Originally posted by FreakyKBHOriginally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]No.
It sure sounds like you are when you say such things as "science is committed." Just saying.
Firstly, methodological naturalism is constitutive of 'science' as understood by competent speakers of English.
Well, of course it is, dear. Of course it is. However, if we wish to go beyond merely competently speaking the language to the ...[text shortened]... the data in order to draw conclusions about the data. Hmm. Part of the data, then?[/b]
It sure sounds like you are when you say such things as "science is committed." Just saying.
So if I say that dog owners are those who own one or more dogs, would I be limiting these people in some way or just clarifying terms? I think the latter. If you disagree, then that would explain why you interpret what I've said in the way you did.
Well, of course it is, dear. Of course it is.
I'm glad you agree.
However, if we wish to go beyond merely competently speaking the language to the level of understanding what the hell is being said, we'll have to do better than what you've offered.
I don't think there is anything 'mere' about speaking competently about complex issues. You illustrate this fact quite well actually.
Methodological naturalism is either open or it is closed, flexible or rigid. When you start to spit out phrases that sound all sciencey and whatnot, you ought to take the extra step of knowing what it is that you're speaking about.
Physician heal thyself, since all this talk of yours about 'open or closed' or 'flexible or rigid' seems very woolly to me. Perhaps you will clarify?
Can you see those three words nearly in the middle of this statement? "Do not admit" has a way of limiting things, don't you think?
You think it is my claim that limits scientists? Who told them I made it? Why was I not told? You'd better alert the dog owners as well come to think of it 🙂
Originally posted by FreakyKBHLessee... logic is not transcendent in your worldview, but it is applied to the data in order to draw conclusions about the data. Hmm. Part of the data, then?
[b]No.
It sure sounds like you are when you say such things as "science is committed." Just saying.
Firstly, methodological naturalism is constitutive of 'science' as understood by competent speakers of English.
Well, of course it is, dear. Of course it is. However, if we wish to go beyond merely competently speaking the language to the ...[text shortened]... the data in order to draw conclusions about the data. Hmm. Part of the data, then?[/b]
I'm not sure what you mean by 'transcendent' here. Could you clarify please?
Originally posted by Lord SharkSo if I say that dog owners are those who own one or more dogs, would I be limiting these people in some way or just clarifying terms?
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
It sure sounds like you are when you say such things as "science is committed." Just saying.
So if I say that dog owners are those who own one or more dogs, would I be limiting these people in some way or just clarifying terms? I think the latter. If you disagree, then that would explain why you interpret what ...[text shortened]... s I not told? You'd better alert the dog owners as well come to think of it 🙂[/b]
Apples, oranges.
The illustration you use is qualifying, i.e., you are describing what makes an owner as such. However, you cannot say a dog owner is someone who owns dog(s), whether or not they own any dogs at all... which is essentially what you did with your first statement relative to what a scientist may consider.
I'm glad you agree.
Well, I guess if a soul is going to be tone-deaf in any regard, sarcasm isn't the worst one to pick.
I don't think there is anything 'mere' about speaking competently about complex issues. You illustrate this fact quite well actually.
Cute. Lacking in substance, but cute, nonetheless. Good for you!
Physician heal thyself, since all this talk of yours about 'open or closed' or 'flexible or rigid' seems very woolly to me. Perhaps you will clarify?
There's not "all this talk," really, just a simple statement. Namely, methodological naturalism is not science in pure when it rigidly disallows any possibility of outside influence--- especially in light of logical inference otherwise. To begin with MN is not a crime; however, when faced with overwhelming evidence (both from without, as well as irreconcilable conflict within), a flexible methodology allows for logic to work its magic.
Logic is transcendent in your equation, as you use it to come to some conclusions and relations, therefore, it does not abide by the rules of your stated rigid MN. A flexible one--- which you exhibit when you use logic--- is more reflective of the stated tenets of science.
Originally posted by FreakyKBHOriginally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]So if I say that dog owners are those who own one or more dogs, would I be limiting these people in some way or just clarifying terms?
Apples, oranges.
The illustration you use is qualifying, i.e., you are describing what makes an owner as such. However, you cannot say a dog owner is someone who owns dog(s), whether or not they own any dogs at al ...[text shortened]... ou exhibit when you use logic--- is more reflective of the stated tenets of science.[/b]
Apples, oranges.
The illustration you use is qualifying, i.e., you are describing what makes an owner as such. However, you cannot say a dog owner is someone who owns dog(s), whether or not they own any dogs at all...
