31 Jul 05
I feel intuitively that there must be some flaw in your assessment but I am not familiar enough with formal logic to find it. Then again, maybe my intuition is wrong.
Let me ask you a question. Of A, B, C and D, which do you not believe? I don't see any rational answer to that question other than that you believe all of them.
31 Jul 05
5 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungWell, under the working definition of 'believe' I believe all of them.
I feel intuitively that there must be some flaw in your assessment but I am not familiar enough with formal logic to find it. Then again, maybe my intuition is wrong.
Let me ask you a question. Of A, B, C and D, which do you not ...[text shortened]... l answer to that question other than that you believe all of them.
But I don't think that all of those beliefs should be said to be justified.
Now, throughout this discussion I have taken our definition of belief
as given and assessed the justification criterion in that light. Alternatively, I could have taken our justification criterion as
given and assessed the definition of belief. In that case, my finding would be that the definition of belief is flawed.
The bottom line is that I find there to be a flaw in our (definition of belief, justification criterion) pair.
And in case you didn't notice, there was a numerical error in my particular underlying example, which I pointed out in my final edit, but the argument should hold given a proper example.
Now, I do believe I will take a break for some dinner.
I believe I shall return.
31 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWhy are they not justified? How can one hold beliefs that are not justified? Are you irrational? Why aren't you a mystic, since you seem to think his position is superior?
Well, under the working definition of 'believe' I believe all of them.
But I don't think that all of those beliefs should be said to be justified.
Now, throughout this discussion I have taken our definition of belief
as give ...[text shortened]... ve I will take a break for some dinner.
I believe I shall return.
I guess the question is - what exactly does it mean for a belief to be justified?
31 Jul 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWell, we need to clarify what is necessary and what is sufficient for a belief to be justified (I am getting the lingo down XD). After all, this entire thread is exploring whether the belief in god(s) by theists is justified. Is there anything more to justification than that a set of contradictory beliefs cannot be justified?
It is simply my aesthetic opinion that a set of beliefs should not be called justified if the conjunction of the propositions underlying those beliefs is a contradiction.
I am very surprised that you feel you can reasonably have beliefs when you are fully aware it is impossible to justify those beliefs. Is it meaningless whether or not a belief is justified? Is a justified belief superior to a non justified belief in any way? Why would it matter whether a belief is justified or not?
31 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by AThousandYoungI'll give one example of the sort of belief that I think should be termed an unjustified belief, and it's one that many hold, and I thus answer your question by construction.
How can one hold beliefs that are not justified?
A belief that is merely a station on a circular train track of reasoning should be termed unjustified. Many theists hold such a belief, if it comes from this sort of reasoning:
I believe in God.
Why? Because the Bible says he exists.
Why do I believe the Bible? Because the Bible is the Word of God.
Here, the initial claim must presume its own truth for the chain of reasoning to hold, and thus belief in the claim does not deserve to be called justified.
31 Jul 05
5 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungAnd I am surprised that you can call a certain set of beliefs justified when you are fully aware that one of them must be a belief in a false proposition.
I am very surprised that you feel you can reasonably have beliefs when you are fully aware it is impossible to justify those beliefs.
Don't get me wrong - I'm not claiming that the red mystic's should be termed justified either. I only use the mystic to point out that with respect to constructing a justification criterion that maximizes the expectation of the number of one's correct beliefs, the criterion under discussion is sub-optimal - it's guaranted to always yield one incorrect belief, and does not expect to yield more correct beliefs than the mystic's in the ball drawing problem.
31 Jul 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI agree. But would the theist agree?
I'll give one example of the sort of belief that I think should be termed an unjustified belief, and it's one that many hold, and I thus answer your question by construction.
A belief that is merely a station on a circular train track of reasoning should be termed unjustified. Many theists hold such a belief, if it comes from this sort of reaso ...[text shortened]... hain of reasoning to hold, and thus belief in the claim does not deserve to be called justified.
31 Jul 05
2 edits
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesAnd I am surprised that you can call a certain set of beliefs justified when you are fully aware that one of them must be a belief in a false proposition.
And I am surprised that you can call a certain set of beliefs justified when you are fully aware that one of them must be a belief in a false proposition.
Don't get me wrong - I'm not claiming that the red mystic's should be t ...[text shortened]... re correct beliefs than the mystic's in the ball drawing problem.
I can only call this set justified because of the specific and nonintuitive definition of the word "belief" we are using. In normal conversation I wouldn't say I believe the ball is not red/green/blue unless someone told me they'd seen it or something. Belief in ordinary conversation shows stronger conviction than the >50% definition philosophers seem to go by. When I say belief that the ball is not red is justified, all I mean is that it's been shown that the chance that the ball is not red is >50%. Because of this, it's not inconsistent if I know one of the claims I "believe" is right is actually wrong.
When you say you believe unjustified things, it means to me that you're claiming knowledge that there is a >50% chance that the thing exists, while freely acknowledging there is no reason whatsoever for you to think so; not divine revelation, not psychic understanding, utterly no reason. You're being completely inconsistent.
I only use the mystic to point out that with respect to constructing a justification criterion that maximizes the expectation of the number of one's correct beliefs, the criterion under discussion is sub-optimal - it's guaranted to always yield one incorrect belief, and does not expect to yield more correct beliefs than the mystic's in the ball drawing problem.
The expectation values as I calculate them are as follows: belief in A, B, C and D the expectation is 3 correct, 1 incorrect, P = 1. Mystic belief is (1/3 x [4 correct, 0 incorrect] = [4/3 correct, 0 incorrect]) + (2/3 x [1 correct, 3 incorrect] = [2/3 correct, 2 incorrect]) = 2 correct, 2 incorrect. Belief in A, B, C and D has the superior expectation value.
