Why Is There Belief in the Divinity of Jesus?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Then the existential claim or denial is irrelevant in the determination of who has the burden of proof; it falls on the person whose claim lacks sufficient evidence (whether it claims the existence of something improbable or denies the existence of something probable.)

Do you think that some people might have a different evaluation of what is probable (o ...[text shortened]... rely an atheist at a conference of theists would have the burden of proof. Does that make sense?

…Do you think that some people might have a different evaluation of what is probable (or has evidence) when they make a claim? …

Yes.

…For example, a person who claims the existence of the president of the USA in front of a group of tribal savages may have the burden of proof. …

Within that group of tribal savages, IF they do NOT have the benefit of hindsight of the knowledge of the evidence other people else where in the world and IF they don’t trust the word of a stranger that comes in front of them and claims that such evidence exists -then yes, the burden of proof is on the stranger in the narrow sense that if he is to expect the tribal savages to RATIONALLY be convinced of his claim that the president of the USA exists, then it is he (the strange) that must provide the evidence.

However, in practice, they would probably have good reason at least in their own minds to just trust his word because they may observe that most people most of the time do not lie and, if they have no particular reason to think he is one of the exceptions to this generalisation, then they implicitly can take that to be “evidence” that he probably at least thinks he is speaking the truth when he says evidence exists of the existence of the president.

…If so, surely an atheist at a conference of theists would have the burden of proof. Does that make sense?…

No. And the reason why it isn’t the same is because the difference is that, on the one hand, some people DO have sufficient evidence for the existence of the president of the USA, so, in the light of this sufficient evidence for his (the president’s) existence, the burden of proof is on the person that refutes his (the president’s) existence, while, on the other hand, theists do NOT have sufficient evidence for the existence of a “god”, so, in the light of this insufficient evidence for his (god’s) existence, the burden of proof is on the person that refutes his (god’s) existence.

Therefore, using my criterion, an atheist at a conference of theists would NOT have the burden of proof -only the theists at that conference would have the burden of proof because it is they that are making the existential claim and yet they have insufficient evidence to backup their existential claim.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I think you have misconstrued my intentions. I do not want to give a comprehensive rule that will allow people to calculate a parabola that will intersect a comet. My objection is to this "burden of proof": originally, Hamilton said it applied to instances of existential claims with insufficient evidence, but the 'existential' part of the claim is not relev ...[text shortened]... f allows (at a theistic conference, for example, the burden of proof is intuitively on him.)

…My objection is to this "burden of proof": originally, Hamilton said it applied to instances of existential claims with insufficient evidence, but the 'existential' part of the claim is not relevant…

Wrong! Of cause it is relevant! If a claim has no 'existential' part to it then, logically, that must mean it is not an existential claim! -and, therefore, my criterion cannot apply to it!

…what matters is whether there is evidence for the claim;…

…AND also that it is an existential claim else my criterion does not apply -I though I made that crystal clear.

…Hamilton, however, exaggerates the purpose of this conversational maxim and claims that, unless he knows of otherwise evidence, he can make whatever statements he wants unchecked…

No I don’t! That is not my claim! My claim is that my criterion only applies to existential claims and, therefore, I do not claim to “make whatever statements I wants unchecked” because, firstly, if I claim a non-existential claim then my criterion does not apply and, secondly, if I am the one that is making an existential claim as opposed to refuting an existential claim then, without sufficient evidence, the burden of proof is on me!

Originally posted by Nemesio
Ah. Just like I thought. You define 'real' and 'met' in non-standard ways.

I mean real in the most basic sense and "met" also. It is just that Christ is an extraordinary Person.

Originally posted by bbarr
Yes, so? My objection was to James' criterion, and did not presuppose that he was talking about any particular class of propositions. But, in any case, nothing I've said entails that we cannot freely adopt religious hypotheses as preliminaries to inquiry. But it would be epistemically irresponsible to treat these hypotheses as beliefs prior to the results o ...[text shortened]... t the world provisionally as though it were the case that some proposition or other were true.

Further, we do not have the power to simply choose to believe propositions, at most we can choose to treat the world provisionally as though it were the case that some proposition or other were true.

I don't buy this.

