07 Feb 03
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Originally posted by bbarrAre you saying that I am free to do what I will, but what I will is either caused or random? What then, causes me to will what I will? I submit that the one and only thing that causes me to will what I will is me. Of course, my will is influenced by my surroundings and my past choices, among other things, but that does not negate the fact that I am the final authority on which things I choose to do, and which I chose not to do.
But your willing is also an event, and as such is itself either caused or random. So we are left with two options. Either your actions result from an chain of causes regressing backwards in time (causes precede their effects, after all), or y ...[text shortened]... then it seems they are independent of any willing on your part.
For example, at the moment, I am drinking a cup of coffee. Some would say that this event was caused by a chemical dependency on caffiene (sp?). However, the reason I have a coffee habit is because I have CHOSEN to drink coffee frequently in the past.
07 Feb 03
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Originally posted by royalchickenLet's say the cause of an event is another event, preceding it in time and sufficient to bring it about. Let's say a random event is one without a cause. The 'soft determinist' or, more commonly 'compatibilist' will argue that our actions are caused by our willing. The question then becomes is our willing caused or uncaused? As for an example of a random event, the closest I've been able to find is in quantum mechanics, where e.g., the decay of particular radioactive particles is said to be random. But it's obvious that the argument is not weakened in any way if there are no random events. For then, everything will have a cause sufficient to bring it about, and its cause will have a cause, regressing backwards in time. So your actions will be the result of a causal chain regressing backwards in time to a point prior even to your conception. So prior to your conception the state of the world was such that there were events sufficient to bring about your current actions. So there is no way you could have, at any moment, have done otherwise than that which you in fact do (and no way you could have willed otherwise than you in fact willed). As for defining free will, let's say in action is free if and only if given a complete specification of all the facts that obtain at a particular time prior to the willing of the action, that specification does not entail the content of the willing AND the content of the willing is not random. This last part seems crucial, because if I just found myself willing this or that (willy-nilly, so to speak) the content of my willing wouldn't relate to my character in any way, and thus wouldn't seem like a willing that was mine.
I don't see what's being argued here. I think Acolyte may have hit on this before, but certain parts of the argument seem ill-defined. Also, I think your argument should be extended backwards a bit so it can rest on sounder axioms; ...[text shortened]... clusion, through other arguments I have seen. Where is this from?
07 Feb 03
Originally posted by richjohnsonSo complete specification of who you are (all the facts about you that obtained prior to the point of one of your willing) entails what you will in fact choose to do. But this means that when confronted with a decision, the choice you will make was already ordained in some sense, because causal forces sufficient to bring about that particualr choice were present prior to the willing. By the way, Rich, you're the physicist....what's an example of a random (uncaused) process from Q.M.?
Are you saying that I am free to do what I will, but what I will is either caused or random? What then, causes me to will what I will? I submit that the one and only thing that causes me to will what I will is me. Of course, my will is influenced by my surroundings and my past choices, among other things, but that does not negate the fact that I am th ...[text shortened]... eason I have a coffee habit is because I have CHOSEN to drink coffee frequently in the past.
Bennett
07 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrYeah. I don't know what you mean by an "uncaused event". Plainly, a random event still has a cause (a preocurring event necessary for its happening). In other words, if there is some event B such that if B did not happen, A would not either, then B "causes" A. Now events can be placed very simply in 1-1 correspondence with statements, as follows: associate event A with the statement "A happens". Then "B causes A" in the previous sense can be replaced with the implication "B happens" ---> "A happens". In this sense, because there are at least two events that happened, on a formal-logic level every pair of events that happened fit the above implication. So no event is uncaused.
By the way, Rich, you're the physicist....what's an example of a random (uncaused) process from Q.M.?
Bennett
I don't quite know what you mean by "random", either. There are of course, various statistical and information-theoretical conceptualizations of randomness, but these don't necessarily apply here.
07 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrThis last part seems to contradict the statement:
action is free if and only if given a complete specification of all the facts that obtain at a particular time prior to the willing of the action, that specification does not entail the content of the willing AND the content of the willing is not random. This last part seems crucial, because if I just found myself willing this or that (willy-nilly, so to spea ...[text shortened]... uldn't relate to my character in any way, and thus wouldn't seem like a willing that was mine.
