08 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHYour analyses do not add up. If the claims in the quote amount to saying "this existence is all there is; no before, no after, it came from nothing and will end in nothing" (which they do not, you just infer stupid crap willy-nilly, but whatever...), then how does this translate to "this existence caused itself"?
Thanks for the update on my imperfection: in all of the commotion, I'd nearly forgotten that tidbit.
As stated, however, the speaker was quoting a famous atheist whose emphatic claim that this existence is all there is; no before, no after, it came from nothing and will end in nothing. This sentiment is in principle what the OP speaks of. Namely, that this existence caused itself.
The level of intellectual hypocrisy in this thread is just astounding. It is beginning to be more than I can take.
Let's apply this to your own position. According to you, there is no before God; there is no after God; God came from...well ????. Oh, you must then be committed to the idea that God caused himself. This is, in fact, a view held by many theists, in the vein of self-existence or causa sui. But you have already said, to the contrary, that you think God's existence is brute and that seems fair enough; so something must be wrong about this analysis, don't you think?
See, there are probably persons on both sides (atheists and theists) who hold crazy views (at least I think they are crazy) about self-referential causation or some such. But you, somehow, presume to project this type of committment globally onto atheists. You would never project this type of self-causation committment onto theists globally. You laughed before when I mentioned the idea of God explaining himself. But, guess what, that's already something a lot of theists think. Why aren't you ragging on them?
08 Aug 11
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrI was ruminating on our discussion while at work today and I think (think) I had a breakthrough of sorts. It occurs to me that as a Christian there really isn't any good reason to hold to the DCT. The better I understand virtue ethics, the more virtue ethics seems consistent with Christian theology. In fact, it seems to me that Christian theology actually perfects virtue ethics (although I'm probably wrong about that, too). Virtue ethics finds its basis (I realize I'm butchering this) in conforming to heroes of virtue. Christians do the same thing: the central teaching of Christianity is the imitation of Christ. Further, from the little I've read about virtue ethics, its shortcomings revolve around the lack of the existence of moral principles, i.e., the reason we should develop the virtue of honesty is because it is actually wrong to lie. Now, it seems to me that God's laws have always been principles rather than stark, black and white laws meant to be applicable in any situation, e.g., Christ's reformulation of the ten commandments demonstrates that God's laws, which were once written in stone, are principles; meant to be obeyed in the spirit they were written, rather than by slavish obedience to the letter. All of this points to what I gather to be the main gist of virtue ethics. What say you, Bennett?
Actually, it can't seem that way to you, since you think that what is good, appropriate or best is a function of God (in some sense or other). So, again, what's the difference between those two propositions I mention above? You're alleging that non-theistic ethics lacks an appropriate notion of obligation. I'm asking you what the notion of obligation bjective view! No wishy-washy reliance on the character of some mysterious agent!
08 Aug 11
Originally posted by epiphinehasInteresting. For some reason, this reminds me of something I read about St. Gregory of Nyssa—that he didn’t need (nor use) the “supernatural category” [my phrase, as you know], because for him God was the ultimate nature, from which all other nature derived. Nevertheless, Gregory maintains a “diastema” between God and the rest of nature, that at least preserved his panentheism from a thoroughgoing nondualiam like mine. Gregory was the most philosophical of the Cappadocians (and perhaps early theologians generally), though Hans Urs von Balthasar (I think) made the point that Gregory was applying his Christian faith to Greek philosophy, rather than the other way ‘round.
I was ruminating on our discussion while at work today and I think (think) I had a breakthrough of sorts. It occurs to me that as a Christian there really isn't any good reason to hold to the DCT. The better I understand virtue ethics, the more virtue ethics seems consistent with Christian theology. In fact, it seems to me that Christian theolo ...[text shortened]... his points to what I gather to be the main gist of virtue ethics. What say you, Bennett?
Only a thought. My prejudicial view has been that DCT somehow had to be part and parcel of Christianity (even back when I was a Christian, trying to unravel such stuff); Now I think that may be well just—a prejudicial view.