Consider that James delineates any given hypotheses by three either/or categories:

* 1, living or dead;
* 2, forced or avoidable;
* 3, momentous or trivial;

1. A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: "Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: "Be an agnostic or be Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief.

2. Next, if I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrella or without it," I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Similarly, if I say, "Either love me or hate me," "Either call my theory true or call it false," your option is avoidable. You may remain indifferent to me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decline to offer any judgment as to my theory. But if I say, "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind.

3. Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, your option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only similar opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it into your hands. He who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried and failed. Per contra, the option is trivial when the opportunity is not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversible if it later prove unwise. Such trivial options abound in the scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent. But if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for his loss of time, no vital harm being done.

http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html

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You seem to propose that a hypothesis can only be defined by category 3 (above), as being either momentous or trivial. What of James' assertion that a hypothesis may be both "live" and "forced"? It seems that we are able to choose to believe at least certain propositions.

You seem to propose that a hypothesis can only be defined by category 3 (above), as being either momentous or trivial. What of James' assertion that a hypothesis may be both "live" and "forced"? It seems that we are able to choose to believe at least certain propositions.

What about Spinoza? Not that he got it any more correct than James did, but his 15 axioms and the proof that follows for the existence of God is a monumental and serious alternative to the ontological argument.

Spinoza's proof that God — an infinite, necessary and uncaused, indivisible being — is the only substance of the universe proceeds in three simple steps. First, establish that no two substances can share an attribute or essence. Then, prove that there is a substance with infinite attributes (i.e., God). It follows, in conclusion, that the existence of that infinite substance precludes the existence of any other substance.

For if there were to be a second substance, it would have to have some attribute or essence. But since God has all possible attributes, then the attribute to be possessed by this second substance would be one of the attributes already possessed by God.

However, it has already been established that no two substances can have the same attribute. Therefore, there can be, besides God, no such second substance.

If God is the only substance, and whatever is, is either a substance or in a substance, then everything else must be in God. Spinoza posited: "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God."

I can go a long way toward agreement with Spinoza, without regard to his proof's validity. Even Einstein went along with this concept of God.

Spinoza also writes against "those who feign a God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and subject to passions. But how far they wander from the true knowledge of God, is sufficiently established by what has already been demonstrated."

Spinoza concludes, as I do, that besides being false, such an anthropomorphic conception of God can have only deleterious effects on human freedom and activity.

Originally posted by Scriabin
What about Spinoza? Not that he got it any more correct than James did, but his 15 axioms and the proof that follows for the existence of God is a monumental and serious alternative to the ontological argument.

Spinoza's proof that God — an infinite, necessary and uncaused, indivisible being — is the only substance of the universe proceeds in three simp morphic conception of God can have only deleterious effects on human freedom and activity.

It follows, in conclusion, that the existence of that infinite substance precludes the existence of any other substance.

I realize this may be besides the point, but it mustn't necessarily be the case that God's infinite substance precludes the existence of every other substance. In light of recent discoveries in quantum mechanics, we know that the visible universe is somewhat like a holographic image, an illusion of substance, i.e., there is a deeper, underlying "unseen" reality that gives birth to all the objects and appearances of our physical world in much the same way that a piece of holographic film gives birth to a hologram. This invisible reality is that which David Bohm called the, implicate or "enfolded" order, verified by specific experimentation designed to test whether photons are nonlocally connected or not.

Spinoza concludes, as I do, that besides being false, such an anthropomorphic conception of God can have only deleterious effects on human freedom and activity.

As far as I am aware, the anthropomorphic conception of God, found primarily in the Old Testament, was largely a human projection cast in place of the indescribable nature of God, e.g., God's holiness represented by his righteous anger, etc. A.W. Tozer wrote a book entitled, The Knowledge of the Holy, wherein he explores the identity of God from this perspective. He separated the attributes about God from the incomprehensible nature of God as he is in himself. That is, he concluded that we can know certain attributes about God, those which God has revealed about himself, but God as he is in himself cannot be identified with any one of his many attributes and is inexorably beyond human comprehension.

I had a conversation with my mom about God yesterday along these lines. Some of her friends speak about God as if he were a person, giving him feelings and thoughts which often seem inaccurate or "too human." She doesn't buy any of it. In response I said that just because your friends misrepresent God as he is in himself doesn't mean that God isn't a person - he may just be misrepresented and so it doesn't sit well with you.

