Holy spirit

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]If God’s knowledge is fallible, then there is no necessary contradiction—it will just turn out that God is wrong.

Again, no. It is still contradictory to say "God might know that (and it is true that) I will choose X" and "I will choose ~X". It is still contradictory to say "God will know that I will choose X" and "I will choose ~X". ...[text shortened]... t is as contradictory to say "God foreknows E" and "God will know E", yet "~E".[/b]

If there are any cases in which God "knows", thinks, or "might know", in which is is "not true that", then God's knowing would not be infallible. Then there is no contradiction. I would not argue at all if anyone said that God could be wrong: i.e., that God's "knowing" still allowed for that "it is not true that".

Originally posted by vistesd
If there are any cases in which God "knows", thinks, or "might know", in which is is "not true that", then God's knowing would not be infallible. Then there is no contradiction. I would not argue at all if anyone said that God could be wrong: i.e., that God's "knowing" still allowed for that "it is not true that".

I am not sure whether this answers my argument, vistesd. Do you concede at least that it a contradiction to say "God will know that I will choose X" yet "I will choose ~X" I do not see how God's fallible knowledge in any way weakens the contradiction.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]The logical contradiction that I have set out with various terms still holds. Your example of the defendant knowing “with a high degree of certitude” the results of his own action has no bearing on it whatsoever.

Gosh, vistesd, don't be dense. Of course the logical contradiction you have laid still holds. My point is that it holds out in such a w ...[text shortened]... east in this thread, when I say 'free will', this is shorthand for 'libertarian free will'.[/b]

My point is that it holds out in such a way that it is absurd. It means that a person who has no certitude whatsoever about their future actions has free will; yet a person who would have high certitude (or infallible conditional knowledge) does not.

You have changed the case from God (or P) knowing, to my knowing what I will do. In other words, you now have a case of self-reference applying to P. The confusion may be my fault, as I did not specify P as a third-party (I will henceforth), thereby allowing for self-referential possibilities. God, of course is a third party, and I would not argue that God’s knowing what God will do precludes free will.

There is only a contradiction in the conjunction of God's (third-party P's) knowledge and my effective ability to choose the alternative. The contradiction can be relieved on either side of the conjunction. I am not concerned with which side you choose. 🙂

One of the problems with libertarian free will is that it does reduce to either randomness or a conditional determinism.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I am not sure whether this answers my argument, vistesd. Do you concede at least that it a contradiction to say "God will know that I will choose X" yet "I will choose ~X" I do not see how God's fallible knowledge in any way weakens the contradiction.

If God's "knowledge" can be wrong, then that relieves the contradiction. God "knows" that I will choose X; I choose ~X. You can either say that God's "knowledge" was fallible (and in fact false); or you can say that God really didn't "know". It comes to the same thing.

LemonJello laid out fallibilistic versus non-fallibilistic epistemic theories once. That's why I am careful to stress inafllibility, rather than assume it.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]My point is that it holds out in such a way that it is absurd. It means that a person who has no certitude whatsoever about their future actions has free will; yet a person who would have high certitude (or infallible conditional knowledge) does not.

You have changed the case from God (or P) knowing, to my knowing what I will do. In other words, y bertarian free will is that it does reduce to either randomness or a conditional determinism.[/b]

You have changed the case from God (or P) knowing, to my knowing what I will do. In other words, you now have a case of self-reference applying to P. The confusion may be my fault, as I did not specify P as a third-party (I will henceforth), thereby allowing for self-referential possibilities. God, of course is a third party, and I would not argue that God’s knowing what God will do precludes free will.

It could still work for a third-party. In order to demonstrate that the man did not act act of free will, the defending lawyer may bring in character-witnesses who each confirm that the man acted in a way radically different from his usual character. The point would then be to show that the man acted randomly and unpredictably. For some reason, you seem to think that this confirms free will (in the libertarian sense) because it shows that there was a non-zero probability that he could choose X or ~X.

There is only a contradiction in the conjunction of God's (third-party P's) knowledge and my effective ability to choose the alternative. The contradiction can be relieved on either side of the conjunction. I am not concerned with which side you choose.

This puzzles me. How does God's knowledge affect my ability to choose, yet my own knowledge does not? (This was indeed the first question I asked when I took the issue up with Agerg).

