11 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357Well, we’re back to nondualism again! (Or, at most, a kind of panentheism—without the additional attributes generally ascribed to theos.) Let me try to lay out my own version (of which I would consider Watts’ to be a wonderful aesthetic expression—nondualism has a stream in most religions, and the details and the aesthetics differ; one particular one I will mention below). Dualism and nondualism are, for me, the great metaphysical divide and the great divide in religious philosophy.
OK I will submit for discussion the following premise:
If there is a G that is the source/basis/whatever-word-applies of all that is purported to be dualistically other than G, then by its being what it is, there is in fact nothing (no thing) other than G. All such supposed things are manifestations of G to the creatures of G (who are themselves manifestati ...[text shortened]... ch a G, it is just about what the premise that there is such a G, strongly implies, IMO.
With perhaps some redundancy, I call my version “gestaltic nondualism”. The basic premise is that we can speak of a Whole other than which nothing is; the Whole is by definition unbounded, even if finite. Everything that we perceive going on is a happening in and of the Whole, including us. We perceive all these happenings as figures against a ground; a figure may be singular (a tree, against the ground of a forest), or collective (a forest against the ground of the mountain)—and the mountain against the sky [and in the sky are birds….].
So the Whole can be thought of in terms of figure and ground, but the ground is ultimately just everything within the Whole that we are not focusing on as figure—i.e., and this is another premise, that I might call the “complete manifestation” or the “full disclosure” premise (I have really not attempted to put the whole thing together in a presentation before). That is, there is no empty or static leftover that we call the ground. The Whole itself, by definition, has no ground—and so there is a kind of (infinite but bounded?) recursiveness to the gestalt: e.g., the gestalt includes us talking about a gestalt that includes us talking about the gestalt that…. All within the Whole (which is the only “place” that words like “place” and “within”, and “cause” and “when” etc. have any meaning).
No one has a “view from nowhere” from which to perceive the Whole as a whole. Likewise, the ground against which we can perceive anything is always implicate, never explicate.* Only the figures are explicate.
Everything in the Whole is mutually arising (to use the Buddhist phrase) and nonseparable—that is, nothing can properly be separated from the gestalt for analysis, anymore than the gulf stream can be separated from the gulfstream for analysis; and yet it makes sense to speak of “figures” and manifestations” in the same way as it makes sense to refer to a phenomenon called “the gulf stream”.
Of course, we could call that gestalt—G. 😉 And we have: “If there is a G that is the source/basis/whatever-word-applies of all that is purported to be dualistically other than G, then by its being what it is, there is in fact nothing (no thing) other than G”.
Then we can take a further step: “ All such supposed things are manifestations of G to the creatures of G (who are themselves manifestations of G)”. The reason I parsed your words this way, is that it entails (1) that the figures are in fact manifestations (manifest phenomenon) and not strictly delusions (which is one version of nondualism, that I associate with the term “monism”, which states that only the Whole is real, not the figures; I take the figures to be real); and (2) that the Whole itself is, as I said above, active in generating the manifestations (another version of nondualism, that I associate with the term “pantheism” implies, or seems to imply, that the Whole is simply the sum of separable (countable, as it were) “parts”.
So—I do not think your statement was convoluted at all! Quite the contraray. I went through a lot more convolutions here to try to express my own nondualism as a background to your—figure.
Now, we get to Watts, though. And this raises the question of consciousness. Is Watts intending to be strictly metaphorical—or does a word like lila imply an intentionality that implies that the Whole is in some way (self-) conscious? Or do we take sentient beings (manifestations) themselves to be the whole of the sentience—and consciousness—of the gestalt. Does saying that the gestalt manifests consciousness—as conscious beings such as us—imply that there is some “larger” consciousness to the gestalt? I would say not, but I still find it to be a fascinating question.
I far from object to metaphorical language when dealing with nondualism. Metaphor, poetry, allegory, myth and elicitive speech such as Zen koans are ways to tackle the recursiveness and limited perspectivism to which we are subject—as beings in and from and of the very Whole that we are trying to speak about.
