Questions for the moral atheist

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Further, I'm really confused by why you think that your account provides for any sort of objectivity in ethics, since your account is wholly subjective.... That the agent is not human hardly makes these facts more objective. It certainly doesn't make these facts more objective than an account based on objective features of human beings.

Aren' irtuous ideal? But why am I obligated to be a moral idealist? It just doesn't add up.[/b]

And now you've oscillated back to the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. If God's commands are based upon objective facts about human beings, then presumably it is those facts that explain the commands. But now God isn't functioning as the ultimate standard of morality, but rather as an infallible (on your view) detector and reporter of moral norms that find their ultimate basis in objective facts about human beings. Suppose it is an objective normative fact about human beings that our lives go better when they contain X (love, autonomy, desire-satisfaction, or whatever...). If this fact about us explains why God commands "Endorse, promote, pursue X", then the command is not what determines rightness and wrongness regarding X-related behaviors. That there is such a command would suffice, as evidence, to show that this or that X-related behavior was right or wrong, but that would be because God is always correct about X-related behaviors, not because God determines by fiat, via his commands, the moral status of X-related behaviors or, for that matter, the goodness of X. And that's the rub. If it is an objective normative fact about humans that their lives go better with X, then that could serve as a foundation for a moral theory. And this moral theory would have the same claim to objectivity as the theistic view you're endorsing. It's just that we will have cut out the middle man.

And, again, I have no idea what you mean by 'obligation'. Above, you seemed to equate it with objectivity. If I am obliged to A just in case it is an objective fact that I ought to A, then God is not required for obligation. All that is necessary is that the truth-conditions of the claim "I ought to A" be such that they meet whatever standard of objectivity is at issue. Here, however, you seem to want more than objectivity from the notion of obligation. You want something like a guarantee; some reason that can be given to an agent to show him that he ought to A, or that will suffice to motivate him to A. If so, then good luck. But I see no reason to think either that you will be successful in providing an account of obligation that doesn't, at the end of the day, reduce to a form of egoism (i.e., I should be moral lest I be punished) or to something childish (i.e, I should do what God says because I worship him). I'd prefer a moral theory that focuses on moral education, that teaches folks that others are equally real, deserving of respect and love simply because they are agents for whom things can go better or worse. I'd prefer a moral theory that ultimately explains moral norms on the basis of some basic conception of human excellence in character and flourishing in life than on the fear/hope of punishment/reward or the unreflective childish endorsement of the dictates of authority.

Originally posted by bbarr
And now you've oscillated back to the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. If God's commands are based upon objective facts about human beings, then presumably it is those facts that explain the commands. But now God isn't functioning as the ultimate standard of morality, but rather as an infallible (on your view) detector and reporter of moral norms that fi ...[text shortened]... ent/reward or the unreflective childish endorsement of the dictates of authority.

Egoism equality, perhaps?

Originally posted by black beetle
OK, regarding the parts you don't understand, methinks getting rid of the parentheses (I tried to offer a primitive Christian exegesis along my lines) would do.

Well, if you don't agree, you have no argument at all.
And if you still agree, then your thesis is as subjective as it gets, as bbarr pointed out some posts earlier. That is, your thesis is ...[text shortened]... we can talk solely about onstantly re-evaluated and ever-changing collective subjectivity)
😵

Didn't realize the lines could be so razor-thin in your world.

I've not really put forth a thesis, per se, as much as a general gist. As far as being subjective, well, I guess you have me there. Given that we are all subjects of Him, and given that existence itself is subject to His whim, I don't know that being subjective is such a bad position.


That being said, we get ourselves into theological trouble when we don't mind the distinctions, as well as when we misapply them. The perfection of God is not a separate aspect of His being any more than is His righteousness or justice or love. While that perfection becomes (in the mind of man, and in man's consideration of his own behavior) an objective, near-rigid standard, he fails to understand the totality of God's integrity who considers His perfection (or any other aspect of His integrity) isolated from the other attributes of His character. We see this same type of distortion when discussing love. The amount of people who are so flummoxed by John 3:16 as to walk away thinking themselves the object worthy of God's affection is a jaw-dropping proposition.

When you say silly things such as "the Basic Element of Everything" you lose the trees for the forest... and vice versa. You are using the same keys on the piano--- even hitting some of the same notes within--- but, ultimately, you have the wrong song.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Didn't realize the lines could be so razor-thin in your world.