One of the problems with libertarian free will is that it does reduce to either randomness or a conditional determinism.

Yes. But a libertarian should at least accept that human action occurs predictably, according to the individual's character. If I am acting on free will, then it is the sum of all the features of the I which determine how I will act. And since I, friends and God should know that 'I' very well, my actions should be foreknown.

Originally posted by vistesd
If God's "knowledge" can be wrong, then that relieves the contradiction. God "knows" that I will choose X; I choose ~X. You can either say that God's "knowledge" was fallible (and in fact false); or you can say that God really didn't "know". It comes to the same thing.

LemonJello laid out fallibilistic versus non-fallibilistic epistemic theories once. That's why I am careful to stress inafllibility, rather than assume it.

But if I say "God might know E will occur", the proposition that E will occur is still being asserted. So it would be contradictory to also assert that ~E is possible when I have asserted "God might know that E will occur" (meaning, E will occur and God might know this.) So the contradiction still exists even if God's knowledge only be fallible.

Again, I do not see how fallible knowledge could relieve the contradiction.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]You have changed the case from God (or P) knowing, to my knowing what I will do. In other words, you now have a case of self-reference applying to P. The confusion may be my fault, as I did not specify P as a third-party (I will henceforth), thereby allowing for self-referential possibilities. God, of course is a third party, and I would not argue tha d since I, friends and God should know that 'I' very well, my actions should be foreknown.

[/b]The point would then be to show that the man acted randomly and unpredictably. For some reason, you seem to think that this confirms free will (in the libertarian sense).

I don’t.

This puzzles me. How does God's knowledge affect my ability to choose, yet my own knowledge does not?

Your own knowledge clearly affects how you choose (unless, as you say, you choose randomly). That, I hope is cleared up anyway.

God’s knowledge does not affect how I choose (I may deliberate away in perfect ignorance of what God does or does not know). But if God knows that I will choose X, then my deliberations cannot result in any other choice without God’s having been wrong. That also should be clear.

Originally posted by Conrau K
But if I say "God might know E will occur", the proposition that E will occur is still being asserted. So it would be contradictory to also assert that ~E is possible when I have asserted "God might know that E will occur" (meaning, E will occur and God might know this.) So the contradiction still exists even if God's knowledge only be fallible.

Again, I do not see how fallible knowledge could relieve the contradiction.

"God might know E will occur"

I simply mis-read this then, and did not parse it into (a) “God might know” and (b) “E will occur". Any premise that states “E will occur” precludes the alternative conclusion (without contradiction), even if God is totally ignorant.

To say that God infallibly knows that E will occur is just to say that (1) God knows E will occur, and (2) E will occur. [Better: To say that (1) God knows that E will occur, and (2) God cannot be wrong, leads to the conclusion that E will occur.]

"Fallible" means that God could be wrong, that's all. As I said, there is an epistemological formulation under which the the word "know" does not preclude fallibility. I don't know the ins and outs of that (ask LJ), and so am just being careful and specific.

Originally posted by Conrau K
There is. I cannot say "P will know that E will occur (at time t1)" and "~E will occur (at time t1)". That is a contradiction.

No, there is no contradiction. 100% certainty is not required for knowledge. If it was, then we could not claim to know much of anything about the world, for there is always the chance that our 'real life' is nothing more than a dream or a simulation.

Originally posted by Agerg
but any timelines/futures that could have been available to us are removed from consideration when you assert that our future is known from something else's perspective

As I've suggested earlier suppose from God's perspective he knows that two days after some specific time t_0 in my frame of reference I shall do X at t_1
then at any time between t_0 and t_ ...[text shortened]... e will choices.

multiple futures really is a moot agument with your model of omniscience,

but any timelines/futures that could have been available to us are removed from consideration when you assert that our future is known from something else's perspective
-------------------agerg------------------

Why? If I know what Hitler will do in 1939 does that prove that at that moment in time he was not free?

You seem to not understand that free choices occur in the present moment in which they are contained. Just because God knows what our free choices will be in those moments does not prove that they are not free choices.

In a sense all it means is that our future is determined ahead of us by US!! Another way of thinking about it is that we are restricted to making that free choice we are going to make.

You ARE going to make a free choice tomorrow and your future is being determined by you in that tomorrow. You can make and will make and are making only one choice in that future moment.