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I really should try to lay it all out more cohesively, and open it up to the kind of challenges that I was trying to open dualism to—or to see if there is a kind of minimalist dualism that makes sense. It does not seem that you and googlefudge and twhitehead and LJ and I have yet been able to accomplish that. But my project here is still to try to find a metaphysical dualism that I think is defensible—and you can see how much I have to compartmentalize my mind to attempt that! But now that I’ve “shown mine”, you can see how much in agreement we really are—and I will try to set that aside again for a bit. But I really would like to discuss our understandings of nondualism at some point.
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* Although I am using visual images, by perception I mean every aspect of it; even figures identified in our imagination or dreams require a ground—this is one of the problems I have with metaphysical dualism: vis-à-vis what ground (your H) can we identify this being G? Also, it would perhaps be more grammatical of me here to use the terms “implicit” and “explicit”, but I am spinning off from David Bohm’s phrase: “the implicate order”—the ground is “implicated”, as it were, in every act of perception.
11 Oct 11
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Originally posted by josephw“G is G” is tautologically true; but all it says is that, for any A, A is itself. (The law of identity.)
[b]Suppose a posited entity, called G, meeting the following criteria:
1. G is the cause of all that is the case other than itself (the “world” );
2. G is not coextensive with the world;
3. G is itself uncaused; and
4. G is the only entity meeting criteria 1 - 3.
Tautological or not, "G" is posited as "G" above. Therefore, G is G.
...[text shortened]... veals G. Otherwise G cannot be known. Therefore, G exists, because the concept of G is know.[/b]
“G reveals G” seems a bit more interesting. As you might know, the Greek word translated as “truth” is aletheia, which basically means that which is un-hid, uncovered, disclosed (as opposed to hidden or disguised). Does every A reveal itself? If it does not, then we can’t talk about it. But does every (or any) A accurately reveal or disclose itself? What can we know of any A other than what is revealed? What can we infer from any such disclosure?
—These, and other questions, it seems to me, lead to the question, for a given being, G, how and how much G reveals itself, and how much can be reasonable inferred from what is revealed. I know that you have your answer—I also know that other Christians on here have other answers, and that “you” (as a group; the plural “you” here) will not only argue but accuse one another of not being “True Christians™”. I am not interested in partaking of such sectarian discussions.
As for the rest, googlefudge is right. (And Anselm’s ontological argument comes to mind here.)
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11 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdShort reply; more mulling to follow. I think the only way to have an ontological dualism that is real, is for neither of the two elements or parts to be genitive of the other. Maybe generative is the better word, maybe being the source, creator, maker, having one part proceed from the other, etc. Further, I might -- might -- add that in a real dualism, neither element is in any sense 'superior' to the other, although I suppose they might have complementary differences. Once a real dualism is set up, the trick then becomes whether and how they interact. I don't think it's via Descartes' pineal gland.
Well, we’re back to nondualism again! (Or, at most, a kind of pan[b]entheism—without the additional attributes generally ascribed to theos.) Let me try to lay out my own version (of which I would consider Watts’ to be a wonderful aesthetic expression—nondualism has a stream in most religions, and the details and the aesthetics differ; on ...[text shortened]... rase: “the implicate order”—the ground is “implicated”, as it were, in every act of perception.[/b]
But if the philosophical goal is to make sense of things, epistemically, then we are merely constructing models when we speak of monisms or dualisms, and then the decisive criterion might be whether the models do the work we want them to do. In this case the above restrictions might be relaxed. I don't think this failure to address the underlying ontology would be very satisfying.
11 Oct 11
1 edit
Originally posted by JS357Again, I tend to agree. And, once again, it is the "generative" aspect that raises problems (somehow simple contingency of U on G doesn't seem satisfactory to the dualist project; I am going to think about the word "genitive" though because sometimes differences in grammar can be fruitfully applied).
Short reply; more mulling to follow. I think the only way to have an ontological dualism that is real, is for neither of the two elements or parts to be genitive of the other. Maybe generative is the better word, maybe being the source, creator, maker, having one part proceed from the other, etc. Further, I might -- might -- add that in a real dualism, neither d. I don't think this failure to address the underlying ontology would be very satisfying.
I'm going to stubbornly go ahead with a Second Reformulation, trying to capture LJ's objections as well as the others so far. I'll keep the contingency premise for the moment, but try to suggest a "generative" alternative--the kind of relaxation you mention. Question: Perhaps that causal/generative premise, as an ontological one, represents a first move (or a bridge step) from dualism per se to theism? Aristotle's prime mover?
