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10 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdHey it's a fascinating discussion, I am intrigued how it will turnout.
I tend to agree with all of that (although, since my purpose here has not been to present a particular argument—but to test the parameters of argument—I will wait and see if any counter-arguments are forthcoming). An analogy might be “multiverses” as opposed to a “manifold universe”. If there no information can pass between multiple universes then, at best ...[text shortened]... willing to cast what was likely your position anyway in terms of the experiment I’m trying here.
10 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357…as deity normally entails criteria that have not been introduced.
WRT monotheism it seems to me the entity G can consist of parts, aspects, bundled qualities, etc. I don't think deity should be inferred, as deity normally entails criteria that have not been introduced.
But I wonder why G is called an 'entity' that exists, while U is called 'states of affairs' that exist.
I am drawn to the idea that G encompasses its H ...[text shortened]... mate bottom of things, but the ifs and woulds leave me wondering, what's the bottom line?
True, but a dualist theism I think entails at least the criteria that have been introduced. A dualist theism cannot fly without an underlying dualist metaphysics.
But I wonder why G is called an 'entity' that exists, while U is called 'states of affairs' that exist.
I suppose we could call G a “state of affairs” as well, but wouldn’t that be confusing in discourse?
I'm not following the note on 3b. I do think nondualism has to be at the ultimate bottom of things, but the ifs and woulds leave me wondering, what's the bottom line?
Nondualism may or may not have to be at the bottom of things (I am a nondualist, but the matter here is the sustainability of a strictly dualist view). If 3(b) holds, then H—unless specifically excepted—is a subset of U, and dualism collapses.
I suspect that dualism does collapse, at precisely the points that you and twhitehead and googlefudge have articulated. But, we have not yet heard a dualist counter-argument. And I am struggling to maintain an agnostic opinion just for the sake of seeing how this thread plays out. I thought that it made sense to try to articulate an inference such as has developed, with help from you guys, that in a sense might specify the parameters of argument for dualism—e.g., the conditions that would need to obtain.
Now, I suspect that many (most?) theists would not accept H—even not as a subset as U. And that would lead to additional criteria, and start to move from dualistic metaphysics to dualist theism, I think. But I think that an H disjunct (if that’s a verb?!) from U defeats any epistemological warrant for believing G exists. That might be sufficient, but I am wondering if there is not a stronger position to be taken. And I just want to see. (An H that is not disjunct from U reduces to nondualism.)
10 Oct 11
Originally posted by googlefudgeI thank you for taking part. (It is hard for me to restrain my own nondualism; but, as I indicated to bbarr, I also want the practice of trying to pose questions from the framework of an analytical philosophy—so that I might do it better, even as a layperson, in the future.)
Hey it's a fascinating discussion, I am intrigued how it will turnout.
10 Oct 11
TT: You're searching in the wrong place for God.
GF: I am not searching for god.
TT: ...And therein lies your problem.
JS357: Not searching is the solution.
TT: ! somebody understands !
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Now, I am a big fan of Zen koans—but I don’t see one here. No one is searching for god here. The thread has to do with metaphysical dualism of a certain sort as a necessary underpinning to dualist theism (which, as has been pointed out) requires further criteria. If the former is defeated, the latter is defeated as well. Although the terminology is—as twhitehead points out—(technically, i.e., actually) incoherent, the phrase, a “causal” dualist metaphysics, I think communicates the idea under discussion.; and most dualist theists would not, I think, acknowledge the problem with “causal”. So I don’t know what TT’s point is in this thread. And I really would like to accommodate disparate arguments—as long as there is an argument (or at least a koan).
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10 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdThanks, I wonder if we are ready to roll with the questions. Here are my initial responses. I don't intend to get into a defense of them.
[b]…as deity normally entails criteria that have not been introduced.
True, but a dualist theism I think entails at least the criteria that have been introduced. A dualist theism cannot fly without an underlying dualist metaphysics.
But I wonder why G is called an 'entity' that exists, while U is called 'states of affairs' that exist.
I ...[text shortened]... taken. And I just want to see. (An H that is not disjunct from U reduces to nondualism.)[/b]
Q1: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of G to be possible?
Q2: Is the notion of a non-contingent G coherent? If so, how? [This goes to necessity of H.]
Q3: How can any being in U know (i) that G exists, and (ii) that U is contingent on G?