Addendum: I wonder what Meister Eckhart might have said? He was largely a follower of Aquinas, who was largely Aristotelian. But I don’t recall, offhand, anything that Eckhart said about ethics/morality (and I really don’t know Aquinas at all). But he could’ve said something along the lines of, if someone allows themselves to be immersed in the godhead, then virtue will naturally flow from the character that is informed by that state.
Anyway, I’ll let Bennett respond, and just say “Hello!” otherwise. 🙂
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You know, or should, that I have never dismissed a Christic version of nondualism—and generally consider panentheism a subset of that—from my own view. I like both Nyssa and Eckhart (and Justin Martyr). But I then have to rely on the parallel “oral gospel” (subsequently put into various writings) alongside the “written gospel” that is the only one recognized by Protestants since Martin Luther (who really invented sola scriptura). My version of that “oral gospel” is likely closer to the Greek Orthodox (who are really never presented on here)—but you know that I always have problems with that dogmatic “-oxy”. 🙂 In any event, I do not want to enter the intramural lists debating who are the “True Christians™”, which, among Protestants anyway, always seems to exclude such as Eckhart and Nyssa and Justin Martyr….
09 Aug 11
Originally posted by vistesdHello, vistesd, and thank you, as always, for the insights and the name-dropping (I eat it up).
Interesting. For some reason, this reminds me of something I read about St. Gregory of Nyssa—that he didn’t need (nor use) the “supernatural category” [my phrase, as you know], because for him God was the ultimate nature, from which all other nature derived. Nevertheless, Gregory maintains a “diastema” between God and the rest of nature, that at least pre ...[text shortened]... among Protestants anyway, always seems to exclude such as Eckhart and Nyssa and Justin Martyr….
I see virtue ethics and divine command theory working together in Christian theology. Christians are undoubtedly called to 'be like Christ', but being like Christ, involving as it does creatively obeying the spirit of the law rather than the letter, is itself an obligation to God created by His divine command. In Christian theology, it seems, the notions of DCT and virtue ethics form a sort of double-pronged attack: God's commands to "love God with all your heart, body, strength and soul, and to love your neighbor as yourself" lend themselves to a rich diversity of practical application across a broad spectrum of possible situations, while Christ stands as the perfect exemplar of obedience to those commands. Thus, to be like Christ means to obey God's commands, and to obey God's commands means to be like Christ.
So perhaps I was too hasty to throw aside the DCT all together.
09 Aug 11
Originally posted by epiphinehasMy understanding of morals are as follows:
Now, it seems to me that God's laws have always been principles rather than stark, black and white laws meant to be applicable in any situation,.....
1. Always Bad: harm to others with no benefit to self.
2. Debatable depending on valuation: harm to others with benefit to self.
2. Debatable depending on valuation: harm to others to prevent harm to self.
3. Bad: avoiding benefit to others despite minimal cost to self.
3. Good: benefit to others at minimal cost to self.
4. Very Good: benefit to others at high cost to self.
Add into the equations:
Various 'circles' are valued differently. Generally the closer the circle the higher the value, which may vary from society to society and situation to situation. Such circles may include:
-Your immediate family.
-Your friends.
-Your sex.
-Your relatives.
-Your Countrymen.
-Your race.
-Your religion.
-Your species.
But generally, giving higher value to certain circles over others is considered acceptable. Giving high value to all is considered extra good.(eg Buddhists who wont even hurt a fly).
Of course all the above rules fit every moral code I know of, and are also explainable as the expected outcome of evolution acting on a societal animal. I cannot see how they can be explained in theism. Especially the second half where family may be given priority over foreigners. I think Theists sometimes recognise this problem and try to throw the second half away and declare everyone equal, but although it makes more logical sense, it doesn't fit well psychologically.
09 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrI like some aspects of what twhitehead says in his post above this one, relative to your last two questions, however, I think something is being left out in the consideration of patterning of whichever entity.