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EDIT: Ooops! I don't think genitive or generative can be used with an incommensurability premise. And I think LJ's objection is right: that something like in incommensurability premise is needed. (Sigh!)
11 Oct 11
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Dualism
I think that LJ is right that we haven’t nailed down the dualism condition. According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [hereinafter, whenever I need it, CDP]’ dualism is:
“the view that reality consists of [a] two disparate parts. The crux of dualism is an [b ] apparently unbridgeable gap between two [c] incommensurate orders of being that must be reconciled if our [d] assumption that there is a comprehensible universe is to be justified.” (bracketed letters and italics mine)
We have already stated [a].
[b ] The question of an “unbridgeable gap”: I suspect that any “causal” metaphysical dualism, as well as any dualism with some form of information passed between the parts, has to rest critically on that “apparently”. This may well be fatal. I am going to bracket it for the time being, though, pending input from you guys.
My argument for [d] would be: How can skepticism about a comprehensible (or coherent) universe be considered itself comprehensible (or coherent) if the universe of which the skeptic is part is incomprehensible (or incoherent)? Nevertheless, see that as a problem that dualism needs to engage, not a criterion of dualism itself.
I see [c] as the missing piece from the previous formulations (and LJ was pointing out). So I will add that to a Second Reformulation in the following post, and see where that leaves us—
11 Oct 11
2 edits
Second Reformulation
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G’s existence; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
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Happy for objections/corrections.
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However—
I still suspect (following JS357, if I read him correctly) that 4. is too weak to sustain any dualism of incommensurable orders where one part has any “causal” or “creative” or any kind of effective position vis-à-vis the other. This might be a fatal flaw for any attempt to construct a “causal” dualism. Is there any way to capture the idea behind a “causal” metaphysical dualism (i.e., it’s putative ontology) without incoherency? For example, I might suggest some kind of mysterious “supra-causality”—but is that just a case of bewitchment by language, in which even I cannot know what I myself mean? Or can we identify—and in some way indicate—an aspect of reality that our grammar cannot handle? [This happens in nondualism, too. And then we employ something like elicitive language.] Is the incoherency of causality applied other than within U an ontological incoherency as well as an epistemological one? Does it make a difference?
Suppose I were to say something like: “4’. U’s existence is effectively contingent on G’s existence”?
Thoughts? [Remember: I am not a dualist, but the experiment is to see what are the conditions necessary for a “causal” dualist metaphysics to hold (if there are any), without which a dualist theism cannot hold. Once those conditions are set out clearly, then they can be challenged. The attempt to lay out a formulation for metaphysical dualism (with due attention to Okham’s razor with regard to needed criteria) is for the purpose of establishing those conditions. I think we have already got a good start on those conditions, since they seem to become apparent to some of you as we proceed. Perhaps we are close to a simple list…]
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11 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesd
Again, I tend to agree. And, once again, it is the "generative" aspect that raises problems (somehow simple contingency of U on G doesn't seem satisfactory to the dualist project; I am going to think about the word "genitive" though because sometimes differences in grammar can be fruitfully applied).
I'm going to stubbornly go ahead with a Second Reform ...[text shortened]... on is right: that something like in incommensurability premise is needed. (Sigh!)
Second Reformulation
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G’s existence; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
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11 Oct 11
1 edit
Originally posted by JS357sorry, mistakenly hit Post.Second Reformulation
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G’s existence; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
12 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357I’m still ruminating. But I think you were right with your comment about using “entity” for G and “state of affairs” for U. I think I was being a bit prejudicial, having dualistic theism in my subconscious perhaps. Otherwise, why would I have thought it strange to use “state of affairs” for G? Good catch. One of the reasons I come back to this place…
sorry, mistakenly hit Post.
12 Oct 11
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Originally posted by vistesdReferring to your CDP excerpt, the critical part that I considered lacking from the First Reformulation was [a], which to my mind is, broadly speaking, the essential feature of dualism. 'Disparate' means "fundamentally distinct in kind", or at least something very close to that. I felt that this was lacking in the First Reformulation since, again, that X and Y are excluded on the basis of identity does not imply that X and Y are disparate.
