Why Is There Belief in the Divinity of Jesus?

Originally posted by bbarr
I have to take issue with some of this. First, it is simply not the case that people never believe a proposition without evidence. For instance, people come to believe propositions based on inference from false beliefs, fallacious inferences from true beliefs, and in some cases from psychological events that do not even roughly count as inferences. People c ...[text shortened]... on, settles no dispute, and only serves to obfuscate religious discussions.

Thanks, bbarr. I concede the points you've made. It seems the charge of epistemic irresponsibility is inescapable for a person of faith. However, I think my point still stands that Christian faith is not blind faith, i.e., it is based on evidence (even though that evidence may not count as 'good' evidence in the normative sense). And this, I think, is where William James' point applies, i.e., "a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule." For instance, belief in miracles may not be epistemically justifiable, but if miracles (i.e., direct acts of God interrupting the flow of natural cause and effect) do in fact occur, however improbable, then epistemic responsibility may prevent one from acknowledging an important aspect of reality. This may be especially pertinent if faith in the miracle-working power of God is indeed a prerequisite for justification.

Originally posted by whodey
Great! Now all you need to do is show me a mathmatical equation that either proves that God exists or does not exist.

Of course I was looking for examples that does not include mathamatics. 😉

…Great! Now all you need to do is show me a mathematical equation that either proves that God exists or does not exist…

Wrong! don’t need to! I said this in two other posts but:

The burden of proof is NOT on the person that refutes the claim of the existence of something X (such as the claim of the existence of a “god&ldquo😉, the burden of proof is on the person that supports the claim of the existence of something X. If it is you that is claiming X exists then it is you that has to provide evidence to rationally justify your claim that X exists. All the person that refutes X exists (for example, an atheist that refutes that there exists a “god&ldquo😉 has to do to justify his claim that the probability of that X existing is vanishing small is to point out that, according to all known science and/or observations (excluding observations that can be demonstrated to be hallucinations, mirages etc) there is no evidence to support that claim that X exists -that is all!

If that wasn’t the case then how would you argue against somebody that claims Santa exists and correctly asserts “nobody has proven that Santa doesn’t exist!”?

…Of course I was looking for examples that does not include mathematics.…

As you wish:

Suppose that X,Y and Z are propositions that may be true or false (it doesn’t mater what these propositions are -they could all be totally absurd in which case they will all be false).

here’s is just one non-mathematical example of a proof of what is rational:
It is rational to believe the following proposition:

If proposition (A) is true where proposition (A) is:

(A) “only If X AND Y are both true then Z must be true else Z must be false”

then it logically follows that it is rational to believe that proposition (B) is true where proposition (B) is:

(B) “If either X OR Y or both are false then Z must be false else Z must be true”

And here is the proof -although you have to manually check the validity of all four statements below for yourself:

1, If X is false and Y is false then, according to both (A) and (B), Z must be false.
2, If X is false and Y is true then, according to both (A) and (B), Z must be false.
3, If X is true and Y is false then, according to both (A) and (B), Z must be false.
4, If X is true and Y is true then, according to both (A) and (B), Z must be true.

This covers all four of the possible combinations for truth values for X and Y in both (A) and (B) and demonstrates that (A) and (B) produce the same corresponding conclusion regarding whether or not proposition Z is true and therefore this proves that if (A) is true then it is rational to believe that (B) must also be true as required.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[Wrong! don’t need to! I said this in two other posts but:

The burden of proof is NOT on the person that refutes the claim of the existence of something X (such as the claim of the existence of a “god&ldquo😉, the burden of proof is on the person that supports the claim of the existence of something X. If it is you that is claiming X exists then it is you ...[text shortened]... hallucinations, mirages etc) there is no evidence to support that claim that X exists -that is all!

So what you are looking for is material "proof" for an immaterial God? Do you see any problems with this?

Of course I can point to evidences such as the material appearance of Christ and his teachings, but I have no such proof as you well know.

