Abortion

Originally posted by ianpickering
At what point is it a 'someone' ?

I don't know. Not at conception, and not for many months afterwards. Medical science doesn't have an precise answer to this, so I'm not qualified to say.
If you believe that its a someone from conception, then that belief should guide your action. What a woman believes on this matter will have a bearing on wherther she has an abortion, but that's her choice.

Originally posted by ianpickering
At what point is it a 'someone' ?

In my perception it is not a point but a line. A line that starts at "nobody" and that develops via the mother into someone. There are different points on that line that we can describe as fundamental shifts in the process of becoming an independent being. A very important step we all can marvel about is when birth takes place and the new born being starts communicating with the outer world by taking its first breath.

Fjord

Originally posted by ianpickering
At what point is it a 'someone' ?

The only scientifically sound answer is: at conception. The conceptate is a genetically unique human individual.

Originally posted by huntingbear
The only scientifically sound answer is: at conception. The conceptate is a genetically unique human individual.

i think you confuse the terms scientific and genetic.

genetically the foetus seems to be largely separate at that stage. but genetics is not everything.

a scientific concept involves any testable idea, genetics is only a very very small part of this technique.

are they connected?

is one enclosed within the other?

are there a reliance on the mother?

do they have separate thoughts?

will a reluctant mother bring up a criminal?

none of these loaded questions on its own comes close to bringing an answer as to what we should do about it.

Originally posted by huntingbear
The only scientifically sound answer is: at conception. The conceptate is a genetically unique human individual.

Actually, this response begs the question against the pro-choice advocate. You assume that the condition of being a 'someone' is fulfilled by being a 'genetically unique human individual'. But your condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a 'someone'. For instance, if it was the case that genetic identity sufficed for being 'someone', then an entailment would be that monozygotic twins (or clones) were the same 'someone', but this is clearly false. Further, suppose that your genetics were altered in some relatively cosmetic way: if there were no real substantive psychological changes accompanying such a change you would have very good reason to think you were the same 'someone' that existed prior to the cosmetic genetic change. Though according to your view, such a change would amount to the destruction of one 'someone' and the creation of another 'someone', each identified by his unique genetic identity. Clearly, since you would survive such a change (and be the same 'someone'😉 you are not essentially your genetics. This shows your criterion of genetic identity unnecessary for 'someone'-hood, or, in philosophical parlance, "personhood". Incidentally, this last point indicates the competing conception of personhood (or 'someone-hood'😉 most often held by those who are pro-choice, and that is a psychological account.

What the pro-choice advocate claims is that no person (in the moral sense: minimally, a sentient, self-aware creature) exists at conception. It is obviously the case that life begins at conception, and it is obviously the case that a human organism begins at conception, but it is simply not the case that a person (in the moral sense) begins at conception.

The distinction between being a human organism and being a person is what is often ultimately at issue in debates on abortion. The pro-life side assumes that being a human organism suffices for being a person, and the pro-choice side simply denies that being a human organism suffices for being a person. These debates are pointless unless, at a minimum, the sides get clear on the distinctions they are each drawing or refusing to draw.

Originally posted by bbarr
Actually, this response begs the question against the pro-choice advocate. You assume that the condition of being a 'someone' is fulfilled by being a 'genetically unique human individual'. But your condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a 'someone'. For instance, if it was the case that genetic identity sufficed for being 'someone', ...[text shortened]... a minimum, the sides get clear on the distinctions they are each drawing or refusing to draw.

Alternatively (and I don't take this position), why not accept the pro-life definition of a person and try to refute the claim that it is always bad to kill people. Conditions already exist under which society in general agrees killing is okay, like self-defen(s/c)e or war.

Originally posted by royalchicken
Alternatively (and I don't take this position), why not accept the pro-life definition of a person and try to refute the claim that it is always bad to kill people. Conditions already exist under which society in general agrees killing is okay, like self-defen(s/c)e or war.

Although we could do that, if we did the term 'person' would no longer do the work it is supposed to do. 'Person' is a moral notion, it has normative force. To say of something that it is a person commits us to respecting it; the recognition of personhood obligates us in particular ways. If 'person' became coextensive with 'human organism', then we would need another term to do the work that 'person' used to do. For example, suppose we take this suggestion, and use 'person' to refer to any and all human organisms. Suppose we come across a person who is literally brain-dead, and we wonder 'what are our obligations to this person?'. It seems that such a case would force us to draw a distinction within the class of persons. We would henceforth have to call one class 'persons with sentience' and another class 'persons without sentience'. Why would such a distinction have to be drawn? Simply because whether a thing is sentient makes a damn bit of difference to us in how we treat it (compare kicking a rock down the road with kicking a mouse down the road). Further examinations of the class of 'persons with sentience' will reveal to us creatures who are merely sentient and those who are both sentient and self-aware and/or rational. Upon such a discovery we will again have to create a sub-class within the class of persons with sentience to account for this distinction. Why? Because self-awareness and rationality seems to mark a relevant moral difference (the difference between creatures merely to whom we have obligations and those creatures who also have moral obligations; or, in other words the difference between moral patients and full moral agents). But now look where we are: The distinctions we've drawn and the terminology we've adopted track our earlier distinctions. Now, instead of using 'person' we use 'person with sentience and self-awareness and rationality'. Certainly this seems more trouble than it's worth.