[b]Dualism
I think that LJ is right that we haven’t nailed down the dualism condition. According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [hereinafter, whenever I need it, CDP]’ dualism is:
“the view that reality consists of [a] two disparate parts. The crux of dualism is an [b ] apparently unbridgeable gap between two [c] ...[text shortened]... o I will add that to a Second Reformulation in the following post, and see where that leaves us—[/b]
I would import in a disparateness clause, rather than an incommensurability clause. The usage of 'incommensurable' seems rather more vague in the current context (I may simply be ignorant of the usage of 'incommensurable' as it relates to dualism; I am more familiar with the usage of 'incommensurable' applied to, for example, different values that lack a common standard of measure).
The other thing I would mention is the following. As it concerns U, U seems to take the form of some mereological sum with its parts being, as you stipulate, actual states of affairs that are not identic with G. The reformulation claims that U itself is contingent on G. But from this I do not think it follows that the same holds for any of the parts of U. My background in mereology and decomposition is not very good, but I think to assume otherwise would be to commit something like a fallacy of division. In other words, consider some state of affairs or fact, u, that is a proper part of U. From the fact that U is contingent on G, I do not think it follows that u is contingent on G. Not sure if you consider this a problem for your formulation or not.
12 Oct 11
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Originally posted by LemonJelloI did not understand “disparate”, I guess, as being strong enough to get it—once I saw that you were right that we had not nailed dualism down. I am happy to substitute it. But, would categorically different also work—or, what’s your understanding of the distinctions?
Referring to your CDP excerpt, the critical part that I considered lacking from the First Reformulation was [a], which to my mind is, broadly speaking, the essential feature of dualism. 'Disparate' means "fundamentally distinct in kind", or at least something very close to that. I felt that this was lacking in the First Reformulation since, again, that contingent on G. Not sure if you consider this a problem for your formulation or not.
With regard to your second point: understood. I didn’t consider it a problem, because I didn’t consider it. I’m building as I go—“with a little help from my friends” (and I hope you’ll keep lending a hand)—trying to get some specificity on a model, dualism, that I usually argue against. But in those arguments, certain features of the model have always been advanced, and open to challenge, without anything like a specific model aimed at setting forth the actual minimal criteria for a “causal” metaphysical dualism that would be a necessary substructure for a causal monotheism.
I’ll substitute disparate for now, and try to formulate a statement to address u/U. Thanks.
Also: I am reconsidering rejection of that word “cause”, on the grounds that (a) if it is incoherent if applied to anything other than our universe, then so is almost any term at all because all of our understanding is conditioned by our place in U. I am, frankly, comfortable with that within nondualism, because no one has any perspective from which to say anything (non-tautological anyway) about the Whole itself. And, (b) if one assumes two disparate, actual states of affairs, there is no reason to assume that causality in G is limited to the form it takes in U. Any thoughts on that?
EDIT: As much as possible, I want to use ordinary language in the formulation; and that is another reason for my reconsidering "cause"; I'm not sure if it becomes incoherent in this metaphysical language game as long as its use is understood, and hence it's meaning accessible (if I'm putting that clearly).
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12 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdI've been thinking along the same lines for 'cause'. 'Contingent on' seems about as far as we have gotten, and that term has more than one meaning. I had said "U would not exist if G did not exist" and parenthetically said U is contingent on G. I'm not sure these two depictions of the relationship between G and U are identical, but we can specify them to be. Causality is tricky enough to apply to events within U; applying it to the relation between G and U may require additional foundational propositions.
I did not understand “disparate”, I guess, as being strong enough to get it—once I saw that you were right that we had not nailed dualism down. I am happy to substitute it. But, would categorically different also work—or, what’s your understanding of the distinctions?
With regard to your second point: understood. I didn’t consider it a problem, becau ...[text shortened]... use is understood, and hence it's meaning accessible (if I'm putting that clearly).
For example: So far, there is no sense of action occurring whereby U comes to be; for that matter, there is no statement about G's coming to be, we just say G is. So far, U and G might be temporally coexistent. Or, it might be that when U comes to be, G ceases to be, or becomes U. We also have not specified that G is not contingent on U. Could it be coherent to specify that in a duality, neither part would exist, if the other did not exist? There is a lot left to be done here, and I admire your patient, thorough approach.
