Originally posted by DoctorScribblesAn interaction between to beings is not an experience either. For example, you and I are interacting. What I am experiencing is the feelings of my fingers on the keyboard, the visual images I get from looking at the monitor, the thoughts I have which are affected by what I read on the screen, my memories which involve what you've said, etc. These things could all exist without you existing; the experiences exist independent of your existence. Similarly, the experiences that the theist has exist (unless he's lying), but that does not mean God exists.
Let us be precise.
You are correct that in my analogy, I should have referred to the theist experiencing an interaction with God, not experiencing God.
But the gist of this thread is not whether someone else's alleged experienced interaction with God (e.g. a near-death experience, or a priest who has been "called" ) is compelling evidence fo ...[text shortened]... that both beliefs wholly stem from each one's personal experience of the entities in question?
Consciousness itself is an experience, so I know it exists. I do not claim the existence of consciousness proves some third being's existence.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI guess I agree with that. However whether something has been demonstrated to be true or false is entirely subjective unless maybe there is some mathematical analysis of probabilities, which is not generally the case for these sorts of discussions and analyses. Who is not a weak atheist by this definition? Do theists claim their belief in God has not been demonstrated to be more true than false in their opinion?
The only tenet of Weak Atheism that I have been able to extract from the Weak Atheists is:
Existential claims should be denied until such time as they can be demonstrated to be more likely true than false.
If you agree with that, then you would be a Weak Atheist.
You would also be wrong a considerable amount of the time about the truth of vari ...[text shortened]... your justification criterion, you would always be epistemically justified in your incorrectness.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWhether A justifies B is entirely subjective. If the theist feels his experiences justify his belief, then he's right. If I feel his experiences do not justify his belief, I am right too.
It should be emphasized that since this is a discussion of epistemology, what is at issue is the justification of beliefs, not the correctness of beliefs, or the sureness that one's beliefs are correct. (By 'correct', I mean a belief in proposition P is correct iff P is true; I don't mean it in the sense that it's correct to have ...[text shortened]... heir existence are justified according to the Weak Atheistic belief justification criterion.
Originally posted by AThousandYoungI'm not. I see nothing special about the value 'false' such that the absence of evidence indicates that a proposition is more likely to have that value than 'true'. What is special about 'false' that it should be the default?
Who is not a weak atheist by this definition?
Originally posted by yousersI don't really understand your post.
It is interesting that we have chosen Descartes as a starting point for this discussion. If we should accept the cogito as true, we should consider the rest of his "Meditations," seeing as how they all are based on his skepticism. He is ...[text shortened]... would consider neither path to be more justifiable than the other.
If we should accept the cogito as true, we should consider the rest of his "Meditations," seeing as how they all are based on his skepticism.
Not necessarily. A person can be correct in one thing and incorrect in another.
[p] His establishment of an all-powerful being is necessary for him to procede, because the god, who is assumed to be good, is not willing to decieve us concerning the existence of a world outside of ourselves.[/b]
I am not familiar with his argument about this.
...it seems that the athiest can only say, without doubt, that he exists. Anything beyond this requires the assumption that the mal genie is not at work.
I agree with this. The only reason I assume there is no mal genie is Occam's Razor. By the Razor, the best explanation is that there is no mal genie and no God either.
Theists can reject the Razor I guess but if they do then it becomes impossible to live life normally unless the theist applies it inconsistently. For example, every day, theists assume there are no little elves that need to be fed a pint of the theist's blood to cure the theist's hunger (in addition to the theist eating). There are an infinite number of possibilities; Occam's Razor is the only way we can bring this down to a manageable level as far as I can tell.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesReally? You believe things that you think might be more likely false than true?
I'm not. I see nothing special about the value 'false' such that the absence of evidence indicates that a proposition is more likely to have that value than 'true'. What is special about 'false' that it should be the default?
Originally posted by AThousandYoungI fear I'm not communicating my question clearly. It is an objective one, with nothing to do with subjective feelings.
If the theist feels his experiences justify his belief, then he's right.
Given that it is true that the theist believes he has experienced an interaction with God, does the theist's belief in the existence of God pass the Weak Atheist's justification test cited above?
I suggest it does, because the Weak Atheist holds that belief in his consciousness is justified, such justification coming solely from his personal experience, and the theist would appeal to this same personal experience sort of evidence.
Originally posted by AThousandYoungNo, and that's not what I said.
You believe things that you think might be more likely false than true?
I said that in the absence of evidence about a claim - when there is nothing to suggest that a claim is true or false - I don't think there is any reason to choose 'false' as the default assessment of the claim.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesHmm.
I'm not. I see nothing special about the value 'false' such that the absence of evidence indicates that a proposition is more likely to have that value than 'true'. What is special about 'false' that it should be the default?
