Abortion

Originally posted by ivanhoe

There are human beings who are more equal than other human beings. Bbarr calls those human beings persons and thus Bbarr has created two kinds of human beings, one kind with human rights, and another kind without human rights. To "solve" this question he wants to rename "human rights" to "person rights". Problem solved. Too bad for those human bein ...[text shortened]... u know what ? That can change in the future ! Maybe he'll change his definitions ....... 😵

Kirk, were aaaaaare youuuu ?

StarValleyWhy neeeeeeds youuuu ..... 🙄

Originally posted by ivanhoe
Kirk, were aaaaaare youuuu ?

StarValleyWhy neeeeeeds youuuu ..... 🙄

Fjord,

Thanks for reminding me of this post and requesting a response. I had meant to respond to this sooner, sorry for the delay.

I agree with you that sex has more functions than procreation. But the reason that sexual intercourse developed in the evolution was the necessity of procreation.

Actually, this claim rests on a common confusion about evolution. Evolution isn't a directed process, it is a blind process that by its nature is sensitive to environmental pressures. I agree, however, that one of intercourse's biological functions is procreation. But this doesn't entail that procreation is the only biological function that intercourse serves, nor does it entail that the purpose of sex is always procreation. It seems plausible that another biological function intercourse serves is to elicit feelings of protectiveness and intimacy between members of our species. Also, the purpose of intercourse is a function of what we want it to accomplish. After all, sterile couples and homosexual couples also engage in intercourse, and they don't do it for procreative purposes (how could they?). Additionally, heterosexual couples that take precautions against getting pregnant also have a purpose in mind when they have intercourse, and that purpose is not to have children (in fact, they are actively trying to prevent that from occuring).

It is thinkable that the function of procreation in the future will disappear and that we arrange procreation in a different way. The function of sex will change.

Perhaps the biological function of intercourse will change as our species evolves. But the biological function of intercourse is not the same as its purpose. The purpose of intercourse is determined by the reasons that those who engage in intercourse engage in intercourse for. Sometimes people have sex to make babies, sometimes they have sex for fun, sometimes for money, sometimes as a way of expressing intimacy, sometimes for a combination of these and other factors. It is absurd to claim that the actual purpose of some act of intercourse was to procreate, when the couple is on the pill, using a condom, had had a visectomy, or... If you doubt this, ask a couple who uses protection if they have sex in order to have babies. What ultimately determines the purpose of some activity is what the acting agents intend. This is the difference between the purpose of something and it's biological function(s).


It is one of the human abilities to make drastic and sometimes tragic changes in the course of events in our own lives and in nature in general. Often we change this course of events without a good view of all the consequences. This danger of overestimating the value of new developments is in my opinion also true in our approach to questions about sexuality, pregnancy, and euthanasia. It is not easy to say what the consequences will be, when sex will be more and more disconnected from its function of procreation.

I don't see any reason to think that, for instance, providing access to birth control will harm us. Of course it is possible that having sex for love or fun, without intending to have babies, will cause widespread harm, I doubt this will actually be the case.

The distinction you make between human organisms and persons is very helpful in finding the borderlines of what is permissible in the field of killing living organisms. You have tried to describe the borders within which killing is permitted. Your picture is clear, but I don't feel at ease with the easiness you present them. It might be me, it might be the heated discussion in which it comes to me. I don't know yet.

This ease is not indicative of any detachment I feel from the issues, but rather to the frequency with which I confront and present arguments in theoretical and applied ethics. I present them in this way because I've been presenting them for years, both in my own work and in teaching the work of others to my classes.

It is not very clear to me what you mean with suffering. I have asked you before if you see suffering as an attribute of self-awareness. You denied that. You see it as an independent property that beings possess. But I still do not understand what you actually mean by suffering.

