Why Is There Belief in the Divinity of Jesus?

Originally posted by Scriabin
With respect to your having shifted the context completely withiin the boundaries of the New Testament, assuming a priori that things described therein are facts rather than otherwise, I must ask your pardon, for you mistake me for someone who gives a damn.

I am vexed, as it should be obvious to anyone who had sufficient oxygen at birth, by those who ins ...[text shortened]... ple enough for you? I find that vexing.

Everyone is gifted. Some open the package sooner.

A lot of flowery talk. But I couldn't find your answer.

But if you want to trade barbs, in the words of Moss Alison - "Your mind is on vacation and your mouth is working overtime."

Next time try to make it rhyhm. It will be even more intertaining.

Originally posted by whodey
Incorrect. The mere fact that he has no other evidence other than to say it exists would be defeating evidence in my mind. In fact, if no one were even to back up his claims I would have to presume that his evidence is severely lacking and doubtful.

Now getting back to epistemology justificaton, what is the justification for the majority of people to bel ...[text shortened]... can defer to the one who I believe knows all and sees all.

Now is that logical or what? 😀

Incorrect. The mere fact that he has no other evidence other than to say it exists would be defeating evidence in my mind.

Then I guess I was misreading you, and we probably don't disagree as much as I thought initially. But this strikes me as strange wording. I would have thought that to present "defeating" evidence against P would be to present good reasons that make P sufficiently implausible (or something along those lines). But now, you're indicating that for P to be "defeated" it is sufficient that one have no evidence in P's favor. In other words, you're saying that in order to defeat belief in P it is not necessary to bring evidence like what I just described against P. Again, I don't really disagree with you (if I understand you correctly now), but this strikes me as awkward wording. To make sure I understand your position, it would help me if you would recast your account of justification without using the phrase "defeating evidence".

Now getting back to epistemology justificaton, what is the justification for the majority of people to believe in God of are they simply off the charts, so to speak, as myself?

I'm not sure what you mean by "off the charts". Generally, I don't think theistic belief is justified, so I was hoping you could help me out on this one. You lost me with the rest of that paragraph.

I am merely suggesting that God is greater than I and is why I need faith. At some point, God will tell me something that may not make much sense if any, therefore, I will have a choice to make. I will either fall back on what I know, which is limited and shortsided, or I can defer to the one who I believe knows all and sees all.

I really don't consider this consistent with your earlier claims. Remember, earlier in this thread you stated that your faith is a belief in God as a benevolent, all-knowing, loving being. Now, you are saying your faith is something that is characteristically choice-based, and what you describe now sounds more like the "provisional" acceptance that bbarr described earlier. I don't consider these two accounts consistent since belief is typically not something that is choice-based. Am I missing something; or do you have some way to reconcile my concern; or do you want to retract one of your accounts; or...?

Originally posted by whodey
Interesting, because my faith seems to indicate that this is the main way in which people come to God. First they are exposed to your character and demeanor. They will then see if you are trustworthy, kind, level headed etc. and then they will be exposed to your testimony. They will then have one of two choices. They can attribute your good qualities to s ...[text shortened]... re is a better road to travel than the one they are currently on or they will NEVER come to God.

the only way to attract others to Christ is to provide them with something desirable.

Presumably, if you have good evidence underlying your theistic belief, then you could relay that and probably bring others into theistic belief whether they desire it or not. If all you can offer to others is pragmatic reasons, then I think you will be extremely ineffectual at bringing others to theistic belief since I do not think typical deliberative belief-building can proceed through solely pragmatic considerations. On the other hand, I think you could probably use pragmatic reasons to bring others to a provisional acceptance of Christianity, which might be the best you could hope for.

Originally posted by Scriabin


Your point is immaterial, if you will pardon the expression, and irrelevant as a rejection of Spinoza's concept. Whatever is the case, he says, is God.

Yes, it is like talking to a nebula. There is no point for us to do that, yes.

My point, exactly.

Hence, the Bible is a bunch of nice poetry and there is a lot of good advice buried in there to ...[text shortened]... ne or two or three anthropomorphic entities is vanity, pure and simple.

I find it vexing.

Your point is immaterial, if you will pardon the expression, and irrelevant as a rejection of Spinoza's concept. Whatever is the case, he says, is God.

I disagree.

Hence, the Bible is a bunch of nice poetry... Any interpretation of what is the case that posits a personal deity or one or two or three anthropomorphic entities is vanity, pure and simple.

I disagree.

Originally posted by LemonJello
For what it's worth, I would like to throw out an excerpt from the Plantinga article I mentioned previously. I think it is apt to this discussion and, anyway, I like Plantinga quite a bit (I often disagree with him, but he always makes me think).

From "Religious Belief as 'Properly Basic'", by Plantinga:

Can I have intellectual obligations if my the least compelling". Actually, P argues for belief in God as properly basic.

