18 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357I am not saying that theistic ethics cannot employ robust conceptions of flourishing and virtue. Augustine and Aquinas, for instance, had very wise and important things to say about good lives and good character.
"I think ethical inquiry that starts with a robust conception of human flourishing and excellence in character will end up tracking our best-considered judgments about morality better, and provide better guidance, than any version of theistic ethics. "
This is an interesting statement. It seems to imply that no theistic ethics can endorse starting with a ro ...[text shortened]... and excellence in character.
At any rate, I am enjoying being in the mostly quiet audience.
I am also not saying that theists cannot base ethical inquiry on a robust conception of flourishing and virtue. For instance, a theist could claim that God created this world, which has properties X, Y & Z, and that properties X, Y and Z suffice to make the moral propositions P, Q & R true. That theist could also claim that it doesn't essentially matter why properties X, Y and Z obtain in this world; that had the world been random, uncreated, etc., the mere fact of properties X, Y and Z obtaining makes it the case that the moral propositions P, Q and R are true. If that theist also holds that the truth of all other moral propositions is derivable from, or best explained by, P, Q & R, then that theist will have an ethical account that is essentially secular. It will be an ethical account where moral facts rely causally on God's creative act, but only contingently so.
But theistic ethics, as I understand it, refers to ethical accounts or moral theories that ultimately explain the truth of various moral claims on the basis of normative claims about God. That is what I meant about not being able to "start with" foundational or basic or bedrock concepts about flourishing and virtue. For theistic ethics, these notions are, at best, an explanatory mezzanine.
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThanks, Freaky, I appreciate your kind words. Of course, I'm sorry about us having acrimonious arguments in the past. I respect your views and I know you're a conscientious and caring guy. I just hope to convince you, someday, that some of us atheists aren't so bad either!
Let me take a break right here and say something probably uncharacteristic of me otherwise. I fully understand the wide gap between LJ, bbarr (and others herein who have offered their slants on the opposing side) and me, the ill-equipped theist. But I have to tell you, despite our contentions otherwise, I find myself exceedingly grateful for a chance to ...[text shortened]... reciated. Hope that didn't sound too over the top. Now let's get back to the fisticuffs.
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by black beetleI have no idea what you're saying. I find your prose impossible to parse.
Edit: "If moral norms are just norms to which we've collectively agreed, then what explains the agreement? Are these norms right because we've agreed to them, or did we agree to them because they're right?"
The agreement is explained out of our consensus, consensus being just a product of the evaluation of the mind. And we agree to them because (we ...[text shortened]... of the mind. If there is indeed Something to be found, you have to find it on your own
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18 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrYes. Establish whatever moral theory we want without any reference to a deity, and a deity could be posited as being the source of the observables that lead to that theory. But the question for me is whether bringing in a deity eliminates any problems that are raised by not bringing in deity. What are those problems, and does bringing in deity eliminate them?
I am not saying that theistic ethics cannot employ robust conceptions of flourishing and virtue. Augustine and Aquinas, for instance, had very wise and important things to say about good lives and good character.
I am also not saying that theists cannot base ethical inquiry on a robust conception of flourishing and virtue. For instance, a ...[text shortened]... hing and virtue. For theistic ethics, these notions are, at best, an explanatory mezzanine.
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357To me, that is just abrogation of responsibility, Put our morals in the hands of people who claim to be in some hierarchical line between humans and god, I would not trust someone like that to wash my car much less tell me about morals when they say, trust me, I just spoke to god and I have its morality code fired into these stones, see for yourself.
Yes. Establish whatever moral theory we want without any reference to a deity, and a deity could be posited as being the source of the observables that lead to that theory. But the question for me is whether bringing in a deity eliminates any problems that are raised by not bringing in deity. What are those problems, and does bringing in deity eliminate them?
No thanks. I would much rather trust thinking humans who actually might use feedback to see where morality rules break down and can modify them accordingly.
You get dudes like Idi Amin who puts out his own set of moral codes for his underlings to follow and of course now we know the were built specifically to put Idi on top of the power heap and keep him there.
So seeing the results of bad morality, we are intelligent enough to see problems and so now we may say, oh, same sex marriage is not so bad after all, civilization doesn't immediately collapse, kids aren't being forced into homosexuality and the end result is less tension in the world.
Or look at the lessening of tension that would come about if the morality of drug use was modified so that every drug was legalized.
The US, which till now buys more drugs than most other countries entire GNP, there would be no money to keep the cartels going and killing hundreds of thousands of people.
People would rant and rave over such a thing but the easing of tension on the US-Mexican border would be obvious and ad campaigns would ease the use of drugs after the honeymoon period when you could by marijuana at the local 7-11 and such like.
Those in power would see it as though civilization were coming apart at the seams
But I suspect we would survive such a major trauma as most people think it would be.
