know God does exist."

Sorry, but that is not an argument. The best way for you to respond would be to actually evaluate the arguments we have that we think justify our stance and tell us what you think is wrong with them, if anything; at the same time, you could offer whatever actual arguments you have (if you have any, that is) for your opposing stance. That's more or less how debates are supposed to work.

Anyway, your views here seem to keep shifting. You challenged bbarr earlier with showing that he had "logically eliminated" any possibility that God does exist, as though this is required for his having knowledge that God does not exist. Okay, if you're going to require that one eliminate any possibility that not-P in order for them to have knowledge that P, then you need to do so consistently. Of course doing so will leave you with the stance that you can know virtually nothing. You certainly won't be able to know God exists under such a requirement. You don't get to be a radical skeptic about knowledge only when the claim goes against your cherished religious beliefs. Either be consistent in your requirements on knowledge, or spare us all this nonsense about epistemic certainty being required for knowledge.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Okay, then you do agree that (1) should be included in the analysis of knowledge.

Regarding the rest, I think there is some notional confusion here. As bbarr has already pointed out, (1) is not something we satisfy. As you can see from its statement, (1) makes no demand on S. It makes a demand on P, in how the proposition needs to relate to the worl ...[text shortened]... im we know P, then that would tie into a failure to satisfy (3), not (1). Does this make sense?

That makes sense, yes. My quibble about (1) in the present context (existence of god) is misdirected and is really a quibble about (3).

So here's the thing -- and this is entirely apart from the whole "god thing": when S says "I know P," that is logically equivalent to asserting that the conjunction

"(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)"

is true, which of course requires that the four statements comprising the conjunction be all simultaneously true. Moreover, I take it you and Bbarr do not allow for the possibility that (2), (3), and (4) can be true and (1) false, and this is because if (1) is false there is no way (3) can be made true. That is, if P is false, you say S can never be justified in believing P. That is all fine and well, but as a matter of practice history is rife with instances wherein individuals, institutions, or societies thought they "knew" something to be true that in the end turned out to be false. As far as can be judged with what modern science knows about the world, we may grant that S is warranted in believing P, when P is in fact false. Once we discover that P is false we can, after the discovery, look back and say that S was not warranted in believing P after all, but that's almost like changing the rules of the game to turn a loss into a win.

(1) is strict. It's either true or false. S may amass loads of data to make the case that (3) is true, but it still may be that (1) is just plain false, in which case the statement "S knows P" is likewise false. Indeed the very act of amassing data is done in order to determine whether (1) is likely to be true to begin with. Yes, (1) is an external condition, but we don't know whether it's true or false a priori.

Still, I take your point, as well as Bbarr's, that in the case of the Christian God (3) looks very much to be satisfied "beyond a reasonable doubt," and that in turn renders the truth of (1) to be "beyond a reasonable doubt". But it must be admitted that we're using (3) to justify (1) "post hoc," as it were.


EDIT: I have only now noticed there are two r's in bbarr. More vowels, man!

Originally posted by Soothfast
That makes sense, yes. My quibble about (1) in the present context (existence of god) is misdirected and is really a quibble about (3).

So here's the thing -- and this is entirely apart from the whole "god thing": when S says "I know P," that is logically equivalent to asserting that the conjunction

"(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)"

is true, which of cou ...[text shortened]... I have only now noticed there are two r's in bbarr. More vowels, man!

So I can make a statement: Lets assume for the moment god with a big g, GOD, is real. Well then, I can make a statement that what we think of as GOD with a big g, is really only the local sheriff and he/she/it reports to an even bigger god who reports to an even bigger god.

So Creationists, disprove it.

Originally posted by Soothfast
That makes sense, yes. My quibble about (1) in the present context (existence of god) is misdirected and is really a quibble about (3).

So here's the thing -- and this is entirely apart from the whole "god thing": when S says "I know P," that is logically equivalent to asserting that the conjunction

"(1) & (2) & (3) & (4)"

is true, which of cou I have only now noticed there are two r's in bbarr. More vowels, man!

Moreover, I take it you and Bbarr do not allow for the possibility that (2), (3), and (4) can be true and (1) false, and this is because if (1) is false there is no way (3) can be made true.

No, that is not correct. What would make you think that? Nothing we have stated implies this. I do allow for this possibility. And I do think S can meet (3) even if (1) is in fact not satisfied. That is, I think there are cases where one can be justified in believing a proposition even if that proposition happens to be in fact false.

we may grant that S is warranted in believing P, when P is in fact false

Yes, I agree. Of course, S would not know P in that case.