Excellent, this helps clarify my thought.

I see now that bbarr's construal (3) is exactly the faith I had in mind, and that there's no need to include (1).

The will is implicated.

Platinga's argument is limited in that he assumes an 'absence' of evidence for belief. But the belief we are considering in this thread is based on evidence, i.e., the Bible.

(Or, for those less charitable evidentialist objectors in the crowd, "a belief not based on nothing at all..." 😉)

LOL!

Therefore, we must define what is 'insufficient evidence' for belief in Jesus Christ.

__________


Classic apologetics can establish the Bible as the most reliable document out of antiquity, in terms of the preservation of its original texts. Objections to the divinity of Jesus can be met to an adequate degree, only so far as it can be established that the divinity of Jesus was, in fact, intended by the authors. My guess is that those who argue against the Bible as sufficient evidence for belief in Jesus Christ will eventually find themselves backed into a corner, if they don't dismiss the scriptural account as a reliably preserved source (i.e., assuming they treat its reliability to the same degree of credulity afforded any other ancient text). The corner they will find themselves backed into will be having to approach the NT just as it was intended to be approached, as a historical narrative. It will be the contents of that narrative which will raise any objections to its validity, namely, the miraculous content, e.g., Christ walking on water, raising the dead, healing the blind, his resurrection, etc. Therefore, an appeal will be made to Hume's conclusion that belief in miracles is unreasonable, i.e., that it is always more reasonable to assume that the miracles found in the Bible did not happen; that the authors of the NT either made a mistake or they lied. Various arguments can be made in support of the sincerity and trustworthiness of the apostles, or the number of witnesses to the miraculous, in an attempt to offset the objections raised by Hume. But such arguments, however plausible, won't succeed in persuading all objectors that it is any more reasonable to believe an account of miracles.

At best the divinity of Jesus can be reasoned improbable, though not impossible - not enough to justify censure, IMO.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Excellent, this helps clarify my thought.

I see now that bbarr's construal (3) is exactly the faith I had in mind, and that there's no need to include (1).

The will is implicated.

Platinga's argument is limited in that he assumes an 'absence' of evidence for belief. But the belief we are considering in this thread is based on evidence, i.e., th ...[text shortened]... s can be reasoned improbable, though not impossible - not enough to justify censure.

Platinga's argument is limited in that he assumes an 'absence' of evidence for belief. But the belief we are considering in this thread is based on evidence, i.e., the Bible.

I understand, but to put P's article in proper context, he is actually tackling the question of whether or not theistic belief can be "properly basic". Of course, P is a theist, and he certainly doesn't think there is no evidence for theism. But what he's actually trying to defend in this article (if one were to read on) is the idea that belief in God, even in the absence of evidence, can nevertheless be grounded in justification-conferring conditions. Hence, his dwelling on the absence of evidence here for the purposes of the discussion. Let's call it his temporary provisional acceptance of the absence of evidence for theism! 🙂

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Platinga's argument is limited in that he assumes an 'absence' of evidence for belief. But the belief we are considering in this thread is based on evidence, i.e., the Bible.

I understand, but to put P's article in proper context, he is actually tackling the question of whether or not theistic belief can be "properly basic". Of course, P is a ...[text shortened]... call it his temporary provisional acceptance of the absence of evidence for theism! 🙂[/b]

Ah... Methinks I should look into this Platinga person. What book of his have you been quoting from?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Ah... Methinks I should look into this Platinga person. What book of his have you been quoting from?

Actually, I have just been reading some of his essays. For example, "Religious Belief as 'Properly Basic'" (from Faith and Rationality, Notre Dame Press, 1983); "On Ockham's Way Out" (from Faith and Philosophy, 3:3, 1986); "Is Naturalism Irrational" (from Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford Press, 1993 -- he has an argument that naturalism is in a sense self-defeating); "Warranted Belief in God" (not sure where I got this excerpt).

Anway, some of his papers are online at his website:

http://philofreligion.homestead.com/Papersbyplantinga.html

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Wrong! Of cause it is relevant! If a claim has no 'existential' part to it then, logically, that must mean it is not an existential claim! -and, therefore, my criterion cannot apply to it!

You have said that your criterion applies when an existential claim is made without sufficient evidence; you have also admitted that the burden of proof also fa ce - which sounds to me as if he would be doing the work of the burden of proof.[/b]

…You have said that your criterion applies when an existential claim is made without sufficient evidence; …

Correct.

…you have also admitted that the burden of proof also falls when there is a denial of an existential claim and that denial has insufficient evidence…

Wrong! That’s NOT what I have been saying!
What I am saying is that:
“the burden of proof also falls when there is a denial of an existential claim and the ASSERTION of the existential claim (NOT the DENIAL of the existential claim) has insufficient evidence.”