For myself, I wouldn't bother believing in a God who isn't also a person. What would be the point? If God isn't a person, then talking to him would be like talking to a nebula; yeah, it's beautiful, but it doesn't engage your higher nature in any way. Further, how can a nebulous blob love? Love is only significant, at least to me, if it arises from an intelligent being who knows everything about you.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Further, we do not have the power to simply choose to believe propositions, at most we can choose to treat the world provisionally as though it were the case that some proposition or other were true.

I don't buy this.

Consider that James delineates any given hypotheses by three either/or categories:

* 1, living or dead;
* 2, forc It seems that we are able to choose to believe at least certain propositions.[/b]

(1) Neither agnosticism nor Christianity make any appeal to my belief. This is so because neither strikes me as even minimally plausible. They are both dead to me because the evidence I have at my disposal renders each likely to be false. Live options are just those where the evidence one takes there to be does not count so heavily against the option in question that it strikes one as implausible. It is a live option for me, for instance, that my cats will be playing when I get home. It is also a live option that they will be sleeping. But I cannot simply will myself to believe either of these options. The epistemologically responsible reaction to live options is to believe their exhaustive disjunction (e.g., in this case, that my cats will be either playing or sleeping) and to remain uncommitted regarding the truth of any particular disjunct.

(2) Yes, so? The options are not 'believe P' or 'believe ~P'. The options are 'believe P', 'believe ~P', or 'Believe (P v ~P) but remain uncommitted as to which disjunct is true'. There is no contradiction in this third option. What I cannot do is simply choose to believe an arbitrary disjunct of a disjunction I believe to be true.

(3) Irrelevant. I never claimed one could not provisionally assume a proposition for the sake of inquiry. What would be epistemically irresponsible would be for the scientist to believe the proposition that guides his inquiry prior to the inquiry itself. The scientist ought to apportion his confidence in a proposition to his evidence. If a hypothesis is live for one, then since that just means that one takes there to be some evidence in favor of the hypothesis, one ought not be confident in the falsity of live options. But this does not entail that one ought be confident in their truth either.

____________________

I do no such thing.

What of it? Nothing about the notion of living hypotheses nor one being forced to proceed as though a hypothesis was true or as though it was not true entail anything about being able to choose to believe a proposition. Do neither you nor James recognize the distinction between believing P and provisionally assuming P? Do neither you nor James recognize that you can believe a disjunction comprised of live alternatives while remaining uncommitted to the truth of any particular alternative? James was a sloppy epistemologist, you would do better to look elsewhere than pragmatism for good epistemology.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Further, we do not have the power to simply choose to believe propositions, at most we can choose to treat the world provisionally as though it were the case that some proposition or other were true.

I don't buy this.

Consider that James delineates any given hypotheses by three either/or categories:

* 1, living or dead;
* 2, forc It seems that we are able to choose to believe at least certain propositions.[/b]

It seems that we are able to choose to believe at least certain propositions.

Say what???? Your post demonstrates absolutely nothing of the sort. Let's consider your "forced" example: suppose you make some claim to me that I have never really considered before and you tell me to believe or not believe it (in the example you talk about acceptance, by which you may or may not mean the same thing as belief; but this is supposed to be about belief, remember? bbarr's claim is that we cannot simply choose to believe P. As I understand it, acceptance is not necessarily the same as belief {I read a nice bit by Plantinga where he outlines what he thinks can be the differences}, and I think it often is more like the "provisional" assent that bbarr already conceded that we can actively engage in. But, anyway, this is supposed to be about whether or not we can actively choose to believe, remember?). So okay, you make the claim and command me to either believe it or not believe it. Now, it's just trivially true that if we then part ways it will be under either my believing your claim or my not believing your claim (that's tautological!). But even if I leave believing it, it certainly doesn't follow that I actively chose to do so. It's still perfectly consistent with my being passively brought into belief based on deliberations on the spot and whatever support you offer for it. I don't think the body of your post supports your conclusion above in the least.

Originally posted by bbarr
(1) Neither agnosticism nor Christianity make any appeal to my belief. This is so because neither strikes me as even minimally plausible. They are both dead to me because the evidence I have at my disposal renders each likely to be false. Live options are just those where the evidence one takes there to be does not count so heavily against the optio mologist, you would do better to look elsewhere than pragmatism for good epistemology.