"But this means that when confronted with a decision, the choice you will make was already ordained in some sense, because causal forces sufficient to bring about that particualr choice were present prior to the willing."
How is it possible that you can go around willing willy-nilly, while everything I do or will (or think?) is an inevitable result of "causal forces?"
07 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrDoes this mean that you've been convinced that there is no 'self', and that a person is merely the sum of all of their actions? Say it ain't so, Mr. Barr. :'(
So complete specification of who you are (all the facts about you that obtained prior to the point of one of your willing) entails what you will in fact choose to do. ... By the way, Rich, you're the physicist....what's an example of a random (uncaused) process from Q.M.?
Bennett
I guess the outcome of a 'spin' measurement of a particular photon could be considered to be a random event, but I'm not sure that it would be proper to say that the event is uncaused. Until the photon's spin is measured, it may have both 'up' and 'down' spin, and it is the act of measurement itself which causes the photon's spin to be either 'up' or 'down'.
In any event, IMHO, arguments based on our the behavior of subatomic particles (our understanding of which is far from perfect) are highly non-persuasive in the context of a philosophical debate about free will.
08 Feb 03
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Originally posted by royalchickenWell, what I mean by random just is uncaused, so a random event is one such that no event or set of events occurring prior to the random event are sufficient to bring about that event. If there are random events, then of course there will be other events necessary for them to come about (e.g., the event that was the creation of the universe is a necessary condition for the random decay of a radioactive particle for the simple reason that were there no universe there would be no radioactive particles to decay). But although random events have necessary conditions in this sense, they have no sufficient conditions, no event of set of events such that the occurrence of those events will bring about the random event in question.
Yeah. I don't know what you mean by an "uncaused event". Plainly, a random event still has a cause (a preocurring event necessary for its happening). In other words, if there is some event B such that if B did not happen, A would ...[text shortened]... izations of randomness, but these don't necessarily apply here.
About your argument with the conditional: You seem to be claiming that we can represent 'A causes B' by 'A ---> B'. Then you say that since any two events can be placed respectively into the antecedent and consequent postions of the first-order logical connective ' ___---->___', every event is caused. But this would only be the case if the meaning of 'cause' was completely captured by the conditional. But if you look at the truth conditions of the conditional, you discover that all that is required for a statement in first order logic of the form
"___---->___" to be true is that either the antecedent be false, or the consequent be true. The only condition under which the conditional connective is false is when both the antecedent is true and the conditional is false. For example, the claim 'all you bases belong to us' could be sybolized as (x) (Base x ---> Belongs to us x). Where (x) is the universal quantifier, 'Base' is the property of being a base, 'Belongs to us' is the property of belonging to us, and the bound variables x range over objects. But this claim would be true even if there were no bases. In this situation, the antecedent of the conditional would be false for every element of our ontology, and thus, by the truth conditions of the conditional connective, the statement itslef would be true. So in a world without bases, 'all your bases belong to us' would be true. But this should be enough to show you that although the conditional connective may be useful as notation, it is a mistake to think of it as being an accurate translation into first order logic of 'cause'.
The correct translation would be something like this:
(A & ((B v C v D v ....) <----> A))
Where the lest side of the biconditional is a disjunction, where the disjunts are each an events or set of events sufficient to bring about A. The right side of the biconditional is, of course, the caused event. The truth conditions of the bidonditional are such that the biconditional is true if and only if either both sides of the biconditional are true or both sides are false. This second half of the truth condition need not concern us, however, because A is true. After all, if you are debating whether A was caused or uncaused, then A must have happened.
08 Feb 03
Originally posted by richjohnsonI'm not quite sure what you are asking. The first statement is an implication of the truth of determinism, the doctrine that all events are caused. The second statement is a consequence of the claim that your willings are themselves random. This is a dilemma. They can't both be true, the problem is that it seems like one of them has to be true, and on either case free will is threatened.
This last part seems to contradict the statement:
"But this means that when confronted with a decision, the choice you will make was already ordained in some sense, because causal forces sufficient to bring about that particualr choice were present prior to the willing."
How is it possible that you can go around willing willy-nilly, while everything I do or will (or think?) is an inevitable result of "causal forces?"
