Free will does not exist!

Originally posted by Conrau K
I love my family. It follows that if I love them I should care form them. This is a form of reasoning. And in this case my actions have been ruled by an emotion and reason. What if i didn't love them and hence didn't care for them? Is that my fault?

Yes, it would be your fault. You are held accountable for both
your actions and your inactions. Your feelings of love, have
nothing to do with that you should care for your family, love
would make it a joy to do so, but even if it isn't it is still your
family.
Kelly

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Why not construe freedom as the capacity to act without external interference, upon the results of one's deliberations, where one's deliberations are informed by one's character?

Because that is not free will. Theoretically I could predict your every action. This does not constitute free will. By implication you have no capacity to choose (althoug ...[text shortened]... e. as you put it by your character and deliberation) which means you cannot have free will.[/b]

Again, that is mere question begging on your part. What reason is there to think that it is inconsistent with being free that one's actions are predictable? My good friends predict my actions and reactions all the time, because they know me very well. That doesn't entail that my actions aren't free, unless you import substantial assumptions about the nature of freedom (which, of course, the compatibilist will reject). The point is that the compatibilist can give an account of freedom that accords with the vast majority of our intuitions regarding when people act freely. Libertarianism cannot do this, and to that extent it is a bad theory of freedom. Feel free to stipulate that actual freedom would require libertarianism to be true; after all, you can believe whatever you want. But why should any of your claims concern the compatibilist? Do you have any arguments against compatibilism that do not presuppose that actual freedom requires libertarianism?

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Why not construe freedom as the capacity to act without external interference, upon the results of one's deliberations, where one's deliberations are informed by one's character?

Because that is not free will. Theoretically I could predict your every action. This does not constitute free will. By implication you have no capacity to choose (althoug e. as you put it by your character and deliberation) which means you cannot have free will.[/b]

I ask you for $20 dollars, I tell you I'm going to give your $25 on
payday for the loan. Now, does my honesty allow you to predict
if I'm going to pay you back, or cheat you? Depending on what
I do, isn't still my free will to do whatever I choose to do providing
you loan me $20 dollars in good faith? If I’m honest and true to
my word, you get $25, if I’m a cheater and liar, you lose your
$20 and instead get a variety of excuses on why I cannot pay
you back when I said I would. Predicting isn’t voiding the freedom
to make a choice, it is simply knowing the variables at play, because
if I'm honest I choose to be, if I'm not honest it is because I
choose to be, my choice either way.
Kelly

Originally posted by Conrau K
Well, I'll first errr, deal with the first part of your post.

So tell me why do we put people in jail?
Is it just for the victim's retribution?
For some people the answer would be yes, but there is only a very small minority who would not hope that the person (X) will not be rehabiilitated.

As for Y, soeciety in general is a Y person. We all have ...[text shortened]... riminals deserve some synpathy for their actions, anf that in no way entails encouragement.

So tell me why do we put people in jail?
Is it just for the victim's retribution?
For some people the answer would be yes, but there is only a very small minority who would not hope that the person (X) will not be rehabiilitated.

The point I was trying to draw on earlier is that we do not normally put people in jail based solely on a prudential judgement that it is in our best interests to do so in order to promote fewer future transgressions. Rather, the act of sentencing one to jail is normally based on the premise that he is accountable for his actions*, and further that it has been sufficiently demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed an action that is against the law. The question of what sentence is appropriate would probably naturally consider the idea of rehabilitation. But, this premise* that one is accountable for his actions is not available to you based on your claim that free will does not exist. So I am interested to know what types of systems of justice are available to you, and whether or not such systems seem to make sense.

If we found a person with a higher probability then normal in committing a crime we already try to rehabilitate them. In my country its called state funded counselling.

With this counseling process, is the application of rehabilitation mandatory? Also, what is the process by which they determine who should be counseled?

I think your criticism is more directed at criminal correction services and not at free will.

