17 Aug 12
Originally posted by AgergLemonJello not too long ago beat me over my stubborn head until I got it that the only thing the theist advocate of omniscience needs to say: “If something happens, God knows it”—in order to defeat the fatalist argument (which I was making along those same lines of G’s perfect knowing that I either X or ~X). I think the key to the OP is the phrase “is going to”, which implies foreknowledge, which entails the time dimension you are referencing. If the theist adopts LJ’s formulation, they’ve simply got omniscience with no implications for “free will”.
I used to be of the opinion that only the point that "God" is defined to be omniscient was enough to destroy the argument that we have freewill; I don't agree with this anymore however.
Hypothetically speaking I may well be able to choose X or ¬X with it being the case that "God" infallibly knows what I will choose - and still have freewill. The defence the ...[text shortened]... e universe however (and the timeline which accompanies it)...that's a different story.
17 Aug 12
As I understand it, one of the entailments of libertarian free will is that, considering some past action, I could have chosen differently in the same situation. (Whether that past is long ago or just minutes ago.)
Let any situation S include both the external circumstances C (and the information they offer) that present themselves to me, and my own mental capacities M at the time (my knowledge base, my ability to observe accurately and to reason to a decision, etc.). This excludes such things as: “If only I knew then what I know now”, or the notion of projecting adult reasoning abilities onto a child, or “If I had just seen that . . .”.
So, if I revisit (hypothetically) the same S, I will only know what I did then, I will only be able to consider the facts of C as I did then, and to reason from them to a decision as I did then.
In such a case, either I make my choice based on reason-giving considerations according to M at the time—in which case, it is hard to see how I could choose any differently at all; or else my “choices” are random. In the first case, my ability to choose is constrained by both C and M; in the second, there is really no “choice” at all. (Unless you could say that C and M result in such confusion, that I, for example decide to flip a coin—but how could that decision change in exactly the same S?)
If this “could have chosen differently”—or for that matter, could choose differently in a present S, similarly constrained by C and M now—is in fact part of the libertarian account of free will, then that account seems clearly to fail (e.g., by devolving to randomness).
I may, of course, judge afterward that I have chosen badly, that I have made some error of fact or of reason, say. Then I can carry that information forward, and hopefully not commit the same kind of error again. But that does not change the fact that my choice at any given time—as long as I am consciously choosing based on what I identify as reason-giving considerations—is conditioned and constrained by the totality of S, including both C and M.
This does not mean that a choice is not made. It seems to me that I do make choices, and that I can identify and describe them—so I do not see this as needing to devolve to a hard determinism; if it does, then part of the fundamental make-up of our consciousness is to be totally deceived on this score, which means that discussions such as this one is simply “…sound and fury, signifying nothing”.
Although one can talk of a compatibilist account of free will, I personally prefer the simple phrase from my economics background: “constrained choice”—rather than “free will”. At bottom, I doubt there is any such thing as “unconstrained choice” (though we might speak of “uncoerced choice”, with respect to gun-to-the-head kind of coercion), since we only ever choose in the context of some S.
Thanks for your patience, as I think and write at the same time—which generally leads to long-winded posts.
17 Aug 12
Originally posted by twhiteheadi haven't heard of any systems and the idea doesn't make much sense to me. any concept of free will that i discuss is not compatible with a fully deterministic system.
That depends very much on the definition of 'free will'. Under some definitions, a fully deterministic system is still permissible.
I also don't see how the use of the supernatural changes anything whatsoever. The supernatural body (or a soul/spirit) wherever it may be located must also work via some mechanism that is either deterministic or random and in no way changes the basic issues.
true. the basic issues are deterministic or random. free will can exist in random systems but not in deterministic ones (at least any free will that i'm talking about).
The basic concept with 'free will' is that an entity is capable of making decisions without them being forced upon it by external factors. However, if we break down the mechanism by which said entity makes these decisions we find that one or more of the following must be the case:
1. The decisions are in fact a result of external factors, though possibly from the past.
2. The decisions may contain randomness.
The only possible exception is an eternal entity - in which case its decisions may contain brute facts.
to determine a randomness of a system, we would have to conduct a speculative experiment. suppose you could take a snapshot of the universe. the snapshot includes the positions of all particles and their vector/velocity.
then a conscious decision is made and the outcome recorded.
now rewind the universe back to the snapshot and run it again.
if a deterministic system is in effect, the exact same decision would be made, even if you run the universe from that snapshot an infinite number of times.
if different decisions are made, then the potential of randomness and free will exists. i say it is potential since we don't know what external influences are acting upon the universe. those in turn could be deterministic. we have no way of knowing.
we can only come to the logical determination that for free will to exist, there has to be true randomness somewhere along the line; whereas true randomness is described as a condition where no physical laws are in effect.