31 Jul 05
3 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungWhat possible state of affairs gives the mystic three incorrect beliefs? He always gets D right, and he always gets at least one of A, B, and C right.
(2/3 x [1 correct, 3 incorrect]
But even given that correction, we have:
(1/3 x [4 correct, 0 incorrect] = [4/3 correct, 0 incorrect]) + (2/3 x [2 correct, 2 incorrect] = [4/3 correct, 4/3 incorrect]) = 8/3 correct, 4/3 incorrect.
So it appears that the mystic's justification criterion does yield an inferior expection of correct beliefs. But this seems like an arbitrary subset of beliefs to examine.
Why not include their beliefs about the ball being orange? If you're going to exclude their beliefs on orange, what reason do you have to include their beliefs on blue and green? If you just consider their beliefs on red, along with D, the mystic is superior: (1,1) for the non-mystic, (4/3, 2/3) for the mystic. Analzying on any single other possible color gives each party an equal expectation of (1,1).
31 Jul 05
6 edits
Here is yet another argument aiming to demonstrate a flaw in our (definition of belief, justification criterion) pair.
Consider some proposition X whose probability of being true is .8
Consider these other propositions, and their associated probabilities, depending on whether you think we are dealing with independence:
X and X, .64 or .8
X and X and X, .51 or .8
X and X and X and X, .41 or .8
If we are dealing with independent propositions, then belief in X is justified, while belief in (X and X and X and X) is not justified! Can we agree that this would be an absurd result of our choice of justification criterion?
If we are not dealing with independent propositions, then you would say that (X and X) has the same probability as X because the truth of the former derives from the truth of the latter. However, you should be required to always apply this reasoning in the face of non-independent propositions. You shouldn't pick and choose which non-independent sets you'll apply this to.
Using our formerly defined propositions, given that you hold D, A, and B to be more likely true than false, from that it is derivable that C is more likely false than true. Agreed? If so, then C must be denied, by definition of belief.
You must treat the colors as you treat the X's, and for this reason, you cannot simultaneoulsy hold belief in A, B, C, and D; if you do, you must accept that (X and X)'s truth does not derive from the truth of X.
Dr. S
P.S. God damn it! There is a flaw in this argument. If you can spot it, then I will concede this debate to you. It's been a pleasurable one and I have learned from it.
31 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf the mystic says the ball is red, and the ball is blue, then the mystic is wrong that the ball is red; he is wrong that the ball is not blue...oh right. He's right that the ball is not green. My mistake.
What possible state of affairs gives the mystic three incorrect beliefs? He always gets D right, and he always gets at least one of A, B, and C right.
But even given that correction, we have:
(1/3 x [4 correct, 0 incorrect] = ...[text shortened]... sible color gives each party an equal expectation of (1,1).
If you include their beliefs about the ball being orange, black, etc...you get an infinite number of "rights" for both sides. They are both right that the ball is not orange, not black, not white... So let's include orange.
Weak Atheist with orange: 4 correct, 1 incorrect. If we include black, 5 correct, 1 incorrect.
Mystic with orange: 11/3 correct, 4/3 incorrect. With black: 14/3 correct, 4/3 incorrect. Weak atheist always wins. We exclude all those infinite other colors and possibilities because both perspectives get identical results which cancel out. We could include the expectation that there is no ball (since it was stated there was a ball, P=0), etc.
PS it is interesting to note that the mystic's amount of correctness approaches asymptotically to that of the weak atheist's as you add more correct beliefs.
31 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThat's right. It's because the mystic and the Weak Atheist always differ only on a finite (one) number of beliefs, within that set of beliefs whose cardinality approaches infinity.
PS it is interesting to note that the mystic's amount of correctness approaches asymptotically to that of the weak atheist's as you add more correct beliefs.
31 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf we are dealing with independent propositions, then belief in X is justified, while belief in (X and X and X and X) is not justified! Can we agree that this would be an absurd result of our choice of justification criterion?
Here is yet another argument aiming to demonstrate a flaw in our (definition of belief, justification criterion) pair.
Consider some proposition X whose probability of being true is .8
Consider these other propositions, and th ...[text shortened]... to you. It's been a pleasurable one and I have learned from it.
Not at all. Let's make X a real object: a twenty sided die (an icosahedron with faces numbered 1-20). The chance that we'll roll a 16 or less is 0.8. We're justified in believing that if we roll the die once, we'll get a 16 or less. However we are not justified in believing that if we roll the die 4 times, we'll get 16 or less every single time. This would describe independent propositions.
A fully dependent set of propositions would be: we roll the die once, and record the result four times. This is not what's going on with the balls. If anything the balls are partially dependent on one another.
To be honest I don't really understand what you're trying to say when you talk about dependence. The fact that the balls each have P = 1/3 instead of P = 1 is due to their dependence on one another. The probabilities of all possibilities must add to 1. Other than that I don't understand what you mean.
You must treat the colors as you treat the X's, and for this reason, you cannot simultaneoulsy hold belief in A, B, C, and D; if you do, you must accept that (X and X)'s truth does not derive from the truth of X.
I don't understand what (X and X) means, to be honest.
31 Jul 05
Using our formerly defined propositions, given that you hold D, A, and B to be more likely true than false, from that it is derivable that C is more likely false than true. Agreed? If so, then C must be denied, by definition of belief.
I don't think I agree with this:
from that it is derivable that C is more likely false than true.
How did you determine that?