23 Nov 12
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloSorry, there is in fact nothing you or Bbarr has said to imply that such is your position. Indeed, as my previous post indicates, I'm actually thinking of adopting the position myself. It allows for retention of the current definition of "know" you and doubtless most philosophers use, and concentrates all the "burden of proof" on (3) such that it is clear that (1) is purely external even in contexts in which we are dealing with a messy physical universe. It was always so, but now I take the position that (1) cannot be false when (2), (3) and (4) are "truly true."
[b]Moreover, I take it you and Bbarr do not allow for the possibility that (2), (3), and (4) can be true and (1) false, and this is because if (1) is false there is no way (3) can be made true.
No, that is not correct. What would make you think that? Nothing we have stated implies this. I do allow for this possibility. And I do think S can meet ...[text shortened]... an be justified in believing a proposition even if that proposition happens to be in fact false.[/b]
24 Nov 12
Originally posted by Soothfast"S knows P" is true if and only if "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)" is true. Thus, if we take "S knows P" to be true, then "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)" is likewise true, and it follows necessarily that (1) is true; that is, we take "P is true" to be true. A mighty assertion! Someone like me might start to think that our definition of "know" has to be altered in some way to get around such consequences
You make many lucid points, but the above is the crux of my "problem," I think, if not the entirety of it. So: to say "S knows P" is logically equivalent to the conjunction "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)", which means "S knows P" is true if and only if "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)" is true. Thus, if we take "S knows P" to be true, then "(1)&(2)&(3)&(4)" is likewise true, and it ...[text shortened]... formal definition" of what it means to "know" something.
First, the reason why I disagreed with your claim before is that it sounded like you were saying that if one utters "I know P" it necessarily means he intends to report "P". Strictly, there is absolutely no way that is true, because a person could intend 'know' in all sorts of (potentially weird) ways. So, I disagree with that idea.
However, as you have clarified it here, yes I agree. That is, under the analysis of knowledge given by (1)&(2)&(3)&(4), we can certainly say that necessarily, if S knows P, then P is true. That follows from the external truth condition.
I don't agree with your claim (or really know what you mean by it) that anything here is a "mighty assertion". Neither the claim "Necessarily, if S knows P, then P is true", nor the claim "P is true" is mighty here. "Necessarily, if S knows P, then P is true" just reflects the external truth condition. If you want to deny this, then you need to deny the external truth condition. But, note, that will basically commit you to the idea that one could know a proposition that is in fact false, so I doubt you want to do this. Neither is "P is true" a mighty assertion here. This just happens to basically be the content of S's belief that P. After all, a belief is a propositional attitude wherein one takes the proposition to be true. Of course, belief proceed at differing levels of confidence or credence, apportioned as the evidence dictates. Note, however, that to assert "P is true" is not to assert that P is necessarily true; and it is not to assert that I have absolute confidence that P is true; or etc.
I see absolutely no problems here whatsoever. Bottom line, though, if you have some problem with the idea that "P is true" follows with necessity from "S knows P"; and you think the analysis of knowledge has to be altered to get around this; then, simply put, you have to deny the external truth condition on knowledge. Are you prepared to do this? It will basically commit you to the idea that, regarding all the practical and theoretical components necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge, propositional truth is not one of them. It will basically commit you to the idea that one could know a proposition that is in fact false. Again, are you prepared to take that on?
From the point of view of S, however, the truth value of P (and by extension (1)) can only be determined with a degree of probability based on observation if P is a statement about the physical universe.
How does this in any way suggest that we need to alter the analysis of knowledge? Again, the analysis of knowledge purports to outline all those practical and theoretical components that are necessary and jointly sufficient for an instance of knowledge. The point of (1) has absolutely nothing to do with the practicality of S's being able to justify or ascertain the truth value of P. It also has nothing to do with any limitations S may have on being able to guarantee the truth of P. So, what does these considerations have to do with whether or not (1) should be included in the analysis of knowledge? These types of considerations have nothing to do with (1).
So here's what I think must be our practice in order to retain the current definition of "know". Say the participants in a debate agree that S has done his bit to satisfy (2), (3) and (4), but then an advanced alien from planet Ziltoidia comes down in a flying saucer and reveals that (1) is in fact false (i.e. ~P, or "not-P," is true). What to do? Do we have to start qualifying our lovely definition with footnotes and exception clauses that amount to saying "S knows P" doesn't "strictly" have to imply the statement "P is true"...? Not at all. We can conclude that the participants were mistaken in their assessment that (3) is true. That is, S was not justified in believing P after all, because there was a flaw in S's reasoning that no one caught, or the data S collected was insufficient or corrupted in some way no one noticed.
No, we would probably conclude simply that S, in fact, did not know P (even if he was justified in claiming to know P) because (1) wasn't in fact satisfied.
In the present context, if the Christian God were to suddenly present himself and say "Here I am, I exist!", then we must conclude that Bbarr had not satisfied (3) after all. And this is perhaps no great revelation, because I think that is implicitly the standard operating procedure among normal people having an argument who are unaware of any "formal definition" of what it means to "know" something.