There are an infinite number of possibilities which are not consistent with one another. For any one to be true, all the rest must be false. Therefore unless there is additional information which shows one of them is likely to be true, the odds are that it's false.
Originally posted by AThousandYoungBut the Weak Atheist dooms himself to certain failure upon a global analysis of the situation.
Hmm.
There are an infinite number of possibilities which are not consistent with one another. For any one to be true, all the rest must be false. Therefore unless there is additional information which shows one of them is likely to be true, the odds are that it's false.
Suppose I put three balls in a bag: red, green, and blue.
Now I pull one out in my closed hand.
According to you...
Is belief that it's red justified? No.
Is belief that it's green justified? No.
Is belief that it's blue justified? No.
According to Weak Atheism, you must deny every possibility! You doom yourself to being wrong every time! You have no chance of ever holding a correct belief about the ball.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesMy claiming that I like beer is something specific to myself. It has no objective or permanent reality outside of myself. I could say that I like Samuel Smith's Oatmeal Stout and hate Bud Light, and it would be impossible for you to contradict me. Plus I am free to change my mind on a whim and claim to like whatever I want. Even if it really isn't true. Claims of this nature are so subjective and trivial in nature that they require virtually no justification at all. Plus, if it were otherwise it would make absolutely no difference.
The fact that belief entails consciousness is an unintended aspect of my choice of analogy. If I had it to do over, I would ask what justifies your belief in the existence of your like for beer, instead of what justifies your belief in your consciousness.
As I said, I'm perfectly willing to stipulate that people are in fact conscious. I'm not ...[text shortened]... ist not justified in his belief in God if that theist has a personal experience of that God?
Claiming to believe in god is something altogether different. For one, the theist is claiming that his belief is true, not just for himself, but for everyone else as well. Plus he is claiming to have knowledge of an objective reality external to himself. His claim for the existence of god is an extraordinary one. And we all know what extraordinary claims require.
It is also different in the following: A theist claims to believe in god. In your example, he uses his alleged experience of god to justify his belief. Where is this god that he claims to have experienced? If no demonstration were forthcoming, It would be well within my rights to be incredulous. When I claim to like Samuel Smith's Oatmeal Stout, at least I am able to produce the object in question for examination, and even let you try it yourself if you were so inclined.
So, no, an alleged personal experience does not justify belief in something.
As for "belief" in a consciousness, I don't know why you've circled back around to that again when you've already disavowed the question in the same post. Belief in a consciousness, itself, justifies belief in a consciousness.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesOk. The weak theist was defined as someone who makes this claim:
No, and that's not what I said.
I said that in the absence of evidence about a claim - when there is nothing to suggest that a claim is true or false - I don't think there is any reason to choose 'false' as the default assessment of the claim.
Existential claims should be denied until such time as they can be demonstrated to be more likely true than false.
Now, the existence of an object G either has been demonstrated to be more likely true than false, or it has not.
If the existence of G has not been demonstrated to be more likely true than false, then either it has been demonstrated to be more likely false than true, or nothing has been demonstrated regarding the likelihood of G's existence.
I think you are saying you are not a weak atheist because if nothing has been demonstrated regarding the likelihood of G's existence, then both trueness and falseness are equally likely.
Now a relevant issue is this: does the Christian God exist? If this being exists, then other beings do not; for example, other religion's gods which created everything. Now all these different possibilities cannot be equally likely to be true and false, because they are inconsistent and there are more than two.
So which do we choose for what we believe created the universe; or even if the universe were created at all, in the absence of evidence? There's no reason to believe anything at all - you're almost definitely wrong if you have no evidence. There are so many other possibilities.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesYour analogy is quite flawed. If we know the colors of the balls in the bag, then we know that the one you pulled out MUST be one of those three. We are perfectly justified in saying that the ball has a chance of being red. Of course we could not "believe" that the ball is definitely red. Or green. Or blue. All we could believe is that it must be one of those three.
But the Weak Atheist dooms himself to certain failure upon a global analysis of the situation.
Suppose I put three balls in a bag: red, green, and blue.
Now I pull one out in my closed hand.
According to you...
Is belief that it's red justified? No.
Is belief that it's green justified? No.
Is belief that it's blue justified? No.
Ac ...[text shortened]... every time! You have no chance of ever holding a correct belief about the ball.
Originally posted by AThousandYoungIn the absence of evidence, if I play 'true' for some possibility, I may be almost definitely wrong, but the Weak Atheist is committed to playing 'false' for every possibility and is certainly wrong.
There's no reason to believe anything at all - you're almost definitely wrong if you have no evidence. There are so many other possibilities.
Originally posted by rwingettBut that chance is less than half, so the Weak Atheist must deny the claim "The ball is red", for that belief would not be justified. Correct?
We are perfectly justified in saying that the ball has a chance of being red.
To deny that claim is to assert "The ball is not red." Correct?