"atheism is a belief"

Originally posted by vistesd
First, as you already know, I reject the concept of “supernature”. But I have always agreed with twhitehead that, if the supernatural did intervene in the natural order, it would appear manifest as events-in-nature—and no matter how weird they seemed we would have no real warrant to, even provisionally, assume the supernatural, rather than some natural acti ...[text shortened]... upernatural" and "phenomena" can be coherently conjoined--but I need to think on that some more.

Originally posted by vistesd
First, as you already know, I reject the concept of “supernature”. But I have always agreed with twhitehead that, if the supernatural did intervene in the natural order, it would appear manifest as events-in-nature—and no matter how weird they seemed we would have no real warrant to, even provisionally, assume the supernatural, rather than some natural acti ...[text shortened]... upernatural" and "phenomena" can be coherently conjoined--but I need to think on that some more.

There is a trend in science and law to define the word "supernatural" as "the untestable," which is perhaps understandable for its practicality, but deeply flawed as both philosophy and social policy. Flawed as philosophy, because testability is not even a metaphysical distinction, but an epistemological one, and yet in the real world everyone uses the word “supernatural” to make metaphysical distinctions. And flawed as social policy, because the more that judges and scientists separate themselves from the people with deviant language, the less support they will find from that quarter, and the legal and scientific communities as we know them will crumble if they lose the support of the people. Science and the courts must serve man. And to do that, they must at least try to speak his language. And yet already a rising tide of hostility against both science and the courts is evident. Making it worse is not the solution.

As I argue in Sense and Goodness without God (pp. 29-35), philosophy is wasting its time if its definitions of words do not track what people really mean when they use them. And when we look at the real world, we find the supernatural is universally meant and understood to mean something metaphysically different from the natural. I could adduce many examples of the bad fit between real language and this ill-advised attempt at an "official" definition, but here are just two:

The underlying mechanics of quantum phenomena might be physically beyond all observation and therefore untestable, but no one would then conclude that quantum mechanics is supernatural. Just because I can't look inside a box does not make its contents supernatural.

Conversely, if I suddenly acquired the Force of the Jedi and could predict the future, control minds, move objects and defy the laws of physics, all merely by an act of will, ordinary people everywhere would call this a supernatural power, yet it would be entirely testable. Scientists could record and measure the nature and extent of my powers and confirm them well within the requirements of peer review.

Consequently, we need a proper definition of "supernatural" (and, therefore, of the word "natural" as well), one that tracks what people really mean when they use the word, one that marks a metaphysical distinction, and allows us to say when the word is being used sloppily or improperly, as must be the case for any word we intend to be useful. This is all the more crucial for metaphysical naturalists, who must define their worldview in some manner that actually makes it meaningfully different from supernaturalist worldviews. Critics of naturalism are entirely correct about this.

I define "nature" in Sense and Goodness without God (on pp. 211-12, with a little help from pp. 67-69). But I explain this in elaborate detail, with considerable supporting evidence, in my Secular Web article Defending Naturalism as a Worldview (2003), to which I referred readers in my book. After this, and the publication of Sense and Goodness, I defined the natural-supernatural distinction even more rigorously in the joint statement of the Carrier-Wanchick Debate (2006). Anyone who wishes to interact with my definitions of natural and supernatural must read these two articles.

In short, I argue "naturalism" means, in the simplest terms, that every mental thing is entirely caused by fundamentally nonmental things, and is entirely dependent on nonmental things for its existence. Therefore, "supernaturalism" means that at least some mental things cannot be reduced to nonmental things. As I summarized in the Carrier-Wanchick debate (and please pardon the dry, technical wording):

If [naturalism] is true, then all minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely caused by natural [i.e. fundamentally nonmental] phenomena. But if naturalism is false, then some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature. In other words, such things would then be partly or wholly caused by themselves, or exist or operate directly or fundamentally on their own.

Despite all I have written on this, several people have had difficulties understanding how to apply my construction of these terms, so I thought I'd have some extended fun. Analogies and concrete examples always do a better job getting across to people what we're talking about, so that's what I'm going to do today. With a bit of fantasy, I'll show how my natural-supernatural distinction can be used to tell the difference between a natural and a supernatural explanation (a metaphysical question), and how we can know when one or the other actually is true (an epistemological question). I take a look at supernatural beings, substances, powers, properties, and effects, and we'll get to see what natural explanations of similar observations would look like, and how they would be different. ...............

Originally posted by googlefudge
Yes, and I disagree with twhitehead on this point. The best definition I have come across for the supernatural is here:

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/defining-supernatural.html

The argument pretty much exactly nails my problem with the "defining the supernatural out of existence" argument.
And then presents a [to my mind] working so ...[text shortened]... te]

Emphasis mine.

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/defining-supernatural.html

This from Carrier’s conclusion in the Carrier-Wanchick debate:

The best methods known for ascertaining the facts have only discovered results corresponding to naturalism.