What if a person provisionally assumes P, and subsequently comes to believe P. Would you characterize that as a choice to believe P? If not, why not?

EDIT: Nevermind, I just "got it".

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[b]…My objection is to this "burden of proof": originally, Hamilton said it applied to instances of existential claims with insufficient evidence, but the 'existential' part of the claim is not relevant…

Wrong! Of cause it is relevant! If a claim has no 'existential' part to it then, logically, that must mean it is not an existential claim! -a ...[text shortened]... ting an existential claim then, without sufficient evidence, the burden of proof is on me![/b]

Wrong! Of cause it is relevant! If a claim has no 'existential' part to it then, logically, that must mean it is not an existential claim! -and, therefore, my criterion cannot apply to it!

You have said that your criterion applies when an existential claim is made without sufficient evidence; you have also admitted that the burden of proof also falls when there is a denial of an existential claim and that denial has insufficient evidence. Balancing these two claims, logically, the 'existential' part of your criterion has no relevance. Let me put this formally: there is an object 'a'; an existential claim will be a claim which uses the existential predicate E! and this object 'a', such that E!a is the claim that 'a' exists; the denial of this will be its negation ~E!a; if the claim regarding 'a' has insufficient evidence we will say Ia. So the burden of proof falls if ((E!a & Ia) or (~E!a & Ia)). This simplifies to (Ia & (E!a or ~ E!a)). Now, as (E!a or ~ E!a) is a tautology, we do not need to include it as a conjunct in this expression (it is always true, so the truth valuation of the conjunction is determined entirely by Ia). So, we can conclude, the burden of proof falls if Ia (if the statement about 'a' is insufficient). There is no need to talk about 'existentials'; I might as well invent a similarly superfluous criterion about brilligs.

Therefore, using my criterion, an atheist at a conference of theists would NOT have the burden of proof -only the theists at that conference would have the burden of proof because it is they that are making the existential claim and yet they have insufficient evidence to backup their existential claim.

But only the atheist would think that there is insufficient evidence. The theists would be entirely convinced of the soundness of their arguments (Aside: this is my hypothetical so I can make whatever tatements about what these theists will think.) So for the atheist to impose the burden of proof, he would need to convince them that their claim of the existence of God has insufficient evidence - which sounds to me as if he would be doing the work of the burden of proof.

Originally posted by bbarr
(1) Neither agnosticism nor Christianity make any appeal to my belief. This is so because neither strikes me as even minimally plausible. They are both dead to me because the evidence I have at my disposal renders each likely to be false. Live options are just those where the evidence one takes there to be does not count so heavily against the optio ...[text shortened]... mologist, you would do better to look elsewhere than pragmatism for good epistemology.

Let's return to your 4 categories of faith. After much deliberation, I think (3) is the religious faith I have in mind when I use the term 'faith.' In my own experience, however, there were certain verses out of the Bible which convinced me of its veracity on the spot. Upon hearing these verses read aloud something 'clicked' in my heart and mind and I found myself believing. Category (1) seems to characterize this first stage of faith (this was despite any doubts I had previously). It wasn't until after this occurred that I chose to provisionally assume that Christ was Lord and act upon that assumption, per construal (3). It seems to me that it would have been possible for me to ignore the recognition of the Bible's veracity, and not choose to provisionally assume that Christ was Lord (and so forgo acting upon it being true). Isn't it possible to believe (or recognize) that P is the case, but refuse to act as if P is the case? For instance, if I would rather live according to my own whim than submit to the Lordship of Jesus (even if I did believe in Jesus), couldn't I simply choose not to act as if I believed in him? Or if I am inundated with doubts after first believing in Jesus, would I not be forced to provisionally assume that Jesus is Lord in order to act as if he is Lord? This is why, I think, in churches you find people who genuinely believe in Jesus, but who nevertheless need encouragement in their faith and who periodically have to recommit to living for him. That's why I can't decide between construal (1) and (3), because the will is involved in choosing to act as if, yet the individual, in another sense, did not choose to believe that Jesus is Lord.

What do you make of this?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]It follows, in conclusion, that the existence of that infinite substance precludes the existence of any other substance.

