Questions for the moral atheist

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]Are there distinguishing marks of a morality by which is can be known to be non-arbitrary? What are they? Having a priest announce it?
An uncaused cause would be that non-arbitrary source.

Since when does the source being "ultimate" entail non-arbitrariness?
At the risk of sounding contradictory, the rule can be relative. By way of exam ...[text shortened]... . You're making Grand Canyon leaps in logic and missing more than the core of the argument.[/b]

Are there distinguishing marks of a morality by which is can be known to be non-arbitrary? What are they? Having a priest announce it?

An uncaused cause would be that non-arbitrary source.

As announced by a priest. (I use "announce" and "priest" to include in writing, by a religious scribe.)

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Honestly, I'm not sure why you think that, as stopping points go, God is the least arbitrary.

Here's how my thinking goes: God is the greatest conceivable being—and since it is better to be the paradigm of goodness rather than to merely exemplify goodness—if there is a supreme moral standard, then God is it.

But suppose I am be objective, in the sense of having a reality independent of our moral perceptions.

There is a sense of 'paradigm' that means to serve as a model. On this reading, one could be more or less paradigmatic. Presumably, if we take 'paradigm' in this sense, then God would be the perfect paradigm of goodness. But that would be the same as God perfectly exemplifying goodness. You mean something different. You mean that God defines goodness. He is like the rod that defines the meter. Other rods may be a meter long, but they are a meter long simply in virtue of being the same length as the defining rod. What I don't understand is why it is better to be the ultimate standard or definition of goodness than to merely be perfectly good. Better in what sense? You can't mean that it's morally better, since that yields a contradiction. Do you mean that God is thereby more perfect, a la Anselm's ontological argument? That would be a strange claim, and tautologous, since it amounts to nothing more than the claim that it is more perfect for God to be whatever he essentially is than for God to perfectly meet some independent standard of goodness. But is exemplifying the property of identity a perfection? Is it a perfection for God to have God-constituting properties? If so, then I guess everything has a similar perfection, since everything is identical with itself. Look, you want to have it both ways here. The only motivation there is for thinking it a perfection for God to be the standard of goodness comes from the thought that goodness is something that makes an entity greater, better, etc. Having Bennett-properties doesn't make me better, unless those properties are themselves good. Similarly, having God-properties doesn't make God better, unless those properties are themselves good. But to say a God-property is good, on your view, is just to say it's a God-property (because God-properties are definitions). Well, fine, but so what? This is a lot of fancy footwork on your part to get right back where you were before. Yes, I understand you want to identify the good with some properties God has. The claim, again, is that this is irrelevant and arbitrary from the point of view of a sincere moral inquirer. "Why should I be good?", he asks. You answer "Because you will thereby be acting in accord with a set of properties that partially constitute the essential nature of some strange entity...". You must see how unsatisfying such an answer would be. Why that entity? Why not some other entity with a different set of properties? You could answer "Because it is more good to aspire to Godlikeness", but all that means is that it is more Godlike to act Godlike. Trivially true. At the end of the day, simply identifying the good with God vitiates what is important, noble, and meaningful about morality and goodness. It's just ethical egoism with a really giant ego, or subjectivism where only one subject matters. There is nothing objective about moral norms on your view, except that they do not depend on human opinion. Moral facts are still dependent on the nature of an agent; they are still dependent on that agent's character or psychology, they are totally mind-dependent. Switching divine agency and psychology for human agency and psychology doesn't make your view more objective. It just makes it subjective and unchanging.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Don't you see how that descends into circularity? 'greatness' and 'goodness' are essentially arbitrary because you are defining them as standards based on God and God as the ultimate of those standards.

[b]The reason I brought up the character of God was just to show that it is conceivable that God's commands aren't arbitrary.
I am not sure that i ...[text shortened]... nceivable being' in some other respect? (and therefore not God by your definition).[/b]

If they [God's commands] are not arbitrary then they necessarily depend on some greater truth which would contradict your definition of God and your claim that God is the source of morality.

Not at all. God's commands are necessary expressions of His essentially loving and just character. If God's commands were arbitrary, that would mean that they were based on whim.

What if Gods commands turned out to be unjustifiable and impractical?

That would be surprising if God were essentially a just and loving God.

Why [in the absence of God, is there less reason to be obligated to be a good person]? Surely that would still be for practical reasons? Self preservation (a better afterlife) being the primary one.

Practical reasons for being a good person (e.g., self-preservation, a better afterlife, etc.) don't in themselves establish obligation. If human lives have objective value, then we are obligated to preserve human life. But, on atheism, I don't see any way to establish objective value. Our own intuitive sense of value can't in itself establish objective value, since, on atheism, moral perception is merely the result of socio-biological evolution; in which case, value is illusory.

If human lives have objective value, apart from what we ascribe to it, individually or collectively, God is necessary. God's commands establish obligation: A is required of S if and only if a just and loving God commands S to [/i]A. A is forbidden to S if and only if a just and loving God commands S not to do A. A is permitted for S if and only if a just and loving God does not command S not to do A.