Self-awareness is the capacity to reflect upon one's own internal states, to have a concept of one's identity. I don't think that it is necessary to have such a capacity or concept in order to suffer. For instance, I think that one type of suffering, physical pain, can be present in an organism without that organism having the ability to think about that pain or having a concept of its own identity. There are different sorts of suffering. The most basic type of suffering is, I think, physical pain. But creatures with complex mental lives can suffer in other ways. Depression, loneliness, frustration, humiliation, hoplessness, despair, fear, existential angst, etc. are all states I would classify as instances of suffering, yet none involve physical pain. Most of these are states of which I think many mammals other than humans are capable. Many of these can only be experienced by those with the capacity for self-awareness, but not all of them. I doubt that loneliness or fear, for instance, require the capacity for self-awareness, and I suspect there are analogues of depression that some animals can experience even while lacking the capacity for self-awareness.

I know when I suffer and I can see others suffer because they are like me. But where do you draw the line between who and what suffers or not. Is not everything that is thwarted in its normal development suffering in some way?

I draw the line at the best available evidence. The capacity for suffering arises through the development of causal structures. For most creatures of which we are aware, the capacity to suffer arises through the development of neural structure with certain functional properties. The capacity to suffer is also contingently linked with at least some behavioral sophistication (e.g., the ability to adapt to the environment). Of course the line is vague, and that is why I claimed that when in doubt about whether a creature can suffer, we ought to err on the side of caution. But many cases are clear. Zygotes have no ability to suffer because they lack mentality. They lack mentality because they don't have the causal structures necessary to bring mentality about. Adult mammals have the capacity to suffer. These cases are beyond dispute. It is not the case that everything that is thwarted in its normal development suffers is some way, unless you are redefining the term "suffer". My normal develpment (at this point) consists of gradually dying (I'm in my late 20's). Were you to prevent me from gradually dying (by making me immortal, for instance), I wouldn't thereby suffer. I'm stipulating that "suffering", as I use the term, necessarily requires mentality. No mentality, no suffering. So creatures without mentality cannot suffer. If you want to use "suffer" in a different way, that's fine, but then we won't be talking about the same thing.

If I understood Pyrrho well, he claims like you (?) that suffering has no value in itself. Agreed, but is there anyhow anything that has value in itself? Is value not a thing we always first have to give to something or somebody?

I don't think anything has value in and of itself. Value arises through the act of valuing, and it is in virtue of being the types of creatures that we are that we are rationally committed to valuing our personhood and the personhood of others.

Suffering seems to me like all other emotions neutral, without value. The value comes in sight by the way a person, a group, a culture or a religion uses our ability to suffer. Suffering can become good or bad, depending how we estimate it or can deal with it. We should avoid needless suffering as we should avoid anything that is needless.

You're correct that some suffering is necessary. Presumably, the suffering that goes along with, e.g., getting burned, serves the dual function of getting us to immediately stop burning ourselves and also to prevent us from getting ourselves into future situations that involve our being burned. You're also correct that some suffering can be incorporated into our conceptions of ourselves, and therby give meaning to our lives. For instance, the suffering a person undergoes at the hands of an abusive parent may lead that person to empathize with other abused children, and perhaps lead them to work as a counselor or social worker. But it is surely the case that there is something about suffering that makes needless instances of it worth preventing. When you are undergoing extreme suffering, don't you desire it to be lessened? Aren't you appreciative of those who undertake to try and help you? Generally, because we know what it is like to be in a state of suffering, When we see a creature in a needless state of suffering, our recognition that the suffering is needless gives us a reason to try and help the creature.

Reply to Fjord (continued from above).

When we look at the Buddhist philosophy we encounter a total different approach towards suffering and the attitude we humans have to take towards suffering. Actually they claim that a growing awareness can overcome suffering. This is not the place to question their claim. It just shows how difficult it is to use suffering as an indicator if an organism is a person or not. A Buddhist who claims to have overcome suffering has become less of a person?

I never claimed that having the capacity to suffer is a sufficient condition for being a person, only that it is a necessary condition. When a Buddhist claims they have transcended suffering, or have realized that suffering is ultimately illusury, or have realized that suffering is merely a byproduct of our mistaken conception of ourselves as distinct individuals, etc., they are not claiming that they have lost the capacity to suffer. A Buddhist can have the capacity to suffer, even though as a matter of fact they no longer experience suffering. Similarly, a normal person may have the capacity to suffer, even though through luck and circumstance they have never experienced any sort of suffering. But all this is beside the point, as I'm sure no Buddhist would claim that at enlightenment a person loses the very capacity to suffer, but rather that they have achieved a state of being where they have an additional capacity: the capacity to see beyond suffering.

