25 Jan 04
Originally posted by royalchicken"for its purpose"...
I haven't thought about what you said in huge detail, but I will. For now the best I can say in reply is that the post on the top of this page needs close attention paid to it, because for its purpose it is one of the most beautiful things I've read.
What is it? The purpose?
Here is what I think was said. I will use bbars frames.
(1) As follows, S is not a human. S is above passion. The "best state" imaginable, ie, the "categorical imperitive", is to become a superior being... no longer haunted by passion.
(2) Then poor old S hits up against his passion in the form of "I hate Floyd!" Poor S, being perfect becomes caught up in the human condition. BUT! Being superior, he shows no passion. But begins to reason.
(3) S weighs his options. Should he "flay floyd"? What! And destroy his illusion, both publically and privately that he is superior?
(4) If S "flays floyd" AFTER SUPERIOR REFLECTION, then he reveals himself as imperfect. Is that worth the risk? S has to decide how he wants to be viewed on the world stage. or... "he must endorse some practical identity, so"
(5) He rethinks his options and does what every human does. He rationalizes.
(6) After all is "thought and done", S decides that he will either do it or not. Depending on how mad Floyd makes him next time they meet.
This is another demonstration of the difference between math idiots like me and math capables like you, RC. If you, or any other person alive can read bbars referred to post and REALLY KNOW what he said, then I guess you are truly just plain superior! As for the rest of the vast majority of us, we long for people who are able to use language as a method of teaching and communication, in lieu of obfuscation.
25 Jan 04
Originally posted by StarValleyWyMike, I had a huge amount of trouble with bbarr's post. Truth be told, I found it confusing and unclear. But I read it again. And again. Five times to really understand it, then five more because I was certain something must be wrong. I agreed with you before--morals cannot be dealt with on a logical basis. I thought, therefore, that morals aren't good enough. You thought that logic therefore isn't good enough. After reading that post, I find that we are both wrong. I don't know whether those are his ideas or not, but it hardly matters (I only say that because my sister told me about something also called a 'categorical imperative', courtesy of Kant, that is the same as that). You yourself spoke of how logic is applied to science. We don't reason about actual things in science, we use theoretical models. Similarly, in (1) he establishes a theoretical model of a person. Note that he does not claim we ought to act this way, he just proves that not to act this way is irrational. Those two statements are different. That is the source of the disparity. And I did not suggest I am superior to anyone.
"for its purpose"...
What is it? The purpose?
Here is what I think was said. I will use bbars frames.
(1) As follows, S is not a human. S is above passion. The "best state" imaginable, ie, the "categorical imperitive", is to become a superior being... no longer haunted by passion.
(2) Then poor old S hits up against his passion in the ...[text shortened]... ho are able to use language as a method of teaching and communication, in lieu of obfuscation.
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by royalchickenNo you did not imply any such thing. It was my way of saying that I really don't think that anyone can read that post and understand it. My interpretation of it should be evidence of that. Are we then to try? You evidently thought it important to do so. I only made a second pass at it because you referred me to it as worthwhile. After the second pass, I felt only frustration. Hence, my attempt at a plain english interpretation. Is that wrong? To want to put it into a form that means something to me?
Mike, I had a huge amount of trouble with bbarr's post. Truth be told, I found it confusing and unclear. But I read it again. And again. Five times to really understand it, then five more because I was certain something must be wrong. I agreed with you before--morals cannot be dealt with on a logical basis. I thought, therefore, that morals aren ...[text shortened]... different. That is the source of the disparity. And I did not suggest I am superior to anyone.
Your point about models in science is taken. But the inference that it follows in philosophy is not valid. In my opinion your statement of a "theoretical model" of a "person" is not allowed. There are plenty of "people". We need no models. A model is the "disposable" object referred to in my reference to bbar in my first post of the day (above). All the posturing on "S" is obscene. See my post above where I actually refer to it as "evil". One should either say "I think this" or "It seems that" ... but don't say NOTHING in the hopes that people will think it is a well reasoned argument.
By the way, who's (1) through (6) were you able to read and understand the best? Mine or bbars? Am I "off" in any of my six assessments? If so, I would be very interested in which and why.
26 Jan 04
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrhow can it be universal yet not go beyond S's exact circumstances, and especially that the subject must be S himself? this doesn't sound very universal.
The generalization is not automatic, it is an inference S draws by virtue of being fully reflective. The hypothetical imperative P is both universal and very specific. It doesn't merely say 'People generally like me should A in virtue of ...[text shortened]...
Your mother is a wise women, as mothers tend generally to be. 😉
presumably you are saying another subject S2 can go through this process for themselves and value their own reflective agency, but that valuation only then applies to themselves.