That was my point. Owning one or more dogs is a necessary condition of being a dog owner. Methodological naturalism is a necessary condition of science. You can say 'goddunnit' if you like, but then you have stopped doing science.
which is essentially what you did with your first statement relative to what a scientist may consider.
No. What I did was say that necessarily, in order to be a dog owner you must own at least one dog. Necessarily, in order to be doing science your methodology must not use supernatural elements.
Well, I guess if a soul is going to be tone-deaf in any regard, sarcasm isn't the worst one to pick.
I don't think it was tone deafness so much as a principle of charity.
Cute. Lacking in substance, but cute, nonetheless.
Thanks darling. I'm not confident in your ability to adjudicate on matters of substance though.
There's not "all this talk," really, just a simple statement. Namely, methodological naturalism is not science in pure when it rigidly disallows any possibility of outside influence--- especially in light of logical inference otherwise. To begin with MN is not a crime; however, when faced with overwhelming evidence (both from without, as well as irreconcilable conflict within), a flexible methodology allows for logic to work its magic.
I disagree. The methodology of science deals with natural phenomena by attempting to model these and testing the models against data. The models include such elements as causal mechanisms and laws. To complain that this is 'rigid' because it doesn't include supernatural elements is like complaining that the definition of 'dog owner' is too restrictive because it doesn't admit those who only own cats. Methodological naturalism is silent on the existence of god, which is an ontological question. Methodological naturalism does not entail ontological naturalism.
I have not seen any 'overwhelming evidence' of outside influence.
Logic is transcendent in your equation, as you use it to come to some conclusions and relations, therefore, it does not abide by the rules of your stated rigid MN. A flexible one--- which you exhibit when you use logic--- is more reflective of the stated tenets of science.
There is nothing about my use of logic which is incompatible with MN. If you think there is then you have misunderstood either MN or the role of logic, or both in my view.
Originally posted by Lord SharkMethodological naturalism is a necessary condition of science. You can say 'goddunnit' if you like, but then you have stopped doing science.
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Apples, oranges.
The illustration you use is qualifying, i.e., you are describing what makes an owner as such. However, you cannot say a dog owner is someone who owns dog(s), whether or not they own any dogs at all...
That was my point. Owning one or more dogs is a necessary condition of being a dog owner. Me ...[text shortened]... then you have misunderstood either MN or the role of logic, or both in my view.[/b]
In this, you err. Rigid MN is anything BUT science, at least, if one is to follow the spirit of science. Its establishment as a discipline and field of study is an instrument in man's search for truth. As such, it is not limited to pursue anywhere truth may take the one in pursuit. Were that the case, for example, Einstein's theory of relativity (better: invariance) would never be allowed for consideration.
By its very terminology, a rigid MN is circular logic: everything that has occurred in nature is natural. What a trivial statement to make! But to take it a step further to state that only nature can cause events is to end up in absurdity... and certainly not in line with what has traditionally been the scientific viewpoint. Specifically, science has been the pursuit of the logical explanation. MN is nothing more than a high-jacking of science.
Your attempt to paint all scientists as beholden to a rigid MN is patently false, but you likely already knew that before you posted your linguistic gymnastics, huh.
There is nothing about my use of logic which is incompatible with MN.
So are you now claiming logic to be a result of purely natural causes?
Originally posted by FreakyKBHIn this, you err. Rigid MN is anything BUT science, at least, if one is to follow the spirit of science.
[b]Methodological naturalism is a necessary condition of science. You can say 'goddunnit' if you like, but then you have stopped doing science.
In this, you err. Rigid MN is anything BUT science, at least, if one is to follow the spirit of science. Its establishment as a discipline and field of study is an instrument in man's search for truth. As s ...[text shortened]... patible with MN.[/b]
So are you now claiming logic to be a result of purely natural causes?[/b]
I disagree. There is nothing 'rigid' (in the pejorative sense of the term) about MN. One must adopt MN in order to follow the spirit of science.
Its establishment as a discipline and field of study is an instrument in man's search for truth. As such, it is not limited to pursue [b]anywhere truth may take the one in pursuit.[/b]
I agree that science is a discipline, a collection of methodologies and procedures that seek truth. However, it might be a kind of truth that your dance was beautiful but it doesn't follow that this falls into the remit of science. Science deals with natural phenomena, empirical questions.
By its very terminology, a rigid MN is circular logic: everything that has occurred in nature is natural.
I don't recognise this as a useful description of MN, sorry.
But to take it a step further to state that only nature can cause events is to end up in absurdity... and certainly not in line with what has traditionally been the scientific viewpoint.