The rest of your argument doesn’t apply as a result.

…But only the atheist would think that there is insufficient evidence. The theists would be entirely convinced of the soundness of their arguments …

I have no doubt that any theist, conference or no conference, would be “entirely convinced of the soundness of their arguments” -but would their arguments be really based on evidence? Perhaps they would think so? If they do think so, then I would simply disagree with them and ask them to show me this “evidence”.

…So for the atheist to impose the burden of proof, he would need to convince them that their claim of the existence of God has insufficient evidence .…

Wrong! That’s NOT what I have been saying!
For the atheist to impose the burden of proof, he must insist to the theists that, because it is THEY (the theists) who are making the existential claim and not himself, it is NOT up to HIMSELF (the atheist) to “convince them (the theists) that their claim of the existence of God has INsufficient evidence”, it is up to the theist to convince HIM (the atheist) that their claim of the existence of God has Sufficient evidence!

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[b]…You have said that your criterion applies when an existential claim is made without sufficient evidence; …

Correct.

…you have also admitted that the burden of proof also falls when there is a denial of an existential claim and that denial has insufficient evidence…

Wrong! That’s NOT what I have been saying!
What I am saying ...[text shortened]... vince HIM (the atheist) that their claim of the existence of God has Sufficient evidence![/b]

Wrong! That’s NOT what I have been saying!

I asked you whether the burden of proof falls when "there is an existential claim with insufficient evidence or when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence". You replied "correct". When I asked if the burden of proof falls on the claim "there is no president of the USA", you assented. Given this, and the criterion you have, the 'existential' part of the claim is irrelevant; what matters is whether it has insufficient evidence. Now you can legitimately impose the burden of proof when an existential claim has insufficient evidence -- but I do not understand why you think the 'existential' part has any importance.

I have no doubt that any theist, conference or no conference, would be “entirely convinced of the soundness of their arguments” -but would their arguments be really based on evidence?

This conference is devoted to an apologetic defense of the five Thomistic proofs of God. They are entirely convinced that these proofs unequivocally prove God's existence -- can you see why they would impose the burden of proof on you?

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Wrong! That’s NOT what I have been saying!

I asked you whether the burden of proof falls when "there is an existential claim with insufficient evidence or when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence". You replied "correct". When I asked if the burden of proof falls on the claim "there is no president of the USA", you as rove God's existence -- can you see why they would impose the burden of proof on you?[/b]

…I asked you whether the burden of proof falls when "there is an existential claim with insufficient evidence or when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence". You replied "correct".…

I believe you are referring to your question:

…To clarify: the burden of proof falls on a person who makes an existential claim of which there is insufficient evidence and on a person who denies an existential claim for which there is sufficient evidence. Is this your criterion for the burden of proof?… (spelling corrected)

And I answered “correct” because what I assumed you meant by this question was;

…To clarify: the burden of proof falls on a person who makes an existential claim of which there is insufficient evidence (I.e. INsufficient evidence for the existential claim) and on a person who denies an existential claim for which there is sufficient evidence (I.e. Sufficient evidence for the existential claim). Is this your criterion for the burden of proof?…

To clarify, is this what you meant?

I never would claim that the burden of proof falls “when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence (I.e. INsufficient evidence for the DENIAL of the existential claim) if that is what you are suggesting but what I would claim is that burden of proof falls “when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence (I.e. INsufficient evidence FOR the existential claim).

… When I asked if the burden of proof falls on the claim "there is no president of the USA", you assented. Given this, and the criterion you have, the 'existential' part of the claim is irrelevant;…

I said there IS sufficient evidence for the “existence of the president of the USA" -how do you conclude from this and the criterion I have that the 'existential' part of the claim is irrelevant?

…Now you can legitimately impose the burden of proof when an existential claim has insufficient evidence -- but I do not understand why you think the 'existential' part has any importance. …

Its only “importance” in this context is in the correct application of my criterion because that particular criterion only applies to existential claims.


…This conference is devoted to an apologetic defense of the five Thomistic proofs of God. They are entirely convinced that these proofs unequivocally prove God's existence -- can you see why they would impose the burden of proof on you?…

I would deny that they have proof of gods existence so it is up to them to convince me that their “proof” of god existence really does “prove” god exists.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[b]…I asked you whether the burden of proof falls when "there is an existential claim with insufficient evidence or when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence". You replied "correct".…

I believe you are referring to your question:

…To clarify: the burden of proof falls on a person who makes an existential claim to convince me that their “proof” of god existence really does “proof” god exists.[/b]

Then the issue is whether these two are equivalent:

- a denial of an existential claim which has sufficient evidence
- a denial of an existential claim and this denial has insufficient evidence.

In what way do you think these two are different? When would one be true and the other false?