Those examples come from shucking the morality of deity based morality that can only change on millennial time frames. Civilization is advancing too fast in many ways to be stuck with unchanging moral codes.
For instance, now it is seen as irresponsible and immoral to be texting while driving.
New moral codes have to be included in modern life to cover such things. Just sticking with ancient deity laden codes makes it much more difficult for civilization to adjust to the major changes going through our lives now, like cloud computing, supercomputers adding to our innate intelligence, the moral issues that would come from such developments would be too much for biblical based morality codes to wrap around.
We absolutely need human based moral codes, warts and all, to be able to have a decent civilization good for as large a percentage of the population as we can muster.
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrOh well; you asked “…If moral norms are just norms to which we've collectively agreed, then what explains the agreement? Are these norms right because we've agreed to them, or did we agree to them because they're right?”…
I have no idea what you're saying. I find your prose impossible to parse.
I replied that in my opinion, as regards your main concern, we have nothing but Piaget’s schemata that take a specific form out of Popper’s Three Worlds. Then, having in mind your somehow bitter comment about the Neo-Kantian and the neo-Hobbesian accounts as regards their obvious end-point, I followed Nagarjuna and I claimed that all these schemata and their products are merely empty: that is, I said there is nothing to be found other than the fact that we just invented morality and our differ moral practices because we simply wanted to do so.
Now, if this holds (kindly please feel free to debunk it by any means), then the cornerstone of everything (invention of morality, invention of G-d etc. etc.) is merely our mind, so I concluded that the variations all start from there: our mind. Thus I argued that whatever we do, we are doing it because it arises out of our nature -and our nature is the nature of our mind. Therefore, since we are nothing but the products of our products (and therefore empty) as Popper amongst else offers, I concluded that It’s only Us, meaning that, whatever we perceive, we are perceiving it in a unique way according to our personal evaluation of the mind: there are as many realities out there (that they arise -once they are analysed by the cognitive apparatus/ consciousness of the sentient beings- out of the single undifferentiated reality projected by the epiontic Universe), as many are the sentient beings that construct "Meaning" out of the interaction of the Physical World, their Inner World and their World of Ideas. So in my opinion, it all boils down to this: (as regards morality, theoplacia and every other invention of ours) there is nothing to be found other than mind; if one thinks there is Something more, one has to find it on her/ his own.
Now, back on track: obviously, our Freaky is looking for "Meaning" that is located “somewhere” out of his own mind, a specific yet poorly defined “somewhere” that is revealed when one “pierces the ceiling into transcendence”. This is fine with me; since anybody can demonstrate within three minutes that Aquinas’ core theology at its best is complete bonkers, I wish him heartily good luck
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18 Aug 11
Originally posted by pyxelatedSure thing;
Originally posted by black beetle
[b]... since anybody can demonstrate within three minutes that Aquinas’ core theology at its best is complete bonkers, I wish him heartily good luck
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Okay, I'll jump in here; you've piqued my interest. Please spend three minutes and debunk Aquinas. 🙂[/b]
Aquinas suggests that G-d is an existent observer, and he tries to overcome his inability to simply state "well, this is the epistemic object in question, you have it in front of you and it is as real as any other existent observer that you are noticing everyday" by using the trick of the so called "incomprehensibility of G-d". This way, he hopes to establish as factual the hypothesis that G-d cannot be directly observed although it is an existent entity.
So Aquinas states that the incomprehensibility of G-d is given because, for one, to comprehend is to understand perfectly; for two, to understand perfectly is to understand a thing as well as it can be understood; and, for three, G-d is incomprehensible because is infinitely understandable, due to the “fact” that G-d's incomprehensibility is rooted in a part of this entity that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding. Incomprehensibility, according to Aquinas, is caused because G-d cannot be seen as perfectly as intrinsically he is visible, whilst in the beatific vision incomprehensibility results from its fullness which overwhelms the finite intellect. Aquinas roots G-d’s incomprehensibility in God's unlimited ability to be comprehended, and on the other hand he claims that, if God's incomprehensibility resulted merely from an ontological disproportion, then the final happiness of the human person would not be achievable. Of course, according to Aquinas, if G-d were ultimately comprehensible in the beatific vision, the human subjectivity in comprehending the entity would transcend G-d.
This way, Aquinas speaks of the incomprehensible G-d as the infinitely understandable God; and he feels quite comfortable, probably because he thinks he is not obliged to explain how exactly and by what means “the part of G-d that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding” became an epistemic object. But all this jazz is not justified, because Aquinas merely accepts blindly as existent an “epistemic object” (G-d) out of the blue (“blue”, over here, are the so called Holy Scripture and everything else that the beleiver has to accept blindly because it comes from an authoritative agent, because it is supposed to be the Word of G-d). Aquinas does not have a honest way to establish the existence of his G-d by means of using his mind, he just accepts blindly his unjustified religious dogma and then he is using it as the cornerstone on which his Summa is constructed.
