Spirituality
14 Feb 09
05 Mar 09
3 edits
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThe fact that for God, E is a foregone conclusion, while for us it remains a mere possibility is only a matter of perspective; our deliberations take place within the limits of that perspective. But that perspective has no more determining impact on actual outcomes than does (fore)knowledge.*
I think the issue here is--- again--- the timing as well as the level of knowledge. For us, some things might happen and some things might not happen.
For God, the past, present and future are all one, comprehensive unit. What is still a possibility for us is just as "set in stone" to God as the past is for us.
And, while you contend that knowledge ce in contrast to alternative action that might take place. This leads to the contradiction.
The fact that, in your model, from God’s perspective E “has already happened”, so to speak—or is, as you put it, “set in stone”—means that our thinking there are non-foreclosed possibilities is an illusion. That God already knows the outcome as an ex post facto, while I do not, only means that I am operating under an illusion: God’s knowledge is complete, mine is not; I think (erroneously) that I have actual non-foreclosed choices in my future.
Now, I started out with the specific case of “E = (I [will] choose X)”. And, when I presented my first argument, I stated the assumption that “free will” entails the ability to effectively choose. That ability to effectively choose entails that there are non-foreclosed alternatives (i.e., X or ~X)—otherwise there is no actual choice. In other words, there is the actual possibility that I might choose either X or ~X, or there is no such actual possibility.
Can you present a valid argument wherein (1) God infallibly knows that I [will] choose X, and (2) I am actually able to choose ~X? Without contradicting God’s infallibility?
Alternatively, you might redefine “free will” such that it reflects nothing more than my deliberations based on what I, because of my illusory perspective, believe are actual possibilities. This would not be libertarian free will,** but I think that under compatibilist versions of free will, I could still be held morally accountable.
NOTE: I am really quite willing to reconsider my position; and I think that twhitehead might be onto something that will require that I do so...
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* We have not brought any, presumably omnipotent, action by God into it at this point.
** As SwissGambit, here, and LemonJello elsewhere, have pointed out.
05 Mar 09
1 edit
Originally posted by SwissGambit===================================
One shouldn't need to be specific. Logic alone proves that infallible foreknowledge of action A and libertarian freedom to do action A cannot both exist.
If a person can shrug off a logical contradiction, and just believe contradictory claims, then no amount of specific examples will convince them, either.
Edit: This, and other threads, have had se ...[text shortened]... eter's denial of Jesus. My move Qd2 that will lose the game. My drinking tea at 11am tomorrow.
One shouldn't need to be specific. Logic alone proves that infallible foreknowledge of action A and libertarian freedom to do action A cannot both exist.
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In your daily practical experience of choosing and selecting what and what not to do ... it makes NO discernable difference. It makes absolutely no detectable effect.
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If a person can shrug off a logical contradiction, and just believe contradictory claims, then no amount of specific examples will convince them, either.
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Cute. Real cute SwissGambit.
That's a sophisticated way of saying "Ain't got none anyway ! "
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Edit: This, and other threads, have had several specific examples. Peter's denial of Jesus. My move Qd2 that will lose the game. My drinking tea at 11am tomorrow.
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Okay, now you have something that kind of makes me sit up and consider.
But .... that's Peter's experience. What's yours ?
And I might add, what happened to Peter only worked out for his latter benefit in every way.
So if this does count for your divine coercion (and it is arguable that it does simply because God knew what was going to happen) it really turned out to be a blessing and benefit to Peter.
He no longer trusted in himself but in the grace of God, which made him the effective apostle that he was. No injury. Only blessing.
05 Mar 09
2 edits
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Edit: This, and other threads, have had several specific examples. Peter's denial of Jesus.
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I would like to know why we do not have a record of Peter arguing with Jesus about this. If he held your philosophy I would think he would have complained that he was predestinated to deny the Master and therefore was owed an apology.
Anyway, there's no hint that Peter felt coerced by divine foreknowledge.
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My move Qd2 that will lose the game. My drinking tea at 11am tomorrow.
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When did God tell you to move to Qd2?
When did God tell you that at 11 am tomorrow you will drink tea?
Other than your imagination do you have a concrete example of where you have experienced the coercion of divine foreknowledge or predestination ?
05 Mar 09
Originally posted by vistesdI haven't yet got it clear in my own head so I am having trouble expressing my points.
As opposed to one and only one future, in which either E or ~E will occur? (In the latter case, I think the logic does apply, and use of the phrase “it is/is not possible that…” can just be a recognition of relative probabilities, whether one can calculate them or not. The point being, even the possibility—i.e. some positive probability, however sl ...[text shortened]... on.)
Have I got what you’re saying to that point? I just want to make sure before going on…
Let us suppose that there is only one future in which E occurs. We do not know that E occurs in the future. We might work out the probability of E occurring based on information available to us, but that does not affect the fact that E will occur. We would be wrong to say that ~E might occur because it wont.
I think I am questioning the use of the phrase 'might occur'.
Lets try something that does not include time.
I role a dice but do not tell you the outcome.
From your perspective it might be 5 or ~5. Does my infallible knowledge that it is actually a 5 make it illogical for you to say it 'might be 5 or ~5'?