BBarr said: Now given that S has been led to valuing his personhood, what good reason does he have for not valuing it in that of another? How could S simultaneously value his own personhood and fail to value the personhood of another without being inconsistent? Any supposed difference between S and another in virtue of which one could claim that S’s failing to value another’s personhood was not inconsistent would have to be a merely contingent difference.
this expansion to valuing another seems not only unsound, it also flies in the face of reality. people care more about themselves. that they care about others at times does not force them to always do it. to simply write off reality as a contingency would be writing off too much.
a different thing: that their reason overrides desire at times does not force them to always do it. or is this what you mean by "fully" reflective - that they will always act this way? again, reality, in my experience, is that many important decisions are made on the run, trusting of that initial desire to lead me (and StarValleyWy) along the right path.
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by StarValleyWyIs that wrong? To want to put it into a form that means something to me?
No you did not imply any such thing. It was my way of saying that I really don't think that anyone can read that post and understand it. My interpretation of it should be evidence of that. Are we then to try? You evidently thought it important to do so. I only made a second pass at it because you referred me to it as worthwhile. After the second pass, ...[text shortened]... "off" in any of my six assessments? If so, I would be very interested in which and why.
Not at all.
There are more electrons than people, and we've got many models of those. I had less trouble with the syntax of yours than I did with Bennett's, but I don't think they say the same thing at all. His is based on the scientific assumption that models can be made of anything, as long as the relevant property of the thing is preserved in the model. You evidently have some reason to think that this is not true of people. Within the context of your assumptions, I can't say your wrong. But I am going to read it again.
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by StarValleyWyI don't think you and bbarr said the same thing. I will compare the respective points.
(1) As follows, S is not a human. S is above passion. The "best state" imaginable, ie, the "categorical imperitive", is to become a superior being... no longer haunted by passion.
(2) Then poor old S hits up against his passion in the form of "I hate Floyd!" Poor S, being perfect becomes caught up in the human condition. BUT! Being superior, ...[text shortened]... ho are able to use language as a method of teaching and communication, in lieu of obfuscation.
(1)You say S is not human. The argument says that S exhibits at least one human characteristic, reflectivity, and possibly other ones, but those are not part of the argument.
(2)Your (2) and bbarr's (2) are basically identical except that S is not 'superior' or 'inferior', he is just an embodiment of reflectivity.
(3)I don't see the connection between the two different (3)s.
(4)They are totally different IMO. There is no 'world stage' in bbarr's, unless S considers 'public opinion' a reason to endorse or not endorse P.
(5)Your (5) is a description of the other (5).
(6)Your (6) contradicts your (1), because in (6) S is no longer ''superior'' the way you intended. However, you certainly made no error, instead you are making a point about how it is wrong to build models of people. CLearly you have a reason for this, and since your (1)-(6) is not designed to be an argument, I can't attack it. This is just a case of disagreement in what we are allowed to assume. So no, I don't agree with oyur interpretation, but I don't necessarily think you're wrong either. I do agree that bbarr's post was not at all easy to understand, but I think worth it.
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by royalchickenNow we are communicating. You are absolutely correct. I have lived with the same woman for almost thirty three years. She is as unknown to me as I am to her. I can't explain ME to her. She sure can't explain HERSELF to me. We are and always will be strangers AT THE DEEPEST LEVEL OF BEING HUMAN. To try and build, or even suggest that a model of "A HUMAN" can be built is doomed to failure. There are more ways of thinking than there are faces. ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE SOME SPLIT PERSONALLITIES OUT THERE! 😉 And every face is different. Hell, I can't even describe myself to myself. Can you?
[b]Is that wrong? To want to put it into a form that means something to me?
Not at all.
There are more electrons than people, and we've got many models of those. I had less trouble with the syntax of yours than I did with Bennett's, but I don't think they say the same thing at all. His is based on the scientific assumption that models ca ...[text shortened]... thin the context of your assumptions, I can't say your wrong. But I am going to read it again.[/b]
Stated another way... your statement "models can be made of anything, as long as the relevant property of the thing is preserved in the model. ", implies only "group think". A "broad study" of the species MIGHT allow modeling. I doubt it, but it might. A "narrow study" of properties of the human psych is recursive. The studying mind assumes 'relevant properties' and is about as likely to be correct ON ANY SINGLE MIND as would be the chances of catching a "certain" snow flake on a "certain" tongue in a "particular" blizzard.
We know this instinctively. "Don't paint with a broad brush.". "Don't make outlandish statements unless you enjoy eating crow." "Don't judge a person by the color of their skin."
