10 Feb 03
Has anyone mentioned quantum mechanics yet? Surely this area of physics turns its back on determinism: not only is an electron's spin UNKNOWN until you measure it, it is said to be (in an absolute sense) INDETERMINATE.
Things don't have to be totally determined or totally random. You can do arithmetic with what I'll call "fuzzy numbers" (don't know what they're actually called) f(x,y), where x is a definite quantity, and y is something completely random between -1 and 1 (say it's the sine of a randomly chosen real number). Eg 5 + y is a fuzzy number. You don't know what it is, but you can be certain that it's at least 4, and at most 6. Another is e^y, which you know is between 1/2 and 2.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrInteresting thread. Interesting enough to "lay" my first post here, but not to read all the answers 😛
1. Your actions are events.
2. Every event is either caused or uncaused.
3. If an event is uncaused, it is random.
4. Thus, your actions are either caused or random.
5. If your actions are caused, then your will is not free.
6. If your actions are random, then your will is not free.
7. Thus, your will is not free.
So, what do you think?
1. Your actions are events. true
2. Every event is either caused or uncaused. still true
3. If an event is uncaused, it is random. OK
4. Thus, your actions are either caused or random. aha! a mistake! all actions may be events, but that doesn't mean that all events are actions!. if that would have been the case, then action <==> event, and 1. would not have been necessary. so you can't say that actions can be random. that's my opinion.
10 Feb 03
Perhaps free will vs. determinism is a false dichotomy. It may be argued that determinism does not preclude free will, but rather that free will *requires* a deterministic universe. Our actions will be the cause of future events for which we be accountable. But what does it mean when we say that our actions are determined by all the causal factors preceding them? A good part of those causal factors are inherant within us. Those factors are part of what makes up who we are. In this sense it may be said that this is a manifestation of our "free will".
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarri like the soft determinist position. lets look at it in more detail. The following is a good account that i have found-
Owen Flannagan is a soft determinist
The soft-determinist attempts make determinism and moral responsibility compatible. the argument goes-
1. Determinism is compatible with a specific meaning of freedom.
· Determinism is true. Everything is determined by antecedent causal events. What occurs now is determined by past events.
· Moral responsibility is a usable social concept. It has social worth as a principle of regulating behavior.
· Words can have meaning and refer to something in the world or to a fictional item. For example the word 'unicorn' has meaning, but does not refer to an existing thing, whereas 'apple' does. The word 'freedom' has meaning, but doesn't refer to an indeterminate mysterious power called free-will. Rather, 'freedom' or 'free-will' has meaning through reference to a type of deliberation that goes on in the agent who does the action. Again, there is no thing or power called free-will; 'free-will' does not refer to any power which is other than or separate from the determinate powers of the universe.
· When someone says he has made a free-will choice, he means that his choice is determined, but refers to a process that we would want to say is a free. A choice which is free meets the following conditions:
a, the agent knows that he is doing the choosing;
b, he has deliberated over the options of choice;
c, he was not coerced internally or externally by causes which would force him to choose one option over others; and
d, he made the choice given his criteria of making a choice --his criteria led him to choose this particular option over the others.
· Thus, by a "free-choice" is meant that the above processes occurred. The choice was determined by antecedent factors, the criteria used by the agent to pick the option were determined but, so what? The fact that the agent made his choice through his deliberations is precisely what is meant by "free-choice." That being the case, the agent can be open to moral critique.
· Consider the following example. I decide to make a spelling mistake in this sentince. I made the mistake under the following conditions. I knew what I was doing. I was not coerced by anyone to make the error, nor was I compelled by some psychological disease to pick out "sentence" and intentionally misspell it. I typed the error having deliberated over whether to do it or not. I decided that such an example would be a good one. Given the preceding list, this process is precisely what we mean when we say someone did something of his own free-will. We refer to the events involved in the decision and action, all of which were strictly determined.
2. Even though determinism is true, there is moral responsibility.
What the soft-determinist says is that we should not worry so much about whether or not some sort of magical indeterminate power of free-will exists, but whether the term 'free-will' has a useful meaning. And, says the soft-determinist, it does. What it means is everything that we ordinarily mean when we refer to the process of choosing among options. A person is said to have made a free-choice and is morally responsible for his action when he has complied with all the conditions of free-choice. He has deliberated over the options. He is not coerced internally or externally; no one or thing forces him to choose one option over another. And, he makes the choice given the criteria that are his own. When all those conditions in making a choice are met, that's what we mean by and refer to in making a free-choice. Of course, the outcome of choice is determined by the criteria used by the agent, but those criteria belong to the agent. What else can we mean by making a free-choice except that we were not forced to choose one option and that we deliberated over the options using our own criteria? That being the case, we can hold people morally responsible for their actions. So, determinism and moral responsibility are compatible given this meaning of freedom. Soft-determinists, needless to say, are often called "compatibalists."
