09 Feb 03
interesting thread 🙂 a recent review of an owen flannagan book entitled "problem with the soul" discussed this very issue of free will. It noted that it is of course an ancient and intractable philosophical conundrum; Flanagan's book does not so much solve it as claim that it is usually badly posed. We should "stop talking about free will and determinism and talk instead about whether and how we can make sense of 'deliberation', 'choice', 'reasoning', 'agency', and 'accountability' ... within the space allowed by the scientific image of minds." It makes no sense to talk about freedom of the will not conditioned by any cause. We are part of the universe and it is subject to cause and effect, but we can make sense of rational deliberation and choice in a causal universe. This view has a strong buddhist flavour.
09 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrIt may be that every choice I make has a prior cause. But the question is whether or not those prior causes lead necessarily to the choice I subsequently make, or is it possible that they could have turned out otherwise? You could say that A precedes B in a causal chain. Fair enough. But does A necessarily lead to B, or is it possible that A could lead to C instead? Just to observe that there are causal relationships between my choices and prior events is insufficient. You would have to demonstrate that they were *necessary* causal relationships in order to say that my choices were predetermined.
So complete specification of who you are (all the facts about you that obtained prior to the point of one of your willing) entails what you will in fact choose to do. But this means that when confronted with a decision, the choice you will make was already ordained in some sense, because causal forces sufficient to bring about that particualr choice were pre ...[text shortened]... you're the physicist....what's an example of a random (uncaused) process from Q.M.?
Bennett
09 Feb 03
Originally posted by rwingettYou're right, in a sense. My lighter can cause the conflaguration of this cigarette before me, that is, it is sufficient to bring about the lighting of my cigarette, but only if certain other factors are in place. Obviously, my lighter isn't sufficient to light my cigarette if I do not put the flame to the cigarette. But I think this really misses the point. So we can think of not only one isolable factor being A cause, but also a set of factors constituting THE cause. And the claim here is that either it's the case that there exists some set of factors such that given those factors your willing was determiined (i.e., your willing was brought about by those factors) or it's the case that your willing was was not brought about by those factors (i.e., it was a random event). In either case it doesn't seem like it was an act of yours that determined the content of your willing. The soft determinist claims that although my willing is determined, that I couldn't have ever willed otherwise than what I in fact willed, it's still the case that my actions are casued by my willing, and this is the only type of free will that is possible.
It may be that every choice I make has a prior cause. But the question is whether or not those prior causes lead necessarily to the choice I subsequently make, or is it possible that they could have turned out otherwise? You could say that A precedes B in a causal chain. Fair enough. But does A necessarily lead to B, or is it possible that A could lead to C ...[text shortened]... they were *necessary* causal relationships in order to say that my choices were predetermined.
09 Feb 03
Originally posted by redlentilsOwen Flannagan is a soft determinist, or compatibilist, as described in the post above.
interesting thread 🙂 a recent review of an owen flannagan book entitled "problem with the soul" discussed this very issue of free will. It noted that it is of course an ancient and intractable philosophical conundrum; Flanagan's book does not so much solve it as claim that it is usually badly posed. We should "stop talking about free will and determ ...[text shortened]... rational deliberation and choice in a causal universe. This view has a strong buddhist flavour.
09 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrI was using "A" to equal all the contributing factors leading up to a given choice. You are assuming, I think, that if you had access to A (a knowledge of all the contributing factors) you would be able to infallibly predict B (the choice I will subsequently make). I think this is a false assumption. I claim that you could have access to A and still be unable to infallibly predict that B will be my choice. Your knowledge of A may only be able to lead you to the conclusion that my choice will be restricted to the range of B-E. If my choice turned out to be C, that choice was still caused by A. A lead to C, but it could also have lead to B, D, or E. It has been predetermined that I will choose from the range B-E, but I think free will still exists within that predetermined range. Or is that what you are choosing to define as a random event?
You're right, in a sense. My lighter can cause the conflaguration of this cigarette before me, that is, it is sufficient to bring about the lighting of my cigarette, but only if certain other factors are in place. Obviously, my lighter isn't sufficient to light my cigarette if I do not put the flame to the cigarette. But I think this really misses the poin ...[text shortened]... at my actions are casued by my willing, and this is the only type of free will that is possible.
09 Feb 03
Originally posted by rwingettIf you mean by 'A' ALL the causal factors contributing to bringing about a willing on your part, then what allows for this range of variation you claim still exists? If the state of the world prior to your willing is such that an accounting of all the causal factors impinging upon you is sufficient to bring about your willing, then your willing cannot fail to be brought about, this is just what is means for a state of affairs to be sufficent to bring about another state of affairs. If you calim that a complete account of all the causal forces prior to your willing is still insufficient to bring about your willing, then your willing is random. And if your willing is random, it will not bear the right relation to your person to be considered a choice of YOURS or an instance of YOUR will. I'm not cashing out sufficient causation in terms of prediction, that is just a way of thinking about entailment. Of course it may be that even a complete description of the world at a time may not enable me to infallibly predict, I could just not have the complexity of thought or computational power necessary to make the required inferences. But this failure of prediction would be essentially a failure on my part, it would not imply that the state of the world at a later time was indeterminate, merely that it was indeterminable by me. So, again, the claim is that if you take a full account of all the causal factors working upon you at a time prior to your willing, then those causeal factors will either be sufficient to bring about that willing or they will not. If they are sufficient, then there was only one option available and you could not have willed otherwise. If they were not sufficient, then your willing was random (and hence beyond your control) and you could not have willed otherwise.