Q1: Existence must mean more than "as a concept" and the like, otherwise the question is uninteresting. We are talking about G having instantiation in a dimensional habitat H (even if that H is an aspect or part of G). Logical possibility has been mentioned as necessary. I agree, at least to the extent that it allows rational thought on the subject. However, logical possibility cannot be ascertained until everything that is said about G, has been examined. Nomological possibility (consistency with known science) is not required, as there may be a habitat having different science. Satisfying the necessary conditions satisfies the sufficient conditions, for possibility (not for actuality).
Q2: The notion of non-contingency of G is not only coherent, it is required. Whatever G is thought to be contingent upon, must be considered to be an element of G, neutralizing the issue. G would not even be self-contingent -- that being the ability to not exist.
Q3: I do not believe that any of the ways we justify calling a belief knowledge, can suffice here, at least, in any worthwhile sense of "knowledge." Also, our best understanding of what "G exists" means might be inadequate. After all, we agree that chickens don't know this, and we are more like chickens than we want to admit. I think that is the state of affairs for this U. It might be a necessary state of affairs for any U; any resident of a G-contingent U might be able to imagine some sort of G, but might be constitutionally unable to actually know the answers to these questions in any worthwhile sense.
10 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdI am having trouble understanding what 1-4 have to do with dualism.
[b]First Reformulation
Here is an attempted reformulation of the OP, based on suggestions/objections so far—
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G;
3(a). There exist states of affairs that are not G; (b) the totality of such states of affairs we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G’s existence. ...[text shortened]... r now despite recognizing twhitehead’s objection; I would be happy to substitute a better word.[/b]
1-3 certainly seem to have nothing to do with establishing dualism.
(Compare to:
1'. There exists an entity we will call LemonJello's cat.
2'. There is only one LemonJello's cat.
3'(a). There exist states of affairs that are not LemonJello's cat; (b) the totality of such states of affairs we will call U'.)
And 4 seems neither necessary nor sufficient for dualism either, since there are many differing views with respect to efficaciousness (or interaction or some such) within dualism.
I would think that to make it dualistic, it needs to be more explicit that G differs in fundamental kind or category from at least something else. Maybe I am just not getting it....
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10 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesd
TT: You're searching in the wrong place for God.
GF: I am not searching for god.
TT: ...And therein lies your problem.
JS357: Not searching is the solution.
TT: ! somebody understands !
___________________________________________________
Now, I am a big fan of Zen koans—but I don’t see one here. No one is searching for god here. The ...[text shortened]... mmodate disparate arguments—as long as there is an argument (or at least a koan).
The thread has to do with metaphysical dualism of a certain sort as a necessary underpinning to dualist theism (which, as has been pointed out) requires further criteria. If the former is defeated, the latter is defeated as well.
I hope we deal specifically with this.
10 Oct 11
3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloThanks for coming in LJ.
I am having trouble understanding what 1-4 have to do with dualism.
1-3 certainly seem to have nothing to do with establishing dualism.
(Compare to:
1'. There exists an entity we will call LemonJello's cat.
2'. There is only one LemonJello's cat.
3'(a). There exist states of affairs that are not LemonJello's cat; (b) the totality of such s mental kind or category from at least something else. Maybe I am just not getting it....
I would think that to make it dualistic, it needs to be more explicit that G differs in fundamental kind or category from at least something else.
I’m not sure this is correct. The inference makes explicit that U is all that is not G (perhaps we should include that G is all that is not U). The point of nondualism (by which I do not mean a strict monism) is that this U cannot be defined as excluding either LJ or vistesd—although some other, possible U might exclude either or both. But we have explicitly defined U as excluding G. And, with reference to multiple U’s, that G is excluded from the set of all U’s. I don’t see why that exclusion is not sufficient, coupled with a one-way contingency, for dualism to hold.
[By way of analogy, how could nondualism with regard to natural phenomena hold if, for example, the ocean could be excluded from the gulf stream—ontologically or epistemologically?]
Nevertheless, we have been batting about, really, the question of the non-contingency of G. Such non-contingency would surely satisfy your concerns—but is it coherent to speak of a non-contingent being? That can be coherently thought of as a being without that conception being dependent on the H that JS357 mentioned? How does one think of a being without that distinction being contingent on some relational ground? If the categorical difference is the non-contingency of G, then I think that the dualist metaphysics falls.
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LATE EDIT: Okay, I'm still thinking about this. I think the key may be that you did not include that "U is contingent on LJ's cat". In a nondualist model, everything is really contingent on everything else. G would be contingent on U. U--as it actually is! (or this U)--is contingent on the existence of LJ's cat; otherwise it would be a different U entirely. But i think that we can talk about different kinds of exclusion as well; I just haven't thought it out yet...
