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12 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357Yes but if the first parts can't be made logically sound it doesn't matter what comes nextIs "G" God? Is that what we're talking about here?
If I'm one of the 'we' you are referring to, I'm only talking about the entity/state of affairs called G, that is tentatively described by the criteria stated in the formulation under discussion. If you want to think of G in ways not yet in the stated formulation, that's none of my beeswax.
...[text shortened]... t this point there has been no discussion of how inhabitants of U come to know things.
because the first bit is still unsound.
I don't think you can create a dualist definition of entity G that will stand up.
Which makes the subsequent question of how G can communicate with entities in U mute.
But I remain fascinated by the discussion.
13 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357Whatever.Is "G" God? Is that what we're talking about here?
If I'm one of the 'we' you are referring to, I'm only talking about the entity/state of affairs called G, that is tentatively described by the criteria stated in the formulation under discussion. If you want to think of G in ways not yet in the stated formulation, that's none of my beeswax.
...[text shortened]... t this point there has been no discussion of how inhabitants of U come to know things.
13 Oct 11
3 edits
Originally posted by vistesd1. There exists an entity we will call G;
[b]Second Reformulation
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G’s existence; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
___ ...[text shortened]... seem to become apparent to some of you as we proceed. Perhaps we are close to a simple list…][/b]
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G*; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
*U's existence isn't contingent upon G's existence but contingent upon G itself.
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I hope that makes sense. I don't think U's existence can be contingent upon G's existence because then the only difference between U and G would be 2. even given 5.
Edit: In other words, what I am trying to get at is that U has to be contingent upon something more than G's existence.
13 Oct 11
2 edits
Originally posted by tomtom232The problem then becomes "what more can U be contingent upon?"
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G*; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
*U's existence isn't contingent upon G's e m trying to get at is that U has to be contingent upon something more than G's existence.
I don't think this can actually be answered because 1 and 2 are not a clear enough definition of G to have more that U can be contingent upon.
Edit: There would have to be some subset of G that allows for G to be one entity.
13 Oct 11
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3. G has the ability (a) to create.
4(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
5. U’s existence is contingent upon G(a); and
6. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
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I don't see a way around this but it opens a whole new can of worms that I believe the OP was trying to avoid.
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13 Oct 11
Originally posted by josephwWell, vistesd's immediate objective is to explore under what definitions of G and U, where U is everything but G and so forth, a G=>U world can be dualistic. Interpretation of "=>" is part of the exercise. That's all there is to it, so far, as far as I can tell. The challenge is how a G=>U situation doesn't add up to U being an instantiation of G. 🙂
Whatever.
13 Oct 11
Originally posted by tomtom232I'm too tired any more tonight, but i think I get the point (and it goes to this whole "causality" dillema we've been considering); you might well be right. I also understand the next post--and I'll take a closer look tomorrow, when my brain isn't fried. Thanks for joining in.
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G*; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
*U's existence isn't contingent upon G's e ...[text shortened]... m trying to get at is that U has to be contingent upon something more than G's existence.
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13 Oct 11
Originally posted by tomtom232
1. There exists an entity we will call G;
2. There is only one G (for simplification);
3(a). There exist actual states of affairs (facts) that are not G; (b) the totality of such facts we will call U;
4. U’s existence is contingent upon G*; and
5. G and U are incommensurable with one another.
*U's existence isn't contingent upon G's e ...[text shortened]... m trying to get at is that U has to be contingent upon something more than G's existence.
Edit: In other words, what I am trying to get at 'tis that U has to be contingent upon something more than G's existence.
What more that might be? Curious, not challenging.
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13 Oct 11
Originally posted by tomtom232I will risk being the one to go toward the bounds by saying it could be that G has to be suitably disposed toward U's existence. This implies that U's existence is not necessitated by G's existence. Personifying for a moment; G chooses freely whether U exists. But if G is a "universe generator" without free will concerning whether U exists, then this choice is not operative. Does anything we know about U bear on this question? Or are we left to depend on josephw's moment of revelation?
I don't think I can answer that without going "out of bounds".
However if ALL G is, is a U-generator, it seems to be there only as a stand-in for our ignorance of what happened, and how it happened, before the Planck epoch ended.
Gdidit!
The challenge it seems to me is to find something that is rationally implied about a putative G, based on information we have about U.
13 Oct 11
Originally posted by JS357I think I see tomtom’s point. If I’ve got it right (in my own words), it’s something like that it’s difficult to see how the existence of U [E(U)] could be contingent on just the existence of G [E(G)], rather than some (even unspecified) property/attribute/activity of G. And your use of “disposed toward” might be the minimum possible statement of the nature of such a property/attribute without specifying exactly what it is—and still staying one step removed from “activity”, which I think could only be construed as a causal activity (such as “create” ).
I will risk being the one to go toward the bounds by saying it could be that G has to be suitably disposed toward U's existence. This implies that U's existence is not necessitated by G's existence. Personifying for a moment; G chooses freely whether U exists. But if G is a "universe generator" without free will concerning whether U exists, then this choice is ...[text shortened]... thing that is rationally implied about a putative G, based on information we have about U.
