Abortion

Originally posted by royalchicken
I was not advocating ANY imperative though, instead I was just giving an example of another possible one, which was according to your post not a good example. However, is there any reason why the principle expressed in your previous p ...[text shortened]... rements of showing your CI to be the only rational moral rule.

O.K., Chicken, for the benefit of the lurking shy and curious, let’s go through the argument together:

First, let us suppose:

(1) S is throughout a fully reflective agent.

This idea here in not that we are always fully reflective, nor that given limitations on information and time we ought to be. We are interested in what is involved in being fully reflective because the capacity for full reflection (or autonomy) is a basic feature of our being agents, or, in other words, creatures who form beliefs and intentions based upon reasons. Fully reflective activity is the paradigm case of human action. My argument will be that this reflectivity is the source of the categorical imperative.

Next, let us suppose that our fully reflective agent is confronted with some desire:

(2) S is faced with the desire, D, that favors his now performing action A. (I want now to flay Floyd)

Since S is fully reflective he is reflectively aware that (2). We understand S’s potential A-ing on the basis of his awareness that (2) to be an exercise of his agency, and not merely the output of some causal process. That is, we are assuming for this discussion that agent’s actions are explained by reference to their reasons for acting, and not by some third-person account of the causal processes eventuating in their action. Anyone who is not a thorough skeptic about morality will have to make a similar assumption. So, given that S’s sees the question of whether to A in virtue of (2) is an exercise in practical rationality, he needs to determine whether D provides him a good reason for A-ing. That is,

(3) S is faced with the question: Should he now act on D? Should he endorse his now acting on D? (Does wanting to flay Floyd give me a good reason to flay Floyd?)

As a fully reflective agent, S will only A because of D if he sees D as providing a good reason to A. That is, S must either endorse A-ing in virtue of D or not endorse A-ing in virtue of D. But what is involved in the endorsement of A-ing in virtue of D? Well, at a minimum, taking D to be a good reason for A-ing commits S to the endorsement of a general principle, a hypothetical imperative, that D is a good reason for A-ing. More specifically, endorsing A-ing in virtue of D commits an agent to endorsing A-ing in virtue of D in circumstances exactly like these. So,

(4) If S reflectively endorses A-ing in virtue of D now, then S endorses a general principle P, of hypothetical form, that endorses so acting. (Yes, my wanting to flay Floyd is a good reason to flay Floyd, so it’s a good rule that if someone (like me) wants to flay Floyd (in circumstances just like this) they ought to flay Floyd).

Now, since S is fully reflective, he is aware of both endorsing A-ing in virtue of D and the hypothetical imperative P. Also, since S is fully reflective, he is faced with the question of whether he ought to endorse being a person who endorses P. If he can’t endorse being that sort of person, the hypothetical imperative P will lose its endorsement as well, and this loss of endorsement will iterate to the desire, D, for A-ing. So, failing to endorse being a person who endorses P leaves one without any reason for A-ing.
The endorsement of being a person who endorses the hypothetical imperative P will commit him to an endorsement of some practical identity, or a description of himself under which he acts, trivially, the description of being a person who endorses the hypothetical imperative P. Notice that the reflective demands presented thus far apply to any desire for any end. So, if our fully reflective agent S is to ever act, he must endorse some practical identity. So,

(5) S must endorse some practical identity or other that grounds or supports the hypothetical imperative P and thus his A-ing in virtue of D. (I endorse being the type of person who thinks wanting to flay Floyd provides a good reason for flaying Floyd).

