Holy spirit

Originally posted by twhitehead
All talk of probability is essentially a case of not knowing the outcome and making a best guess on the information available.
If there is only one future, is it really meaningful to claim that there are several possible futures?

If there is only one future then it essentially exists from any perspective, we simply do not know what it contains.

If there is only one future, is it really meaningful to claim that there are several possible futures?
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Why not? If there are many possible futures potentially available one can only live one life and make one choice. One future will win out over the rest that will remain only potential futures (ie not exist).

What exactly is the problem? If we really do have free will we will only be able to live one life and one timeline will be resulting from that.

Originally posted by knightmeister
If there is only one future, is it really meaningful to claim that there are several possible futures?
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Why not? If there are many possible futures potentially available one can only live one life and make one choice. One future will win out over the rest that will remain only potenti ...[text shortened]... ve free will we will only be able to live one life and one timeline will be resulting from that.

but any timelines/futures that could have been available to us are removed from consideration when you assert that our future is known from something else's perspective

As I've suggested earlier suppose from God's perspective he knows that two days after some specific time t_0 in my frame of reference I shall do X at t_1
then at any time between t_0 and t_1 from my perspective before I choose to do X or not I have only one future since it has been determined that I did X at t_1 from God's perspective.
But then you could also argue also, that your god knows that two days after t_-1 from my perspective I would do Y at t_0, such that my future was also determined between times t_-1 and t_0.
You can keep applying the same argument until the day I was born and before; and by doing this you should see my action are scripted, ie: not free will choices.

multiple futures really is a moot agument with your model of omniscience,

Originally posted by SwissGambit
That God knows the future isn't the issue. The issue is, in light of God's perfect and comprehensive knowledge, is free will negated--- or, as v puts it, illusory?

The examples of God telling people their own future are the clearest illustration of the fact that they are not free to do otherwise.

The restrictions you place on God's knowledg ...[text shortened]... examples of God telling people the future to make it clear that he has foreknowledge.

The examples of God telling people their own future are the clearest illustration of the fact that they are not free to do otherwise.
You’ll need to back that statement up with some proof of their lack of choice in the matter. Peter vociferously and adamantly rejected the Lord’s prediction of his eventual denial. His mindset was that he would never deny Christ, period. This was so much in his thinking, that when he did deny knowing Christ, it wasn’t until afterwards that he recalled what the Lord said would take place.

No, that's up to you. There is more than one way out of the dilemma. For example, you may leave God's knowledge intact, and admit that our will is restricted, or our will is not libertarian.
I can see no such demand on either of the contingencies.

Sure, but that's because the parent can be wrong about what their child will do.
Man can always be wrong, but fallibility isn’t the issue. The prediction of another’s action doesn’t take away from their ability to choose freely, even if said prediction offers the hearer more information than they had before their actions are manifested.

The minute that you admit this, you have fallen into the dilemma. All he really has to do is know the future - with certainty. He doesn't actually have to tell anyone anything. I only used the examples of God telling people the future to make it clear that he has foreknowledge.
Again, His knowledge of the future hasn’t been the issue.

Originally posted by vistesd
"An argument is valid if it is impossible for the premises to all be true and, at the same time, the conclusion false." (The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy)

Either way, the following is invalid:

(1) P knows infallibly that E will occur;

(2) E will not occur.


It is impossible for (1) [premise] to be true, and (2) [conclusion ...[text shortened]... nce makes an invalid argument.

However, I still need to consider what twhitehead is saying…

As I said earlier, the contradiction is not between God's foreknowledge. You can change (1) to:

a) P will know that E will occur.
b) P does not know that E will occur.
c) P may know that E will occur.

And this will still contradict (2). Yet, in neither a) b) or c) does P have infallible foreknowledge of E. There is a contradiction, but it is not brought about by infallible foreknowledge.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]The examples of God telling people their own future are the clearest illustration of the fact that they are not free to do otherwise.
You’ll need to back that statement up with some proof of their lack of choice in the matter. Peter vociferously and adamantly rejected the Lord’s prediction of his eventual denial. His mindset was that he would ...[text shortened]... ar that he has foreknowledge.[/b]
Again, His knowledge of the future hasn’t been the issue.[/b]

You’ll need to back that statement up with some proof of their lack of choice in the matter. Peter vociferously and adamantly rejected the Lord’s prediction of his eventual denial. His mindset was that he would never deny Christ, period. This was so much in his thinking, that when he did deny knowing Christ, it wasn’t until afterwards that he recalled what the Lord said would take place.