God knows what your free choice is (and will be) and in that moment you will be free to make it. In a sense tomorrow's free choice is your destiny because you are freely choosing it in tomorrow's present moment. The fact that God knows this does not prove that it is the only destiny you could have had , it just shows that God knows your free choice tomorrow. He knows what you are destined and determined to freely choose. Because it's your destiny to make that free choice

In short the fact that you cannot make any other choice is not proof of determinism because you are setting your own destiny in place by your free choice. Nothing else is determining you but you in that present moment.

Right now you are making a free choice and you are totally free in this present moment, but whatever you choose is always known eternally by God and he knew this present moment yesterday. You could say that you were destined to make this choice you are now making , but that doesn't matter as long as you are free right now to do what you like.

Now , you may disagree with this idea but why can it not be possible?

Originally posted by knightmeister
but any timelines/futures that could have been available to us are removed from consideration when you assert that our future is known from something else's perspective
-------------------agerg------------------

Why? If I know what Hitler will do in 1939 does that prove that at that moment in time he was not free?

You seem to not understand th do what you like.

Now , you may disagree with this idea but why can it not be possible?

Why do you continue to use the Hitler analogy??? there exists no correspondence between you seeing what Hitler has done and a Hitler that has yet to make such a choice from its own perspective. Hitler existed in the same timeline as you and he is dead!!!

Your God supposedly exists externally to our timeline, and so if a correspondence exists between me having done X from God's perspective, and me yet to do X in the future from mine, X is all I can do, and it has been determined beforehand. If determined by me then arguing recursively, it can be shown that whatever action of mine determined that choice was determined by yet another prior choice. Continuing in this way we arrive either at an original scripted seed of all them 'future' choices or nonsense (in that some choice I make in te future was determind by me before I existed).

Furthermore, an omniscient God that lives externally to our timeline would know the state of our universe's entire timeline the instant he creates it! (for prior to our universe existing there was obviously no timeline associated with it) That timeline and the actions that occur within it would be direcly attributed to how he created the universe.

Originally posted by Agerg
[b]Why do you continue to use the Hitler analogy??? there exists no correspondence between you seeing what Hitler has done and a Hitler that has yet to make such a choice from its own perspective. Hitler existed in the same timeline as you and he is dead!!!

Your God supposedly exists externally to our timeline, and so if a correspondence exists between ...[text shortened]... the actions that occur within it would be direcly attributed to how he created the universe.[/b]

So if I had a time machine and could travel to tomorrow and watch you freely choosing to do X then that would suddenly make X not a free choice anymore? (by virtue of me knowing it)

Surely all I would have seen is your one choice and this would tell me nothing about whether it was free or not. What you seem to think is that in order for you to have free will I would have to see you making multiple choices?

(BTW - I'll stop mentioning Hitler if you drop this idea you have of "THE" future as opposed to a future which you have not arrived at from your relative perspective)

Originally posted by knightmeister
So if I had a time machine and could travel to tomorrow and watch you freely choosing to do X then that would suddenly make X not a free choice anymore? (by virtue of me knowing it)

Surely all I would have seen is your one choice and this would tell me nothing about whether it was free or not. What you seem to think is that in order for you to have ...[text shortened]... " future as opposed to a future which you have not arrived at from your relative perspective)

Do you have a time machine? no!
Do you know anyone who has a time machine other than ficticious characters in books and films? no!
Do you understand the paradoxes that would be caused by having a time machine? no!
Have you considered that you would have to exist in a timeline separate from ours in order to travel through time? no!

Your time-travelling analagy is total fail.

Again...and this is driving me nuts; if you form a correspondence between a perspecive where X has occured and another perspective where X has yet to occur in the future then there are no other futures. It isn't even important that your God knows X has occured!, merely the correspondence between two frames of reference for which in one of them X occured is important. Omniscient God merely implies this.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
No, there is no contradiction. 100% certainty is not required for knowledge. If it was, then we could not claim to know much of anything about the world, for there is always the chance that our 'real life' is nothing more than a dream or a simulation.

Actually, I do not see how certitude has anything to do with knowledge. If I know X is the case, that means I believe X to be true and in addition X is true. So 'P will knows E will occur' this entails that the proposition that 'E will occur' is true. This contradicts the second premise '~E will occur'.