Another problem with your philosophical approach of who may be killed and who may not is the absence of time in your reasoning. It seems it is sufficient for you to determine that someone at a certain moment is lacking the essential properties to be labeled as a person. But let us assume that a living organism is lacking these properties but there is a chance these properties can come back in the future? Can we kill such a being according to your theory? And if you agree with me that we cannot kill a being where such properties may return why is it than allowed to kill a zygote that has all the potential to grow out to a person?

A person may temporarily lack rational thought or self-awareness, but that doesn't mean they have lost the capacity for those properties. It is having the capacity for those properties that is essential for their personhood. As I've explained at length, the zygote doesn't even have the capacity for these properties.

A zygote is not a person according to your definition, but if you treat it well it will become one. It feels to me that you have overlooked the consequences of cutting out the time dimension in your reasoning.

Yes, this why abortions become morally problematic later on in the pregnancy. Given that I have always claimed that as the pregnancy progresses, there are increasingly serious moral problems with abortion, how can you possibly claim that I have overlooked the effects of time in my reasoning. That seems like mere carelessness on your part.

We may wonder why so many women are suffering from depressions after an abortion. Mentally they know that the fetus didn't suffer on a physical level, but they still feel they have lost something very valuable.
From where comes that feeling after an abortion that they have lost something that they valued and that never can return? They (and their intimates) wrestle with feelings of guilt.

Many women suffer emotionally from an abortion, and many women do not. Many women wrestle with feelings of guilt because there are people who mistaken think that having an abortion is an instance of killing a person, an instance of murder. Many women wrestle with feelings of guilt because they feel they have an obligation to be mothers. I know women who have felt such guilt, and yet maintain that were they to have the option of choosing again, they would still have an aboriton. I also know women who have had abortions without severe emotional effects. Of course, in a perfect world no woman would get pregnant until she desired to be pregnant. Alas, this is not a perfect world.

To compare such a pregnancy that with a car accident is wrong and not very helpful, not before and not afterwards an abortion. Woman may feel that a sexual assault is like a horrible not wanted accident, they may feel that the bursting of a condom is like a flat tire. That is not directly connected with what is happening afterwards and inside her womb.

This still doesn't give me any reason to think the analogy doesn't work. All you've said is that there is no "direct connection". Please tell me precisely how the anaology fails. Remember that the analogy was directed at a previous claim that the woman knows there is a risk of getting pregnant when she has sex, and thus must bear the responsibility for her decision. I'm claiming that people know that there is a risk of a car accident when they drive, and yet that doesn't entail that they are responsible for any accident they get into. When a woman is on the pill, and uses a condom, this indicates that she knows there is a risk of getting pregnant, and is taking reasonable precaution. When people drive defensively, with their seat-belts on, this indicates that they know there is a risk of an accident, and they are taking reasonable precaution. Just as you wouldn't hold people responsible if, despite taking reasonable precaution, they got into a car accident, you shouldn't hold a woman completely responsible for getting pregnant if she took reasonable precaution against that possibility. Please try to keep in mind the claim the analogy was directed against. It works perfectly well for that purpose.

I am not against abortion (at an early stage) nor against euthanasia. And I appreciate your attempt to make a sharp distinction between what is permitted and what is not. But I get the feeling that your solutions are too mathematical, too one-dimensional. And that provokes in me a feeling of resistance.

I'm sorry that my way of presenting argument prompts in you feelings of resistance. Again, this is probably due to the fequency with which I present them.

While you can ask here for a clarifying answer, I really must advice you against searching it here. Ask for professional advice everywhere.

Originally posted by bbarr
Reply to Fjord (continued from above).

[b]When we look at the Buddhist philosophy we encounter a total different approach towards suffering and the attitude we humans have to take towards suffering. Actually they claim that a growing awareness can overcome suffering. This is not the place to question their claim. It just shows how difficult it is to use suf ...[text shortened]... ngs of resistance. Again, this is probably due to the fequency with which I present them.