The bulk of my evidence lies within the teachings of Christ, namely, loving your neighbor as yourself and even going so far as to teach that we should love our enemies. Unfortunatly, such concepts as love has little place in this material world. In fact, it does not exist in and of itself in the material world other than to clumsly describe it as a seiries of chemical reactions in the brain. This, of course, is despite the fact that love is the single greatest driving force within our being that helps give us purpose and fulfillment in our lives.

So there you have it. You have an immaterial concept that dominates our material existence. Go figure?

As for burden of proof, I have no burden of proof because if God wanted us to have proof we would have it. Why would I lay upon my heart a burden that God did not see fit to address? In fact, many have had proof of his existence Biblically but it did little to sway them from rejecting him in the end, so what benefit has there been shown for proving his existence in the past to mankind?

In short, all I can do is point to the immaterial such as how we show love in our lives and drive home the notion that this is ALL that matters in this material world!

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Thanks, bbarr. I concede the points you've made. It seems the charge of epistemic irresponsibility is inescapable for a person of faith. However, I think my point still stands that Christian faith is not blind faith, i.e., it is based on evidence (even though that evidence may not count as 'good' evidence in the normative sense). And this, I think, i t if faith in the miracle-working power of God is indeed a prerequisite for justification.

It seems the charge of epistemic irresponsibility is inescapable for a person of faith.

I don’t think that’s the case. I think what bbarr was pointing out was that the word “faith” can be used in epistemically irresponsible ways, or as a rationalization for epistemic irresponsibility. I think he was also suggesting that such usages undermine the very theological project they are intended to support.

His examples (“whether or not my name is Bennett, or that I live in Seattle, or am now seated at my desk”, etc.) are aimed at particular (bizarre) applications of the word. He did not say that the word ought to never be used.

Ironically, last night I was reading St. Gregory of Nyssa’s On the Soul and the Resurrection. Nyssa was perhaps the most philosophically astute (in his knowledge and application of the Greek philosophical tradition) among Christians of his day (4th century), and at least one of the most philosophically astute in the whole patristic age. His understanding of faith seems (in that work anyway) very close to mine: an attitude of confidence (“assurance” *) in the face of uncertainty—I would add the word “existential”, and perhaps Gregory would not object.

The mundane example I have given before on here: an athlete is faced with that improbable play. She knows (“believes” justifiably on past evidence; and any sports psychologist will say) that the more confidence she can muster in the attempt, the more likely she will make the play. Playing with confidence makes for better play, generally.

That is why I speak of faith as an existential attitude of confidence in the face of uncertainty. I think that this is the kind of faith that Bennett is referring to in his last paragraph, from which I quote:

If faith is really nothing more than any instance of epistemically uncertain belief, than nothing except their respective propositional contents distinguishes your faith in Jesus from my faith that I am at my desk. But I thought that, according to theists, faith was something additional to belief; a type of persisting trust even in face of hardship or countervailing evidence, that sustained belief, informed character, and made one better. All this is lost, if you conflate faith and belief.

Now, I think that kind of faith is valuable for just the project of living and thriving, whether it serves a particular theological project or not. It also happens to be what I think the NT writers are talking about; at least it’s what a theologian of St. Gregory of Nyssa’s stature thought they were talking about. In any event, it's the only way in which I ever use the word.

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* Nyssa’s translator follows the NRS in translating hypostasis here as “assurance”, rather than the KJV’s “substance”—it is the attitude of assurance, conviction, confidence that “becomes a support for the uncertainty of the things hoped for” [Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection, p. 80; translated by Catharine P. Roth].

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]It seems the charge of epistemic irresponsibility is inescapable for a person of faith.

