Free will does not exist!

Originally posted by bbarr
Huh? Compatibilism is a thesis (or, better, a label applied to a constellation of related theses) concerning the conditions under actions are free. Compatibilists think that it makes sense to say of some actions that they are free, and that sometimes people ought to be held morally accountable for their actions. What's the problem here? If you think that t ...[text shortened]... be free (for some mysterious reason), then of course you will disagree with the compatibilist.

Well, i think that free will must be libertarian. Of course, as discussed before, other factors will influence it. If there is a free will its options might range throughout the entire alphabet however the environment and its conditions might limit the choices to only A and B. Is this compatibilism?

But what makes this free will choose A or B?

I am arguing that this modicum of free will that we might have cannot be ruled by anything (even if its chioces are restricted) because then how could it be free?

Maybe in some cases we don't have free will and in some we?

However if that is so then this free will (when we have it) chooses randomly.

I also dont think you should worry about moral responsibility. Alot do without it anyway. It wouldn't be a bad thing if culpability was diminished. Also, people are not just motivated by insidious impulses. Alot of the rebuffs I hear from people is that it wouldn't be "stable" in society to have this theory. I disagree.

Originally posted by powershaker
Our consciousness cannot be the product of chemicals and their interactions. That has never been proven anywhere in science. And, also, I'd cite some sources where that's been proven before a strew my atheistic garbage all across the internet. Also, how the consciousness be the product if chemicals when a woman who dies and has no heart beat, ends up have a choice in our hearts and in our souls to choose the living God or eternal damnation.

Our consciousness cannot be the product of chemicals and their interactions. That has never been proven anywhere in science.

true, but there is compelling evidence to say the least.

Also, how the consciousness be the product if chemicals when a woman who dies and has no heart beat, ends up floating up above her on body, over the tops of the hospital and sees some tennis shoes on the roof. When she is brought back, she informs the doctor that she saw tennis shoes on the roof. They go and check. There are indeed tennis shoes on the roof. The doctor asks, "HOw did you know?" She said she saw them after she died.

How is this an examle of free will? The non-existence of free will is not irreconcilable with, err, "astral" phenomenon (if it exists). This womans experience might still be explained by science. Just as how the planets orbit the sun.

We are destined for greater things, and the soul is directed by the consciousness.
So now we are destined? Isn't destiny inconsistent with free will?
Our soul is directed by consciousness? Thats not free will.

We have a choice in our hearts and in our souls to choose the living God or eternal damnation.
So why do people "choose" eternal damnation?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Well, i think that free will must be libertarian. Of course, as discussed before, other factors will influence it. If there is a free will its options might range throughout the entire alphabet however the environment and its conditions might limit the choices to only A and B. Is this compatibilism?

But what makes this free will choose A or B?

I am ...[text shortened]... ear from people is that it wouldn't be "stable" in society to have this theory. I disagree.

I wouldn't want a will that wasn't ruled by anything, because then there would be nothing that determined the content of my willings. The outcomes of my deliberations would be random, in such a case. I would prefer a will that is ruled by my psychological states and my character. At least that way, my actions will follow from who I am, and not from no reason at all (which is the entailment of the libertarian view).

Originally posted by bbarr
I wouldn't want a will that wasn't ruled by anything, because then there would be nothing that determined the content of my willings. The outcomes of my deliberations would be random, in such a case. I would prefer a will that is ruled by my psychological states and my character. At least that way, my actions will follow from who I am, and not from no reason at all (which is the entailment of the libertarian view).

Good to have to back Bennett!

Can't one's will be informed by reasons without being ruled or determined by them (or anything else)? That would appear to be the essence of libertarian will. Isn't there more to the libertarian view, at least in terms of its ambitions, than that acts of will follow for no reason whatsoever?

Originally posted by Pawnokeyhole
Good to have to back Bennett!

Can't one's will be informed by reasons without being ruled or determined by them (or anything else)? That would appear to be the essence of libertarian will. Isn't there more to the libertarian view, at least in terms of its ambitions, than that acts of will follow for no reason whatsoever?

Hey Aiden, nice to talk to you again.

Suppose I am deliberating on whether to A or not A.

Suppose I can marshall in support of A some set of reasons R+.

Suppose I can marshall in support of not A some alternate set of reasons R-.