17 Aug 12
Originally posted by VoidSpiritI am enjoying this discussion between you and tw very much--both thinkers that I respect. I want to stress that my last post was aimed strictly at the libertarian account of free will, as I understand it--not the broader accounts that you guys are discussing.
i haven't heard of any systems and the idea doesn't make much sense to me. any concept of free will that i discuss is not compatible with a fully deterministic system.
[quote]I also don't see how the use of the supernatural changes anything whatsoever. The supernatural body (or a soul/spirit) wherever it may be located must also work via some mechan ...[text shortened]... whereas true randomness is described as a condition where no physical laws are in effect.
17 Aug 12
Originally posted by stellspalfieGood point. Here is what I posted on the science forum:
i see many christians on here use free will as a way of excusing bad human behavior. i ask this though - if god knows what is going to happen to everybody then it is impossible for them to have free will. we all have our futures planned out. nothing can change.
Is time travel possible? Many physicists say maybe in the past but not in the future. Is this true?
In the spirituality forum there is a thread called free will. I often used the free will question to provoke thought from the Jehovah's Witnesses that would knock on my door. "If god knows what will happen in the future how can that be compatible with free will?" I would ask them.
If time travel into the future is possible then it seems as if there is not free will. If it is not possible then there is free will. That is my way of looking at it anyway.
Is time travel into the future possible? I tend to think no.
17 Aug 12
Originally posted by vistesdThe statement “If something happens, God knows it” suggests (to me at least) some sort of transferrence of information from the event to "God" instantaneously - and while this looks ok, it seems to me that it is ok only in isolation from other theistic claims (for example it knows the future (however such is worded or inferred from scripture)). As I said in the post you quoted me on I stand back from my earlier position that omniscience (in the sense of just knowing everything maybe because such an entity has "seen" our entire timeline) is sufficient to defeat free-will. On the otherhand composing omniscience (defined to be all that is logically possible to be known) with the propositions that
LemonJello not too long ago beat me over my stubborn head until I got it that the only thing the theist advocate of omniscience needs to say: “If something happens, God knows it”—in order to defeat the fatalist argument (which I was making along those same lines of G’s perfect knowing that I either X or ~X). I think the key to the OP is the phrase “is goin ...[text shortened]... st adopts LJ’s formulation, they’ve simply got omniscience with no implications for “free will”.
1)our universe was created by the thing ("God" )that is omniscient, and
2)there has never been a temporal point which "God" experiences for which it failed to be omniscient
does, I argue, have implications for free-will because by (2) "God" knows the nature of any universes that will come to exist (before (for some temporal point from "God's" perspective) that universe existed), and by (1) we have "God" actually going ahead and creating that universe. “If something happens, God knows it” I argue becomes rather vacuous in this case.
I could of course be rambling if no theist subscribes to my definition of omniscience or propositions (1) and (2). :]
17 Aug 12
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdYeah, that is the basic idea. To be more precise, the libertarian theist can adopt some understanding of G's infallibility and G's status as a perfect cognizer that is encapsulated by an infallibility condition such as "Necessarily, if P then G knows P". P here, of course, stands generally for any proposition; so this covers temporally indexed claims as needed. (For instance, claims regarding the future, such as 'S will do A', are covered.) Having done so, I do not believe this libertarian theist will be threatened by theological fatalism, as has been discussed in depth in previous threads.
LemonJello not too long ago beat me over my stubborn head until I got it that the only thing the theist advocate of omniscience needs to say: “If something happens, God knows it”—in order to defeat the fatalist argument (which I was making along those same lines of G’s perfect knowing that I either X or ~X). I think the key to the OP is the phrase “is goin ...[text shortened]... st adopts LJ’s formulation, they’ve simply got omniscience with no implications for “free will”.
It's interesting, though, that it is important how the modal term 'necessarily' is worked into the infallibility condition. For example, if instead the condition were "If P, then necessarily G knows P", then this position will fall immediately to fatalist concerns.
17 Aug 12
2 edits
Originally posted by vistesdYeah, there's the rub. The libertarian theist can rejoice that his position can be made immune to fatalist attack. On the other hand, his libertarian understanding of freedom is utterly incoherent to begin with. (To really rain on his parade, G doesn't exist either....😛 )
As I understand it, one of the entailments of libertarian free will is that, considering some past action, I could have chosen differently in the same situation. (Whether that past is long ago or just minutes ago.)
