Holy spirit

Originally posted by Conrau K
Well, since it is my premise, I define the terms. In context, we are talking about infallible knowledge.

If that is so, then why did you say "Actually, I do not see how certitude has anything to do with knowledge"?

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]
I simply mis-read this then, and did not parse it into (a) “God might know” and (b) “E will occur". Any premise that states “E will occur” precludes the alternative conclusion (without contradiction), even if God is totally ignorant.

Yes, this was my point. But in the proposition "God might know that E will occur", there is a contradicti will. So I do not see how the initial contradiction between 1) and 2) precludes free will.[/b]

The contradiction is neither in the premises nor in the conclusion: it is in their conjunction.

(1) God knows [or will know] that I will choose X;

(2) God cannot be wrong;

(3) Therefore, _______________________.

Fill in the blank with any statement that is not illogical and nonsensical.

Or— Set up your own deductive inference in which God knows that I will choose X, but I am still free to choose ~X without a contradiction that renders the inference illogical and nonsensical.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
If that is so, then why did you say "Actually, I do not see how certitude has anything to do with knowledge"?

I don't see that certitude has anything to do with knowledge but I have no intention to argue on that subject.

Originally posted by vistesd
The contradiction is neither in the premises nor in the conclusion: it is in their conjunction.

(1) God knows [or will know] that I will choose X;

(2) God cannot be wrong;

(3) Therefore, _______________________.

Fill in the blank with any statement that is not illogical and nonsensical.

[b]Or— Set up your own deductive inference in w ...[text shortened]... free to choose ~X without a contradiction that renders the inference illogical and nonsensical.[/b]

I know, Vistesd. But if I posit:

1. God will know that I will choose X (perhaps at the same time as, or after, I will choose X)

God's knowledge cannot impinge on any libertarian model free will (because the knowledge does not precede the action), yet it still precludes the possibility that I will choose ~X. The contradiction still exists, but it has no bearing on libertarian free will.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I know, Vistesd. But if I posit:

1. God will know that I will choose X (perhaps at the same time as, or after, I will choose X)

God's knowledge cannot impinge on any libertarian model free will (because the knowledge does not precede the action), yet it still precludes the possibility that I will choose ~X. The contradiction still exists, but it has no bearing on libertarian free will.

I’m not sure what we’re arguing about anymore! 🙂

Ex post facto knowledge has no bearing on my ability to effectively choose, since I have already chosen. Your ex post facto knowledge in such a case would be no different from God’s, if God’s knowledge is also only ex post facto.

My point is simply that when theists posit that (1) God knows what I will choose, and (2) God cannot be wrong—then they have set up conditions under which it is illogical and nonsensical to claim that I can effectively choose otherwise. By their statement of the case, nothing more. If “free will” entails that I can effectively choose otherwise, then said theists have set up a proposition under the terms of which that is logically impossible.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I don't see that certitude has anything to do with knowledge but I have no intention to argue on that subject.

Main Entry:
cer·ti·tude
1 : the state of being or feeling certain 2 : certainty of act or event

in·fal·li·ble
1 : incapable of error : unerring <an infallible memory> 2 : not liable to mislead, deceive, or disappoint : certain <an infallible remedy> 3 : incapable of error in defining doctrines touching faith or morals

So, you are using 'knowledge' to mean 'infallible knowledge' in context, and yet you think it has nothing to do with certainty? 🙄

Originally posted by SwissGambit

So, you are using 'knowledge' to mean 'infallible knowledge' in context, and yet you think it has nothing to do with certainty? 🙄

No. I just do not see how it makes sense to say "I know X is true" when X is not true. It makes sense to say "He believes X, but he is wrong", but not "He knows X, but he is wrong." I don't really care anyway.

Originally posted by vistesd
I’m not sure what we’re arguing about anymore! 🙂

Ex post facto knowledge has no bearing on my ability to effectively choose, since I have already chosen. Your ex post facto knowledge in such a case would be no different from God’s, if God’s knowledge is also only ex post facto.

My point is simply that when theists posit that (1) ...[text shortened]... en said theists have set up a proposition under the terms of which that is logically impossible.

My point, as it has bas been since my first response to your post, is that no matter what tense, mood or polarity you put the "God knows" clause in, there will still be a contradiction. I can say "God does not know that I will choose X", "God will know know that I will choose X", "God may know that I will choose X", and this still contradicts the premise "I will choose ~X".

My point is simply that when theists posit that (1) God knows what I will choose, and (2) God cannot be wrong—then they have set up conditions under which it is illogical and nonsensical to claim that I can effectively choose otherwise

My point is that, even disregard point 2, and still it is illogical and nonsensical to effectively choose otherwise.

Originally posted by Conrau K
My point is that, even disregard point 2, and still it is illogical and nonsensical to effectively choose otherwise.

I agree with you, and personally believe that libertarian free will is equivalent to a claim that there are multiple futures. God having infallible knowledge of the future proves that there are not multiple futures and thus no libertarian free will.

Originally posted by Conrau K
No. I just do not see how it makes sense to say "I know X is true" when X is not true.

It can make sense if the evidence at our disposal strongly indicates that X is true, even though X is actually false. Sometimes, despite best efforts, we are not aware of all of the evidence.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
It can make sense if the evidence at our disposal strongly indicates that X is true, even though X is actually false. Sometimes, despite best efforts, we are not aware of all of the evidence.

So having discovered that X is not true, would you maintain that you still knew X was true but that now you do not know that X is true?

Originally posted by twhitehead
I agree with you, and personally believe that libertarian free will is equivalent to a claim that there are multiple futures. God having infallible knowledge of the future proves that there are not multiple futures and thus no libertarian free will.

I am not so prepared to concede the last point. I do not see how mere knowledge can have such a power.

Originally posted by Conrau K
So having discovered that X is not true, would you maintain that you still knew X was true but that now you do not know that X is true?

Technically, yes.

If I had to actually explain the change to someone else, I would not say that I knew it was true; I would say I thought it was true. This would be mainly to make it clear that I now know it is false.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I am not so prepared to concede the last point. I do not see how mere knowledge can have such a power.

I never said that knowledge has any power whatsoever. I merely claim that it is impossible to have knowledge of something if that something does not exist - by definition. If God knows the one and only future then there is only one future. His knowledge in no way creates the future or affects reality but rather is simply an indication of what reality is.

Your knowledge of my existence does not have any power over my existence but you can conclude that I exist if you assume that you have knowledge that I exist.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I never said that knowledge has any power whatsoever. I merely claim that it is impossible to have knowledge of something if that something does not exist - by definition. If God knows the one and only future then there is only one future. His knowledge in no way creates the future or affects reality but rather is simply an indication of what reality is. ...[text shortened]... existence but you can conclude that I exist if you assume that you have knowledge that I exist.

…but rather is simply an indication of what reality is.

Well put.