(1) is strict. It's either true or false. S may amass loads of data to make the case that (3) is true, but it still may be that (1) is just plain false, in which case the statement "S knows P" is likewise false.

Sure, yes.

Yes, (1) is an external condition, but we don't know whether it's true or false a priori.

Well, that may or may not be the case. There are certainly propositions one can know a priori (that is, based on a priori justification). If S knows P, it follows trivially that S knows (1). So, if S knows P based on a priori justification, then this claim of yours is false.

This is starting to remind me of a debate I had on here previously (I believe it was with googlefudge, if I recall correctly). He took issue with the external truth condition on knowledge. But his argument was literally self-contradictory. His stance was that one can know P on the basis of (2) & (3) & (4) being satisfied; but that one cannot know the truth condition is satisfied. Well, that is just contradictory, since if one can know P is true, then it follows immediately one can know (1), since P is true is precisely the content of (1)!!! His beef with the external truth condition was that it is not reasonable to require S to satisfy it. But, as already discussed, this concern is an imaginary one, since (1) is simply not something S satisfies or is meant to satisfy.

Still, I take your point, as well as Bbarr's, that in the case of the Christian God (3) looks very much to be satisfied "beyond a reasonable doubt," and that in turn renders the truth of (1) to be "beyond a reasonable doubt". But it must be admitted that we're using (3) to justify (1) "post hoc," as it were.

I don't understand your point here about "post hoc" justification. Justification comes into play on (3) & (4), not (1). If (3) & (4) are satisfied, then S has done his job when it comes to justification. Period. The point of (1) has nothing to do with S's doing his job concerning justification. Again, (1) makes no demand on S with respect to his epistemic work. It requires something of P, not S.

EDIT: Thread 141932 contains the exchange between myself and googlefudge to which I was referring.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't understand your point here about "post hoc" justification. Justification comes into play on (3) & (4), not (1). If (3) & (4) are satisfied, then S has done his job when it comes to justification. Period. The point of (1) has nothing to do with S's doing his job concerning justification. Again, (1) makes no demand on S with respect to his epistemic work. It requires something of P, not S.

Heh - yeah, but, for S to come out and say "I know P", S is necessarily making the claim that P is true. S is "speaking for external reality". This business about the truth or falseness of P being wholly apart (external) from mortals and their fleeting opinions is completely theoretical, because mortals are not omniscient and in real life have to make conclusions based on observation. So how does S know P is true? It can be a logical conclusion based on a preponderance of evidence, but it is that selfsame evidence that is used to establish (3) (i.e. S is justified in believing P). This practical (if not logical) dependency between (1) and (3) is why, earlier on, I was saying we don't have (1) "in the bag" in the present context. Nevertheless I do agree that I should have been directing my attention at (3), not (1).

In his earlier post Bbarr may as well have just come out and said "God does not exist" as a statement of fact. It's part and parcel of his statement "I know God does not exist."

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Moreover, I take it you and Bbarr do not allow for the possibility that (2), (3), and (4) can be true and (1) false, and this is because if (1) is false there is no way (3) can be made true.

No, that is not correct. What would make you think that? Nothing we have stated implies this. I do allow for this possibility. And I do think S can meet ...[text shortened]... contains the exchange between myself and googlefudge to which I was referring.[/b]

Other things you mention here I'll try to get to tomorrow or some other time. It's gotten so late where I am it's early.

Originally posted by Soothfast
Heh - yeah, but, for S to come out and say "I know P", S is necessarily making the claim that P is true. S is "speaking for external reality". This business about the truth or falseness of P being wholly apart (external) from mortals and their fleeting opinions is completely theoretical, because mortals are not omniscient and in real life have to ...[text shortened]... atement of fact. It's part and parcel of his statement "I know God does not exist."

for S to come out and say "I know P", S is necessarily making the claim that P is true.

No I don't think so, strictly. But, of course, in general if one says "I know P", we can take it that he thinks P is true. I'm not understanding the problem here.

S is "speaking for external reality". This business about the truth or falseness of P being wholly apart (external) from mortals and their fleeting opinions is completely theoretical, because mortals are not omniscient and in real life have to make conclusions based on observation.

The point of the analysis of knowledge is to outline conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge. It goes without saying here that S does not have direct, perfect awareness of the world, or external reality. Knowledge, then, is something that involves not only S and his mental representations but also the external reality. It's not good enough that S keep up his end, since the external reality also has to cooperate in the sense that the content of S's mental representation needs to pick out something actual. This is the reason for the truth condition. We call it "external" because it makes a demand not on S, but on the relation between P (the propositional content of S's mental representation) and the world. This is one component of the analysis, and yes I would say it is theoretical in the sense that it has nothing to do with the practicality of S's keeping up his end. Such practicality requirements are taken up in the other components.