But no stress, this is theology afterall: bad philosophy, theoplacia, supreme mambo-jumbo
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18 Aug 11
Originally posted by black beetleOokay... don't have time for a comprehensive reply right now, but "he just accepts blindly his unjustified religious dogma" counts as a refutation? You state his argument and then just assert that his premises are bad. I don't think you've refuted him. 🙂 But more later.
Sure thing;
Aquinas suggests that G-d is an existent observer, and he tries to overcome his inability to simply state "well, this is the epistemic object in question, you have it in front of you and it is as real as any other existent observer that you are noticing everyday" by using the trick of the so called "incomprehensibility of G-d". This way, ...[text shortened]... no stress, this is theology afterall: bad philosophy, theoplacia, supreme mambo-jumbo
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18 Aug 11
Originally posted by pyxelatedI hope you will state what specific positions of Aquinas (in your view) BB failed to refute, and that one of you will cite the writings of Aquinas that are involved.
Ookay... don't have time for a comprehensive reply right now, but "he just accepts blindly his unjustified religious dogma" counts as a refutation? You state his argument and then just assert that his premises are bad. I don't think you've refuted him. 🙂 But more later.
The following cites some possible source materials:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6404/is_n3_v56/ai_n28661924/
It says:
"The doctrine of God's infinite incomprehensibility remains an aspect of Thomas's theology which richly deserves further discussion.(1) Although pertinent texts can be located in the Summa theologiae, the incomprehensibility of God is most clearly seen as an issue in the scripture commentaries, especially three sequential sections of the Commentary on John.(2)
The eleventh lecture of this text (sections 208-222) is devoted to a discussion of John 1:18, "No one has ever seen God; it is the Only Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, who has made him known." Sections 208-10 address our need for wisdom in the face of human ignorance of God with references to Augustine (209) and the seeming contradictions in other passages of Scripture (210). Then, in section 211, Thomas asks, "How are we to understand what the evangelist says: 'No one has ever seen God'?""
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by black beetleI understand God perfectly well:
Sure thing;
Aquinas suggests that G-d is an existent observer, and he tries to overcome his inability to simply state "well, this is the epistemic object in question, you have it in front of you and it is as real as any other existent observer that you are noticing everyday" by using the trick of the so called "incomprehensibility of G-d". This way, ...[text shortened]... no stress, this is theology afterall: bad philosophy, theoplacia, supreme mambo-jumbo
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p <--> ~p
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357Well, I knew I was in for a little bit of a research project when I opened my big mouth, but I didn't anticipate quite that amount of work 🙂
I hope you will state what specific positions of Aquinas (in your view) BB failed to refute, and that one of you will cite the writings of Aquinas that are involved.
The following cites some possible source materials:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6404/is_n3_v56/ai_n28661924/
It says:
"The doctrine of God's infinite incomprehensibility re ...[text shortened]... sks, "How are we to understand what the evangelist says: 'No one has ever seen God'?""
But... okay. You may have to be patient with me; I have a hazy notion of what I want to say, but to put it into coherent form and provide all the relevant parts of Aquinas is going to take a little while. I'll try to dribble it out over the next few days, not to keep people hanging.
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by pyxelatedHe begs the question. Turtles all the way down. The unmoved mover? Colour me unmoved.
Originally posted by black beetle
[b]... since anybody can demonstrate within three minutes that Aquinas’ core theology at its best is complete bonkers, I wish him heartily good luck
😵
Okay, I'll jump in here; you've piqued my interest. Please spend three minutes and debunk Aquinas. 🙂[/b]
18 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357I guess the rub would be the insertion of a new concept. With the theist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with God is called good. Not sure how to express that as an actual formula, but something along the lines of:
Remembering that you said to bbarr: "you haven't offered a compelling reason why flourishing is better, good or what-have-you... in any way, preferred."
Now as an example of a compelling reason to accept your view, you offer "The agreement/convergence is analogous to those points wherein our intentional actions are in accord with God's. Simplified, one cou ...[text shortened]... not in accord with it. It is like, for example, a light switch -- on is good, off is bad.
"Truth = good and if t = Truth, then t = good"
For the atheist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with flourishing is called good, or:
"Flourishing = good and if t = Flourishing, then t = good"
So the formulas appear the same, but the distinction comes with the designation of the term 'good.' We think of God as good because a person (Him) said so. He had to call Himself something, so let's not quibble about the value just yet.
But we the good that we attribute to flourishing is attributed by us--- we give it that value. That might not be a problem, but we'll see. Upon what is our valuation of good based? Given that life is accidental, has no purpose, cannot be prolonged for any significant amount of time, is headed toward certain destruction and will leave no source of help or history, what makes flourishing good? Is there any good at all, really?
Back to the theist, who at least appears to have somewhat of an objective, i.e., outside of his own measurements, standard of the term good--- not matter how it is constituted in his own mind.