I've not really put forth a thesis, per se, as much as a general gist. As far as being subjective, well, I guess you have me there. Given that we are all subjects of Him, and given that existence itself is subject to His whim, I don't know that being subjective is such a bad position.

...[text shortened]... even hitting some of the same notes within--- but, ultimately, you have the wrong song.

Methinks being subjective is all one can be;

"Wrong song", well, is an empty notion that makes sense (to me) solely when one inserts His Coin in a Specific Nickelodeon -but there are many of them jukeboxes around I reckon😵

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Didn't realize the lines could be so razor-thin in your world.

I've not really put forth a thesis, per se, as much as a general gist. As far as being subjective, well, I guess you have me there. Given that we are all subjects of Him, and given that existence itself is subject to His whim, I don't know that being subjective is such a bad position.

...[text shortened]... even hitting some of the same notes within--- but, ultimately, you have the wrong song.

Edit: "Didn't realize the lines could be so razor-thin in your world."

They are, maybe even more than you could probably imagine. The lines are nothing but empty variations, and the variations have to be solid. In my world the logicians and the philosophers cope with the catuskoti. Negation of realism is considered the most delusional approach, and the metaphysic realists have to evaluate in full the nature and the products of their mind😵

Originally posted by bbarr
Sorry for the delay, and sorry for getting short and snippy with you earlier; you deserve better than that. Let's try this again. Let me get clear on your view, and then I'll try to answer your questions.

You reject moral realism, the view that at least some moral judgments are true, in favor of a version of non-cognitivism. Your view, roughly, is that m ...[text shortened]... ion regarding your preferences, or does it simply express a preference of yours?

No, worries, I'm glad we're back on track.

I became a self-designed non-cognitivist after first hearing about it here and then going on to read about in in Wikipedia and, more importantly, also at plato.stanford.edu. So, as you can see, I don't have a formal understanding of the concepts and so I understand that my use of such labels may not be as crisp as you would like.

If I understand correctly, the first option you mention is a form of (what I think is) ethical subjectivism. I don't think that's a good description of what I believe, which is more similar to how you describe the Boo/Hooray theory of morality. In short, that I think moral claims are preference-dependent does not mean that a moral claim is exactly the same as stating a preference. I would not call "I prefer behaviour X" to be a moral claim, but I would call "Behaviour X is good" to be one. The difference is that the latter obviously also reveals my preference but also something more. It has the "Hooray!" connotation in that there is an emotional support that tries to get others on board in behaviour X".

However, I'm not sure that it's exactly the same as the Boo/Hooray theory (perhaps it is, hopefully you can clear that up) as I believe that a moral claim has both a cognitive (I reveal my preference) and a non-cognitive (the emotional support) dimension. Stripping the non-cognitive dimension would make me go back to "I prefer behaviour X" which I don't view as a moral claim as it's neither prescriptive nor it shows emotional support for others to behave that way. In short, what is a moral claim? I think part of my difficulty in answering that beyond what I just said earlier plays a big part in describing myself as a non-cognitivist.

Is this clear so far?

As for epistemology, I believe that there is unavoidable circularity. A claim like that seems contradictory to me as "evidence" requires cognition and so I qualify it by excepting beliefs that are required for interpreting cognition. But to answer your precise question, I guess it depends on what "One should" means in that context. It could simply be meant as a proposition regarding the claimer's preferences about how others form beliefs or also include a non-cognitive element providing emotional/prescriptive support for it. I don't think it is necessarily one or the other, although I believe in most cases it would be the latter.

Originally posted by black beetle
Edit: "Didn't realize the lines could be so razor-thin in your world."

They are, maybe even more than you could probably imagine. The lines are nothing but empty variations, and the variations have to be solid. In my world the logicians and the philosophers cope with the catuskoti. Negation of realism is considered the most delusional approach, and the metaphysic realists have to evaluate in full the nature and the products of their mind😵

I sometimes wonder how your esoteric utterances square in the 'real world.' I mean, when you order at Starbucks, do they end up giving you what you wanted, or do you always walk away with a black coffee?

Originally posted by Palynka
No, worries, I'm glad we're back on track.

I became a self-designed non-cognitivist after first hearing about it here and then going on to read about in in Wikipedia and, more importantly, also at plato.stanford.edu. So, as you can see, I don't have a formal understanding of the concepts and so I understand that my use of such labels may not be as crisp a ...[text shortened]... e or the other, although I believe in most cases it would be the latter.