I would add another. "Don't model specific 'properties' onto POOR OL' EVERYMAN. He may decide to eat you."😲😵
26 Jan 04
1 edit
Originally posted by StarValleyWyi agree with you, i think that problems relating to morals are very difficult, possibly impossible, to model and rigorously explain in any meaningful way that is related to the lives we lead. and when the explanations do come they often seem senslessly convoluted and full of jargon, and assumptions that the people are nothing like how we ourselves know ourselves to be.😕
Now we are communicating. You are absolutely correct. I have lived with the same woman for almost thirty three years. She is as unknown to me as I am to her. I can't explain ME to her. She sure can't explain HERSELF to me. We are and ...[text shortened]... perties' onto POOR OL' EVERYMAN. He may decide to eat you."😲😵
but i certainly admire anyone who gives it a go🙂
p.s. do you like the "possibly impossible" bit?
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by StarValleyWyI have lived with the same woman for almost thirty three years. She is as unknown to me as I am to her. I can't explain ME to her. She sure can't explain HERSELF to me. We are and always will be strangers AT THE DEEPEST LEVEL OF BEING HUMAN. To try and build, or even suggest that a model of "A HUMAN" can be built is doomed to failure. There are more ways of thinking than there are faces. ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE SOME SPLIT PERSONALLITIES OUT THERE! 😉 And every face is different. Hell, I can't even describe myself to myself. Can you?
This is right on. The model contained by ''S'' is a 'thing which has some properties that most humans have sometimes'.
Stated another way... your statement "models can be made of anything, as long as the relevant property of the thing is preserved in the model. ", implies only "group think". A "broad study" of the species MIGHT allow modeling. I doubt it, but it might. A "narrow study" of properties of the human psych is recursive. The studying mind assumes 'relevant properties' and is about as likely to be correct ON ANY SINGLE MIND as would be the chances of catching a "certain" snow flake on a "certain" tongue in a "particular" blizzard.
This is right, but 'morals' are a ''groupthink'' concept. Unless we need to worry about ourselves with others, there is no need for ethics. So I think Bennett was justified in using a model that has some of the properties that an average human does. You are also correct in pointing out that we should not get too carried away by this model; indivuduals are vastly more complex thn groups because they require more magnification.
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by royalchickenAs to point 1 and my saying that S isn't human... I was referring to bbars use of the word "full" and the term "Fully reflective activity "... Assuming that "reflective" is synonimous with "thinking" or "thoughtful" then "fully thougtfull" would imply perfection. Ergo... "S is not human." Or at least I can't remember ever meeting a "fully reflective" person. Scare the crap out of me if I did.😕
I don't think you and bbarr said the same thing. I will compare the respective points.
(1)You say S is not human. The argument says that S exhibits at least one human characteristic, reflectivity, and possibly other ones, but those are not part of the argument.
(2)Your (2) and bbarr's (2) are basically identical except that S is not 'superi ...[text shortened]... . I do agree that bbarr's post was not at all easy to understand, but I think worth it.
(3)... Thank the gods! I din't understand his or mine. If you had, I would have worried for you. Mine was a story. To make it interesting.
My 4 is a specific. Is bbar's generic? I used it to show that a specific instead of a generic can lead to confusion. It usually does in philosophy. Does that make the specific invalid? (standard answer is "yes!, no! , Maybe... Huh?" Truth chart time! Yuck.
(5)... well at least I got something confused then.
(6)... "Wull ... Six is six isn't it." <smile and think of the accountant in Life of Brian.
26 Jan 04
1 edit
how can it be universal yet not go beyond S's exact circumstances, and especially that the subject must be S himself? this doesn't sound very universal.
The point is that when S endorses acting in virtue of his present desire, S must recognize that the desire he has gives him a good reason for so acting. To acknowledge that the reason his desire presents him with is a good one is just for S to acknowledge that in exactly similar circumstances a desire exactly like D would provide anyone exactly like him an equivalently good reason for undertaking an action exactly like A. The principle is maximally specific, in that it is conditional on S's precise state and context, but it is universal in that S endorses its application not only to himself, but to anyone who satisfies the antecedent of the conditional priniciple. It doesn't matter one whit if there is in fact nobody just like S, nor whether S or anyone like S will be in circumstances like the one S finds himself within. By way of analogy, suppose you undertake some act for what you take to be a good reason. Now, ask yourself: if you were in that exact circumstance again, knowing only those things you then knew, would you take the reason you initially acted upon to be a good one? It seems there is no way that you couldn't take something to be a good reason for acting in one sircumstance, and fail to see that reason as just as good in another circumstance exactly like the first (where by 'circumstance' I mean the entire context of the action, including what you believed, desired, etc.).