Minimally, for it to be rational for me to form the intention to A, it must be the case that I believe R+ to, on balance, outweigh R+. That is, all things considered, I must believe that the reasons in support of A-ing are more stronger or more compelling than the reasons against A-ing. Further, it is a necessary condition for the intention to A to be mine, to be properly connected to my agency, that it result from my belief. If my intention to A did not result from my belief that I ought to A (or, worse, if it arose despite my believing that I ought not A, as in cases of akrasia) then the intention to A is in a very deep sense foreign to me. Now, what are the causal origins of the belief that I ought to A? Either my appreciation of the respective merits of R+ and R- caused me to have this belief, or it did not. If so, then my appreciation of the relevant reasons determined my belief, which determined my intention and led to the resulant action. If not, then either 1) my appreciation of the reasons was causally irrelevant to my belief that I ought to A, or 2) my appreciation of the reasons was causally relevant, but insufficient, to bring about my belief that I ought to A. If 1, then the libertarian needs to give some account of how a belief can be sensitive to a reason without that reason thereby bearing some causal (or sustaining) relation to the belief. If 2, then either there were causal factors other than my appreciation of the reasons that were sufficient to bring about my belief that I ought to A, or there were no sufficient causal factors. If the former, then my belief was causally determined. If the latter, then the occurance of my belief was a random event, and hence beyond my control (in which case the formation of my intention will proceed from factors outside of my control, and thus fail to be free). Libertarianism is inconsistent with either of these options.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Well, i think that free will must be libertarian. Of course, as discussed before, other factors will influence it. If there is a free will its options might range throughout the entire alphabet however the environment and its conditions might limit the choices to only A and B. Is this compatibilism?

But what makes this free will choose A or B?

I am ear from people is that it wouldn't be "stable" in society to have this theory. I disagree.

In terms of social "stability", I guess that I am not sure what your prescription really is. If you hold the view that free will is nothing but illusion, then your system of justice will not be based on moral responsibilty for one's actions. Earlier in this thread, there was mention of a system of justice based not on the premise that one ought to be held morally responsible for his actions, but on a "prudential" judgement basis that employs methods of preventative rehabilitation. That is (using the example bbarr mentioned), if X commits act A, then even if the event was through no fault (or moral accountability) on the part of X, we may still conclude that it is in our best interests to subject X to rehabilitation in order to promote fewer future A occurrences. But my interpretation is that when we conclude that it is in our best interests to rehabilitate X, we are really saying that it is perceived to be the case that the probability that X, without recourse to this rehabilitation, will commit future A acts is sufficiently high, and further that it is expected that the rehabilitation process will lower this probability. It seems like such a system is merely a system of expectations, in which you base the application of rehabilitation on perceived probabilities of future occurrences. So, we discussed already X, but now suppose there is Y. Y has never committed an A act, but he grows up in an area that is known to produce a high rate of persons who commit A acts, and suppose that his character and environment indicate a high probability that he will commit future A acts. Then based on such a system of justice, if it is perceived that the probability that Y will commit future A acts is sufficiently high, and further that rehabilitation is expected to lower this probability, then are we not obligated to subject Y to rehabilitation even though he has never committed an A act? How is that not a violation against Y? I guess that I don't see how any justice system could be fair unless it works under the premise that one may be held accountable for one's actions.

I don't profess to have any idea what I am talking about here, but I just am interested in your thoughts. Thinking about methods that are currently already in place, the sentencing of the legally insane comes to mind. In that case, it is granted in the eyes of the law that the person is not morally accountable for their actions, but the person may still be subjected to mandatory rehabilitation based, presumably, on the perception that such rehabilitation is in the best interest of not only society, but also the individual himself. Parole hearings also may be pertinent since they, at least in part, seem to base their verdict on the perception of the probabilty of future "A" acts, ie., the question of has the prisoner undergone sufficient rehabilitation such that he is not an overly probable threat to society.

Concerning free will, I think the libertarian notion only leaves open the possibilty that my willings are random. That is not much of a "free will". On the other hand, compatibilism says that free will (and moral responsibility) and determinism are compatible. In particular, I do not agree with the common view that free will should be recognized as an ability "to do otherwise" under identical conditions. If you ask whether or not I could have done otherwise at the same precise time and under the same conditions and state of the world, then I think it is clear that the answer is no, unless my willing is random. But I think we can still ask the question of whether or not I am a "genuine" source of my actions. For that, we can ask whether or not I could have done otherwise if it were the case that leading up to that time I had alternative psychological dispositions and motivations. If so, then I think it is clear that I am a genuine source of my actions and ought to be held accountable for them. Further, it seems to me that some determination is necessary for free will and moral responsibility: the actions I commit need to be sufficiently caused by the features that make up my character, motivations, and beliefs; otherwise, more properly, these actions should not be referenced as mine.

Originally posted by Conrau K
This is what first prompted me to initiate this thread.

When completing maths problems I constantly made mistakes. Upon, introspection I observed that when trying to solve the problem, I relayed between my consciousness, my memory and other mental faculties. In brief, I was waiting for an idea to come to me. When, I tried to refine my problem solving sk ...[text shortened]... is slavery. Thus, freedom is slavery and freedom is only an illusion.

Sorry about the wait

I don't believe reasoning is 'freewill', if it were than no one would
ever do anything they knew was wrong or bad for them. This is
not the way it works, there is more to will than simply thinking things
through.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello
In terms of social "stability", I guess that I am not sure what your prescription really is. If you hold the view that free will is nothing but illusion, then your system of justice will not be based on moral responsibilty for one's actions. Earlier in this thread, there was mention of a system of justice based not on the premise that one ought to be he ...[text shortened]... liefs; otherwise, more properly, these actions should not be referenced as mine.

