Originally posted by bbarrThanks for the info.
[b]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/[/b]
It seems to me that there are more then one definition of free will.
The one I have been execrating is that free will is the ability to choose and hence be accountable for ones actions. This entails that a person in the exact same circumstances can choose a different action. This is incompatible with determinism and causality.
Another definition was that free will is the ability choose in accordance with ones will, unemcumbered. This appears to me more acceptable.
However, neither presuppose a moral responsibility.
Originally posted by Conrau KNo problem! There is a problem with moral accountability and compatibilism. If the claim "you ought to have done otherwise" entails the claim "you could have done otherwise" (the so-called "ought implies can" principle), then either compatibilism or moral accountability is in prima facie trouble.
Thanks for the info.
It seems to me that there are more then one definition of free will.
The one I have been execrating is that free will is the ability to choose and hence be accountable for ones actions. This entails that a person in the exact same circumstances can choose a different action. This is incompatible with determinism and causality.
...[text shortened]... red. This appears to me more acceptable.
However, neither presuppose a moral responsibility.
Originally posted by bbarrElectrons are subject chaotic behaviour. Several simple parameters describing an initial state can lead very quickly to extremely complex behaviour.
In order for one's will to be free, one must have a will (ie., the capacity to form intentions on the basis of reasons). Electrons can't do that, so they don't have a will, so they can't have a will that is free.
Turbulence as a result of the flow of water or air around a uniform geometric shape is a good example.
Quantum effects on top of this make it imposible to even know more than probablisticly, a description of postion and momentum of even a single electron.
In the human mind billions of electrons are in motion, within molecules within synapses, within a complex array of interacting electronic fields.
All of these factors more than simply the fiberous conections of the mind have effected the evolutionary route to conciousness in the development of the mind.
No one person alive can say anything objectively meaningful regarding the sensation of conciousness, or the link between matter and mind.
We are hundreds of years away from understanding or even attempting to see a link between matter and mind.
Originally posted by Conrau KYour insistence on your unknown randomness of choice is once again,
So your choice is determined by your truth and honesty. That doesn't seem like free will.
a desire to be dead to the world, to be completely oblivious to all that
touches you. Being familiar or knowing someone isn’t necessary a bad
thing, my honesty allows you to predict my action, your ability to
predict my actions also allow us to live in harmony in trust. Without
that knowledge we could also consider one another a threat.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJayIt depends on your definition of free will. Mine is that fee will is the ability to choose. Which requires that I can choose otherwise. However, if my "choice" is determined by my honesty then I couldn't have acted otherwise (because I would have had to act dishonestly, which I can't) and hence could not have free will.
Your insistence on your unknown randomness of choice is once again,
a desire to be dead to the world, to be completely oblivious to all that
touches you. Being familiar or knowing someone isn’t necessary a bad
thing, my honesty allows you to predict my action, your ability to
predict my actions also allow us to live in harmony in trust. Without
that knowledge we could also consider one another a threat.
Kelly
Originally posted by bbarrIf the claim "you ought to have done otherwise" entails the claim "you could have done otherwise" (the so-called "ought implies can" principle),
If the claim "you ought to have done otherwise" entails the claim "you could have done otherwise" (the so-called "ought implies can" principle),
Can it not entail this?
Originally posted by Conrau KThat's a very good question. We do often hold people responsible for their emotional states ("you shouldn't have reacted so violently" ) and their character traits ("you ought to be more generous" ), even though these are things typically beyond one's immediate control. If we take these 'ought-claims' to express injunctions like "don't react violently" or "be more generous", then they don't violate the 'ought implies can' principle, because injunctions aren't propositions (they are commands) and hence don't have truth conditions, and hence can't entail anything at all (so, no conflict with the principle). Alternatively, if we take these 'ought' claims to express general propositions like "it would have been better had you not reacted violently", or "it would be better if you were more generous", then, again, no conflict with the principle (though some content will have to be given to the term 'better', and it can't mean 'in accord with moral obligations', lest we go 'round in a circle). If, however, we take these 'ought' claims to express propositions about what one should have done (or how one ought to be) in the circumstances, then it is difficult to see how to reconcile them with compatibilist versions of free will. Of course, we could just jettison the 'ought implies can' priniciple, and here's an argument to that effect:
[b]If the claim "you ought to have done otherwise" entails the claim "you could have done otherwise" (the so-called "ought implies can" principle),
Can it not entail this?[/b]
Suppose S A'd when he ought to have B'd.
Suppose 'ought' implies 'can'.
Then, S could have B'd.
But S couldn't have B'd (for the sorts of reasons you've been pointing out).
So, 'ought' doesn't imply 'can'.
A compatibilist can present this sort of argument, because it amounts to nothing more than the denial that S could have acted differently in the circumstances, which the compatibilist is O.K. with anyway. But, one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens, and I suspect you'll say "why not just get rid of ought claims themselves?" And then we're right back where we started, with me pointing out that there are various ways we can construe 'ought' claims such that they don't conflict with the 'ought implies can' principle. Whether this is satisfying, as part of a general account of freedom and responsibility will depend on the extent to which it is internally consistent and coherent with our intuitions on these matters.
This is probably unhelpful, but I'm still thinking about these issues.
Originally posted by Conrau KLike I said, your view of free will is to be numb to everything
It depends on your definition of free will. Mine is that fee will is the ability to choose. Which requires that I can choose otherwise. However, if my "choice" is determined by my honesty then I couldn't have acted otherwise (because I would have had to act dishonestly, which I can't) and hence could not have free will.
around you, or completely blind to everthing else. You don't
give credit for anyone's will being free if they have anything
touch their will at all, including their very make up.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJayShould I give credit? I think I have presented a reasonable argument to discredit.
Like I said, your view of free will is to be numb to everything
around you, or completely blind to everthing else. You don't
give credit for anyone's will being free if they have anything
touch their will at all, including their very make up.
Kelly
Originally posted by bbarrSorry to be a nag but I think we should just get rid of the "ought to" claim.
That's a very good question. We do often hold people responsible for their emotional states ("you shouldn't have reacted so violently" ) and their character traits ("you ought to be more generous" ), even though these are things typically beyond one's immediate control. If we take these 'ought-claims' to express injunctions like "don't react violently" or "b ...[text shortened]... ill thinking about these issues.
Originally posted by bbarrIf "ought" implies I could have done otherwise, then yes. If "ought" implies I should have done otherwise, then no.
Oh, so you think we ought to get rid of the "ought claims", do you?
In the former it would seem judgemental to say you ought to have done otherwise. But in the latter, for the purpose of rehabilitation, it seems only reasonable to say you should have done otherwise or it would have been better to do otherwise (recognizing of course, that the person could not have done as he should or as would be better).