I don’t think that’s the case. I think what bbarr was pointing out was that the word “faith” can be used in epistemically irresponsible ways, or as a rationalization for epistemic irresponsibility. I think he was also suggesting that such usages undermi ...[text shortened]... for” [Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection, p. 80; translated by Catharine P. Roth].[/b]

I don’t think that’s the case. I think what bbarr was pointing out was that the word “faith” can be used in epistemically irresponsible ways

I concede every one of bbarr's points, and I don't think I've misunderstood him. Outside of his main point, i.e., it being an error to declare all instances of belief instances of faith, I'm pretty sure he meant to preserve the epistemically irresponsible nature of faith (in the normative sense). I could be wrong about that; perhaps you might clarify yourself, bbarr, at least for my sake.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Thanks, bbarr. I concede the points you've made. It seems the charge of epistemic irresponsibility is inescapable for a person of faith. However, I think my point still stands that Christian faith is not blind faith, i.e., it is based on evidence (even though that evidence may not count as 'good' evidence in the normative sense). And this, I think, i ...[text shortened]... t if faith in the miracle-working power of God is indeed a prerequisite for justification.

I think my point still stands that Christian faith is not blind faith, i.e., it is based on evidence (even though that evidence may not count as 'good' evidence in the normative sense0

Fair enough, your belief is not based on nothing at all. How does that help you in any way? I don't know anyone who brings such a charge -- that Christian belief is based on nothing at all. I think more likely when one brings the charge that Christian belief is "blind" faith, they still mean to say just what bbarr was talking about: that the belief is not based on "good" evidence. So, I'm sure even those who bring serious charge against you will be willing to concede this point -- that your belief is not based on nothing at all.

And this, I think, is where William James' point applies, i.e., "a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule."

Just so I understand this -- since I do not think I am familiar with this passage -- what does James mean by "absolutely" prevent?

This may be especially pertinent if faith in the miracle-working power of God is indeed a prerequisite for justification.

I'm not sure I understand. How would faith in miracle-working be a prerequisite for justification?

Originally posted by Henry23
Good point, whodey, and I agree with most of what you say in your post.

I didn't know about the 2 Sam 21:19 Scripture, so I checked it out. It seams like it was Goliath's brother, though, when you cross reference it with 1Ch 20:5 'And there was again war with the Philistines, and Elhanan the son of Jair struck down Lahmi the brother of Goliath the Gittit e errors are minor, though.

But I believe that the Bible in the original is infallible.

2 Tim 3:16a All Scripture is given by inspiration of God...

Scripture (in the original Greek; or at least as original as we have) says no such thing. That rendering is a re-write of the original by translators to lend (“scriptural” ) support to a particualr doctrine of inspiration. The KJV translators were honest enough to put in italics any words that they inserted that were non-existent in the original. Subsequent translators followed the KJV in changing the original, but without that helpful notation.

There is no verb at all in verse 16 in the Greek! graphe (writing, scripture) in verse 16 refers directly back to iera grammata (“sacred writings” ) in verse 15, which the individual reader (Timothy: the “you” in verse 15 is singular in the Greek) had known “from childhood”. That means that graphe in verse 16 cannot refer at all to the NT.

___________________________________

Now, in light of the arguments between sola scriptura Protestants and other Christians (e.g., Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox*) about scripture versus tradition, this is hardly a minor matter.

There is no scripture without tradition. It was the ekklesia (the church) that decided what books were to be included in the scriptural canon, which was not finally decided at least until the 4th century.** That is part of the tradition. What any Christian, since the beginning of Christianity, has had to say other than a straight, unadorned quote from canonical texts is—tradition. Whatever any Christian, since the beginning of Christianity, has had to say about scripture is—tradition. If you use a study Bible with footnotes and commentary, you are using—tradition. As Nemesio pointed out, interpreting the scriptures in a manner supporting Trinitarian doctrine is—tradition. Whatever St. Paul said that may have been passed down orally to his successors outside of his extant writings is—tradition. Whatever St. Augustine had to write is—tradition. Whenever I quote early church theologians as to how they read and interpreted scripture, I am quoting—tradition. Luther’s doctrine of sola scriptura (“scripture alone” ) is—very late, and now Protestant—tradition.