I was using "A" to equal all the contributing factors leading up to a given choice. You are assuming, I think, that if you had access to A (a knowledge of all the contributing factors) you would be able to infallibly predict B (the choice I will subsequently make). I think this is a false assumption. I claim that you could have access to A and still be un ...[text shortened]... within that predetermined range. Or is that what you are choosing to define as a random event?
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrWhat is the evidence to indicate that a random event is beyond my control? If a full account of all the factors working upon me was insufficient to bring about my willing, you could rightly claim that it was random. But I do not see why the possible random choices left open to me are beyond my control.
If you mean by 'A' ALL the causal factors contributing to bringing about a willing on your part, then what allows for this range of variation you claim still exists? If the state of the world prior to your willing is such that an accounting of all the causal factors impinging upon you is sufficient to bring about your willing, then your willing cannot fail t ...[text shortened]... your willing was random (and hence beyond your control) and you could not have willed otherwise.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by rwingettI was under the impression this was a priori. We've been talking about random events as those that are uncaused, those events that occur even though they were not brought about by some causal factor. If a cuasal factor did bring them about, they would be caused, correct? So if you were to bring about a random event, you would be causing a random event, but this is a contradiction... again, random events are those that are uncaused. How can can you control an event other than by exerting some causal power? But if something comes about through the exertion of some causal power on your part, then whatever it is that was brought about was caused, hence not random.
What is the evidence to indicate that a random event is beyond my control? If a full account of all the factors working upon me was insufficient to bring about my willing, you could rightly claim that it was random. But I do not see why the possible random choices left open to me are beyond my control.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by richjohnsonWell, if there are no events sufficient to bring about your willings, then there is nothing about YOU sufficient to bring about your willings, so your willings are random and hence beyond your control. By exerting some control on your willings you are exerting upon them a causal power sufficent to bring them about.
I see no reason to conclude that there are.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrI guess I was trying to argue earlier that a random event could have a cause. You claim that a FULL account (not just what we know) of all the causal factors would be sufficient to predetermine our choices. I suggest that it may not be so. Perhaps no amount of information would be sufficient to determine our choices. The event would be random, but would still have a cause, whether we could predetermine it or not.
I was under the impression this was a priori. We've been talking about random events as those that are uncaused, those events that occur even though they were not brought about by some causal factor. If a cuasal factor did bring them about, they would be caused, correct? So if you were to bring about a random event, you would be causing a random event, but ...[text shortened]... l power on your part, then whatever it is that was brought about was caused, hence not random.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by rwingettInteresting. In an earlier post I drew a distinction, perhaps not as clearly as I should have, between something be determinate and determinable. An event is determinate, let's say, if the complete state of the world (all causal factors) at a time prior to that event makes it the case that that event could not fail to come about. An event is determinable, let's say, if it is determinate AND we have it theoretically within our power to accurately predict the coming about of that event. My claims are merely about the determinate nature of willings, not about the estent to which we have it within our power to predict them or their content. I doubt we'll ever have it within our power to infallibly predict the willings of others (and I wouldn't like it if we could). But all the argument against Free Will requires is that either our willings be determinate; that they are such that prior to them occurring the state of world is such that they must come about or that they are not determinate (e.g., random) and such beyond our influence through the exertion of some causal power. Is this any clearer?
I guess I was trying to argue earlier that a random event could have a cause. You claim that a FULL account (not just what we know) of all the causal factors would be sufficient to predetermine our choices. I suggest that it may not be so. Perhaps no amount of information would be sufficient to determine our choices. The event would be random, but would still have a cause, whether we could predetermine it or not.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrI shall have to brood on this for a while. It all seems to be coagulating into a semantic goo right now. I'll see if I can cobble together a more plausible refutation at some future point.
Interesting. In an earlier post I drew a distinction, perhaps not as clearly as I should have, between something be determinate and determinable. An event is determinate, let's say, if the complete state of the world (all causal factors) at a time prior to that event makes it the case that that event could not fail to come about. An event is determinable, ...[text shortened]... ) and such beyond our influence through the exertion of some causal power. Is this any clearer?
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarr
... But this is a mere epistemic limitation on our part ... if we knew all the forces acting on a coin ...
If we knew ALL the forces acting on a coin, then would we be human? Isn't it part of the human condition that we can't understand everything, that we can't have a complete and total grasp of the physical world, and that we make errors? The universe is a pretty big place, nay, dare I use the "I" word, an infinitely big place?
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bidge90Well I doubt we'd have to know all the facts about the universe to know all the cuasal factors relevant to determining which side a coin will land. Additionally, I wasn't making any claims about what we can do, merely that the traditional notion of probability we employ (when we attribute P =.5 to a result of tails on a particular flip, for instance) isn't something inherent to the event. Rather, this notion really gets at our inability to determine, in the vast majority of cases, enough of the relevant causal factors operating on a coin-flip. We say it's fifty-fifty because of our ignorance, to put not too fine a point on it. This notion of probability I was distinguishing from the type used in Q.M., which seems metaphysically more robust. Probability in that sense is something irreducible, inherent to phsycial processes. As to whether vast increases in our knoweldge or capcity for knowledge would turn us into something non-human, I'm not sure. Perhaps there are essential elements of our humanity that require particular illusions to be maintained.