Calling out Pritybetta

Originally posted by Conrau K
This is more the counterexample of which I was thinking. A person can know P yet, irrationally, deny P. He might know, or believe, that some act is wrong yet repress this information and deny it -- although I am not sure whether that is happening in your example.

I'm not interested in cases where the homosexual knows that homosexuality is a sin (because I don't believe any such cases exist).

Rather, I'm interested in cases where the homosexual does not know and does not believe that homosexuality is a sin. Under your criterion, in these cases it isn't in fact a sin.

Originally posted by Conrau K
A person can know P yet, irrationally, deny P.

Such a person exhibits a grave cognitive deficiency. Does you think this generally characterizes homosexuals?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Of course.

If you take knowledge be justified belief in a true proposition, then in order to know that P, it is necessary to believe that P. But to deny P is to believe that not-P. Hence, denying P entails not knowing P.

However, the converse does not hold. That is, not knowing P does not entail a denial of P. One way this could happen is ...[text shortened]... ing are not equivalent, despite being able to infer from a denial of P that one does not know P.

That is, not knowing P does not entail a denial of P. One way this could happen is if a person holds an unjustified belief in P and asserts P. Another way is if a person holds a justified belief in P and asserts P, but P is false.

Another option is that a person could not know P and, therefore, commit himself to neither P nor not-P. Instead, he could suspend his judgement and commit himself to the belief, either P or not-P, until some evidence emerges that convinces him to assert one and deny the other.

In regards to sin (and I acknowledge that I am relying on a Catholic criteria, which may not meet other definitions exactly), a person must know that P is a sin in order to commit the sin of P. A person who is unsure of P will not have committed the sin of P (although it could be argued that, in acknowledging that P is possibly a sin, they have committed another sin of negligence by not before-researching whether it is a sin); a person may believe P is not a sin and thus not commit a sin (although they may have committed the sin of not properly forming their conscience.) Nonetheless, neither will have committed the sin of P.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I'm not interested in cases where the homosexual knows that homosexuality is a sin (because I don't believe any such cases exist).

Rather, I'm interested in cases where the homosexual does not know and does not believe that homosexuality is a sin. Under your criterion, in these cases it isn't in fact a sin.

Rather, I'm interested in cases where the homosexual does not know and does not believe that homosexuality is a sin. Under your criterion, in these cases it isn't in fact a sin.

Of course.

Originally posted by Conrau K
This is more the counterexample of which I was thinking. A person can know P yet, irrationally, deny P. He might know, or believe, that some act is wrong yet repress this information and deny it -- although I am not sure whether that is happening in your example.

In the speed limit analogy, Person B does not believe that going over 55 is wrong and he isn't repressing any information, he is saying that the speed limit is wrong and hence him going over 55 MPH is morally justified. I would maintain that a homosexual is doing the same thing as regards what someone else believes is the "sin" of engaging in homosexual acts.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Such a person exhibits a grave cognitive deficiency. Does you think this generally characterizes homosexuals?

I think this applies to many people. A teenager overpowered by hormonal drives or peer-pressure may repress whatever moral inhibitions they have to make losing their virginity easier (perhaps this no longer applies nowadays).

Originally posted by Conrau K
I think this applies to many people. A teenager overpowered by hormonal drives or peer-pressure may repress whatever moral inhibitions they have to make losing their virginity easier (perhaps this no longer applies nowadays).

How is this an instance of simultaneously knowing and denying some proposition?

I am using the term denial in the cognitive sense -- the finding that some proposition is false. For example, a person telling a lie is not denying the truth of the matter at hand -- in fact they are cognitively asserting it. A person doing something they know to be morally wrong is not denying that it is morally wrong -- their actions do not constitute a denial of some proposition.

Originally posted by no1marauder
In the speed limit analogy, Person B does not believe that going over 55 is wrong and he isn't repressing any information, he is saying that the speed limit is wrong and hence him going over 55 MPH is morally justified. I would maintain that a homosexual is doing the same thing as regards what someone else believes is the "sin" of engaging in homosexual acts.

Ok. I was thinking more of a person who knows that exceeding 55 is against the road regulation, yet sees this as silly and represses all thoughts that exceeding 55 is set as a road regulation (perhaps unconsciously refusing to look at road signs or distracting himself by increasing the volume of his stereo). In such a case, he knows that exceeding 55 is wrong yet tries to eliminate this thought, for whatever motive.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
How is this an instance of simultaneously knowing and denying some proposition?

The teenager knows that P is wrong, yet tries to eliminate the knowledge that P is wrong so as to come to deny P; they succeed yet they retain residual doubt about P in their unconscious. When they lose their virginity, they may be convinced that their action was justified, but feel some revulsion or have momentary doubts. I do not think such behaviour is impossible or unlikely.

But I thought you were only interested in times when a person does not know that P is wrong?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Ok. I was thinking more of a person who knows that exceeding 55 is against the road regulation, yet sees this as silly and represses all thoughts that exceeding 55 is set as a road regulation (perhaps unconsciously refusing to look at road signs or distracting himself by increasing the volume of his stereo). In such a case, he knows that exceeding 55 is wrong yet tries to eliminate this thought, for whatever motive.

But once he's vanquished from his mind all reason to believe that the excess speed is wrong, he no longer knows that it is wrong, and is thus off the hook under your criterion.

Originally posted by Conrau K
The teenager knows that P is wrong, yet tries to eliminate the knowledge that P is wrong so as to come to deny P; they succeed yet they retain residual doubt about P in their unconscious.

But you're simply arguing in favor of what I am claiming, that is, that denial entails lack of knowledge, since you are saying that the knowledge must be eliminated in order for the denial to manifest. Thus, you are providing an example, not a counterexample.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
But once he's vanquished from his mind all reason to believe that the excess speed is wrong, he no longer knows that it is wrong, and is thus off the hook under your criterion.

I am referring to repression, not vanquishment. Shall we have another semantic dispute about the difference between the two?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Ok. I was thinking more of a person who knows that exceeding 55 is against the road regulation, yet sees this as silly and represses all thoughts that exceeding 55 is set as a road regulation (perhaps unconsciously refusing to look at road signs or distracting himself by increasing the volume of his stereo). In such a case, he knows that exceeding 55 is wrong yet tries to eliminate this thought, for whatever motive.

The person I am referring to "knows that exceeding 55 is against the road regulation" "sees this [i.e. the speed limit] as silly" but would have no reason to "repress all thoughts that exceeding 55 is set as a road regulation". I can't think of anyone who would do so but I can think of many, perhaps most people, who are aware of a law but choose not to obey it because they think the law is unjustified (drug laws come to mind). Why would they "repress" anything?

I imagine the vast majority of people who engage in homosexual acts are certainly aware that mainstream Christian believes such behavior is a sin. I doubt if they "repress" that knowledge they merely think that mainstream Christianity is wrong.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I am referring to repression, not vanquishment. Shall we have another semantic dispute about the difference between the two?

No, because it's a wild goose chase with you. You just make up your claims and terminology as you go along.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
But you're simply arguing in favor of what I am claiming, that is, that denial entails lack of knowledge, since you are saying that the knowledge must be eliminated in order for the denial to manifest. Thus, you are providing an example, not a counterexample.

Fair enough. I do think there is an important distinction, however, in how we evaluate the sinfulness of a person who simply denied that P was wrong and someone else who once knew P but through repressive thought-control allowed the denial to come about.