Tradition (oral tradition, whether or not subsequently written down) preceded scripture, and was not univocal, even among those streams that later became known as “Orthodox”. Tradition continued alongside of scripture, as it does today. Anyone who comments on scripture and how it should be read (e.g., literally, allegorically, some of both, etc.) is, in fact, engaging in—tradition (whether early or late).

Different groups rely on their own (early or late) traditions, and their own understanding of early tradition, to counter others (e.g., the Great Schism of 1054—see below—was partly about how the Greek East and the Latin West saw both tradition and scripture speaking to the issue of Papal supremacy; I think the East was clearly right, and Rome wrong—but a member of the RCC will disagree, and I have argued that at long length on here before).

Scripture versus Tradition—that is a false dichotomy. You, here, are using a tradition embedded by translators into the original text, in order to support—that tradition.

___________________________________

* The issue is not about Protestants versus the Roman Catholic Church, though it often seems to be cast that way. The RCC did not come into formal being until the 11th century (1054) with its split from the rest of [Greek] Orthodoxy; Protestant Christianity did come into being until the Reformation (in which the Orthodox churches had no role or consideration) in the 16th century.

** And it always confounds me a bit when Protestants assert that the Holy Spirit guided those Church “fathers” in determining the “true canon”—but then dismiss them totally when it comes to reading and interpreting scripture, as if the Holy Spirit was only concerned with getting the contents right, but not understanding.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]I don’t think that’s the case. I think what bbarr was pointing out was that the word “faith” can be used in epistemically irresponsible ways

I concede every one of bbarr's points, and I don't think I've misunderstood him. Outside of his main point, i.e., it being an error to declare all instances of belief instances of faith, I'm pretty sure h ...[text shortened]... could be wrong about that; perhaps you might clarify yourself, bbarr, at least for my sake.[/b]

We are then reading his last paragraph differently; granted that he put strictly in the context of theist claims...

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]I don’t think that’s the case. I think what bbarr was pointing out was that the word “faith” can be used in epistemically irresponsible ways

I concede every one of bbarr's points, and I don't think I've misunderstood him. Outside of his main point, i.e., it being an error to declare all instances of belief instances of faith, I'm pretty sure h ...[text shortened]... could be wrong about that; perhaps you might clarify yourself, bbarr, at least for my sake.[/b]

It is a trivial matter to show that, as it stands, James' criterion for the acceptability of an epistemic principle is false. All that is required is a true proposition that is so conceptually complex it could not be held in thought by a creature with our finite conceptual capacities. I imagine that some logical theorems are like this; tautologous yet so long and intricate that we could not grasp them in thought. But this entails that there are some necessary truths that could not be objects of acknowledgment for the simple reason that we could not hold them in their entirety before our minds. Further, it is perfectly possible that there are empirical truths that are causally closed to our access. Some true propositions about the past may be like this, if they refer to events that occurred but left absolutely no discernible trace. James' criterion is plausible if it is reformulated such that it refers to classes of truths that it would be nomologically possible for us to know. But this reformulation renders the criterion trivial. Of course it is a bad epistemic principle that rules out of court the possibility of our coming to know a proposition for which we can have sufficient evidence.

I'll respond to your question above in a bit, but I need to think about it carefully first.

Originally posted by vistesd

** And it always confounds me a bit when Protestants assert that the Holy Spirit guided those Church “fathers” in determining the “true canon”—but then dismiss them totally when it comes to reading and interpreting scripture, as if the Holy Spirit was only concerned with getting the contents right, but not understanding.

And it always confounds me a bit when Protestants assert that the Holy Spirit guided those Church “fathers” in determining the “true canon”—but then dismiss them totally when it comes to reading and interpreting scripture, as if the Holy Spirit was only concerned with getting the contents right, but not understanding.