I realize this may be besides the point, but it mustn't necessarily be the case that God's infinite substance precludes the existence of every other substance. In light of recent discoveries in quantum mechanics, we know tha ...[text shortened]... to me, if it arises from an intelligent being who knows everything about you.[/b]

Your point is immaterial, if you will pardon the expression, and irrelevant as a rejection of Spinoza's concept. Whatever is the case, he says, is God.

Yes, it is like talking to a nebula. There is no point for us to do that, yes.

My point, exactly.

Hence, the Bible is a bunch of nice poetry and there is a lot of good advice buried in there to ferret out, reflecting many centuries of human experience boiled into fables and myths as a primitive sort of communication tool -- which is what religion's function was early in human social development. But religion soon enough turned into merely another means for justifying obtaining, concentrating and exerting power over others for the gain of the few at the expense of the many.

But that which is the case is not a person, and anything that we have found "revealed" is that which we have observed, attempted to explain, often through scientific and mathematical means, and then either confirmed or adapted as our ability to observe and understand the data becomes more advanced over time.

Any interpretation of what is the case that posits a personal deity or one or two or three anthropomorphic entities is vanity, pure and simple.

I find it vexing.

Originally posted by Scriabin


Your point is immaterial, if you will pardon the expression, and irrelevant as a rejection of Spinoza's concept. Whatever is the case, he says, is God.

Yes, it is like talking to a nebula. There is no point for us to do that, yes.

My point, exactly.

Hence, the Bible is a bunch of nice poetry and there is a lot of good advice buried in there to ...[text shortened]... ne or two or three anthropomorphic entities is vanity, pure and simple.

I find it vexing.

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Any interpretation of what is the case that posits a personal deity or one or two or three anthropomorphic entities is vanity, pure and simple.

I find it vexing.

==================================

What do you find about Jesus "vexing"?

For instance in the whole gospel of Luke can you point out a particular incident between Jesus and someone that you find would be "vexing" had you been that person ?

Is it vexing that He healed someone? Or is it "Vexing" that He comforted someone ?

Was the raising from the dead of the widow's only child a "vexing" matter to you?

All in all would you have found the character Jesus less "vexing" if He just minded His own business and didn't do or say anything in the Gospel of Luke ?

Originally posted by jaywill
[b]========================================

Any interpretation of what is the case that posits a personal deity or one or two or three anthropomorphic entities is vanity, pure and simple.

I find it vexing.

==================================

What do you find about Jesus "vexing"?

For instance in the whole gospel of Luke ...[text shortened]... e just minded His own business and didn't do or say anything in the Gospel of Luke ?[/b]

With respect to your having shifted the context completely withiin the boundaries of the New Testament, assuming a priori that things described therein are facts rather than otherwise, I must ask your pardon, for you mistake me for someone who gives a damn.

I am vexed, as it should be obvious to anyone who had sufficient oxygen at birth, by those who insist on fairy tales, myths, and in particular the insistent idea that printed words written by human beings were "revealed" by that which may be said to have created the universe -- what I call that which is the case, for I do not distinguish between those concepts -- and if you knew anything of Spinoza, you'd understand what I'm saying. But, of course, you do not as you worship ink on a page rather than seek greater awareness of what is happening now as it happens, awareness of that which is the case. Much too scary. You might have to grow up. So stop quoting scripture at me as though it means anything whatsoever in relation to that which is the case, sit down and give your mind a rest.

You insist on quoting this book at me, assuming the truth of what is in it -- there is that simple enough for you? I find that vexing.

Everyone is gifted. Some open the package sooner.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Let's return to your 4 categories of faith. After much deliberation, I think (3) is the religious faith I have in mind when I use the term 'faith.' In my own experience, however, there were certain verses out of the Bible which convinced me of its veracity on the spot. Upon hearing these verses read aloud something 'clicked' in my heart and mind and I r sense, did not choose to believe that Jesus is Lord.

What do you make of this?

For what it's worth, I would like to throw out an excerpt from the Plantinga article I mentioned previously. I think it is apt to this discussion and, anyway, I like Plantinga quite a bit (I often disagree with him, but he always makes me think).

