05 Sep 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf a proposition P was 50.0001% probable, and ~P was only 49.9999 % possible, then you would believe P, disbelieve ~P, and suspect both P and ~P?
I don't know what you refer to by suspect in relation to some proposition P.
If it means acknolwedging that P is possible, then no, I can suspect P without believing P.
It if means acknowledging that P has some evidence in its favor, then no, I can suspect P without believing P.
Is there something else you mean by suspect in relation to a proposition?
So you don't think it is possible to suspend belief, where the balance of probability is not precisely .5?
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI never asserted that I would suspect anything. I still don't even know what you mean by that term.
If a proposition P was 50.0001% probable, and ~P was only 49.9999 % possible, then you would believe P, disbelieve ~P, and suspect both P and ~P?
So you don't think it is possible to suspend belief, where the balance of probability is not precisely .5?
If a proposition P was 50.0001% probable, and ~P was only 49.9999 % possible, then you would believe P, disbelieve ~P
Correct. That's just what belief means to me. "I believe P" is simply a shorthand of saying "I have considered the available evidence and conclude that P is more likely true than false."
So you don't think it is possible to suspend belief, where the balance of probability is not precisely .5?
Not subsequent to deliberation, no. It's not logically possible to do so according to my notion of belief.
05 Sep 06
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I never asserted that I would suspect anything. I still don't even know what you mean by that term.
Didn't you just state:
"It if means acknowledging that P has some evidence in its favor, then no, I can suspect P without believing P. "
Surely, then, you can suspect P and ~P as long as there is some evidence in their favour. Or don't 50.0001% and 49.9999% count as "some evidence"?
05 Sep 06
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Originally posted by DoctorScribblesConsider the following statements—
I assert that weak atheism denies God's existence. Thus, the only sensible distinction I accept between weak atheism and strong atheism is that strong atheism denies God's existence with certainty. Strong atheism is clearly not justified by any finite number of looks into the proverbial refrigerator.
“I refuse to believe the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence for such a being.”
“I deny the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence.”
“I deny the existence of God based on the following evidence: [e.g., the argument from evil, etc.].”
How would you characterize these differing positions?
It seems to me that you are saying that refusal to commit belief based on lack of evidence would be a proper definition of agnosticism, while all atheism entails a denial (i.e., active dis-belief)—and that a finite number of searches into the “refrigerator” is sufficient for such a denial, but not for certainty. Am I following you?
EDIT: In response to pawnokeyhole, you also seem to be saying that any level of evidence (or lack thereof) is sufficient for reasonably committing belief/disbelief.
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeWhat I stated was a hypothetical, the conclusion of which is only asserted to be true once you assert that the antecedant is true.
[b]I never asserted that I would suspect anything. I still don't even know what you mean by that term.
Didn't you just state:
"It if means acknowledging that P has some evidence in its favor, then no, I can suspect P without believing P. "
Surely, then, you can suspect P and ~P as long as there is some evidence in their favour. Or don't 50.0001% and 49.9999% count as "some evidence"?[/b]
Are you stating that to suspect P is to acknowledge that P has some evidence in its favor? If so, then yes, I would suspect both P and not-P in the current example. Of course, that indicates a silly notion of suspicion on your part, not mine.
05 Sep 06
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Originally posted by vistesd
“I refuse to believe the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence for such a being.”
“I deny the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence.”
“I deny the existence of God based on the following evidence: [e.g., the argument from evil, etc.].”
How would you characterize these differing positions?
while all at ...[text shortened]... the “refrigerator” is sufficient for such a denial, but not for certainty. Am I following you?
“I refuse to believe the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence for such a being.”
“I deny the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence.”
“I deny the existence of God based on the following evidence: [e.g., the argument from evil, etc.].”
How would you characterize these differing positions?
I would not characterize them as differing. They are propositionally equivalent.
while all atheism entails a denial (i.e., active dis-belief)—and that a finite number of searches into the “refrigerator” is sufficient for such a denial, but not for certainty. Am I following you?
That part is correct, provided the atheist has at least deliberated on the current evidence. I haven't spoken to agnosticism.
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI would not characterize them as differing. They are propositionally equivalent.
[b]
“I refuse to believe the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence for such a being.”
“I deny the existence of God, based on the lack of sufficient evidence.”
“I deny the existence of God based on the following evidence: [e.g., the argument from evil, etc.].”
How would you characterize these differing positions?
...[text shortened]... the atheist has at least deliberated on the current evidence. I haven't spoken to agnosticism.[/b]
Which affirms that absence of evidence is evidence (assuming some effort at looking for it). You are simply giving E a positive or negative sign in proposition.