"However, I'm not sure that it's exactly the same as the Boo/Hooray theory (perhaps it is, hopefully you can clear that up) as I believe that a moral claim has both a cognitive (I reveal my preference) and a non-cognitive (the emotional support) dimension. Stripping the non-cognitive dimension would make me go back to "I prefer behaviour X" which I don't view as a moral claim as it's neither prescriptive nor it shows emotional support for others to behave that way. In short, what is a moral claim? I think part of my difficulty in answering that beyond what I just said earlier plays a big part in describing myself as a non-cognitivist. "

Non-cognitivism may be a place to rest between forays into the issues, but I wonder if our emotional boo/hooray reactions occur for the same reasons we have emotional fight-or-flight responses. The emotions are quicker than cogitating out the right thing to do, and can be accompanied by (caused by?) jolts of adrenaline or endorphins that prepare the body for action. It may be, just as there are definitely good and bad substances we can put into our bodies, there are good and bad social behaviors common to societies at various stages of their development, and we learn (and teach) associations between these behaviors and the emotions associated with moral approval and disapproval. Then, lacking an 'objective' 'absolute' foundation for morality, we mistakenly identify our emotional approval/disapproval of X as the foundation of morality, when in actuality our emotional reactions are a sort of tool our bodies apply to situations to assure a quick, consistent response.

Originally posted by JS357
Non-cognitivism may be a place to rest between forays into the issues, but I wonder if our emotional boo/hooray reactions occur for the same reasons we have emotional fight-or-flight responses. The emotions are quicker than cogitating out the right thing to do, and can be accompanied by (caused by?) jolts of adrenaline or endorphins that prepare the body for ...[text shortened]... ns are a sort of tool our bodies apply to situations to assure a quick, consistent response.

As usual, I'm not sure I understand where you're getting at. 😛 Would you mind rephrasing that?

Seems that your claiming emotions are just tools that came about via evolution to allow for quicker responses to certain conflicts. I don't see how this is relevant towards the view that a moral claim is a proposition or not.

Originally posted by Palynka
As usual, I'm not sure I understand where you're getting at. 😛 Would you mind rephrasing that?

Seems that your claiming emotions are just tools that came about via evolution to allow for quicker responses to certain conflicts. I don't see how this is relevant towards the view that a moral claim is a proposition or not.

I am sometimes unclear. I come from the point of view that moral claims are rules, not propositions. They are sometimes stated as true propositions because doing so increases compliance. The contemplation or observation of moral rule violations triggers emotional responses of various kinds and strengths, because this too, increases compliance. They are enshrined in religion because this too, increases compliance. There are other cultural reinforcers of morality, to be sure.

I compared the emotions associated with morality to the emotions associated with fight-or-flight situations to make the point that emotional responses of both kinds are adaptations that are subject to selection.

Morality doesn't seem to need much more explanation, as far as I can tell.

Originally posted by JS357
I compared the emotions associated with morality to the emotions associated with fight-or-flight situations to make the point that emotional responses of both kinds are adaptations that are subject to selection.

So what? Is that the end of story for you, a sort of genetic moral determinism? This seems terribly old-fashioned to me.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I sometimes wonder how your esoteric utterances square in the 'real world.' I mean, when you order at Starbucks, do they end up giving you what you wanted, or do you always walk away with a black coffee?

They square alright thanks to Two Truths.

I always walk away with Iced Coffee Americano Venti no water, because this is what I always order😵

Originally posted by Palynka
So what? Is that the end of story for you, a sort of genetic moral determinism? This seems terribly old-fashioned to me.

I've never been bothered by whether something seems old fashioned. But different human societies do seem to gravitate to similar moral rules if that's what you mean by determinism.

Originally posted by JS357
I've never been bothered by whether something seems old fashioned. But different human societies do seem to gravitate to similar moral rules if that's what you mean by determinism.

What I meant is that it's an outdated view of genetics and evolution. Phenomena like epigenetics are well-studied, not to mention that evolution isn't ever complete.

Originally posted by Palynka
What I meant is that it's an outdated view of genetics and evolution. Phenomena like epigenetics are well-studied, not to mention that evolution isn't ever complete.

OK then you are saying it is not supported by current research. Of course I agree that evolution isn't ever complete. I don't see how what I say cannot recognize the influence of epigenetics, but I don't want to take this on a tangent I didn't intend.