I agree. My point is that I see nowhere that he addressed the question (that tw and I raise) about how it could be otherwise. He argues for empiricism (no problem) and superior methods of discovering evidence (no problem)—but he offers no empirical test that could be performed on the supernatural divorced from any (claimed) effect in the natural realm.

His argument is essentially no more than this: all we see (with our best methods) is nature, so nature is all there is. I agree with his conclusion, but that’s a flawed argument (black swans).

My argument is that, no matter how often and rigorously one has failed to disprove the naturalistic hypothesis, Carrier has to be left with some (small) probability that the (metaphysical) supernaturalist hypothesis is nevertheless correct. And that in itself always justifies further inquiry, on scientific principles. I take the view that—even if a coherent definition of the supernatural is provided (and Carrier may have done that; I’m still mulling it)—there is no epistemic warrant for believing in the supernatural, even if it is empirically nontestable (which I still maintain, and for which Carrier has given, so far as I have seen, no real counter-argument); if nothing else, Ockham’s Razor would apply (though I think I am arguing a somewhat stronger position). [Testing the natural and not finding the supernatural strikes me both as unsurprising, and of far less weight than Carrier seems to give it.]

Carrier’s dismissal of attempts at a naturalized theism (in the other article)—as trivial or meaningless—is just shallow and deflective rhetoric. He may actually provide an argument in his books; he does not do so here. To do so, he would have to at least address the naturalized theism of the Stoics—who thought of themselves as nothing if not rigorously logical, and it would be the rare philosopher, I think, who would characterize their views as trivial or meaningless, even if one disagreed. I'm not sure that a naturalized theism is any more directly testable than supernaturalism--though I'm not sure, which means I'm not sure. 😉 But I don't think it's defeatable on rational grounds--which means the black swan is always there.

Carrier thinks he slew the dragon of supernaturalism; I think he killed a windmill—but I thought it was a windmill to begin with.

Originally posted by vistesd
This from Carrier’s conclusion in the Carrier-Wanchick debate:

[b]The best methods known for ascertaining the facts have only discovered results corresponding to naturalism.

I agree. My point is that I see nowhere that he addressed the question (that tw and I raise) about how it could be otherwise. He argues for empiricism (no problem) and superi ...[text shortened]... of supernaturalism; I think he killed a windmill—but I thought it was a windmill to begin with.[/b]

even if a coherent definition of the supernatural is provided (and Carrier may have done that; I’m still mulling it)

but he offers no empirical test that could be performed on the supernatural divorced from any (claimed) effect
in the natural realm.

Reveal Hidden Content

I think he killed a windmill—but I thought it was a windmill to begin with.

Carrier’s dismissal of attempts at a naturalized theism

But I don't think it's defeatable on rational grounds--which means the black swan is always there.

Originally posted by googlefudge
[i][/internet communication caveat....] My tone and thoughts while writing this were light hearted, however on reading this I
realise it doesn't really scan that way. I am happy with all the points, and don't feel like trying to re-write at 1:40 am and
peppering the post with smiley's doesn't seem suitable... So therefore this disclaimer... Also anyo ...[text shortened]... ays, the bible, along with all other religious texts, belong firmly in the fictional section. 😉

OR—

You’ve convinced me that:

1. The supernatural is a rational possibility;

2. The probability of the supernatural is small;

—Though I still maintain that you never are able to test the putative supernatural phenomena to see if there are underlying, more basic phenomena—but, in fact, the actual process must be the other way around. In fact, there are no supernatural phenomena to test (or so I so recently thought . . . .).

3. There will always be a non-negative probability that the supernatural is real;

4. One cannot validly foreclose the possibility of further evidence (artificially truncate the iterations with a refusal to revisit them), even if further inquiry now does not seem warranted;

5. Therefore there is always at least a small, and open, possibility that the supernatural is real.

That is not enough for epistemic belief (in my opinion). It is, however, sufficient warrant for hope, and to buttress pragmatic reasons for the kind of openness to possibility that I call “faith” (I am thinking, for example, of people I have known 12-step programs who “believed” because it kept them—sober or whatever—for years, even decades; and who didn’t need to think it through further than that; and I would not challenge them on the problems of pragmatic “belief” ).

So, I think I can let go of the natural/supernatural issue altogether. I don’t need to “believe” in Beethoven—or take account of those who think that religion must be more than "Beethoven" (a metaphor) (e.g., that it must entail a chain of historical/doctrinal truth claims and moral commands), or of those who think that “Beethoven” either cannot be, or ought not to be, as much of an enrichment to my daily life as it is.

Originally posted by googlefudge

Aren't you ever even the slightest bit curious about supernatural phenomena [including the existence of God]
which science is neither capable of proving nor disproving with any reasonable certainty?

There are no supernatural phenomena.
Science can and has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that there are no supernatural phenomena.
And ...[text shortened]... ically fantastic. However, unlike you, I can tell the difference between the imaginary and the real.

Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
The salient question still remains: What if you're wrong?