Originally posted by bbarr
There is a sense of 'paradigm' that means to serve as a model. On this reading, one could be more or less paradigmatic. Presumably, if we take 'paradigm' in this sense, then God would be the perfect paradigm of goodness. But that would be the same as God perfectly exemplifying goodness. You mean something different. You mean that God defines goodne ...[text shortened]... make your view more objective. It just makes it subjective and unchanging.

"Why should I be good?", he asks. You answer "Because you will thereby be acting in accord with a set of properties that partially constitute the essential nature of some strange entity...". You must see how unsatisfying such an answer would be.

I'm not sure if my answer would amount to something different than what you've proposed, but for what it's worth this would be my answer: "Because God's commands obligate you to be a good person." One might find practical reasons to be a good person elsewhere, but nothing that creates an obligation. God is the least arbitrary stopping point when determining what ultimately establishes moral obligation.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
I'm not sure if my answer would amount to something different than what you've proposed, but for what it's worth this would be my answer: "Because God's commands obligate you to be a good person." One might find practical reasons to be a good person elsewhere, but nothing that creates an obligation. God is the least arbitrary stopping point when determining what ultimately establishes moral obligation.

The commands of God alone are not enough if His subjects have free will. The commands will only have force if there is some significant penalty for not obeying them. You can save your position, perhaps, by now invoking the fires of hell or some other variant of damnation; but the cost would be to relegate the source of God's authority to that of brute coercion by dint of His omnipotence, which I think tarnishes His credibility to some degree, as well as the notion of free will.

Originally posted by Soothfast
The commands of God alone are not enough if His subjects have free will. The commands will only have force if there is some significant penalty for not obeying them. You can save your position, perhaps, by now invoking the fires of hell or some other variant of damnation; but the cost would be to relegate the source of God's authority to that of brute co ...[text shortened]... ce, which I think tarnishes His credibility to some degree, as well as the notion of free will.

The commands of God alone are not enough if His subjects have free will.

What is obligation without free will? Free will doesn't negate obligation.

The commands will only have force if there is some significant penalty for not obeying them.

Take, for instance, the command to love your neighbor as yourself. Wouldn't disobedience to this command carry sufficient consequences of its own? There's no need to invoke the fires of hell. Still, negative consequence aren't enough to establish obligation.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]"Why should I be good?", he asks. You answer "Because you will thereby be acting in accord with a set of properties that partially constitute the essential nature of some strange entity...". You must see how unsatisfying such an answer would be.

I'm not sure if my answer would amount to something different than what you've proposed, but for wha rbitrary stopping point when determining what ultimately establishes moral obligation.[/b]

O.K., now we're getting somewhere, I think. What do you think the essential difference is between the following two propositions?:

1) All things considered, S ought morally to A.
2) S is obligated to A.

I admit to finding the notion of an obligation mysterious. At least, that is, in the guise in which it appears in a lot of moral philosophy prior to the 1950's. G.E.M Anscombe, in a famous paper called "Modern Moral Philosophy" took issue with the notion, claiming it was based on an outmoded theistic model of morality as based upon divine law. You don't find the notion in Greek ethics. In the Kantian tradition there are perfect and imperfect duties, but, at the end of the day, Kantian obligations are such that their violation is a species of practical irrationality. In my tradition, somewhere between virtue ethics and particularism, deontic notions such as duty and obligation don't really appear. I can translate claims about obligation into claims about what it would be best, ethically, to do. Is there something special and important left out by talking in terms of what is good, appropriate, or best (or, more specifically, about what is kind, compassionate, honest, loyal, etc.) rather than in talking in terms of duties, laws and obligations? If so, what is it?

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., now we're getting somewhere, I think. What do you think the essential difference is between the following two propositions?:

1) All things considered, S ought morally to A.
2) S is obligated to A.

I admit to finding the notion of an obligation mysterious. At least, that is, in the guise in which it appears in a lot of moral philosophy prior to t ...[text shortened]... etc.) rather than in talking in terms of duties, laws and obligations? If so, what is it?

Is there something special and important left out by talking in terms of what is good, appropriate, or best (or, more specifically, about what is kind, compassionate, honest, loyal, etc.) rather than in talking in terms of duties, laws and obligations? If so, what is it?

It seems to me that what is good, appropriate, or best is a value judgment based on factors which may vary from one person to the next, or from one society to the next. Undoubtedly, the recent gunman in Norway knew it was inconsistent with virtue to murder someone in cold blood, but the future dangers of multiculturalism he believed were sufficient to eclipse the immediate observance of virtue, and that at some point in the future, all things considered, he would be justified as acting virtuously. Who's to say the ends don't justify the means? And, further, what is moral about human well-being to begin with such that it ought to determine what is good, appropriate, or best? In short, I guess, what is missing in (1) is objective value, whereas (2) is necessitated by the objectivity of value.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Is there something special and important left out by talking in terms of what is good, appropriate, or best (or, more specifically, about what is kind, compassionate, honest, loyal, etc.) rather than in talking in terms of duties, laws and obligations? If so, what is it?