From "Religious Belief as 'Properly Basic'", by Plantinga:

Can I have intellectual obligations if my beliefs are not within my control? This is a difficult and vexing question. The suggestion here is that I cannot now have a prima facie obligation to comply with a command which it is not now within my power to obey. Since what I believe is not normally within my power, I cannot have an obligation to believe a certain proposition or to refrain from believing it; but then, contra the objector, I do not have an obligation to refrain from believing in God if I have no evidence. This response to the objector is, I think, inadequate. In the first place the response is unbecoming from the theist, since many of those who believe in God follow St. Paul (for example, Romans 1) in holding that under certain circumstances failure to believe in God is culpable. And there are cases where most of us -- theist and nontheist alike -- do in fact believe that a person is culpable or condemnable for holding a given belief, as well as cases where we hold a person responsible for not accepting certain beliefs. (...) We do in fact sometimes think that a person is guilty -- has violated norms or obligations -- by virtue of the beliefs he holds.

The theist, accordingly, should not reply to the evidentialist objector by claiming that since our beliefs are not within our control, we cannot have a prima facie duty to refrain from believing certain propositions. But there is a second reason why this response to the evidentialist is inadequate. I have been using the terms 'accept' and 'believe' interchangeably, but in fact there is an important distinction they can nicely be used to mark. This distinction is extremely hard to make clear but nonetheless, I think, important. Perhaps we can make an initial stab at it as follows. Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing certain crucial Christian claims -- perhaps the teaching that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. Upon calling that belief, he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness. Nevertheless he is committed to this belief; it is his position; if you ask him what he thinks about it, he will unhesitatingly endorse it. He has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it. Let us say that he accepts this proposition, even though when he is assailed by doubt, he may fail to believe it -- at any rate explicitly -- to any appreciable degree. His commitment to this proposition may be much stronger than his explicit and occurrent belief in it; so these two -- that is, acceptance and belief -- must be distinguished. (...)

Now I am quite aware that I have not been able to make this distinction between acceptance and belief wholly clear. I think there is such a distinction in the neighborhood, however, and I believe it is important. It is furthermore one the objector may be able to make use of; for while it is plausible to hold that what I believe is not within my direct control, it is also plausible to suppose that what I accept is or can be at least in part a matter of deliberate decision, a matter of voluntarily taking up a certain position. But then the objector can perhaps restate his objection in terms of acceptance. Perhaps (because of an unfortunate upbringing, let us say) I cannot refrain from believing in God. Nevertheless it is within my power, says the evidentialist objector, to refuse to accept that proposition. And now his claim that there are duties with respect to our beliefs may be reconstrued as the claim that we have prima facie duties with respect to our acceptances, one of these duties being not to accept such a proposition as "there is such a person as God" in the absence of evidence.

Finally, while we may perhaps agree that what I believe is not directly within my control, some of my beliefs are indirectly within my control, at least in part. First, what I accept has a long-term influence upon what I believe....Presumably, then, the evidentialist objector could hold that it is my prima facie duty not to accept belief in God without evidence, and to do what I can to bring it about that I no longer believe. Although it is not within my power now to cease believing now, there may be a series of actions, such that I can now take the first and, after taking the first, will be able to take the second, and so on; and after taking the whole series of actions I will no longer believe in God. (...)

But the fact is there is a quite different way of construing the evidentialist objection; the objector need not hold that the theist without evidence is violating or has violated some duty, prima facie, ultima facie, or otherwise. Consider someone who believes that Venus is smaller than Mercury, not because he has evidence, but because he read it in a comic book and always believes everything he reads -- or consider someone who holds this belief on the basis of an outrageously bad argument. Perhaps there is no obligation he has failed to meet; nevertheless, his intellectual condition is defective in some way; or perhaps alternatively there is a commonly achieved excellence he fails to display. Perhaps he is like someone who is easily gulled, or has a serious astigmatism, or is unduly clumsy. And perhaps the evidentialist objection is to be understood, not as the claim that the theist without evidence has failed to meet some obligation, but that he suffers from a certain sort of intellectual deficiency. If this is the objector's view, then his proper attitude toward the theist would be one of sympathy rather than censure. (...)

Of course, P goes on at length in attempt to argue that regardless of how you interpret the objection from the "evidentialist objector", this objection is "not in the least compelling". Actually, P argues for belief in God as properly basic.