So, to review. Determinism is true. All events are determined. Moral responsibility is a meaningful and useful concept; it is true. But, there is no such thing as free-will in the sense that something different could have happened than it did. Our choices are our own, but they are determined by the way we are "set-up." Yet, that's OK, for that's what we mean by making a free-choice.
Right. now i'd better decide on a strategy in our French defence game, bennet🙂
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by sanshineWell here's the proof:
Interesting thread. Interesting enough to "lay" my first post here, but not to read all the answers 😛
1. Your actions are events. [b]true
2. Every event is either caused or uncaused. still true
3. If an event is uncaused, it is random. OK
4. Thus, your actions are either caused or random. aha! a mistake! all actions m ...[text shortened]... d not have been necessary. so you can't say that actions can be random. that's my opinion.[/b]
{p} 1. (x) (Ax ---> Ex)
{p} 2. (x) (Ex ---> (Cx v Ux))
{p} 3. (x) (Ux ---> Rx)
4. Aa ---> Ea Universal Specification from
5. Ea ---> (Ca v Ua) Universal Specification from 2
6. Ua ---> Ra Universal Specification from 3
7. Aa ---> (Ca v Ua) from 4 and 5
{P} 8. Aa
9. Ca v Ua From 7 and 8
{p} 10. Ca
11. Ca v Ra Tautology from 10
{p} 12. Ua
13. Ra From 6 and 12
14. Ca v Ra Tautology from 13
15. Ca v Ra Disjunction Elimination from 11 and 14
16. Aa ---> (Ca v Ra) Conditionalization from 8 and 15
So aha I'm right.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrHey, that's no fair! I don't have the slightest idea what it is you've just demonstrated here. You have to make your arguments so that stupid people can understand them too. 😳
Well here's the proof:
{p} 1. (x) (Ax ---> Ex)
{p} 2. (x) (Ex ---> (Cx v Ux))
{p} 3. (x) (Ux ---> Rx)
4. Aa ---> Ea Universal Specification from
5. Ea ---> (Ca v Ua) Universal Specification from 2
6. Ua ---> Ra Universal Specification from 3
7. Aa ---> (Ca v Ua) from 4 and 5
{P} 8. Aa
9. Ca v Ua From 7 and 8
...[text shortened]... and 14
16. Aa ---> (Ca v Ra) Conditionalization from 8 and 15
So aha I'm right.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by rwingettWell here's the proof with translation into english:
Hey, that's no fair! I don't have the slightest idea what it is you've just demonstrated here. You have to make your arguments so that stupid people can understand them too. 😳
{p} 1. (x) (Ax ---> Ex) [If something is an action then it is an event]
{p} 2. (x) (Ex ---> (Cx v Ux)) [if something is an event, then it is either caused or uncaused]
{p} 3. (x) (Ux ---> Rx) [If something is uncaused, then it is random]
4. Aa ---> Ea Universal Specification from 1 [so any particular action of yours (say action a) is an event]
5. Ea ---> (Ca v Ua) Universal Specification from 2 [so if your action is an event, then it is either caused or uncaused]
6. Ua ---> Ra Universal Specification from 3 [if your action is uncaused then it is random]
7. Aa ---> (Ca v Ua) from 4 and 5 [so any particular action of yours is either caused or uncaused]
{P} 8. Aa [suppose a is an action of yours]
9. Ca v Ua From 7 and 8 [a is either caused or uncaused]
{p} 10. Ca [suppose a is caused]
11. Ca v Ra Tautology from 10 [then a is either caused or random]
{p} 12. Ua [suppose a is uncaused]
13. Ra From 6 and 12 [then a is random]
14. Ca v Ra Tautology from 13 [so a is, again, either caused or random]
15. Ca v Ra Disjunction Elimination from 11 and 14 [so regardless of whether a is actually caused or uncaused, it is still either caused or random]
16. Aa ---> (Ca v Ra) Conditionalization from 8 and 15 [so if a is an action, it is either caused or random]
So aha I'm right.