I also think googlefudge is right in that even the most minimalist formulation of metaphysical dualism is not going to stand up—even without the question of communication/causality.
I think that I made an error when I tried an initial formulation in the OP, followed immediately by questions about necessary and sufficient conditions. But I think it is also, in part, from responses to those questions that showed how flawed that initial formulation was. But the project—at least it seems to me—has become one of seeing (1) if there is a minimal formulation of a metaphysical dualism that (2) at least allows specific premises to be challenged—without being cluttered with additional properties/attributes normally associated with theism.
And now I’m not at all sure that it can be had. 🙁 I am beginning to think that some kind of “bifurcated nondualism” (for lack of a better phrase to mind) might be the minimum for coherence. But that would require something like your H (an actual dimensional context for G) and some kind of shared dimensional context, for G’s being “disposed toward” to result in the coming-into-existence of U.
And so, you’re not “out of bounds” in any way, but I think we keep getting forced to expand the bounds. And maybe it’s a matter of the exercise itself showing the limitations of what can meaningfully be articulated—even without adding further theistic properties into the mix.
I can’t tell how much I appreciate all your input and help with this. If nothing else, I think I’m getting to a point of better clarity in my own mind (though these comments likely do not reflect it). Maybe we’re not at where I think we’re at—let me know what you all think.
EDIT: Maybe just working "backward" from U "to find something that is rationally implied about a putative G", rather than staring with a G-premise ate all (as I did), is a better move.
13 Oct 11
2 edits
I have an idea.
What if U must exist if G exists but that U can exist without G even if G always exists? Then U isn't contingent upon [E(G)] but G can always exist without the need of H.
Basically, there is some sort of "connection" that extends from G to U but not from U to G.
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13 Oct 11
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdWell, maybe it is worth spending a little time dedicated to find something that is "rationally implied about a putative G" by our knowledge about U. The first realization I have is that those implications will be provisional to the extent our knowledge of U is provisional. Also, looking at history, many inteligent minds have been going on about this kind of project and have issued pronouncements. Some of them claim direct revelation of the truth, and I assume we are not going in that direction, since those people always seem to end up telling US about THEIR direct revelation -- and such telling is not direct revelation.
I think I see tomtom’s point. If I’ve got it right (in my own words), it’s something like that it’s difficult to see how the existence of U [E(U)] could be contingent on just the existence of G [E(G)], rather than some (even unspecified) property/attribute/activity of G. And your use of “disposed toward” might be the minimum possible statement of the natur ut a putative G", rather than staring with a G-premise ate all (as I did), is a better move.
So, in the manner of CSI, what does the crime scene tell us about the perp? Some random observations:
There are regularities about which we can construct "laws of nature." But also, chaos, the uncertainty principle, the Planck epoch, etc. seem to keep some knowledge unavailable to us.
We remember (unreliably) things about what we call the "past" and we speculate, plan, try to control what we call the "future" while only ever experiencing the "now."
There is no universal agreement on the nature of G including whether G in any sense of the word, exists. Even science has nothing to say about a precursor to U.
Some objects in U experience themselves to exist and others don't. Or at least, those of us who think, think those that we think don't think so, don't think so.
All of these observations suggest that there are things G is not disposed for us to know. 😉
The idea that "I exist" may be the one thing about which each person who says or thinks it, can be certain. I think that is a clue to the nature of G and where G resides. But "I exist" is a darkly provisional claim. Or is it?
13 Oct 11
3 edits
Originally posted by JS357Are you saying that G only exists in your own mind? 😀
Well, maybe it is worth spending a little time dedicated to find something that is "rationally implied about a putative G" by our knowledge about U. The first realization I have is that those implications will be provisional to the extent our knowledge of U is provisional. Also, looking at history, many inteligent minds have been going on about this kind of pr f G and where G resides. But "I exist" is a darkly provisional claim. Or is it?
I was actually thinking along the lines of this where H isn't a physical or real habitat but something akin to "the collective mind" of U and "the mind" of each individual U. In other words, a definition where G is the mind and U is the body but each(or any given fraction of) fact in U has a mind and body.
Edit: I can't write about it coherently because the thought isn't complete in my own mind.
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13 Oct 11
2 edits
Originally posted by tomtom232In my mind I've sort of collapsed H -- "G-land" -- into G so that part isn't particularly interesting to me.
I have an idea.
What if U must exist if G exists but that U can exist without G even if G always exists? Then U isn't contingent upon [E(G)] but G can always exist without the need of H.
Basically, there is some sort of "connection" that extends from G to U but not from U to G.
Are you saying U necessarily exists if G exists, and U possibly exists (even) if G does not exist?
BTW, I am now toying with "G" meaning "Generator of U." Or U's.
U being all that is not G, if U is possible without G, then it would have to be an ungenerated U or a self-generated U. I prefer the former for reasons having to do with my difficulties understanding bootstrapping. That's my answer to what your "what if" would imply.
I can think of some one-way connections, like A, being Tom Cruise, knows that B exists but B is a building in Clearwater and so doesn't know A exists. Is there a specific type of connection you have in mind?