10 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357Me too.The thread has to do with metaphysical dualism of a certain sort as a necessary underpinning to dualist theism (which, as has been pointed out) requires further criteria. If the former is defeated, the latter is defeated as well.
I hope we deal specifically with this.
11 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdPlease be patient with me. I may simply be failing to understand the usage of 'dualism' at play here.
Thanks for coming in LJ.
[b]I would think that to make it dualistic, it needs to be more explicit that G differs in fundamental kind or category from at least something else.
I’m not sure this is correct. The inference makes explicit that U is all that is not G (perhaps we should include that G is all that is not U). The point of nondualism (b ...[text shortened]... can talk about different kinds of exclusion as well; I just haven't thought it out yet...[/b]
I would think that in order to establish the commitment to dualism you would need to establish the commitment that, within some realm of discourse, there are two fundamental kinds of things. I do not understand how the exclusion by definition you mention or the discussion about modal status accomplishes this. It would be one thing if the exclusion operation you mention entailed a distinction in kind. But it does not as far as I can tell, since it just involves exclusion on the basis of identity. (Is X identical with G? If no, then X is "excluded" from G.) But this seems wholly consistent with the denial of dualism, since one could exclude things on the basis that they are not identical with each other and yet still hold that they are of the same kind. And then I also do not see how contingent versus non-contingent (necessary) status is critical either. Either way should be compatible with the denial of dualism, since one could hold that things of the same kind can have different modal status.
Hopefully this makes my concern more clear. Again, I may be failing to understand the usage here. But (in regards to what you called the First Reformulation), I cannot understand why we should think 1-4 implicates dualism.
11 Oct 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloNo, I’ve been thinking about it, and I think you’re right. However, a simple difference in kind doesn’t get it either—LJ’s cat and a stone, for instance. I’ll keep thinking at it. But what would you think are the requirements for a metaphysical dualism that would provide a basis for (with other considerations added) a dualistic theism? How would you modify the formulation?
Please be patient with me. I may simply be failing to understand the usage of 'dualism' at play here.
I would think that in order to establish the commitment to dualism you would need to establish the commitment that, within some realm of discourse, there are two fundamental kinds of things. I do not understand how the exclusion by definition you m ...[text shortened]... ed the First Reformulation), I cannot understand why we should think 1-4 implicates dualism.
Thanks.
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11 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdOK I will submit for discussion the following premise:
Me too.
If there is a G that is the source/basis/whatever-word-applies of all that is purported to be dualistically other than G, then by its being what it is, there is in fact nothing (no thing) other than G. All such supposed things are manifestations of G to the creatures of G (who are themselves manifestations of G).
Sorry it's convoluted. Maybe someone can simplify it.
I think Alan Watts' idea that we are a cosmic self playing hide and seek with itself is a good summary.
"In several of his later publications, especially Beyond Theology and The Book on the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are, Watts put forward a worldview, drawing on Hinduism, Chinese philosophy, pantheism, and modern science, in which he maintains that the whole universe consists of a cosmic self playing hide-and-seek (Lila), hiding from itself (Maya) by becoming all the living and non-living things in the universe, forgetting what it really is; the upshot being that we are all IT in disguise. In this worldview, Watts asserts that our conception of ourselves as an "ego in a bag of skin" is a myth; the entities we call the separate "things" are merely processes of the whole."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Watts
This premise is not that there is such a G, it is just about what the premise that there is such a G, strongly implies, IMO.
11 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdSuppose a posited entity, called G, meeting the following criteria:
I think your answers are tautological in that they reduce to something like: “If there really is G, then G has met the conditions of there really being G”. And: “If there is G, then G is G.”
Hope you are well.
1. G is the cause of all that is the case other than itself (the “world” );
2. G is not coextensive with the world;
3. G is itself uncaused; and
4. G is the only entity meeting criteria 1 - 3.
Tautological or not, "G" is posited as "G" above. Therefore, G is G.
G reveals G. Otherwise G cannot be known. Therefore, G exists, because the concept of G is know.
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11 Oct 11
Originally posted by josephwNo because I have concepts of dragons, unicorns, lepricorns, faeries and infinity.
[b]Suppose a posited entity, called G, meeting the following criteria:
1. G is the cause of all that is the case other than itself (the “world” );
2. G is not coextensive with the world;
3. G is itself uncaused; and
4. G is the only entity meeting criteria 1 - 3.
Tautological or not, "G" is posited as "G" above. Therefore, G is G.
...[text shortened]... veals G. Otherwise G cannot be known. Therefore, G exists, because the concept of G is know.[/b]
None of which need exist simply because I can conceive of them.