It seems to me that what is good, appropriate, or best is a value judgment ing in (1) is objective value, whereas (2) is necessitated by the objectivity of value.[/b]

Actually, it can't seem that way to you, since you think that what is good, appropriate or best is a function of God (in some sense or other). So, again, what's the difference between those two propositions I mention above? You're alleging that non-theistic ethics lacks an appropriate notion of obligation. I'm asking you what the notion of obligation, as you understand it, adds to ethical accounts that make use only of notions like 'good', 'right', 'appropriate', 'virtuous', etc.

Further, I'm really confused by why you think that your account provides for any sort of objectivity in ethics, since your account is wholly subjective. On your view, moral facts are, ultimately, facts about the characteristics of an agent. That the agent is not human hardly makes these facts more objective. It certainly doesn't make these facts more objective than an account based on objective features of human beings. It is not more objective than an account like hedonistic consequentialism, which holds that it is a brute moral fact, independent of human beliefs or desires, that suffering is an objective bad to be minimized in the world. Now that is an objective view! No wishy-washy reliance on the character of some mysterious agent!

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Is there something special and important left out by talking in terms of what is good, appropriate, or best (or, more specifically, about what is kind, compassionate, honest, loyal, etc.) rather than in talking in terms of duties, laws and obligations? If so, what is it?

It seems to me that what is good, appropriate, or best is a value judgment ing in (1) is objective value, whereas (2) is necessitated by the objectivity of value.[/b]

This is the pattern that keeps repeating in our discussions. You rag on atheists, suggesting that they fail to provide for objectivity. One would think, then, that your own view would provide for objectivity. But, in fact, there is nothing much objective about your view. This was already played out in some detail, for example, here:

Thread 136838.

It is bad form when your own view suffers from the same problems for which you presume to criticize others. If one looks closely throughout this thread, it is appalling how many instances there are of this within the arguments of yourself and Freaky.

Originally posted by bbarr
Actually, it can't seem that way to you, since you think that what is good, appropriate or best is a function of God (in some sense or other). So, again, what's the difference between those two propositions I mention above? You're alleging that non-theistic ethics lacks an appropriate notion of obligation. I'm asking you what the notion of obligation bjective view! No wishy-washy reliance on the character of some mysterious agent!

Further, I'm really confused by why you think that your account provides for any sort of objectivity in ethics, since your account is wholly subjective.... That the agent is not human hardly makes these facts more objective. It certainly doesn't make these facts more objective than an account based on objective features of human beings.

Aren't God's commands based on objective facts about human beings? It'd be awfully strange if they weren't. For instance, "love thy neighbor as thyself," is a wonderfully rich and applicable command that covers everything from giving a glass of water to a thirsty man to the most courageous acts of altruism conceivable. Now, it is completely understandable to me, as a theist, to say that I am obligated to love my neighbor as myself. Take God out of the equation, though, and where is that obligation to be found? In a virtuous ideal? But why am I obligated to be a moral idealist? It just doesn't add up.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Now, it is completely understandable to me, as a theist, to say that I am obligated to love my neighbor as myself.

And that doesn't add up either. You are just hiding the problem.

If an atheist were to take his morals from the King (as was common in many past societies), would his moral system be equivalent to yours?

Originally posted by Soothfast
Why do you require there to be a "point" to existence? Life is what you make of it.

And I'm not talking about lone psychos having their own morals that are at variance with everyone elses. If you were reading carefully you would note that I am saying, quite unequivocally, that there is no evidence whatsoever of the existence of an Objective Morality, ...[text shortened]... -- have different moral codes. That is easy to see, if you're willing to see.

Your move.

Why do you require there to be a "point" to existence? Life is what you make of it.
I have not required a point to existence. Yet. The thrust is that an atheistic perspective carries with it a pointless existence. Sensing the opportunity to make life what one will is equally pointless, no matter which direction one takes in doing so. In the end, it simply doesn't matter.

Whole societies comprising thousand or millions of people -- not lone psychos -- have different moral codes.
These whole societies, living together, seem to share some common values, regardless of their personal peccadilloes. Hmm... what could those common values be?

Originally posted by JS357
"If there is no intrinsic good ... The universe burped itself into existence and will eventually burp itself out of existence; in between is futile and unimportant."

As humans, we confront this possibility and in most cases, on a gut feeling, reject it and then show ourselves to our own satisfaction that it is wrong, by one means or another. This works for ...[text shortened]... or are they entitled to tell you that you are wrong. Some on both sides don't respect this.

If I read you right, you seem to be saying, 'whatever gets you through the night,' regardless of any grounding in reality.

Originally posted by JS357
You cited this video in response to "Nobody I know claims that "everything can be explained on the sole basis of the laws of physics and chemistry".

The video segment you pointed to did not assert that "everything can be explained on the sole basis of the laws of physics and chemistry". I think you might just admit that as a sign that as we all aren't perfect, you know that includes you.

Thanks for the update on my imperfection: in all of the commotion, I'd nearly forgotten that tidbit.

As stated, however, the speaker was quoting a famous atheist whose emphatic claim that this existence is all there is; no before, no after, it came from nothing and will end in nothing. This sentiment is in principle what the OP speaks of. Namely, that this existence caused itself.