Would you be wrong to say 'It is possible that it is ~5'?
05 Mar 09
Originally posted by vistesdAnd yet perspective is everything with regard to this issue.
The fact that for God, E is a foregone conclusion, while for us it remains a mere possibility is only a matter of perspective; our deliberations take place within the limits of that perspective. But that perspective has no more determining impact on actual outcomes than does (fore)knowledge.*
The fact that, in your model, from God’s perspective E “has a ...[text shortened]... d into it at this point.
** As SwissGambit, here, and LemonJello elsewhere, have pointed out.
From our perspective, there is nothing but freedom in the future, just as there exists nothing but freedom in the present. By the line of thinking you are presenting, freedom can never exist--- even instantly--- as one cannot choose both X and -X in the present.
It seems that part of the confusion lies in applying the thought of inevitability on the tail of infallible knowledge. God's infallible knowledge does not force actions any more than a limited knowledge of future action: each participant is free.
Our knowledge of an action cannot take away from that action's freedom.
05 Mar 09
13 edits
@ twitehead
but surely one could argue that the action of rolling a dice from our perspective has already occured...that one doesn't know the outcome is has no real bearing here.
What KM, Freaky, Conrau k etc... posit is that for an event that has not yet occured from our perspective has occured from God's perspective and it is known what the outcome will be. The analogy doesn't fit.
If there is any meaningful correspondence between the two perspective's God's and ours (where X having occured is known to God)then either:
a) the event X has occured for from both our perspectives
b) the event X will occur from both our perspectives
Free will arguments are moot in (a) and a contradiction in (b)
Futhermore, if we argue multiple futures then even though one could argue God sees all possible futures, the moment one asserts it is known that I shall do X in the future then the set of futures which I have any meaningful existence (from my perspective, (ie: not agerg_2's)), are limited to a subset where X occurs. If there are an infinite number of distinct futures, where the actions I will perform are known to God at each point; then my future is contained in the intersection of all those subsets which contain an action known I would perform by god at any specific time.
If there is more than one future in this case then these futures are identical (for otherwise there would be at least one action I may perform which is unknown to God). This would then contradict distinctness of course
*edit* I like to tweak my posts (and my keyboard isn't very responsive anymore when I type at speed)...hence the edit count
05 Mar 09
1 edit
Originally posted by AgergIt is true that if God knows our future then there is only one future but does that mean that only one future was ever possible?
but surely one could argue that the action of rolling a dice from our perspective has already occured...that one doesn't know the outcome is has no real bearing here.
What KM, Freaky, Conrau k etc... posit is that for an event that has not yet occured from our perspective has occured from God's perspective and it is known what the outcome will be. The analo fic time.
If there is more than one future in this case then these futures are identical.
Free will would result in one future that would be known by an eternal God . Determinism would result in the same outcome.
A free will choice has only one outcome thus creating only one timeline , so would a determined choice. Therefore , it is a false assumption to say that because God knows one future ahead of us that this means that it proves free will to be false. It assumes that in order to have free will multiple timelines must exist , whereas for free will all one needs is POTENTIAL multiple timelines not ACTUAL multiple timelines.
How does the existence of one ACTUAL timeline (future , past or present) prove that other POTENTIAL timelines could never have existed?
The answer is that it doesn't , it's just your unconscious assumptions about time that make it seem so.
05 Mar 09
Originally posted by knightmeisteryou remove those *other* timelines from consideration the moment you form a relation between Gods perspective that I did X and my own perspective where I have yet to do X.
It is true that if God knows our future then there is only one future but does that mean that only one future was ever possible?
Free will would result in one future that would be known by an eternal God . Determinism would result in the same outcome.
A free will choice has only one outcome thus creating only one timeline , so would a determin ...[text shortened]... r is that it doesn't , it's just your unconscious assumptions about time that make it seem so.
06 Mar 09
2 edits
Originally posted by jaywillCute. Real cute SwissGambit.
[b]===================================
One shouldn't need to be specific. Logic alone proves that infallible foreknowledge of action A and libertarian freedom to do action A cannot both exist.
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In your daily practical experience of choosing and selecting what and what not to do ... it makes NO d ce of God, which made him the effective apostle that he was. No injury. Only blessing.[/b]
That's a sophisticated way of saying "Ain't got none anyway ! "
Well, if you want examples that actually happened, there aren't any. Of course, as if you had to be told, I am accepting my opponent's premises [libertarian free will and infallible, omniscient God] for the sake of argument - it is not necessary for me to believe any of this stuff actually happens - all I need to do is show incoherence in the opposing position.
Okay, now you have something that kind of makes me sit up and consider.
But .... that's [b]Peter's experience. What's yours ?[/b]
Again, if I had had any actual experiences of God speaking to me, do you think I'd be an atheist? C'mon, use a little horse sense here.
And I might add, what happened to Peter only worked out for his latter benefit in every way.
Completely irrelevant to the point at hand.
06 Mar 09
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThere are numerous examples in the bible of God telling people in advance what would happen in the future.
And yet perspective is everything with regard to this issue.