You seem to be confusing methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism. Can I suggest that you look at this in more detail by reading about the philosophy of science and methodological naturalism perhaps?
Your attempt to paint all scientists as beholden to a rigid MN is patently false, but you likely already knew that before you posted your linguistic gymnastics, huh.
I'm sorry but I just don't think you know what you are talking about.
So are you now claiming logic to be a result of purely natural causes?
This is a non sequitur.
Originally posted by Lord SharkOne must adopt MN in order to follow the spirit of science.
In this, you err. Rigid MN is anything BUT science, at least, if one is to follow the spirit of science.
I disagree. There is nothing 'rigid' (in the pejorative sense of the term) about MN. One must adopt MN in order to follow the spirit of science.
Its establishment as a discipline and field of study is an instrument in man's search for trut now claiming logic to be a result of purely natural causes?
This is a non sequitur.[/b]
Then you should reveal what you consider to be the "spirit of science," since the history of science stands in complete opposition to what you've offered to date.
However, it might be a kind of truth that your dance was beautiful but it doesn't follow that this falls into the remit of science.
So my dance is transcendent? Is the dance physical? Does it happen in space/time? Can it be measured? Can it be 'adjudicated?' Huh.
Science deals with natural phenomena, empirical questions.
So I guess the tens, the tens of thousands, the hundreds of thousands, the millions of people who have empirically witnessed the supernatural acts of a being calling itself God, are to be discounted? Pffft.
I don't recognise this as a useful description of MN, sorry.
It's probably not very interesting, either. Feel free to substitute your own definition, which, in the end, will find itself in the same cul de sac.
You seem to be confusing methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism. Can I suggest that you look at this in more detail by reading about the philosophy of science and methodological naturalism perhaps?
Sure. I guess I'll see you in--- what? six or eight years, jackass?--- I don't think you can get off that easily. Excellent effort, nonetheless. If there is some technical error I've overlooked or over-reached in my summary, be a good sport and point it out. Otherwise, lay in the bed you made.
I'm sorry but I just don't think you know what you are talking about.
Well, you certainly had the first part correct. If you want to continue obvious falsities, feel free. However, there is no escaping the fact that scientists throughout the world conduct themselves in complete opposition to your supposed iron-clad rules for scientific endeavors. That's kinda what makes them, um, scientists, as opposed to proselytizers.
This is a non sequitur.
Ah. I see.
You're deathly afraid of calling a hoe a spade. Answer the question, sir. Is logic a result of purely natural causes, or not?
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI'm confused (this probably does not surprise you). I thought that Methodological Naturalism was simply a view about the types of explanations we should seek in scientific inquiry. Science does not explain anything by reference to logical truths or logical inferences. Those are just abstract and formal, and do not enter in to the content of explanations. Science explains things by uncovering the constitution of things, their causal powers and relationships. Science uses logic to get to explanations, but logic is not itself part of those explanations. So, even if logical truths are non-natural, it would be no threat to MN. It would be a threat to Ontological Naturalism, but that is a metaphysical view, not a methodological one.
One must adopt MN in order to follow the spirit of science.
Then you should reveal what you consider to be the "spirit of science," since the history of science stands in complete opposition to what you've offered to date.
However, it might be a kind of truth that your dance was beautiful but it doesn't follow that this falls into the remit o . Answer the question, sir. Is logic a result of purely natural causes, or not?
Originally posted by bbarrThank you for intoning. I know that we are often at odds with one another, but I respect your opinions and achievements nonetheless. To be certain, like E.F. Hutton, when you speak, I (among others) pay attention!
I'm confused (this probably does not surprise you). I thought that Methodological Naturalism was simply a view about the types of explanations we should seek in scientific inquiry. Science does not explain anything by reference to logical truths or logical inferences. Those are just abstract and formal, and do not enter in to the content of explanati ...[text shortened]... a threat to Ontological Naturalism, but that is a metaphysical view, not a methodological one.
Science is knowledge. As such, to claim that one methodology is the scientific method is akin to claiming that one denomination is the pipeline to God. When I say a 'rigid' MN, I am specifically referring to a method which precludes logic, only allowing for a natural cause to a natural event. It precludes logic because logic is not a result of natural causes.
I wholeheartedly agree with you and Lord Shark when it comes to the majority of events that are being played out before our eyes: what we see happening around us is a result of explainable forces. However, logic is not allowed when one employs a strict MN viewpoint, i.e., only a naturalistic explanation will be accepted, even if the logical explanation would make more sense... and the logical explanation is something other than simply nature being nature, or, God.