Your argument vis-à-vis pawnokeyhole also treats life analogously to a poker game—no matter what words we choose to describe our reasons (or even whether or not we think about it), we either hold ‘em or fold ‘em, and our decision is manifest in how we play the game. Whether I designate my decision as one of belief or lack thereof, or disbelief, or unbelief, or denial—in my living of my life I manifest my decision about the existence of God. I’m not saying I disagree with that...I’m thinking about it.
(BTW, Doctor, you might like to know that I saved and printed out your dissertation of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning some time back...)
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by vistesdTo the usual" burden of proof" argument by theists I usually reply that absence of evidence is the ONLY evidence of absence of any logically possible entity.
Sometimes absence of evidence is evidence of absence. Would it be your position, Dr. S. (and Playnka, too) that in the case of “God,” such absence of evidence justifies the position of strong atheism? How many times should the atheist be required to “look in the refrigerator” in order for her position to be justifed?
Still, it's merely evidence, not proof. One look in the refrigerator would be sufficient although his position would be more adequately supported with every new look.
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesSorry for misattributing an assertion to you. It was your use of the pronoun "I" that threw me.
What I stated was a hypothetical, the conclusion of which is only asserted to be true once you assert that the antecedant is true.
Are you stating that to suspect P is to acknowledge that P has some evidence in its favor? If so, then yes, I would suspect both P and not-P in the current example. Of course, that indicates a silly notion of suspicion on your part, not mine.
I don't endorse the definition of "suspect" you outline.
Most people would reserve use of the word "believe" for situations in which they regard the evidence in favor of P to be substantially greater than .5. In addition, they would reserve use of the word "suspect" for situations in which they regard the evidence in favor of P to be somewhat greater than P but not a substantially greater, always less than what would be required for belief.
You can define "believe" however you like. However, showing some deference to conventional meanings might be advisable. You are, after all, seeking to communicate effectively with others. What not indicate your special technical meaning with an asterisk for clarity?
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by vistesd
(BTW, Doctor, you might like to know that I saved and printed out your dissertation of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning some time back...)
Which affirms that absence of evidence is evidence (assuming some effort at looking for it). You are simply giving E a positive or negative sign in proposition.
Your argument vis-à-vis pawnokeyhole also treats life analogously to a poker game—no matter what words we choose to describe our reasons (or even whether or not we think about it), we either hold ‘em or fold ‘em, and our decision is manifest in how we play the game. Whether I designate my decision as one of belief or lack thereof, or disbelief, or unbelief, or denial—in my living of my life I manifest my decision about the existence of God.
That's exactly correct.
(BTW, Doctor, you might like to know that I saved and printed out your dissertation of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning some time back...)
Shhh. Don't tell Pawnokeyhole. He might look it up and figure out that suspicion is an abductive phenomenon, and that we are discussing inductive phenomena.
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by PalynkaOkay. I’ll only note that I have been using the word “proof” broadly, without regard to levels of proof—e.g., sufficiency of evidence, preponderance of evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, certainty, etc.
To the usual" burden of proof" argument by theists I usually reply that absence of evidence is the ONLY evidence of absence of any logically possible entity.
Still, it's merely evidence, not proof. One look in the refrigerator would be sufficient although his position would be more adequately supported with every new look.
05 Sep 06
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Originally posted by vistesdThe trouble with this characterization is that a belief admits of degree whereas a decision doesn't.
[b]I would not characterize them as differing. They are propositionally equivalent.
Which affirms that absence of evidence is evidence (assuming some effort at looking for it). You are simply giving E a positive or negative sign in proposition.
Your argument vis-à-vis pawnokeyhole also treats life analogously to a poker game—no matter what ...[text shortened]... printed out your dissertation of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning some time back...)[/b]
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeThe distinction is valid, but I’m not sure I see the problem. With regard to theism, there seem to me to be only three possible choices:
The trouble with this characterization is that a belief admits of degree whereas a decision doesn't.
(1) deferral of opinion pending further evidence—which, if it is to be done in good faith, implies (a) a real belief that present evidence is not sufficient to allow a further decision, coupled with (b) the decision to seek such evidence; otherwise, it is indistinguishable from (3) below.
(2) deciding in favor of the existence of God.
(3) deciding against the existence of God.
In each case, one will have some degree of belief that indicates that is a proper decision.
05 Sep 06
Originally posted by vistesdYes, some degree of belief or disbelief. But that's not the same as a belief.
The distinction is valid, but I’m not sure I see the problem. With regard to theism, there seem to me to be only three possible choices:
(1) deferral of opinion pending further evidence—which, if it is to be done in good faith, implies (a) a real belief that present evidence is not sufficient to allow a further decision, coupled with (b) the decision to ...[text shortened]... .
In each case, one will have some degree of belief that indicates that is a proper decision.
The good Dr. S. will go mental over this. But only because, as an intellectual iconclast, he refuses to defer to conventional meanings.