Again, no. If the Christian God were suddenly to exist, then of course we have to conclude that bbarr didn't actually know the Christian God did not exist. But we don't have to conclude that bbarr didn't meet (3). We can, of course, just conclude that (1) was not satisfied. Again, the entire point of the external truth condition on knowledge is that propositional truth is required for knowledge. If it ain't true, then one cannot know it. So, obviously, in your example, the glaring reason why bbarr didn't know that God did not exist is because it just wasn't in fact true that God did not exist. We don't need to conclude that bbarr did not meet (3).
I don't understand what you are trying to show with these examples. At any rate, your claim that "we must" conclude that (3) was not satisfied is obviously false. That S didn't know P in such examples just follows immediately from the fact that (1) didn't hold.
24 Nov 12
Originally posted by SoothfastIt was always so, but now I take the position that (1) cannot be false when (2), (3) and (4) are "truly true."
Sorry, there is in fact nothing you or Bbarr has said to imply that such is your position. Indeed, as my previous post indicates, I'm actually thinking of adopting the position myself. It allows for retention of the current definition of "know" you and doubtless most philosophers use, and concentrates all the "burden of proof" on (3) such that it is clea ...[text shortened]... now I take the position that (1) cannot be false when (2), (3) and (4) are "truly true."
But (1) can be false even if (2), (3), and (4) are all true. So, I don't understand this position that you're taking.
24 Nov 12
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloAll this does is render epistemic justification itself an external condition.
[b]It was always so, but now I take the position that (1) cannot be false when (2), (3) and (4) are "truly true."
But (1) can be false even if (2), (3), and (4) are all true. So, I don't understand this position that you're taking.[/b]
24 Nov 12
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrWhat I was thinking about this (correct me if you think I'm wrong) is that this position makes Soothfast some sort of infallibilist. If he claims that satisifaction of (2)&(3)&(4) guarantees the truth of (1), then that sounds like some sort of infallibilist notion, such as that in order for S to be justified in believing that P, it is necessary that S's basis, b, for belief be such that it is not possible both that S has b and P is false. Something along those lines....
All this does is render epistemic justification itself an external condition.
EDIT: Here I would also submit that Soothfast basically contends that if (1) turns out not to be met, then we must conclude that (3) was not met. That definitely sounds something like the infallibilist notion above.
24 Nov 12
Originally posted by sonhouseGod has promised never again to destroy the people of the Earth by a worldwide flood. So your solution is to destroy at least 6 billion of them before they are born, right. Aren't you also destroying the innocent? Surely, the unborn babies can not be charged with a crime, unless you wish to make new laws.
So you agree with the hospital staff that the woman dies because they refuse to abort? You would have followed the same path even though it led to the woman's death? What about HER rights? She is a living thinking being, not a fetus with no mind. I guess that counts for nothing in your world.
Do you rail at the atrocities committed on living people? How ...[text shortened]... which might happen if we keep reproducing willy nilly like we have been in the last 100 years.
24 Nov 12
2 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloThat is certainly one possibility, but I think infallibilism is a thesis about knowledge, not epistemic justification. S may be justified in believing P despite S having reasons insufficient to guarantee the truth of P. But S can't know P under those circumstances. We could claim S reasonably believes P, or perhaps even that it would be irrational for S to fail to believe that P, but not that S knows P. All that happens in this case is we stop caring about knowledge and start caring about reasonable belief.
What I was thinking about this (correct me if you think I'm wrong) is that this position makes Soothfast some sort of infallibilist. If he claims that satisifaction of (2)&(3)&(4) guarantees the truth of (1), then that sounds like some sort of infallibilist notion, such as that in order for S to be justified in believing that P, it is necessary that S's ...[text shortened]... e that (3) was not met. That definitely sounds something like the infallibilist notion above.
EDIT: Actually, there are infallibilists about justification, motivated by Gettier. Since Gettier relies on the assumption that one can be justified yet wrong, one response is to reject this assumption and claim that if one is justified, one has to be correct. This has the unpalatable consequence that none of our beliefs about the world are justified. Infallibilism about knowledge isn't as bad. We can still have justified beliefs, just not knowledge.
If he thinks, however, that it is a condition on justification that if S justifiably believes P then P is true, then we will end up with different sorts of epistemic justification: A) The sort to which we have access, that we use to determine what to believe, and that we advance when justifying ourselves to ourselves and others, and B) The sort that guarantees truth. (A) will be the internalist notion, and (B) will be an external condition. What will happen, of course, because (A) will include all the epistemological currency we actually use, is that we'll just talk about being justified in the internal rather than external sense, and knowledge will again be ushered off the stage.
In short, Soothfast's suggestion doesn't help anything or solve any problem. All it does it render knowledge something rarefied, contrary to actual usage, and mess up the notion of justification in the process.