I also agree that logic is not in opposition in discussions about nature, insofar as one acknowledges that logic itself is not of natural origins. It is when a position is taken wherein logic is seen as a disembodied something--- no connection to nature, and no acquiescence to anything other--- that a conflict is presented. Thus, my assertion that logic is transcendent, and at complete odds with MN. Not at odds with (knowledge) science, just at odds with a rigid MN.
Were one armed with an MN viewpoint to arrive at a irresistible supernatural explanation, the same would be forced to either abandon their rigid, closed MN or adopt a new MN: flexible and open. Thus, my reference to the two types of MN.
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Then you should reveal what you consider to be the "spirit of science," since the history of science stands in complete opposition to what you've offered to date.
I think you have misinterpreted what I have offered, which is a simple description of how science goes about its business. Show me some papers in respected peer reviewed scientific journals that posit supernatural causes as part of their explanatory models. If you can't do that, maybe you should consider the possibility that I'm right, and whilst MN does not preclude the possibility of supernatural agents and their influence on the world, none of the methodologies deployed by the different branches of science allow the use of supernatural agents in their explanatory framework. The reason for this is not that MN stipulates that they don't exist. That isn't the issue, and it is pretty obvious that you just haven't understood this point. The issue is that science is unable to make progress, construct useful models or make validatable predictions by saying 'goddunnit'.
So my dance is transcendent? Is the dance physical? Does it happen in space/time? Can it be measured? Can it be 'adjudicated?' Huh.
Possibly, yes, yes, yes, yes. So what? You think science can have the last word on aesthetics? Huh?
So I guess the tens, the tens of thousands, the hundreds of thousands, the millions of people who have empirically witnessed the supernatural acts of a being calling itself God, are to be discounted? Pffft.
If by 'discounted' you mean that I don't automatically believe their interpretation of their own experience, then yes. People are notoriously bad at interpreting their own experience in some circumstances.
It's probably not very interesting, either. Feel free to substitute your own definition, which, in the end, will find itself in the same cul de sac.
Don't take my word for it, do some research.
Sure. I guess I'll see you in--- what? six or eight years, jackass?--- I don't think you can get off that easily.
Dang.
If there is some technical error I've overlooked or over-reached in my summary, be a good sport and point it out.
I already have, and so has bbarr. Basically, it seems to boil down to you making up your own definition of MN and arguing against that, despite the fact that your notion of it is at odds with what the philosophers of science and people with some education about this field think. I have politely suggested that you look it up and read a little though, so we can have a meaningful conversation about it. I'm sure it wouldn't take even six years. Six minutes maybe. Or perhaps even twice that.
Well, you certainly had the first part correct.
Ah, the old ones are the best, eh?
Ah. I see.
You're deathly afraid of calling a hoe a spade. Answer the question, sir. Is logic a result of purely natural causes, or not?
I think logic is something people do, so if people are part of the natural world then I think the answer is yes.
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThanks. Although some of our disagreements are intractable (and heated!), I always read your posts. Whenever you take issue with something I've written, I always stop and wonder whether I've mischaracterized your view, or have misjudged my arguments in some way. We both give as good as we get, I think, but we get further when we step back and try to understand where the other is coming from. With some, I don't bother. With you, it pays dividends to bother.
Thank you for intoning. I know that we are often at odds with one another, but I respect your opinions and achievements nonetheless. To be certain, like E.F. Hutton, when you speak, I (among others) pay attention!
Science is knowledge. As such, to claim that one methodology is the scientific method is akin to claiming that one denomination is d, closed MN or adopt a new MN: flexible and open. Thus, my reference to the two types of MN.
I disagree that science just is knowledge. Although there are etymological reasons that support your claim, there are terms in addition to "scientia", like "episteme" and "techne" that also mean "knowledge". I think the etymological reasons support the claim that science is knowledge of a particular sort; knowledge that derives from a particular type of inquiry. When I use the term "science" in debates like this one, I am referring to a type of inquiry which systematically yields explanations of phenomena.
So, I think there are a few related questions that need to be answered before we even get to discussing MN as a constraint on scientific inquiry. We need to determine which phenomena are proper objects of scientific inquiry. We also need to know what is to count as a legitimate explanation of these phenomena. We also need to determine the type of inquiry best suited to provide these sorts of explanations. With plausible answers to these questions, we'll be in a better position to assess whether MN makes sense as a constraint.