Let any situation S include both the external circumstances C (and the information they offer) that present themselves to me, and my own ment ...[text shortened]... your patience, as I think and write at the same time—which generally leads to long-winded posts.
EDIT: Of course, the fact that libertarian accounts are at bottom basically incoherent; tragically flawed; profoundly inadequate; etc, will not stop them from being the default sort of conceptions that most people form intuitively about the topic of free will. I've come to understand that quite well about these discussions....
17 Aug 12
Originally posted by VoidSpiritThe real question is which type of free will are we more comfortable with? ie which do we desire.
i haven't heard of any systems and the idea doesn't make much sense to me. any concept of free will that i discuss is not compatible with a fully deterministic system.
the basic issues are deterministic or random. free will can exist in random systems but not in deterministic ones (at least any free will that i'm talking about).
Are you OK with knowing that your decisions are essentially arbitrary? Or would you rather they be based on reasoning and experience? Why do you consider the former 'free will' and not the later?
17 Aug 12
Originally posted by vistesdMy biggest issue with foreknowledge is that it sets up time paradox's. In other words, God may know the future but he cannot act on it. If he does act, he will change the future (thus changing reality and his knowledge). So either every possible future can be said to take place or God bases his decisions not on his foreknowledge but on his knowledge of possible futures that are never actually realized.
I think the key to the OP is the phrase “is going to”, which implies foreknowledge, which entails the time dimension you are referencing.
17 Aug 12
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloEDIT: Post deleted, whilst I recall my prior errors vis-a-vis "all possible worlds" (in light of twhitehead's comments just above...
Yeah, that is the basic idea. To be more precise, the libertarian theist can adopt some understanding of G's infallibility and G's status as a perfect cognizer that is encapsulated by an infallibility condition such as "Necessarily, if P then G knows P". P here, of course, stands generally for any proposition; so this covers temporally indexed claims as ecessarily G knows P", then this position will fall immediately to fatalist concerns.
18 Aug 12
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadcomputers can reason as well and experiences are just collections of data and with predetermination, those collections of experiences could never have had a different outcome, they would be entirely conditional to the initial state of the universe and the initial force that acted upon it to get it moving and follow the series of cause and effect down billions of years to your decision to skip coffee this morning.
The real question is which type of free will are we more comfortable with? ie which do we desire.
Are you OK with knowing that your decisions are essentially arbitrary? Or would you rather they be based on reasoning and experience? Why do you consider the former 'free will' and not the later?
edit; to answer your question, it doesn't bother me either way, there are too many variables for my brain to interpret in real time, so every decision i make appears to have been out of my free will. weather or not it is true free will becomes irrelevant if you can't see the bigger picture.
18 Aug 12
Originally posted by VoidSpiritThe alternative of course being that they are not conditional and therefore arbitrary.
computers can reason as well and experiences are just collections of data and with predetermination, those collections of experiences could never have had a different outcome, they would be entirely conditional to the initial state of the universe and the initial force that acted upon it to get it moving and follow the series of cause and effect down billions of years to your decision to skip coffee this morning.
I dispute your claim that the universe is deterministic. I think the findings of quantum mechanics strongly suggest that it is not deterministic - although I concede that this can probably never be proven.
I would call a computers decisions 'free will'. Why would you not? Is the computer being forced by and external force at the time of the decision? No. It may be forced into decisions by its programming, but that is part of its nature, and its nature or origins are not important when it comes to free will, all that is important is where the decision is generated at the time the decision is required.
18 Aug 12
Originally posted by twhiteheadA computer can not have free will because it does not have a mind to give it free will. The computer may make randon decisions due to the programming, but that is different from the free will that we have. I also to not consider the instinct of animals to be free will.
The alternative of course being that they are not conditional and therefore arbitrary.
I dispute your claim that the universe is deterministic. I think the findings of quantum mechanics strongly suggest that it is not deterministic - although I concede that this can probably never be proven.
I would call a computers decisions 'free will'. Why would yo ...[text shortened]... all that is important is where the decision is generated at the time the decision is required.
18 Aug 12
Originally posted by RJHindsa computer cannot make random decisions.
A computer can not have free will because it does not have a mind to give it free will. The computer may make randon decisions due to the programming, but that is different from the free will that we have. I also to not consider the instinct of animals to be free will.