Since S is fully reflective, he is aware of this entire complex of reflective endorsement leading to his endorsement of a conception of himself; an endorsement of his practical identity. But this entire complex of reflective endorsement is itself is something that S can either endorse or reject. So, the demands of full reflection do not stop with (5). Again, if S rejects this complex, if he cannot endorse being the type of person who would through reflection be led to endorse being the type of person who would act according to the hypothetical imperative P and thus find D a good reason for A-ing, then he cannot A in virtue of D. To do so would be for S to act without a reason he ultimately endorses, and to act without a reason one endorses is not only irrational, it is a fundamental failure of agency. In fact, to act without a reason one ultimately endorses is to fail to act at all, for it is the having of reasons that distinguishes an agent’s actions from the mere moving of his body. To act, then, it is necessary for S to endorse his reflective nature as a deeper, or more fundamental conception of his practical identity. In other words, he must endorse his being essentially autonomous. So,

(6) S must endorse his reflectivity itself; his nature as a reflective or autonomous creature, as a conception of his practical identity. (I endorse being, fundamentally, a reflective or autonomous person).

Notice that (6) is not saying that S must only endorse his reflectivity on this particular occasion, but that he must endorse it generally. The reason for this is the same reason that took us from (3) to (4), namely that reflective endorsement as a matter of necessity involves endorsement of a general principle. Notice also that no further question can arise for the S about whether or not to endorse his endorsement of his reflectivity or autonomy. To raise such a question he would have to employ the very faculty at issue, so raising this question presupposes his endorsement of reflective endorsement itself, and hence his being a reflective or autonomous creature. So what has this shown? It has shown that in order for S to act at all he must endorse being a reflective creature, an autonomous creature; in short, he must endorse, and thereby value, his personhood. Now given that S has been led to valuing his personhood, what good reason does he have for not valuing it in that of another? How could S simultaneously value his own personhood and fail to value the personhood of another without being inconsistent? Any supposed difference between S and another in virtue of which one could claim that S’s failing to value another’s personhood was not inconsistent would have to be a merely contingent difference. And reflection upon that difference would lead S, via an argument similar to the one just presented, to realize that that difference can only be valued if personhood itself if already valued. So the value of personhood (reflectivity, autonomous agency) is fundamental, in that a fully reflective agent can value nothing unless he also values personhood. So failing to value personhood is to fail to be fully reflective, and failing to be fully reflective is to be, to that extent, irrational.

Originally posted by bbarr
(4) If S reflectively endorses A-ing in virtue of D now, then S endorses a general principle P, of hypothetical form, that endorses so acting. (Yes, my wanting to flay Floyd is a good reason to flay Floyd, so it’s a good rule that if someone (like me) wants to flay Floyd (in circumstances just like this) they ought to flay Floyd).

i don't see the automatic generalisation from the particular to the universal, especially given that the particular case applies to the central subject S and the generalisation is no longer applying to S. these are never going to be exactly the same circumstances from S's point of view.

Darwin would surely say that it does not work this way.

My mother did teach me that it should be this way however("do unto others as you would have others do unto you&quot😉

Originally posted by bbarr
That is, we are assuming for this discussion that agent’s actions are explained by reference to their reasons for acting, and not by some third-person account of the causal processes eventuating in their action.

perhaps you might call me a sceptic of moral evaluations, but i see an incompatibility here.

the agent must be "free" and not simply a vicar of another.

and yet the process of subjecting S to these assumptions seems to be taking away S's freedom.

Originally posted by huntingbear
Originally posted by bbarr
[b]A creature without interests may be instrumentally valuable, if it is valued by another.

Any other?

But I suspect what you are really asking is whether a creature without interests may be intrinsically valuable

Not necessarily. In fact, I think I agree that the notion of intrinsic value is ...[text shortened]... comes from valuing.
This naturally means that value is thoroughly subjective ... does it not? [/b]

Yes. My valuing something makes that thing intrumentally valuable. Note, however, that it doesn't make it instrumentally valuable for another. This should be obvious. My valuing scotch that tastes like peat moss doesn't give you a reason to value it. To say that a thing is instrumentally valuable is to say merely that it is valued by something for some end or other.

The subjective/objective split is tricky. I think all value is subjective in that it arises from the act of valuing, or, in the context of my proof above, from the act of reflective endorsement. I do not think that value exists in the world apart from the act of valuing, so I do not think value is something objective like mass or shape. But I do think that every rational creature, every autonomous agent is constituted in a manner such that there are things they are committed to valuing, as the post above was at pains to show. So, the value of some things may be ultimately subjective, but also universally shared. In short, the value of some things may be thoroughly intersubjective.