This is what I had tried to explain to epiphinehas. I have queried how scripture can be seen as "self-validating", as a proof in itself of its own authority. This claims easily winds up in circularity, and so we must invoke some alternative authority to lend credence to the scripture - namely tradition (that is, only if we want to claim that scripture is an divinely inspired authority.)

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]And it always confounds me a bit when Protestants assert that the Holy Spirit guided those Church “fathers” in determining the “true canon”—but then dismiss them totally when it comes to reading and interpreting scripture, as if the Holy Spirit was only concerned with getting the contents right, but not understanding.

This is what I had tried to e ...[text shortened]... radition (that is, only if we want to claim that scripture is an divinely inspired authority.)[/b]

Actually, it was that discussion between you and Epi that triggered my thinking, as I recalled that 2nd Timothy quote here. I only read part of that discussion, but it did seem to be getting unnecessarily (and I’m sure unintentionally) bogged down in a Protestant-versus-Roman Catholic format. When Protestants use the word “tradition”, they generally seem to mean RCC tradition (and RCC interpretation of pre-1054 tradition, councils, etc.); but even if they include Orthodox tradition, it suddenly struck me that Protestant tradition is no less tradition (even though it is later tradition). So the argument is never really “scripture-versus-tradition”, but “tradition versus tradition”. The only way for someone to avoid that is simply to only quote scripture, sans commentary or explication.

Originally posted by vistesd
Actually, it was that discussion between you and Epi that triggered my thinking, as I recalled that 2nd Timothy quote here. I only read part of that discussion, but it did seem to be getting unnecessarily (and I’m sure unintentionally) bogged down in a Protestant-versus-Roman Catholic format. When Protestants use the word “tradition”, they generally seem ...[text shortened]... way for someone to avoid that is simply to only quote scripture, sans commentary or explication.

The Protestant "tradition", however, is at least minimalist (and I am talking about the standard, sola scriptura Protestants and not the likes of Bishop Spong). It restricts itself to a finite number of propositions; Catholics, and perhaps Orthodox churches*, are theoretically capable of an unlimited number, as councils or popes define new dogmas and add them to the tradition. I suppose that Protestants find this unacceptable because, as Catholic tradition expands, the derivation from the early church is no longer clear - for example, the pronouncements against contraception. This has only tenuous antecedents in scripture (the supposed sin of Onan) but is really a doctrine that developed in the philosophy of natural law. So their Protestant "tradition" is not entirely comparable to the Catholic and Orthodox.

*although, because of the nature of the Orthodox communion, it does not seem that they are able to add to their tradition anymore. There is no formal procedure to calling an ecumenical council which could resolve whatever doctrinal dilemmas they might want to define.

EDIT: Obviously you already know all this; I'm just writing this because it often helps me to clarify my own position.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[b]…Great! Now all you need to do is show me a mathematical equation that either proves that God exists or does not exist…

Wrong! don’t need to! I said this in two other posts but:

The burden of proof is NOT on the person that refutes the claim of the existence of something X (such as the claim of the existence of a “god&ldquo😉, the burden of p ...[text shortened]... roves that if (A) is true then it is rational to believe that (B) must also be true as required.[/b]

Obviously A and B are the same: for A, you have said, Z if and only if (X and Y); for B, you have just said the same thing but framed negatively: not Z if and only if (not X or not Y), where "or" is an inclusive disjunction. To observe they have the same truth values (given the values of X and Y) is rather trivial because they mean the same thing.