To the extent that free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for one's actions, I think it is only natural that your claim that free will does not exist should lead to inquiries concerning systems of justice that operate independently of the premise that one may be accountable for his actions.

All I am arguing is that criminals deserve some synpathy for their actions, anf that in no way entails encouragement.

I agree that 'sympathy' does not necessarily imply 'encouragement'.

Originally posted by Conrau K
In particular, I do not agree with the common view that free will should be recognized as an ability "to do otherwise" under identical conditions. If you ask whether or not I could have done otherwise at the same precise time and under the same conditions and state of the world, then I think it is clear that the answer is no, unless my willing is rando compatibilist proposition. A kind of soul halfway between the physical world and another

Actually in accordance with quantum mechanics under an identical conditions
different actions could ensue.

I did not state otherwise. I did not state that it is inconceivable for me to do otherwise -- only that if I could do otherwise, then my willing is random. That is, the libertarian notion of free will entails randomness.

I am not accountable for psychological disposition and motivation. Is it my fault I am angry or otherwise? I do not control my reasoning or emotions.

How is all this not just begging the question?

As far as i can see, if there is not libertarian free will, this free will must be controlled (determined) and is hence, not free.

If your position is that free will must be of a libertarian sort, then clearly we are going to disagree. I will continue to maintain that your notion of 'free will' is nonsensical. The notion of free will that is much more aligned with my perceptions/observations/intuition is that even if my willing is determined, it is still the case that it is substantially determined by me -- that is, by my character, my motivations, my beliefs, etc.

Originally posted by bbarr
Again, that is mere question begging on your part. What reason is there to think that it is inconsistent with being free that one's actions are predictable? My good friends predict my actions and reactions all the time, because they know me very well. That doesn't entail that my actions aren't free, unless you import substantial assumptions about the nature ...[text shortened]... nts against compatibilism that do not presuppose that actual freedom requires libertarianism?

A fair criticism.
I'll just outline where we both agree,
1. Libertarianism is wrong.
2. Actions are determined by our psychological disposition and character.

If event c (under a given law/s) occurs we can predict effect e. So e
will always follow from event c.

This is where we disagree. You averr that a free will can exist here (emphasis on "can" because compatibilism only demonstrates the possibility of free will. I haven't seen a compelling proof if its truth).

So given a psychological state, certain conditioning and circumstances we can anticipate in a person the effect e.

But what is this psychological state (the only thing we can be accountable for)?

From the refutation of libertarianism we know it's not a soul. But we do know that this psychological state is causally dependent on chemicals in the brain. If our psychological state is determined by chemicals (and i feel there is circumstantial evidence to support this) it seems to me that a free will cannot exist.

Originally posted by KellyJay
Yes, it would be your fault. You are held accountable for both
your actions and your inactions. Your feelings of love, have
nothing to do with that you should care for your family, love
would make it a joy to do so, but even if it isn't it is still your
family.
Kelly

Well, i suppose that where we disagree.
From your post it seems to me that I should care for my family because of social conventions (which dictate that "you should care for your family".). Thats doesn't entail a choice. It might not be the right thing to do (i.e. to abandon your family) but there are explicable reasons as to why you might have.

Originally posted by KellyJay
I ask you for $20 dollars, I tell you I'm going to give your $25 on
payday for the loan. Now, does my honesty allow you to predict
if I'm going to pay you back, or cheat you? Depending on what
I do, isn't still my free will to do whatever I choose to do providing
you loan me $20 dollars in good faith? If I’m honest and true to
my word, you get $25, if ...[text shortened]... choose to be, if I'm not honest it is because I
choose to be, my choice either way.
Kelly

So your choice is determined by your truth and honesty. That doesn't seem like free will.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]So tell me why do we put people in jail?
Is it just for the victim's retribution?
For some people the answer would be yes, but there is only a very small minority who would not hope that the person (X) will not be rehabiilitated.