Originally posted by huntingbear
Originally posted by bbarr
[b]This would be irrational.

Does that mean that when we say something is 'immoral,' at bottom we're saying that it is merely 'irrational'? Note: I'm only seeking clarification.

You would be failing to see that the properties you have in virtue of which you value yourself also exist in others.

...[text shortened]... ave answered any of my questions already in material you posted in reply to Mark, I apologize.
[/b]

When we say that some act is immoral, we are saying that everyone has an overriding reason not to perform that act. Immorality is a particularly heinous form of irrationality. Note, however, that not all irrational acts are immoral. Failing to abide by hypothetical imperatives is irrational, but not immoral.

As to your second question, I invite you to go back and read the above proof carefully. You can value yourself for all sorts of reasons (e.g., because you are smart, loving, dedicated, etc.), but to the extent you are reflective you will be faced with the question of whether you ought to value yourself for those reasons. There is only one conception of your practical identity that cannot be so questioned, and that is your identity as a reflective creature. So, being fully reflective (fully rational) commits you to valuing your nature as a reflective creature, and consistency commits you to valuing that property when manifested in others. If you are fully reflective, and you value yourself because you are you, you will raise the question of whether you ought to value yourself merely for that reason; you will ask yourself whether the property of being you gives you a good reason to value yourself. The only property for which this question cannot sensibly be raised is the property of being reflective, or, equivalently, the property of being a rational agent.

Originally posted by flexmore
i don't see the automatic generalisation from the particular to the universal, especially given that the particular case applies to the central subject S and the generalisation is no longer applying to S. these are never going to be exac ...[text shortened]... y however("do unto others as you would have others do unto you"😉

The generalization is not automatic, it is an inference S draws by virtue of being fully reflective. The hypothetical imperative P is both universal and very specific. It doesn't merely say 'People generally like me should A in virtue of D in circumstances generally similar to these', but rather 'People exactly like me should A in virtue of D in circumstances exactly like these'. I should have been clearer on this point, so thank you for pointing out the need for clarification. The principle is, in effect, S's endorsement of the reason D gives him to A. Thus, although universal, it is not a generalization that goes beyond S or the circumstances within which S finds himself.

Your mother is a wise women, as mothers tend generally to be. 😉

Originally posted by flexmore
perhaps you might call me a sceptic of moral evaluations, but i see an incompatibility here.

the agent must be "free" and not simply a vicar of another.

and yet the process of subjecting S to these assumptions seems to be taking away S's freedom.

We are not subjecting S to any assumptions. We began with the hypothetical supposition that S was fully reflective. The proof is in the form of a conditional (i.e., If a subject is fully reflective, then he would be committed to valuing his reflectivity and hence reflectivity itself).

Originally posted by bbarr
We are not subjecting S to any assumptions. We began with the hypothetical supposition that S was fully reflective. The proof is in the form of a conditional (i.e., If a subject is fully reflective, then he would be committed to valuing his reflectivity and hence reflectivity itself).

bbarr wrote: So, given that S sees the question of whether to A in virtue of (2) is an exercise in practical rationality, he needs to determine whether D provides him a good reason for A-ing. That is,


this"good reason" essentially causes S to act or not. but S is a free agent and so S's actions should not be caused.

Originally posted by flexmore
bbarr wrote: So, given that S’s sees the question of whether to A in virtue of (2) is an exercise in practical rationality, he needs to determine whether D provides him a good reason for A-ing. That is,


this"good reason" essentially causes S to act or not. but S is a free agent and so S's actions should not be caused.

Why do you assume that acting for a reason entails that one is not free? If you are basing this assumption on the idea that reasons for action are, in effect, causes for action, then you are committed to the claim that no intentional action is ever freely done, for every intentional action is done for some reason or other. If you think the very idea of freedom is unintelligible (and I can sympathize with the rationale for such a view), then you are thereby committed to the claim that no person is ultimately responsible for their actions. In other words, you would thereby be committed to a skepticism about morality. This is a perfectly consistent position. The proof above was only meant for those who are prepared to take morality seriously.