08 Feb 03
Originally posted by richjohnsonNo, don't get me wrong. I like free will as much as the next guy, but I've been sketching out this argument and free will seems more and more mysterious. You're right about the relevance of the quantum domain on philosophical problems involving free will. But if no event is random, then every event has a cause that preceded it sufficient to bring it about. And then it seems like your actions were already determined prior to your birth, as I explained earlier. The stuff about randomness is just meant to sharpen the problem for those who may attempt to argue that determinism is false and then infer (erroneously) that because determinism is false, free is unthreatened.
Does this mean that you've been convinced that there is no 'self', and that a person is merely the sum of all of their actions? Say it ain't so, Mr. Barr. :'(
I guess the outcome of a 'spin' measurement of a particular photon could be considered to be a random event, but I'm not sure that it would be proper to say that the event is uncaused. ...[text shortened]... m perfect) are highly non-persuasive in the context of a philosophical debate about free will.
08 Feb 03
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Originally posted by richjohnsonAlright, fair enough. But now I ask you, the exertion of your will is itself an event, so are there causal forces sufficient to bring about your willing? If there are, then it seems like what you willed was already determined prior to your willing.
I guess I disagree with the assumption that there exist causal forces [b]sufficient to determine the choice I will make in any situation. I'm not saying that my choices are totally free from constraints, merely that there is some leeway within which I may exert my will.[/b]
08 Feb 03
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Originally posted by bbarrwell bbarr, I was getting snippy with you and I apologize. Ironically, I was getting snippy with you for many of the same reasons you stated about me.
Cute, maggoteer. After I try to answer your original post you come back again with a dismissive, ad hominim attack. It's like you missed the day in school when they taught people what constitutes a good argument. Can you tell me what precis ...[text shortened]... familiar....oh, that's because it's what I said originally.
To cut to the chase, yes one my objections is the dichotomy you seemed to make between caused and random. But it appears that your meaning of uncaused/random is different than I interpreted, so my point is somewhat moot.
OK. If you are interested in the definition of a chaotic dynamical system, it has three properties:
1) It's sensitive to initial conditions, as you stated. However that is not enough; one can have systems which are sensitive to initial conditions that are not chaotic.
2) the system must be transitive. That is for any pair of points x and y, and any e > 0, there is a third point z within e of x whose orbit comes within e of y.
3) the periodic points of the chaotic function must be what is known as a dense set. Given a set X and a subset Y of X, Y is dense in X if for any point x in X, there is a point in y in Y arbitrarily close to x. A classic example of a dense set is the rational numbers in the real numbers; for any irrational number, you can find a rational number that is arbitrarily close.
(extra credit for royalchicken and acoylte: are all the properties necessary?)
And my point bbarr was the fact that you can have a deterministic system, which is not random, but whose long term behavior is unpredictable.
And I'm not sure what you mean by a "mere epistemic limitation on our part..." I'd argue a main point of chaos theory is the opposite of what you seem to be saying: mainly that even if we knew all the forces acting on a chaotic coin we still couldn't predict it's long term behavior. To make your argument you have to invoke infinitely accurate measurements, a fundamental impossibility, akin to assuming omniscience.
Well to conclude, guess I'm happy being not only a soulless automaton, but also a predetermined one.
08 Feb 03
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Originally posted by maggoteerHow flattering! This is an interesting question and intrigued me greatly, and I want to clarify it with an example. Given some parameter s, we can iterate the simple equation: x(n) = sx(n-1) (1- x(n-1)) to produce x(n) given x(n-1). The x's (really just a function mapping the natural numbers onto some set of reals) are, I assume, what you would call the orbit. I wrote a quick Quickbasic program to see what this does, depending on the parameter s. In general, for many values of s, the values of x(n) settle neatly into some alternation between a few values, and the "orbit" is predictable and stable. But sometimes, the parameter is just right so that the x(n)'s do not settle into any regular alternation (or the alternation has such a large period we don't see it). For example, s= 3.706.. is such a point. I assume this is what you mean by a "periodic point". The question is, is the set of such points really dense in R? I think, but I don't know... I know I haven't answered the question, but I needed to fiddle about with it a bit first. Sorry if I'm way off the mark; my knowledge of chaos is very slight. Also, sorry bbarr about the vaguely ridiculous nature of my first post here. I gave it insufficient thought.
(extra credit for royalchicken and acoylte: are all the properties necessary?)