The point I was trying to draw on earlier is that we do not normally put people in jail based solely on a p ...[text shortened]... encouragement.[/b]

I agree that 'sympathy' does not necessarily imply 'encouragement'.[/b]

I think one of the best contribution you made was when you said "we are the origin of our actions". This does not presuppose a free will its just an intelligent observation and i think it is the foundation of the system of justice (and not accountability which seems to me an all pervasive fallacy). If we sentence a person to jail it is not for vindictive recourse for the victims. It is for their rehabilitation. When we send them to jail we recognise them as the origin of some evil which through rehabilitation can be rectified (and consequently the number of trangressions can be reduced). Many courts will decide that person a person was not accountable for their actions and hence, give a lenient sentence. I translate this into meaning that such a rehabilitation (conferred on others) would not be suitable for them (i.e. the mentally ill) or that the circumstances of the crime were extreme and hence, it is unlikely that they will recur.

If we are the origin of evil (i.e. we are the cause and evil is the effect), i feel a legal system's responsibility should be to prevent that cause, causing more evil.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Actually in accordance with quantum mechanics under an identical conditions
different actions could ensue.

I did not state otherwise. I did not state that it is inconceivable for me to do otherwise -- only that if I could do otherwise, then my willing is random. That is, the libertarian notion of free will entails randomness.

I am not s substantially determined by me -- that is, by my character, my motivations, my beliefs, etc.

"How is all this not just begging the question?"

As far as I can see, our psychological state is chemical (what else could it be?) and as of such, we are not accountable for it. This includes deliberactions as well. You would not accuse a computer of free will based upon its deliberations.

"it is s still the case that it is substantially determined by me -- that is, by my character, my motivations, my beliefs, etc "

None of which you are accountable for.

Originally posted by Conrau K
A fair criticism.
I'll just outline where we both agree,
1. Libertarianism is wrong.
2. Actions are determined by our psychological disposition and character.

If event c (under a given law/s) occurs we can predict effect e. So e
will always follow from event c.

This is where we disagree. You averr that a free will can exist here (emphasis on e is circumstantial evidence to support this) it seems to me that a free will cannot exist.

My psychological states are token identical with certain chemical states of my brain. So what? The compatibilist claims (very roughly) that it is compatible with being free that one's actions are causally determined by one's psychological states. Whether these psychological states are token identical with chemical states is irrelevant to the issue. Once again, you are just begging the question by assuming that causal determination is inconsistent with free will. But this is exactly what the compatibilist denies.

Here's a very nice and thorough introduction to compatibilism:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

Originally posted by bbarr
My psychological states are token identical with certain chemical states of my brain. So what? The compatibilist claims (very roughly) that it is compatible with being free that one's actions are causally determined by one's psychological states. Whether these psychological states are token identical with chemical states is irrelevant to the issue. Once ag ...[text shortened]... ugh introduction to compatibilism:

[b]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/[/b]

My psychological states are token identical with certain chemical states of my brain. So what?

Then why not argue that animals have free will or that an electron is free?

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]My psychological states are token identical with certain chemical states of my brain. So what?

Then why not argue that animals have free will or that an electron is free?[/b]

Electrons aren't sensitive to reasons, they don't deliberate, and don't form intentions, so they can't be said to act. To the extent that animals don't have these properties, they aren't free either.

Originally posted by bbarr
Electrons aren't sensitive to reasons, they don't deliberate, and don't form intentions, so they can't be said to act. To the extent that animals don't have these properties, they aren't free either.

But our reasoning follows laws, rules and axioms. My point is, if my psychological state is chemical then it follows that I have as much free will as the chemicals that compose it.

Originally posted by Conrau K
But our reasoning follows laws, rules and axioms. My point is, if my psychological state is chemical then it follows that I have as much free will as the chemicals that compose it.

In order for one's will to be free, one must have a will (ie., the capacity to form intentions on the basis of reasons). Electrons can't do that, so they don't have a will, so they can't have a will that is free.