O.K., now we're getting somewhere, I think. What do you think the essential difference is between the following two propositions?:
1) All things considered, S ought morally to A.
2) S is obligated to A.
I admit to finding the notion of an obligation mysterious. At least, that is, in the guise in which it appears in a lot of moral philosophy prior to t ...[text shortened]... etc.) rather than in talking in terms of duties, laws and obligations? If so, what is it?
You were asking in your earlier post what makes God the approved standard. While we could easily spend an entire thread (and I acknowledge here my previous attempt to do so) parsing the particulars of God's attributes, among the big three qualities first encountered in a study of God--- righteousness, justice and love--- that last one typically sticks out the most when we consider our relationship with Him.
It is a given that He be the standard of what is right, as well as possessing the power to make all things right, but it is His love--- the fact that He is love--- which separates Him to the position of complete and full glory, far and away from all other standards.
09 Aug 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloSorry, LJ, but I fail to detect any hypocrisy in equating the two. If nothing came before, and nothing comes after, no gods, no purposes, no life after death... how does one explain existence? Without an outside force/agent, you have nothing left than to suggest that existence either has always been or created itself.
Your analyses do not add up. If the claims in the quote amount to saying "this existence is all there is; no before, no after, it came from nothing and will end in nothing" (which they do not, you just infer stupid crap willy-nilly, but whatever...), then how does this translate to "this existence caused itself"?
The level of intellectual hypocrisy in ...[text shortened]... what, that's already something a lot of theists think. Why aren't you ragging on them?
Oh, you must then be committed to the idea that God caused himself.
As I've stated more times than I can count at this point, God is the un-caused cause. He is not self-sustaining, not self-creating. He simply is, and has always been. Cool, huh.
You laughed before when I mentioned the idea of God explaining himself. But, guess what, that's already something a lot of theists think. Why aren't you ragging on them?
I look at this way: someone who has acknowledged their need for revelation, their need for help getting in touch with God, who then accepts God's solution to their problem is already out of the self-induced misery that Hell represents. Their salvation isn't dependent upon perfect theology. Certainly, I would welcome a discussion with them in order to numerate the decrees of God and thereby clear up their confusion on the topics related, but it's not burning issue in my opinion.
10 Aug 11
1 edit
Originally posted by FreakyKBHYou still cannot see any of the multiple ways in which your arguments throughout this thread have been intellectually hypocritical and/or simply blind to the dialectic symmetries between your own position and that of the atheist. What a shocker.
Sorry, LJ, but I fail to detect any hypocrisy in equating the two. If nothing came before, and nothing comes after, no gods, no purposes, no life after death... how does one explain existence? Without an outside force/agent, you have nothing left than to suggest that existence either has always been or created itself.
Oh, you must then be committed clear up their confusion on the topics related, but it's not burning issue in my opinion.
10 Aug 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloAnd to think that I was finally warming up to you.
You still cannot see any of the multiple ways in which your arguments throughout this thread have been intellectually hypocritical and/or simply blind to the dialectic symmetries between your own position and that of the atheist. What a shocker.
11 Aug 11
Originally posted by epiphinehasI cannot articulate a way out for you and Freaky other than the following:
Hello, vistesd, and thank you, as always, for the insights and the name-dropping (I eat it up).
I see virtue ethics and divine command theory working together in Christian theology. Christians are undoubtedly called to 'be like Christ', but being like Christ, involving as it does creatively obeying the spirit of the law rather than the [i]lett ...[text shortened]... ans to be like Christ.
So perhaps I was too hasty to throw aside the DCT all together.
You can simply define the Christian G-d as the Basic Element of Everything, which by definition it cannot be adventitious, whilst at the same time it contains all the non-manifested Virtue potential (that has the characteristic of being inseparable in a quantum-like realm of existence whenever Virtue is not projected as a property of the Christian G-d; therefore, a specific Virtue as G-d’s property out of the non-manifested Virtue potential ceases to be inseparable either because it is manifested according to one’s free will, or because non Virtue is manifested according to one’s free will).