I would deny that they have proof of gods existence so it is up to them to convince me that their “proof” of god existence really does “proof” god exists.

And they would deny that you have a proof that God does not exist (and from their perspective, they would be right). For them, the burden of proof would rest on you -- you would need to do the convincing.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Then the issue is whether these two are equivalent:

- a denial of an existential claim which has sufficient evidence
- a denial of an existential claim and this denial has insufficient evidence.

In what way do you think these two are different? When would one be true and the other false?

I would deny that they have proof of gods existence so i . For them, the burden of proof would rest on you -- you would need to do the convincing.

…Then the issue is whether these two are equivalent:

- a denial of an existential claim which has sufficient evidence
- a denial of an existential claim and this denial has insufficient evidence.

In what way do you think these two are different? When would one be true and the other false? .…

I was not trying to imply that the two statements are literally not equivalent.

However, reading back on what I said, I can see how what I said gives that impression that I did mean that the two statements are not equivalent and for that I apologise.

When I said:

“I never would claim that the burden of proof falls “when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence (I.e. INsufficient evidence for the DENIAL of the existential claim)….etc”

I should have said;

“I never would like to say that the burden of proof falls “when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence for the DENIAL of the existential claim” because I think that that is an awkward way of saying it that makes the syntax unnecessarily slightly more complex than it needs to be. I think it would be better to state the proposition as: ”that burden of proof falls “when there is a denial of existential claim with insufficient evidence insufficient evidence FOR the existential claim” because I think it is more convenient to stick to simply talking about the “evidence FOR the existential claim” as opposed to talking about “evidence for the DENIAL of the existential claim”.

Sorry for the confusion.

But how did you conclude, as you stated earlier: “…the criterion you have, the 'existential' part of the claim is irrelevant; …“ -I mean, I have already said the criterion only can apply to existential claims and I don’t see how it could apply to a non-existential claim because the criterion is just not designed for that.

…And they would deny that you have a proof that God does not exist (and from their perspective, they would be right). For them, the burden of proof would rest on you -- you would need to do the convincing….

Not according to my criterion IF they have no proof (and I would claim they would have no proof).

Originally posted by jaywill

Next time try to make it rhyhm. It will be even more intertaining.

very good! an attempt at wit and you're almost halfway there, too.

except, of course, that the words are rhymn, not rhyhm and entertaining, not intertaining.

But, then, you are used to making things up as you go.

Don't get insulted, but is your job devoted to spreading ignorance? You do not know the meaning of the word fear, it would appear, but then again you don't know the meaning of most words.

Your questions were non-responsive. What you asked was composed of words from a book which you represent as facts -- and I don't believe the printed words are facts at all, they are what they appear to be: words printed in a book. They are about as factual as Harry Potter or the scribbles of the alleged historian David Irving.

How unpleasant to meet jaywill!
With his features so biblically ill,
And his brow so grim
And his mouth so prim
And his conversation, so nicely
Restricted to What Precisely
And If and Perhaps and Still.
How unpleasant to meet jaywill!

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Let's return to your 4 categories of faith. After much deliberation, I think (3) is the religious faith I have in mind when I use the term 'faith.' In my own experience, however, there were certain verses out of the Bible which convinced me of its veracity on the spot. Upon hearing these verses read aloud something 'clicked' in my heart and mind and I ...[text shortened]... r sense, did not choose to believe that Jesus is Lord.

What do you make of this?

I have had similar experiences in reading philosophy, where I read some passage or argument and think "Yes, this is exactly right". Now, I would be hard pressed in such cases to explain exactly why I assented, and probably could not adduce all the evidence my tacit recognition of which led to my assent. Nonetheless, in such cases I do assent, and treat the claims at issue as provisionally true, but I do not believe them. I treat them as open invitations to further inquiry, as ideas to try out in conversation and in my work. But this is, admittedly, a strange role for a proposition to play, and it does not fit neatly within or without the category of belief. For there are innumerable propositions that I could also provisionally assume, some of which would would be in tension with propositions I have assumed or believed. There are propositions that you believe in earnest that I see as so unlikely that I would never assume them even provisionally. So, even the propositions that we provisionally assume will be live for us in a sense, we will see something to recommend them and take them to be at least consistent with the evidence we take ourselves to have. There are, in short, epistemic constraints on what we can take on faith. If somebody would have asked you, about those passages that clicked with you, why they struck you as correct, I bet you could have pointed to your experiences and knowledge of human nature to explain the resonance. Perhaps this is why you oscillate between (1) and (3), because the class of propositions that are reasonable objects of (3) are those for which you take there to be at least some modicum of evidence, that is, they are the propositions that, qua (1), you take to be plausible on the basis of your evidence. Even when we choose to act, we choose among alternatives that strike us as reasonable. The same is true here, it seems.