Originally posted by bbarr
Although we could do that, if we did the term 'person' would no longer do the work it is supposed to do. 'Person' is a moral notion, it has normative force. To say of something that it is a person commits us to respecting it; the recognition of personhood obligates us in particular ways. If 'person' became coextensive with 'human organism', then we ...[text shortened]... ience and self-awareness and rationality'. Certainly this seems more trouble than it's worth.

Yes, we'd have to redefine the moral concepts which we use the word 'person' to indicate. Currently, we use 'person' to mean 'human organism to which we have these moral obligations'. All I suggested was to change the moral obligations that define personhood, rather than changing the definition of 'human organism' which is what the abortion debate tends to be about. I think I expressed my last post wrong or you missed the point: pro-life and pro-choice people generally agree on the list of moral obligations, or at least claim to (neither supports killing people), but spend huge amounts of effort quibbling over what constitutes a human organism. My post was pointing out exactly what you did, namely that there is a moral construct which is not necessarily fixed and consequently half of the argument is ignored. Ironically, I suspect the real disagreement is not about the 'what is a human' bit at all.

Originally posted by royalchicken
Yes, we'd have to redefine the moral concepts which we use the word 'person' to indicate. Currently, we use 'person' to mean 'human organism to which we have these moral obligations'. All I suggested was to change the moral obligations that define personhood, rather than changing the definition of 'human organism' which is what the abortion ...[text shortened]... d. Ironically, I suspect the real disagreement is not about the 'what is a human' bit at all.

Correct. The debate is not about the status of zygotes or embryos or fetuses as human organisms. The debate is about our moral obligation to these types of human organisms. The debate is about their moral status. It doesn't really matter the point at which a human organism begins but rather the point at which a person begins. Overlooking this point leads to stupid and pointless discussions. Recognizing this point leads to a discussion about the criteria a thing must have to be worthy of consideration in our moral deliberations.

Originally posted by bbarr
Correct. The debate is not about the status of zygotes or embryos or fetuses as human organisms. The debate is about our moral obligation to these types of human organisms. The debate is about their moral status. It doesn't really matter the point at which a human organism begins but rather the point at which a person begins. Overlooking this point leads ...[text shortened]... about the criteria a thing must have to be worthy of consideration in our moral deliberations.

Since something is a 'person' by virtue of our moral obligations to it, it is obvious that our moral obligations toward persons are universal, right?

Originally posted by royalchicken
Since something is a 'person' by virtue of our moral obligations to it, it is obvious that our moral obligations toward persons are universal, right?

No, a thing isn't a person by virtue of our obligations towards it. A thing is a person by virtue of having certain properties, and it is in virtue of having those properties that it is owed moral consideration. But this doesn't effect your question. Our obligations to persons are universal. Cultural relativism is false.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, a thing isn't a person by virtue of our obligations towards it. A thing is a person by virtue of having certain properties, and it is in virtue of having those properties that it is owed moral consideration. But this doesn't effect your question. Our obligations to persons are universal. Cultural relativism is false.

So we have the exact same moral obligations toward everything with enough properties to make it a person?

Originally posted by royalchicken
So we have the exact same moral obligations toward everything with enough properties to make it a person?

It's not a matter of having enough properties, but of having the right properties. Your question is vague. You could be asking whether our obligations are universal in that we must treat every person equally. Alternatively, you could be asking whether our obligations are universal in that we must accord every person equal consideration. The answer to the first question is 'no'. The answer to the second question is 'yes'. Obviously, since 'person' isn't coextensive with 'human organism' (since some human organisms aren't persons and some persons aren't human organisms) the manner in which we ought to treat persons will differ, depending on contingent factors of their psychology, physiology, etc. One reason we're obligated not to go around hurling knives at human persons is that human persons can be hurt by knives. A race of persons with metallic exoskeletons, however, may not be troubled or hurt by knives, and thus we may not be obligated not to throw knives at them (suppose it is rule of etiquette to throw knives in greeting...). Suppose these creatures could be severely injured by loud noises. In such a case we would be obligated to be quiet around them for the same reason we are obligated not to throw knives at human persons. Equal consideration may lead to radically different forms of treatment.

Originally posted by bbarr
It's not a matter of having enough properties, but of having the right properties. Your question is vague. You could be asking whether our obligations are universal in that we must treat every person equally. Alternatively, you could be asking whether our obligations are universal in that we must accord every person equal consideration. The answer to the ...[text shortened]... nives at human persons. Equal consideration may lead to radically different forms of treatment.

Can you say explicitly what properties something must have in order to be a 'person'?

Originally posted by royalchicken
Can you say explicitly what properties something must have in order to be a 'person'?

I think that having the capacity to suffer is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for being a person. However, I do think that having the capacity to suffer is a sufficient condition for moral considerability. I think a necessary condition for being a person is being self-aware. I think a necessary condition for being a person is being rational. By 'rational' I mean something like 'having beliefs and forming intentions through the recognition of reasons, and being sensitive to new reasons', I do not mean to say that something has to be perfectly consistent or even very intelligent to be a person. Taken together I see these three conditions as sufficient. This is just a first pass, however. There are probably revisions that need to be made in this account.