Then you can claim it’s impossible to remove whatever from this Basic Element because it contains everything in a non-manifested, naturally pure (ultimate righteousness, justice, love blah blah blah) dynamic field, due to the fact that this realm of pure dynamism is exactly its nature. Thus there is also no thing to be added to the Basic Element due to the fact that all the expressions of the purified phenomena (say, Virtue dictated by G-d as understood by the Christian doctrine, i.e. by means of the Holy Spirit and manifested by means of the catalyst/ Savior Jesus blah blah blah) are caused solely by and thanks to the nature (and thus thanks to the will) of G-d alone that is fully accepted by the believer’s free will.
This means that everything manifested in separation from that purified dynamism (say, atheist approaches) is indeed manifested due to (say, atheist) afflictions to whatever is separated (sin...) from the Basic Element and thus is relinquished. However the Basic Element contains all the inconceivable Virtue (even atheism per se, atheist virtues, sin etc. are also tolerated by G-d, for the sinner has always the chance to repent during this life according to the Christian dogma), which is still inseparable from it, realized as not being relinquished.
Therefore, whenever Virtue (projected from within the Basic Element as it is proposed by the Christian doctrine) is not manifested in an action, this action is not an action of Virtue. An action of seemingly virtue (say, virtue as perceived by non theists), regardless of the intentions of the doer, its quality and its results, it remains ad infinitum an action of non Virtue because it is separated from the nature of the Basic Element.
Would you agree with the above?
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11 Aug 11
Originally posted by PalynkaSorry for the delay, and sorry for getting short and snippy with you earlier; you deserve better than that. Let's try this again. Let me get clear on your view, and then I'll try to answer your questions.
Again, where did I deny this?
It seems here that you want me to believe additional normative assumptions just because I believe in some other normative assumptions that are not directly about ethics. This strikes me as a weird attempt to justify accepting any of those assumptions. If I had needed some normative assumptions that a realist doesn't, then th ...[text shortened]... h it. Such a person's ethical views then don't seem objective at all if I dig deep enough.
You reject moral realism, the view that at least some moral judgments are true, in favor of a version of non-cognitivism. Your view, roughly, is that moral judgments express personal preferences. The distinction here between cognitivism and non-cognitivism is not particularly clear, though. If you think that moral judgments like "It is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering" are translatable into claims like "I prefer that folks refrain from causing unnecessary suffering", then you still seem committed to moral judgments expressing propositions. And, if it is true that you have the specified preferences, then moral judgments will still admit of truth and falsity. You would end up a moral realist; an egoist who thinks that the truth conditions of moral judgments are indexical. Moral judgments are made true or false by the presence of the relevant preferences. Perhaps your view, rather, is that moral judgments simply express preferences, rather than reporting them. On this view, claims like "It is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering" don't have propositional content at all. If anything they are equivalent to imperatives like "Don't cause unnecessary suffering!" or perhaps "Unnecessary suffering...Boo!". Some philosophers call this view the Boo/Hooray theory of morality.
Are either of these views accurate characterizations of your own?
Also, are you a non-cognitivist about normative claims in epistemology, like "One should believe only on the basis of sufficient evidence."? Is such a claim translatable into a proposition regarding your preferences, or does it simply express a preference of yours?
12 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHOK, regarding the parts you don't understand, methinks getting rid of the parentheses (I tried to offer a primitive Christian exegesis along my lines) would do.
The parts I understand... yes.
Well, if you don't agree, you have no argument at all.
And if you still agree, then your thesis is as subjective as it gets, as bbarr pointed out some posts earlier. That is, your thesis is empty, simply a projection of your own mind and not at all objective (I leave aside the fact that objectivity is non-existant; we can talk solely about onstantly re-evaluated and ever-changing collective subjectivity)
😵