This expansion to valuing another seems not only unsound, it also flies in the face of reality. people care more about themselves. that they care about others at times does not force them to always do it. to simply write off reality as a contingency would be writing off too much.
Please don't be offended if I don't take seriously the claim that my argument 'seems to be unsound'. I would need to see an argument to that effect before I could respond. You are surely right that this flies in the face of reality. But I'm not interested in describing how people in reality treat others, but rather in describing how people ought to treat others. Suppose someone tells me that we ought not kill one another because God forbids it and I respond "That seems unsound because people are killing each other all the time." Surely I would have misunderstood the point of the original claim. Taking about what God forbids isn't meant to accurately describe the way people behave but to tell them how they ought to behave. The point of the proof above is to show that everyone has a fundamental reason to respect everyone else's autonomy. In the context of this discussion, the fact that people often fail to respect the autonomy of other persons shows merely that those people sometimes act immorally and, hence, irrationally.
A different thing: that their reason overrides desire at times does not force them to always do it. or is this what you mean by "fully" reflective - that they will always act this way? again, reality, in my experience, is that many important decisions are made on the run, trusting of that initial desire to lead me (and StarValleyWy) along the right path.
You are correct that people are not fully reflective, and this isn't a bad thing. It would be a bit tedious is everyone were fully reflective, like going to a sci-fi flick with a physicist who keeps protesting "that's a violation of phsyical law!" But, again, the proof doesn't assume that anyone is, in fact, perfectly reflective. Rather, the point is that it is a failure of reflection, a failure of rationality, that underlies our mistreatment of one another.
26 Jan 04
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Originally posted by bbarri think S can look at another person and say "i did it because i am me, but you cannot do it because you are not me - regardless of the fact that there is no other difference between us". you simply claim that this is inconsistent. well i do not see why. i think it is selfish and in many cases immoral, but i do see it as S giving a reflective reason. it results in S reasoning that life will be a struggle between different people.
[b]
Please don't be offended if I don't take seriously the claim that my argument 'seems to be unsound'. I would need to see an argument to that effect before I could respond.
i would love to see a sound argument, of your sort, that we should treat others well. that we should treat them as we treat ourselves. and/ or that reasoning can help us to do this. but i have not recognised one yet.
thankfully, i do see many very good arguments of other sorts that we should be nice people 🙂
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by bbarrI will do that, Bennett. Thank you. I've saved it to my hard disk and I'll have several careful reads of it.
I invite you to go back and read the above proof carefully.
Your involvement in this thread was one of the aims of my initial post about 'the only scientifically sound answer.' I knew you'd never let me get away with that 🙂
And, truth be told, I'm happy in a way if my pre-Christian argument, about it being better to be safe than sorry, does not hold up. As for my current reason for objecting to abortion, it is a Biblical/Christian case and therefore of little use or interest to anyone who does not acknowledge the authority of the Bible.
If anyone is (and I highly doubt it) interested, I will post it here -- But I refuse to debate it in the forums. Public debates about religion bring out the worst in people, including me. As an example, I might never be able to befriend Feivel now, whereas if we hadn't debated religion publically, that opportunity might exist.
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by huntingbear"If anyone is (and I highly doubt it) interested, I will post it here" Huntingbear.
I will do that, Bennett. Thank you. I've saved it to my hard disk and I'll have several careful reads of it.
Your involvement in this thread was one of the aims of my initial post about 'the only scientifically sound answer.' I knew you'd never let me get away with that 🙂
And, truth be told, I'm happy in a way if my pre-Christian argument, about ...[text shortened]... end Feivel now, whereas if we hadn't debated religion publically, that opportunity might exist.
I'm interested 🙂
26 Jan 04
Originally posted by ivanhoe🙂
I'm interested 🙂
The Bible teaches the existence of the human soul and/or spirit (whether these are the same thing is a debated issue). I believe that a human with a human soul/spirit is definitely a person and should be accorded all the same rights and respect as any other person. We can't be sure when the human soul/spirit comes into existence in an individual, but conception seems to me the most likely time*. At any rate, it could be at conception, and so an element of the 'better safe than sorry' argument applies. Note that if the human with a human soul/spirit is a person, now the personhood of the zygote, even of the initial single-cell conceptate, cannot be denied conclusively.
* "...His name was then called Jesus, the name given Him by the angel before He was conceived in the womb." Luke 2:21 NASB
He was conceived, Jesus was conceived, not a "biomass". And we know that Jesus experienced humanity in every way as we do, except that He was without sin. I don't take this one verse as Biblical proof of the personhood of the conceptate, but it is a strong hint and I consider it most probable that the human-in-total (body and soul/spirit) comes into existence at conception.