From our perspective, there is nothing but freedom in the future, just as there exists nothing but freedom in the present. By the line of thinking you are presenting, freedom can never exist--- even instantly--- as one cannot choose both X and -X in the present.
It seems that ...[text shortened]... articipant is free.
Our knowledge of an action cannot take away from that action's freedom.
So, unless God was lying, or fallible, or the stories are myths, you have no choice but to accept that God had foreknowledge of those events.
06 Mar 09
1 edit
Originally posted by jaywillI would like to know why we do not have a record of Peter arguing with Jesus about this. If he held your philosophy I would think he would have complained that he was predestinated to deny the Master and therefore was owed an apology.
[b]================================
Edit: This, and other threads, have had several specific examples. Peter's denial of Jesus.
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I would like to know why we do not have a record of Peter arguing with Jesus about this. If he held your philosophy I would think he would have complained that he was predest example of where you have experienced the coercion of divine foreknowledge or predestination ?[/b]
Exactly! If my opponent's premises are correct, then Peter must have been fated to deny Jesus.
Anyway, there's no hint that Peter felt coerced by divine foreknowledge.
Irrelevant.
When did God tell you to move to Qd2?
One minute before the move was made.
When did God tell you that at 11 am tomorrow you will drink tea?
At some time on the day before.
Other than your imagination do you have a concrete example of where you have experienced the coercion of divine foreknowledge or predestination ?
For the third time, I am not arguing from my own beliefs. I am accepting the premises of theists like KM for the sake of argument, and showing the logical flaw in the set of beliefs.
06 Mar 09
Originally posted by SwissGambitThat God knows the future isn't the issue. The issue is, in light of God's perfect and comprehensive knowledge, is free will negated--- or, as v puts it, illusory?
There are numerous examples in the bible of God telling people [b]in advance what would happen in the future.
So, unless God was lying, or fallible, or the stories are myths, you have no choice but to accept that God had foreknowledge of those events.[/b]
The restrictions you place on God's knowledge (i.e., that His interaction with man cancels out man's free will) are unjustified. When a parent tells a child that specific actions will result in certain consequences and/or situations, that parent's understanding of the pattern of seed-to-fruit does not in any way take away from the child's choice of action. In fact, if anything, the child will do whatever they're being told not to do anyway.
God could tell us everything that we will ever do or think from this moment forward. He hasn't done so for a specific reason. He has, however, told us everything we need to know about the future: and now, we are free to act on that knowledge.
Your rejection of His warnings proves your free will in light of His perfect knowledge.
06 Mar 09
Originally posted by AgergAll talk of probability is essentially a case of not knowing the outcome and making a best guess on the information available.
[b]@ twitehead
but surely one could argue that the action of rolling a dice from our perspective has already occured...that one doesn't know the outcome is has no real bearing here.[/b]
If there is only one future, is it really meaningful to claim that there are several possible futures?
If there is only one future then it essentially exists from any perspective, we simply do not know what it contains.
06 Mar 09
3 edits
Originally posted by twhiteheadAll talk of probability is essentially a case of not knowing the outcome and making a best guess on the information available.
All talk of probability is essentially a case of not knowing the outcome and making a best guess on the information available.
If there is only one future, is it really meaningful to claim that there are several possible futures?
If there is only one future then it essentially exists from any perspective, we simply do not know what it contains.
If there is only one future, is it really meaningful to claim that there are several possible futures?
If the future from our perspective has been determined by its prior occurence from another perspective then I would say yes...several possible futures is meaningless.
If there is only one future then it essentially exists from any perspective, we simply do not know what it contains.
Again, no argument here.
My reason for challenging you was because I thought you were making an analogy that would be later transferred to the free/will+omniscience claim made by others. I assert that any such analogy has to throw away (vital) information in order to sound convincing.
06 Mar 09
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThat God knows the future isn't the issue. The issue is, in light of God's perfect and comprehensive knowledge, is free will negated--- or, as v puts it, illusory?
That God knows the future isn't the issue. The issue is, in light of God's perfect and comprehensive knowledge, is free will negated--- or, as v puts it, illusory?
The restrictions you place on God's knowledge (i.e., that His interaction with man cancels out man's free will) are unjustified. When a parent tells a child that specific actions will resul ...[text shortened]...
Your rejection of His warnings proves your free will in light of His perfect knowledge.
The examples of God telling people their own future are the clearest illustration of the fact that they are not free to do otherwise.
The restrictions you place on God's knowledge (i.e., that His interaction with man cancels out man's free will) are unjustified.
No, that's up to you. There is more than one way out of the dilemma. For example, you may leave God's knowledge intact, and admit that our will is restricted, or our will is not libertarian.
When a parent tells a child that specific actions will result in certain consequences and/or situations, that parent's understanding of the pattern of seed-to-fruit does not in any way take away from the child's choice of action.
Sure, but that's because the parent can be wrong about what their child will do.
God could tell us everything that we will ever do or think from this moment forward. He hasn't done so for a specific reason.
The minute that you admit this, you have fallen into the dilemma. All he really has to do is know the future - with certainty. He doesn't actually have to tell anyone anything. I only used the examples of God telling people the future to make it clear that he has foreknowledge.