Originally posted by Acolyte
Well ivanhoe's here... I'm just waiting for SVW to show up 🙄

I'm Back! Nheehaahaaaaaaaaaaa!

This is pretty weird. First time ever post ... while being dead sober. Emphsis on 'Dead'. As in no creative juices.

Actually, I don't have much to disagree with Ivanhoe on this. From a good Athiests point of view, human and/or sentient life is both valuable and rare and a thing to be treasured. I feel honor and duty bound to protect innocence of all types.

Chanceremichanic... I, being an atheist can only explain that being and atheist only makes it more important for me to try and be a morally worthy being. This demands that I honor life. Especially sentient life.

The most salient point asked in this discussion, i believe, is "when does it become a being?"

I have an Aunt who suffered a mis-carriage and lost here 'baby' in the second month of a pregnancy. In May of 1954. We had a funeral and they dedicated a granite marker in a cemetery, inscribed "Blessed Baby. Died Before Birth on May 18, 1954" . My Aunt (and our entire family) mourned the loss of that baby just as we did for the other deaths in the family. Was that baby real? It seems so to all of us who saw the grief of it's passing.

I have a Father who had six children. He has never referred to any of these six people by their given names. He has never recognized any of them as beings. Were these babies real? They were never really recognized as living beings. Only "Things" to be used, weighed and measured. Everything they did was "quantified" and "qualified" as per reflection upon the father.

Which is more real then? The baby who is loved and remembered each Memorial day, even fifty years later? Or the six kids who were never recognized as being alive?

So my answer is that "it becomes a being" when it is recognized by a mind that views it as such. Emotional ... not rational recognition.

This brings up my basic argument with bbar again. Human beings and our poor plight as beings do not qualify as objects to be put to the test of logic. Human "qualities" are not additive. We are not logical beings. We are emotional beings. We are billions of glorified "Chimps"... striving for recognition and "credit" in exchanges with our peers. All of civilization is based on this striving. "Acceptance" and "Recognition" are THE ONLY CURRENCY WE WILL EVER KNOW. Not logical, but so deep in our genes as to make it so, whether we like it or not.

So should we abandon the "effort to become logical beings"? Yes... as to philosophy and no as to real science. To measure a being using logic as a philosophical exercise is to reduce that being to an expendible commodity. Logic applied to philosophy is evil, through reduction. Logic applied to science, on the other hand, is the most wonderful art invented by humans. And i do believe it is "invented", not "discovered".

So please don't look at abortion as a "logical" argument. It is a "human" argument only. All the logic in the world won't make it acceptable for people who see "life" as the moment of love between a man and a woman when procreation occurs.

So am I against abortion in all cases? No. We as human beings should always be free to choose life or death. More to the point though is that every being deserves to have final say as to procreation. In a "good" world, this would be "thought out in advance", as has been well argued here. In the imperfect world we live in, passion and stupidity seem to rule our lives.

Civilization is two steps forward, and one step back. Two steps forward and three steps back. The only thing that we can be sure of is anger and frustration as we exceed our population density gene. We evolved in groups of about 100 people ... each group separated by at least 30 miles. One million years of it. Then in the blink of an eye we are stuffed like olives into tin-can-cities. Is there any wonder that we have begun to argue if "that other persons' fetus" is alive?

Originally posted by StarValleyWy
I'm Back! Nheehaahaaaaaaaaaaa!

This is pretty weird. First time ever post ... while being dead sober. Emphsis on 'Dead'. As in no creative juices.

Actually, I don't have much to disagree with Ivanhoe on this. From a good Athiests point of view, human and/or sentient life is both valuable and rare and a thing to be treasured. I feel honor and ...[text shortened]... es. Is there any wonder that we have begun to argue if "that other persons' fetus" is alive?

I haven't thought about what you said in huge detail, but I will. For now the best I can say in reply is that the post on the top of this page needs close attention paid to it, because for its purpose it is one of the most beautiful things I've read.