Whether Peter remembered or forgot the prediction, the fact remains that he could not have done otherwise. If he had done so, he would have made a liar out of God. One of the core beliefs of Libertarianism is that free choices are those that could have been otherwise. Thus, Peter's choice was not free in a libertarian sense.

Man can always be wrong, but fallibility isn’t the issue.

😕 Well, we were in the middle of contesting that point, but then you stopped responding. I still contend it is at the very heart of the issue.

Originally posted by Conrau K
As I said earlier, the contradiction is not between God's foreknowledge. You can change (1) to:

a) P will know that E will occur.
b) P does not know that E will occur.
c) P may know that E will occur.

And this will still contradict (2).
[snip]

I see no contradiction in any of the 3 cases.

Originally posted by Conrau K
As I said earlier, the contradiction is not between God's foreknowledge. You can change (1) to:

a) P will know that E will occur.
b) P does not know that E will occur.
c) P may know that E will occur.

And this will still contradict (2). Yet, in neither a) b) or c) does P have infallible foreknowledge of E. There is a contradiction, but it is not brought about by infallible foreknowledge.

Premise: P has infallible foreknowledge that E will occur.

—Under what conditions is it possible that E will not occur without contradicting the infallibility of P’s foreknowledge?

Premise: God infallibly knows that I [will] choose X.

—Under what conditions do I have the effective (actual) ability to choose ~X without contradicting the infallibility of God’s knowledge?

[If you want to say that God’s “knowing” is fallible, or that God’s knowing does not entail infallibility, then that’s fine by me. If you want to simply assume that God’s (fore)knowledge does entail infallibility—and that I am being redundant by stressing it—well, the questions still stand.]

Originally posted by vistesd
Premise: P has infallible foreknowledge that E will occur.

—Under what conditions is it possible that E will not occur without contradicting the infallibility of P’s foreknowledge?

Premise: God infallibly knows that I [will] choose X.

—Under what conditions do I have the effective (actual) ability to choose ~X without contradicting the infallibili ...[text shortened]... il infallibility—and that I am being redundant by stressing it—well, the questions still stand.]

Again, I do not see how foreknowledge has anything to do with the supposed contradiction. I might easily mimic you:

- Premise: P will have infallible knowledge that E is occurring.

-- Under what conditions is it possible that ~E is occurring without contradicting the infallibility of P's knowledge?

As my earlier examples illustrate, the contradiction still exists whether God's knowledge is fallible or infallible, future or present, indicative or subjunctive, positive or negative.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
I see no contradiction in any of the 3 cases.

There is. I cannot say "P will know that E will occur (at time t1)" and "~E will occur (at time t1)". That is a contradiction.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I haven't yet got it clear in my own head so I am having trouble expressing my points.
Let us suppose that there is only one future in which E occurs. We do not know that E occurs in the future. We might work out the probability of E occurring based on information available to us, but that does not affect the fact that E will occur. We would be wrong to ...[text shortened]... to say it 'might be 5 or ~5'?
Would you be wrong to say 'It is possible that it is ~5'?

In any single future either E or ~E will occur. If the probabaility of E occurring is 1.0, then there is no case in which ~E might occur. To say that the probability of E occurring is 1.0, but that ~E might nevertheless occur is a contradiction.

I take the premise that P infallibly knows that E will occur (or God’s infallible knowing that I will choose X) as equivalent to saying that that probability is 1.0—or else that knowledge would turn out not to be infallible after all. That is, there is no condition (in a single future) under which there is any positive probability (any possibility) that ~E will occur without violating the infallibility condition in the premise.. Therefore, even to say that ~E might occur is a contradiction.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Again, I do not see how foreknowledge has anything to do with the supposed contradiction. I might easily mimic you:

- Premise: P will have infallible knowledge that E is occurring.

-- Under what conditions is it possible that ~E is occurring without contradicting the infallibility of P's knowledge?

As my earlier examples illustrate, the contradi is fallible or infallible, future or present, indicative or subjunctive, positive or negative.

…the contradiction still exists whether God's knowledge is fallible or infallible, future or present, indicative or subjunctive, positive or negative.

If God’s knowledge is fallible, then there is no necessary contradiction—it will just turn out that God is wrong.

(It seems as if you are assuming that the word “knowledge”, or “knowing”, entails infallibility. I do not think that is epistemologically correct—but I will let someone more knowledgeable than myself hold forth there; if simple knowing sets up the logical contradiction, that just would make my point stronger.)