12 Oct 11
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Originally posted by JS357Thank you.
I've been thinking along the same lines for 'cause'. 'Contingent on' seems about as far as we have gotten, and that term has more than one meaning. I had said "U would not exist if G did not exist" and parenthetically said U is contingent on G. I'm not sure these two depictions of the relationship between G and U are identical, but we can specify them to be. C ist? There is a lot left to be done here, and I admire your patient, thorough approach.
I'm still pondering “causality” along those lines too, and you’re right that we have no action occurring (which also involves temporality). But there seem to be some affairs at the quantum level of the physical universe that seem paradoxical at best (or at least outside the normal “grammar” of our consciousness)—I am hoping that googlefudge might give us some insight there.
—Your “H”, I think, would provide context to solve that problem (as well as others), if the coherence of “causality” can be taken to depend on some dimensionality, but not a specific dimensionality (such as the one in our universe). I am letting the notion of a “bifurcated nonduality” percolate in my brain. That might require specifying the disparateness (e.g., different dimensionalities). I doubt that would satisfy most monotheists when “G” becomes “God”, but it might be the difference between a coherent theism and an incoherent one.
I agree that we need to specify whether contingency is one-way, etc. I suggest adding that G is not contingent on U for the basic model, understanding that adjustments can be made to the basic model (and fruitfully). I’ll try to state that for the next reformulation.
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I want to state for the record, that I do not have enough hubris to think that any new philosophical (metaphysical) ground is going to be broken here. There is probably some reference in the “canonical” philosophical literature that lays it out. Nor do I think that everyone, whether dualist or nondualist, theist or nontheist, will agree on a particular model. I’m really looking for better clarity in my own mind—as I say, “with a little help from my friends”.
Nevertheless, the further we go, the more I wonder if any model (other than something like a “bifurcated nonduality” ) can be had that can be reasonably defended. I don’t want to set up a strawman, though…
12 Oct 11
Originally posted by vistesdI just gotta take a stab at this one last time.
“G is G” is tautologically true; but all it says is that, for any A, A is itself. (The law of identity.)
“G reveals G” seems a bit more interesting. As you might know, the Greek word translated as “truth” is aletheia, which basically means that which is un-hid, uncovered, disclosed (as opposed to hidden or disguised). Does every A reveal itself ...[text shortened]...
As for the rest, googlefudge is right. (And Anselm’s ontological argument comes to mind here.)
G is the cause of all, G is not coextensive, and G is itself uncaused.
Is "G" God? Is that what we're talking about here?
"Does every A reveal itself? If it does not, then we can’t talk about it. But does every (or any) A accurately reveal or disclose itself? What can we know of any A other than what is revealed? What can we infer from any such disclosure?"
Did "G" become "A" of a sudden? Has it been determined in this thread wether or not "G" exists or revealed anything about itself? Can it be said that aletheia has been revealed or discovered about "G", really?
I don't want to sound like an idiot, but the truth just isn't all that complicated. Untill, and unless it can be proven anything can be know about "G", without it having been revealed by "G", then no one knows anything about "G".
"I also know that other Christians on here have other answers, and that “you” (as a group; the plural “you” here) will not only argue but accuse one another of not being “True Christians™”. I am not interested in partaking of such sectarian discussions."
Me either. That's why I agree with God. 😉
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12 Oct 11
Originally posted by josephw
I just gotta take a stab at this one last time.
G is the cause of all, G is not coextensive, and G is itself uncaused.
Is "G" God? Is that what we're talking about here?
[b]"Does every A reveal itself? If it does not, then we can’t talk about it. But does every (or any) A accurately reveal or disclose itself? What can we know of any A other th ...[text shortened]... ctarian discussions."
Me either. That's why I agree with God. 😉[/b]
Is "G" God? Is that what we're talking about here?
If I'm one of the 'we' you are referring to, I'm only talking about the entity/state of affairs called G, that is tentatively described by the criteria stated in the formulation under discussion. If you want to think of G in ways not yet in the stated formulation, that's none of my beeswax.
Revelation, as perhaps "the communication of some truth by God to a rational creature through means which are beyond the ordinary course of nature." (newadvent.org) would have to be added to the formulation for discussion AFAIAC. At this point there has been no discussion of how inhabitants of U come to know things.