And you already know what I think of your criteria for deciding the burden of proof. There are times when, intuitively, the burden of proof will fall on people who deny obvious existential claims like "there is a no president of the USA." And many claims do not have existential import so obviously your criteria fails to satisfy a lot of situations, like if I said "All aliens eat mars bars". On whom does the burden of proof rest when such a statement is voiced? And, as I explained before re Santa, even though he does not exist, we often make descriptive statements about Santa - the fact that Santa is fat is not impaired by the fact that he does not exist. And presumably, the burden of proof would fall on the person who said that Santa is anorexic. Yes, the concept of Santa exists and we can refer to that as an authority of whatever claims we want to make, but there are also times when we make statements about things that do not exist, have no mythological origin and are incoherent - like if someone says "Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe". I think you over-simplify the issue of the burden of proof. There are numerous instances in which your criteria fail or have no answer.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm not sure I understand. How would faith in miracle-working be a prerequisite for justification?[/b]

Perhaps I can take a stab at this. This is how I understand the necessity of faith in regards to how it produces righteousness.

Faith in God is equivalent to justification and need not be in "miracle-working" in nature. For example, the command that God gave the Israelites to not have any gods before him come to mind. To obey this command is an act of faith even though NO miracle-working activity has been generated from this faith. In essence, faith in God is simply taking him at his word. It is a belief in God that he is:

1. Benevolent. This is key because to believe this is to believe that whatever we believe that God is telling us to do is in our best interest. This is because we believe that God loves us and like a parent should be seen as a guiding light rather than a saddistic manipulator. To not believe that he loves us would open the door for us to question him and would, in turn, open the door to do the opposite of what we believe that he has told us. Therefore, if God truly does love us and is doing what is in our best interest, questioning him and doing the opposite is opening the door to do ourselves and others around us harm. Because he loves us, God considers the outcome of this disobedience disasterous due to the fact that it is not part of his perfect plan for us. The term "sinful" is then used to describe such behavoir. God then withdraws himself from us because he can have no part of it because of his loving nature towards us.

2. All knowing. Therefore, not obeying God would be going against what is not in our best interest. To not believe he is all knowing would open the door for second guessing God and doing the opposite of what he says. If God were all knowing and benevolent, going against his wishes would be sheer madness because he sees what is best for us and wants us to have it. Why then would we fight it?

3. Love. In fact, the Bible says that God is love which opens the door for free will and is where faith enters the picture. Faith is a natural byproduct of a loving relationship that we CHOOSE to exhibit. Without free will, faith and love are nonexistent. It is then up to us to exercise this free will in favor of a loving relationship with our Maker as well as our loved ones. I suppose this is at the heart of the matter. God is love and desires to share his love with us. This is all he is capable of doing and also all that he desires. It is simply his nature and it is our purpose. If it is absent he simply withdraws from us in various ways.

Originally posted by whodey
Perhaps I can take a stab at this. This is how I understand the necessity of faith in regards to how it produces righteousness.

Faith in God is equivalent to justification and need not be in "miracle-working" in nature. For example, the command that God gave the Israelites to not have any gods before him come to mind. To obey this command is an act of f nature and it is our purpose. If it is absent he simply withdraws from us in various ways.

Woah, let's take this slowly because I want to be sure I understand what you are trying to say. You lost me quickly.

You started by claiming "Faith in God is equivalent to justification...." Then you go on to describe how by "faith in God" you mean a belief that God is benevolent, all-knowing, and love. So, it sounds like you are saying that the belief in God as some being who is benevolent, all-knowing and love is equivalent to justification.

I have no idea what that is supposed to mean. The discussion between epi and bbarr was concerned with epistemic justification. How would a belief like what you described be "equivalent to" epistemic justification? I thought that our talk of justification would be in the business of attributing properties to certain things, such as beliefs. For example, someone who takes an evidentialist approach to justification might say that a belief is justified when it "fits" the evidence at one's disposal; or a reliabilist might say that a belief is justified when it comes about through reliable cognitive processes; or there are many other views like that of the coherentist, foundationalist, etc. This is how I normally understand talk of epistemic justification -- not as something that could be "equivalent to" something like a belief in God.

I think I already have a good understanding of what you take 'faith' to be because we have discussed that in the past on these boards. But what does your post really have to do with talk of epistemic justification? Is your faith justified? If so, how is it justified?