😀😀😀
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by AcolyteDo you think that the indeterminacy of the quantum realm can be exploited to make a case for free will? If you go back and read the posts where I brought up this point about Q.M., you'll see I tried to make it clear that it could't help.
Has anyone mentioned quantum mechanics yet? Surely this area of physics turns its back on determinism: not only is an electron's spin UNKNOWN until you measure it, it is said to be (in an absolute sense) INDETERMINATE.
Things don't have to be totally determined or totally random. You can do arithmetic with what I'll call "fuzzy numbers" (don't kno ...[text shortened]... tain that it's at least 4, and at most 6. Another is e^y, which you know is between 1/2 and 2.
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrI still do not agree that this argument rules out free will. It has not addressed the possibility that one of the causes of your willing is internal to you and not merely the result of your genes, past experiences and what you had for lunch.
So we are left with two options. Either your actions result from an chain of causes regressing backwards in time (causes precede their effects, after all), or your actions are random. In either case it seems like free will is ruled out. If your actions result from a chain of causes regressing backwards in time, then it seems like your actions were determine ...[text shortened]... dom, then it seems they are independent of any willing on your part.
So, what do you think?
10 Feb 03
1 edit
Originally posted by richjohnsonI thought I'd already gone over that. Suppose there is some action on your part that is cuased by your willing it to happen. Now the determinist will ask: Is your willing caused or uncaused? You want to say that the willing is caused by something inside you. Fine, let's say that this thing (call it the x-factor) inside you causes your willing. Now, Is the x-factor itself caused, or is it random. If it's caused, say, by something further inside you (a y-factor, for instance) then was the y-factor caused or random? Since causes precede their effects, if you answer that your willing was caused by the x-factor, which in turn was caused by the y-factor..., eventually you will reach an event in the causal chain such that not only is that event sufficient to bring about your willing, but also occurred prior to your birth. Since you have no control over things that happened prior to your birth, you have no control over that which was sufficient to bring about your willing. So you have no control over your willing. Just because some of the links in the causal chain are inside you, that doesn't make your will free (unless you mean by free will what the soft-determinist means).
I still do not agree that this argument rules out free will. It has not addressed the possibility that one of the causes of your willing is internal to you and not merely the result of your genes, past experiences and what you had for lunch.
10 Feb 03
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrWhat do YOU mean by 'free will'? If you are defining it as something which is neither caused nor random, then your assumptions lead directly to the conclusion that there is not free will, since you have assumed that everything is either caused or random.
I thought I'd already gone over that. Suppose there is some action on your part that is cuased by your willing it to happen. Now the determinist will ask: Is your willing caused or uncaused? You want to say that the willing is caused by ...[text shortened]... ee (unless you mean by free will what the soft-determinist means).
10 Feb 03
Originally posted by redlentilsHere's an intuitive illusrtation of what I take to be the notion of free will that people take themselves to have:
a good question for you bennet 😉
Suppose there are two worlds, A and B. Suppose that A and B have identical histories; they are physically identical and are governed by the same laws. Suppose that I am in world A. Now I'll have a doppleganger in world B, physically and mentally identical to me, to the smallest detail. Suppose that in our respective worlds, I and my doppleganger walk down identical hallways and find ourselves in front of identical doors. Suppose that I decide to open the door. Is it possible that my doppleganger decides NOT to open the door?
My intuition is that most people think that if we have free will, then it will be possible for my doppleganger to decide not to open the door. People understand the notion of free will as that in virtue of which it is possible for us to have done otherwise than that which we in fact do.
But I don't see how it could be, given the setup in the example, that my decision and that of my doppleganger could diverge. If both our decisions are the result of our willing, and our willing is the result of our deliberations, and the course of our deliberations is caused by various factors, then how could our decisions end up different? Presumably they could end up different if there was some element of randomness in the world. But if something is random it is beyond our control, and thus doesn't seem to bear the right relation to our will; a relation that would be necessary for our decisions to somehow be OURS or come FROM US.
So it is this radical freedom that I find mysterious, and is the target of my argument. I find myself driven (against my will 🙂) to the compatibilist position.
11 Feb 03
Originally posted by bbarrSo are you saying that all parallel universes would be identical?
...My intuition is that most people think that if we have free will, then it will be possible for my doppleganger to decide not to open the door. People understand the notion of free will as that in virtue of which it is possible for us to have done otherwise than that which we in fact do...
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