EDIT: Nevertheless, I will hew to my more specific wording.

EDIT 2: You will note that I have not used the word "foreknowledge" in most of my examples. I did above because you did.

Originally posted by vistesd
In any single future either E or ~E will occur. If the probabaility of E occurring is 1.0, then there is no case in which ~E might occur. To say that the probability of E occurring is 1.0, but that ~E might nevertheless occur is a contradiction.

I take the premise that P infallibly knows that E will occur (or God’s infallible knowing that I will ...[text shortened]... ondition in the premise.. Therefore, even to say that ~E might occur is a contradiction.

I think it salient to point out that there are many construals for 'may' and there is a substantial amount of argument in modal logic about which is best. To say ~E might occur may mean something like "It is conceivable in some way, in different circumstances, that ~E would occur"; or it could mean "There is a non-zero probability that ~E could happen in the future" (which is your interpretation). There are others, though.

In discussing free will, I personally do not think that the latter is relevant. Take the example of a person who premeditated the death of another. During trial, there is some issue about whether he acted of his free will. Now seeking a conviction the prosecutor would try to show that the defendent knew that the man's actions would precipitate a murder and that he knew this with a high degree of certitude. This actually proves free will, not denies it. On the other hand, the defending lawyer would seek to illustrate that the man did not know that his actions would bring about murder, that the man lacked that foresight and that he acted in a random manner. So uncertainty that E will occur, far from affirming free will, in fact negates it.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]…the contradiction still exists whether God's knowledge is fallible or infallible, future or present, indicative or subjunctive, positive or negative.

If God’s knowledge is fallible, then there is no necessary contradiction—it will just turn out that God is wrong.

(It seems as if you are assuming that the word “knowledge”, or “knowing”, entails ...[text shortened]... have not used the word "foreknowledge" in most of my examples. I did above because you did.[/b]

If God’s knowledge is fallible, then there is no necessary contradiction—it will just turn out that God is wrong.

Again, no. It is still contradictory to say "God might know that (and it is true that) I will choose X" and "I will choose ~X". It is still contradictory to say "God will know that I will choose X" and "I will choose ~X". God's knowledge has nothing at all to do with the contradiction.

EDIT 2: You will note that I have not used the word "foreknowledge" in most of my examples. I did above because you did.

This is because, as I see it, the contradiction still exists whether the knowledge is foreknowledge or present or future knowledge. It is as contradictory to say "God foreknows E" and "God will know E", yet "~E".

Originally posted by Conrau K
I think it salient to point out that there are many construals for 'may' and there is a substantial amount of argument in modal logic about which is best. To say ~E might occur may mean something like "It is conceivable in some way, in different circumstances, that ~E would occur"; or it could mean "There is a non-zero probability that ~E could happen in th ...[text shortened]... nner. So uncertainty that E will occur, far from affirming free will, in fact negates it.

The logical contradiction that I have set out with various terms still holds. Your example of the defendant knowing “with a high degree of certitude” the results of his own action has no bearing on it whatsoever.

Note that nowhere in this thread have I denied “free will” on a per se basis. If you want to discuss the possibility and criteria for “libertarian” free will per se, that’s another topic

Originally posted by vistesd
The logical contradiction that I have set out with various terms still holds. Your example of the defendant knowing “with a high degree of certitude” the results of his own action has no bearing on it whatsoever.

Note that nowhere in this thread have I denied “free will” on a per se basis. If you want to discuss the possibility and criteria for “libertarian” free will per se, that’s another topic

The logical contradiction that I have set out with various terms still holds. Your example of the defendant knowing “with a high degree of certitude” the results of his own action has no bearing on it whatsoever.

Gosh, vistesd, don't be dense. Of course the logical contradiction you have laid still holds. My point is that it holds out in such a way that it is absurd. It means that a person who has no certitude whatsoever about their future actions has free will; yet a person who would have high certitude (or infallible conditional knowledge) does not. A libertarian, as well as a determinist, should both agree that a person who acts randomly, in an unpredictable way, such that no foreknowledge is possible, cannot have free will.

Note that nowhere in this thread have I denied “free will” on a per se basis. If you want to discuss the possibility and criteria for “libertarian” free will per se, that’s another topic

Fair enough. That was my lapse. To clarify, at least in this thread, when I say 'free will', this is shorthand for 'libertarian free will'.