So how does S know P is true?

Again, S knows P iff (1)&(2)&(3)&(4) are all satisfied. If (2)&(3)&(4) are met, then S is keeping up his end. Alas, at the end of the day, (1) still needs to hold though.

It can be a logical conclusion based on a preponderance of evidence, but it is that selfsame evidence that is used to establish (3) (i.e. S is justified in believing P). This practical (if not logical) dependency between (1) and (3) is why, earlier on, I was saying we don't have (1) "in the bag" in the present context.

There is no practical dependency here: (1) has nothing to do with S's justification. That is taken up elsewhere in the analysis.

In his earlier post Bbarr may as well have just come out and said "God does not exist" as a statement of fact.

No I don't think so, since "I know P" purports to report more than just "P".

------------

At the end of the day, I am a bit confused concerning what exactly your beef is with the external truth condition. You agreed before that it needs to be there in the analysis of knowledge, so what's the problem? It seems you want to keep treating it as through (1) places a practicality requirement on S or something like that. As already discussed, though, it doesn't.

It also seems like you have some issue with the idea that in reporting "I know P" one is, at least in part, reporting "P". Again, I don't agree this is necessarily true as you implied. But, at any rate, I don't understand what the problem would be here.

Originally posted by googlefudge
I will give a more in depth answer later, but there is one quick point on which I was apparently unclear and I can clear up....[text shortened]...
I hope this clears that up for you.

Do you still plan on giving an answer?

Originally posted by sonhouse
So I can make a statement: Lets assume for the moment god with a big g, GOD, is real. Well then, I can make a statement that what we think of as GOD with a big g, is really only the local sheriff and he/she/it reports to an even bigger god who reports to an even bigger god.

So Creationists, disprove it.

Let's see if you can understand what is said in the following link:

http://www.answering-islam.org/Shamoun/q_paul_on_one_god.htm

Proof there is only one God:

http://www.bible.ca/trinity/trinity-oneness-unity-one-god.htm

The unity of God:

http://www.bible.ca/trinity/trinity-oneness-unity.htm

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]for S to come out and say "I know P", S is necessarily making the claim that P is true.

No I don't think so, strictly. But, of course, in general if one says "I know P", we can take it that he thinks P is true. I'm not understanding the problem here.
[/b]

You make many lucid points, but the above is the crux of my "problem," I think, if not the entirety of it. So: to say "S knows P" is logically equivalent to the conjunction "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)", which means "S knows P" is true if and only if "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)" is true. Thus, if we take "S knows P" to be true, then "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)" is likewise true, and it follows necessarily that (1) is true; that is, we take "P is true" to be true. A mighty assertion! Someone like me might start to think that our definition of "know" has to be altered in some way to get around such consequences

From external reality's "point of view" the veracity of (1) is either a given or not, and not subject to the interpretation of S. From the point of view of S, however, the truth value of P (and by extension (1)) can only be determined with a degree of probability based on observation if P is a statement about the physical universe. (We can exclude mathematical inquiries here, where logical analysis alone is typically employed to arrive at a conclusion with absolute certainty given certain axioms.)

This is important, because S is presumably representing one side of a debate in a forum like this one, and a debate cannot be won without first making claims and then substantiating them to whatever degree the participants in the debate have agreed is sufficient to settle their truth values (0 or 1).

So here's what I think must be our practice in order to retain the current definition of "know". Say the participants in a debate agree that S has done his bit to satisfy (2), (3) and (4), but then an advanced alien from planet Ziltoidia comes down in a flying saucer and reveals that (1) is in fact false (i.e. ~P, or "not-P," is true). What to do? Do we have to start qualifying our lovely definition with footnotes and exception clauses that amount to saying "S knows P" doesn't "strictly" have to imply the statement "P is true"...? Not at all. We can conclude that the participants were mistaken in their assessment that (3) is true. That is, S was not justified in believing P after all, because there was a flaw in S's reasoning that no one caught, or the data S collected was insufficient or corrupted in some way no one noticed. In the present context, if the Christian God were to suddenly present himself and say "Here I am, I exist!", then we must conclude that Bbarr had not satisfied (3) after all. And this is perhaps no great revelation, because I think that is implicitly the standard operating procedure among normal people having an argument who are unaware of any "formal definition" of what it means to "know" something.