Well, I'll first errr, deal with the first part of your post.

So tell me why do we put people in jail?
Is it just for the victim's retribution?
For some people the answer would be yes, but there is only a very small minority who would not hope that the person (X) will not be rehabiilitated.

As for Y, soeciety in general is a Y person. We all have the potential to commit a crime. If we found a person with a higher probability then normal in committing a crime we already try to rehabilitate them. In my country its called state funded counselling.

In most contemporary legal systems if a person has demonstrated rehabilitation then they are afforded the status of probation and are freed.
Your, right this system is based on expectation and probabilities. I think your criticism is more directed at criminal correction services and not at free will.

Now, I dont believe there is a free will but has that made me strangle my children?
No (you'll have to assume I'm telling the truth).

James Watson who co-discovered the structure of DNA has similar sentiments. He believes that humans are also motivated by love and other benign emotions (even if it is only the prosaic result of a few genes). Society wouldn't collapse as the result of the loss of moral responsibility. We are stimulated by our love for our friends, family and society which prevents us acting against them. If moral responsibility is the only deterent to crime then it is unlikely that would be a very effective deterent.

All I am arguing is that criminals deserve some synpathy for their actions, anf that in no way entails encouragement.

Originally posted by bbarr
I wouldn't want a will that wasn't ruled by anything, because then there would be nothing that determined the content of my willings. The outcomes of my deliberations would be random, in such a case. I would prefer a will that is ruled by my psychological states and my character. At least that way, my actions will follow from who I am, and not from no reason at all (which is the entailment of the libertarian view).

Yes, but a will rules by psychological states and character is not free at all.

Originally posted by KellyJay
I don't believe reasoning is 'freewill', if it were than no one would
ever do anything they knew was wrong or bad for them. This is
not the way it works, there is more to will than simply thinking things
through.
Kelly

I love my family. It follows that if I love them I should care form them. This is a form of reasoning. And in this case my actions have been ruled by an emotion and reason. What if i didn't love them and hence didn't care for them? Is that my fault?

Originally posted by LemonJello

Concerning free will, I think the libertarian notion only leaves open the possibilty that my willings are random. That is not much of a "free will". On the other hand, compatibilism says that free will (and moral responsibility) and determinism are compatible. In particular, I do not agree with the common view that free will should be recognized as a ...[text shortened]... ns, and beliefs; otherwise, more properly, these actions should not be referenced as mine.

In particular, I do not agree with the common view that free will should be recognized as an ability "to do otherwise" under identical conditions. If you ask whether or not I could have done otherwise at the same precise time and under the same conditions and state of the world, then I think it is clear that the answer is no, unless my willing is random.

Actually in accordance with quantum mechanics under an identical conditions
different actions could ensue.

But I think we can still ask the question of whether or not I am a "genuine" source of my actions. For that, we can ask whether or not I could have done otherwise if it were the case that leading up to that time I had alternative psychological dispositions and motivations.

But where did your psychological dispositions and motivations come from?

If so, then I think it is clear that I am a genuine source of my actions and ought to be held accountable for them.

I am not accountable for psychological disposition and motivation. Is it my fault I am angry or otherwise? I do not control my reasoning or emotions.

Further, it seems to me that some determination is necessary for free will and moral responsibility: the actions I commit need to be sufficiently caused by the features that make up my character, motivations, and beliefs; otherwise, more properly, these actions should not be referenced as mine.

As far as i can see, if there is not libertarian free will, this free will must be controlled (determined) and is hence, not free. If there is a free will, this presupposes a "soul" if there is not a free will this means there is no soul. I can't comprehend an in-between or compatibilist proposition. A kind of soul halfway between the physical world and another

Originally posted by Conrau K
Yes, but a will rules by psychological states and character is not free at all.

That's question begging, in this context.

Originally posted by bbarr
That's question begging, in this context.

Ok, so a will ruled by a psychological state and character is free?

Am I missing something?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Ok, so a will ruled by a psychological state and character is free?

Am I missing something?

Well, that's what compatibilists like me contend. Why should freedom require the possibility of having done otherwise than that which in fact one did? Why not construe freedom as the capacity to act without external interference, upon the results of one's deliberations, where one's deliberations are informed by one's character? Such an account will accord with many of our intuitions about when actions are free, and yet be free from the incoherence that infects libertarian accounts of free will.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, that's what compatibilists like me contend. Why should freedom require the possibility of having done otherwise than that which in fact one did? Why not construe freedom as the capacity to act without external interference, upon the results of one's deliberations, where one's deliberations are informed by one's character? Such an account will accord w ...[text shortened]... e free, and yet be free from the incoherence that infects libertarian accounts of free will.

Why not construe freedom as the capacity to act without external interference, upon the results of one's deliberations, where one's deliberations are informed by one's character?

Because that is not free will. Theoretically I could predict your every action. This does not constitute free will. By implication you have no capacity to choose (although the "choice" will originate from you) since your action is determined (i.e. as you put it by your character and deliberation) which means you cannot have free will.