Suppose that the phenomena in which we're interested are typical physical events, and perhaps the behavior of agents. This seems like a plausible start, though you may think it is impoverished. Perhaps we should include other phenomena, like introspectively accessible psychological states. I'm not sure. This is up for grabs.
What does it mean to explain phenomena such as these? This is a very difficult question, and there is little philosophical consensus on what explanations require (or, indeed, what counts as the best explanation for purposes of abductive inference). But roughly, and as a start, it seems like explaining events of the sort mentioned above requires clarification of just what is going on in those events. So, you want an explanation of lightning? It helps to know that lightning is the movement of electrons. You want an explanation of water freezing? It helps to know that water is H20. But explanations seem to require more than uncovering essences, or reducing one class of events to another, or one ontological set to an ontological set couched at a lower level. We also want causal relationships. We want to know what causes massive electron movements. We want to know what causes H20 to go from a liquid to solid state. So explanations seem to require both the clarification of key notions used in the descriptions of the phenomena at issue, and the identification of causal relationships that obtain between the referents of those notions and other things in the world.
Note that these are not the components of all explanations. If you want an explanation for why some inferences are justified, or why some mathematical truth holds, you'll not look to causes. You'll look to the content of the concepts involved (or more, perhaps, depending on where you come down on debates about contingent and necessary truths, analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge, etc.). But, then again, scientific inquiry as practiced today doesn't deal with these sorts of issues. Typically science doesn't bother with issues in normative epistemology (and shouldn't, whatever Quine thought) or formal deductive systems. It deals with descriptively specifiable, contingent facts about the actual world.
Now, what type of inquiry is best suited to provide explanations of this sort? MN is claiming that inquiry should eschew non-natural metaphysical posits. We should aim to clarify phenomena by looking exclusively towards the natural world. We should aim to uncover causal relationships by positing and attempting to disconfirm natural causes of the phenomena at issue. Perhaps you think this constraint is too strong, or that it will lead us astray, or that it begs the question against legitimate possible explanations, or that it will in fact render some phenomena inexplicable by scientific inquiry. All those worries are legitimate, and each has been levied at the scientific establishment in some form or other. In psychology, for instance, Methodological Behaviorism was attacked by cognitive scientists as unduly limiting our ability to explain the behavior of agents, because it forced scientists to ignore what was going on inside the minds of agents. So, the structure of your concern is not without precedent.
But I don't understand why the use of logic renders MN inconsistent, or why it is in tension with MN. MN governs the sort of ontology we're prepared to posit in our explanations. We clarify phenomena only by showing how they arise from the natural world. We uncover causes only by positing causal powers of, or causal relations between, elements of the natural world. Logic itself, either construed as a set of abstract, transcendent laws, or as conceptual truths, or as a codification of the inescapable structure of thought (roughly Kant's view) does not enter into these explanations. Of course, we need logic to get to these explanations. Our scientific inferences are good or bad to the extent that they cohere with those standards that determine what counts as deduction, or strong induction, or good abduction. But the content of the actual explanations (e.g. "E happened because E is really F, and F is caused by the interaction of x and y) makes no reference to laws of logic, theorems of logic, inferences licensed by logic, or anything else of this sort.
Originally posted by pink floyd123Which god? The christian god? Or any god as an intelligent creator?
VERY NICE, i have read alot about the laws of physics and it seems to me that there is an inteligent desin its not just jumbo mumbo and i am not a religion freak but i can see the day when they at least come close to finding GOD
Originally posted by Lord SharkI think the clip is not complete, starting with the end of Quad 1 and continuing with Quad 2. Otherwise it seems consistent with the stage directions.
The quad diagram in that wiki...I can't reconcile it with the clip. What am I missing?
The movements also seem consistent with some depleted version of chess.
Originally posted by galveston75“…I'm curious what scientific facts prove there is no God?...”
Well the old saying really applies here to some extent, "You can't see the forest for the trees."
In reality everything we see around us is from God. I'm curious what scientific facts prove there is no God?
That’s asking the wrong question; like, in a debate about whether the tooth fairy exists, asking; “what scientific facts prove there is no tooth fairy?...” as if the absence of evidence against something equates with evidence for something!
Originally posted by Bosse de NageWell I'm definitely missing something because the arrows on the quad diagram seem to indicate counter-clockwise motion at the centre, whereas the dancers only turn to their left which, as you can see from the clip, gives clockwise motion at the centre.
I think the clip is not complete, starting with the end of Quad 1 and continuing with Quad 2. Otherwise it seems consistent with the stage directions.
The movements also seem consistent with some depleted version of chess.