24 Nov 12
Originally posted by bbarrThanks for that clarification. I think now it would be wrong to claim that this position makes Soothfast an infallibilist because the claim that if (1) is not met we must also reject (3) is still at the end if the day compatible with the idea that generally S can know P despite not having certainty (of course only if (1) is met). I agree instead with the way you put it, that this claim renders justification an external condition. His claim precludes that one could be justified in believing P if P happens to be false, which I think is quite unsatisfactory and undermines normal intuition and usage.
That is certainly one possibility, but I think infallibilism is a thesis about knowledge, not epistemic justification. S may be justified in believing P despite S having reasons insufficient to guarantee the truth of P. But S can't know P under those circumstances. We could claim S reasonably believes P, or perhaps even that it would be irrational for S to ...[text shortened]... rarefied, contrary to actual usage, and mess up the notion of justification in the process.
Originally posted by bbarrSo, similarly, you don't know there does not exist a poltergeist in your freezer. After all, it's logically possible there is a poltergeist in your freezer and your only evidence that there is not a poltergeist in your freezer comes from your personal experience.
So, similarly, you don't know there does not exist a poltergeist in your freezer. After all, it's logically possible there is a poltergeist in your freezer and your only evidence that there is not a poltergeist in your freezer comes from your personal experience.
I just want to pause for second, because I need to you to be straight with me. Are you being hat my evidence is strong enough to justify the claim that I know God does not exist.
No, not similarly. There aren't 2 billion people claiming personal experience with said hypothetical polterqeist. You're using the Flying Spaghetti Argument, which falls completely flat for the reason I just stated. If 2 billion people claimed to know the FSM personally, I wouldn't think less of myself for claiming Agnosticism on the matter. I don't feel compelled to claim "knowledge" of something that I don't really know.
I just want to pause for second, because I need to you to be straight with me. Are you being serious?
Dead serious.
Do you really believe that knowledge of any proposition requires absolute and utter logical certainty?
To claim to "know" something is to implicity claim it as fact (see soothfast below). So yes. Though I wouldn't shy away from claiming as fact the President, the date of my birth, my home address, etc. I do understand that what I really, absolutely know is very little.
Look, whether this is an exercise in disingenuousness or not, I don't know, but you are taking this way too far. When someone says, "I know God doesn't exist," it is extremely unfair to say such knowledge is on equal footing with their knowledge of their home address or who the President is.
While you are acting so surprised at my position, I really think you need to look at yours.
Now get that thread started, and proceed to PROVE your "knowledge" that God doesn't exist, and maybe that will help clarify both our positions.
24 Nov 12
Originally posted by LemonJelloI don't think you're reading what I'm saying with the necessary care. I spelled it out already: If S claims to have (2), (3), and (4) sewn up, and yet (1) is false, then that can only be because (3), in particular, hasn't actually been secured. That is, S may think he is warranted in believing P, but he is mistaken. His data must be incomplete, or his reasoning flawed. I would take "warranted" to be a fairly strong condition here: "warranted" meaning sound mind, sound logic, and sufficient data. All the words in the expression of (1) through (4) leave some wiggle room for these kinds of interpretations. Of course it is a common problem in science that we don't always know that our data is sound in quality and sufficient in quantity. Peer review helps, as does replicating the results of an experiment and so on, but there are no 100% guarantees.
[b]It was always so, but now I take the position that (1) cannot be false when (2), (3) and (4) are "truly true."
But (1) can be false even if (2), (3), and (4) are all true. So, I don't understand this position that you're taking.[/b]
Consider the oldie but goodie: P = "The Earth is at the center of the universe." We can let S = "The Catholic Church". Some might say that in this context (2), (3), and (4) could be granted at least in the early days of the Ptolemaic model, whereas certainly (1) was and is false. I would say that (3) was never satisfied; that is, S was never warranted in glomming onto the Ptolemaic model, because S never went out and did experiments and collected good data, or bothered to listen to anyone who had. To explain why Mars moved in a retrograde direction sometimes, people sympathetic to P just threw in some epicycles and said "job well done."
If you want to interpret "warranted" as meaning "Ho hum, seems good enough for gubbamint work," well, that's fine; and then one can allow for the possibility that (2), (3), and (4) are true yet (1) is false. As I intimated earlier, the strictness we want to assign to the word "warranted" could even vary depending on the seriousness of the consequences of concluding that we "know P" when P is in fact false. God and the Higgs boson? Better be strict! The reason zebras have stripes? Less strict.
24 Nov 12
2 edits
Originally posted by LemonJello
It will basically commit you to the idea that, regarding all the practical and theoretical components necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge, propositional truth is not one of them. It will basically commit you to the idea that one could know a proposition that is in fact false. Again, are you prepared to take that on?
It will basically commit you to the idea that one could know a proposition that is in fact false. Again, are you prepared to take that on?
EDIT: I have to strike what I said here from the record, because it was in error.
I understand that you take the position that it is possible for (2), (3), and (4) to be true and yet (1) false. Very good. But I'm not sure I follow how it is that I'm saying it is possible for someone to know a false proposition. I have never given up (1) from being in the definition of "S knows P". You're likely misinterpreting something I said.